Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

[Burgin, Mark]

Dear Loet,
Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is 
Shannon's measure of information, which is called entropy.


Sincerely,
Mark



On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between/res 
cogitans/ and/res extensa/ as two different realities. Our knowledge 
in each case that things could have been different is not out there in 
the world as something seizable such as piece of wood.


Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, 
but it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among 
others). The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable 
us to operationalize Descartes'/cogitans/ and make it amenable to the 
measurement as information.


Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning 
by a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of 
us prefer to call only thus-meaningful information real information 
because it is embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type 
information as Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as 
physical.


In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the 
physical entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles 
have a distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this 
distribution will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the 
probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 – 
.37 = .49 bits of information. One thus can prove that this 
information is not physical.


Best,
Loet



Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>; 
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of 
Sussex;


Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, 
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, 
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;


Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;

http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ=en


-- Original Message --
From: "Burgin, Mark" <mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>>
To: "Søren Brier" mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>; "Krassimir 
Markov" mailto:mar...@foibg.com>>; 
"fis@listas.unizar.es" <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>

Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis


Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the 
Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is 
real, or it cannot be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes 
other realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural 
Reality,” allows understand information as real but not physical.


Sincerely,
   Mark

On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:


Dear Mark

Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that 
raises the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s 
theorem or mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is 
subjectivity and self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a 
conscious subject with feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, 
measure it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write and your 
behavior. And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So here we 
touch phenomenology (the experiential) and hermeneutics (meaning and 
interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the meaning of signs 
in cognition and communication). We have problems encompassing these 
aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the technical sciences 
that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of information science.


  Best

  Søren

*Fra:*Fis  *På vegne af *Krassimir Markov
*Sendt:* 17. maj 2018 11:33
*Til:* fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark 
*Emne:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to 
publish it in IJ ITA.


It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on

*Is information physical?*

was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss 
and to come to some conclusions.


I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.

For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the 
Infos consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”.


Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the 
r

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis - Can it be Improved?

[Burgin, Mark]

Dear Jerry, Joseph and all FISers,
The title of my contribution is Logical Analysis but not Formal Logical 
Analysis. It means that I did not use any formal logic but thoroughly 
applied simple mundane logic, which is frequently used in everyday life.


   Sincerely,
   Mark



On 5/18/2018 8:45 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

Mark, List:

I find your analysis to be curious from the perspective of scientific 
information theories - that is, the nature of scientific beliefs that 
are used to do science pragmatically - in physics, engr., chemistry, 
biology and medicine. The practice of scientific information uses 
well-established symbol systems, abstractions that relate meaning of 
experience to symbolic meaning in the mind.  Mental images (indices, 
icons, symbols, diagrams, etc,) are systematically manipulated within 
the particular framework of the scientific problem at hand, the focus 
of the inquiry.


The internal representation of the situation under investigation is 
only a private interpretation of the external objects. It is created 
by the various sense organs, for example the critical roles of the 
senses of touch, smell, hearing, etc are essential to the natural 
sciences.


So, who can define the meaning of the (mathematical?) varieties of 
“our model of the world”?
How will such a “model” (path?, category?,)  relate the static to the 
dynamic that we experience in our daily inquiries?


Let me skip directly to the categorizational logic:
Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which 
comprises three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the 
world of structures, we have seven options assuming that information 
exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
- information is physical, structural and mental


Given your premises, I concur with your conclusions.  But...

Philosophically, how does this logic differ from the Vienna Circle 
logic of “Unity of Science” of the 1930’s?


Can you expand the premises to include the processing of informational 
flows in the natural sciences?


It seems to me that the meaning to be associated with this 
categorization is obscured by the usage of the term, structural.

For examples:
Physical information can be considered structured.
Mathematical equations are often considered as structures.
Mental processes are dependent on anatomical structures.
Is time structured?

Where does this categorization take account of the mathematical 
representations of molecular biology, genetics, biological dynamics, 
human diseases, all of which depend on the handedness of biochemical 
isomers and Penrose twistors?


Within this categorization, how are the processes of communication 
represented?


Or, is communication not a component of the purposes for developing 
the categorization?


My personal philosophy is that categorizations are always for a goal, 
purpose, objective, intent, etc.  Thus, many many philosophers have 
proposed categorical theories.


It appears that this proposed categorization of information could be 
improved by addressing the symbol systems used in the biological and 
other sciences. That is, addressing the forms of abstraction that 
relate representation to (in-) forms of physical structures.


Cheers

Jerry





On May 16, 2018, at 9:20 PM, Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu 
<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>> wrote:


   Dear FISers,
   It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent 
and creative individuals participated expressing different points of 
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this 
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem 
based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.


   To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is 
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that 
here physical means the nature of information and not its substance, 
or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical, 
chemical biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum 
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier of 
information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar 
to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are 
only forms or number representations and not numbers themselves.


  If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at 
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers 
assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate 
in our discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for 
example, Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).


   Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, 
namely, to admit that information is physical because only physical 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

[Burgin, Mark]

Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the 
Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is 
real, or it cannot be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other 
realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural Reality,” 
allows understand information as real but not physical.


Sincerely,
   Mark

On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:


Dear Mark

Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that 
raises the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s 
theorem or mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is 
subjectivity and self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a 
conscious subject with feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure 
it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write and your behavior. 
And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So here we touch 
phenomenology (the experiential) and hermeneutics (meaning and 
interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the meaning of signs in 
cognition and communication). We have problems encompassing these 
aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the technical sciences 
that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of information science.


  Best

  Søren

*Fra:*Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> *På vegne af *Krassimir Markov
*Sendt:* 17. maj 2018 11:33
*Til:* fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>
*Emne:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to 
publish it in IJ ITA.


It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on

*Is information physical?*

was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and 
to come to some conclusions.


I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.

For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the Infos 
consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”.


Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the 
relationships “between” and/or “in” real (physical) entities as well 
as “between” and/or “in” mental (physical) entities.


I.e. “physical” include “mental” include “structural”.

Finally, IF  “information is physical, structural and mental” THEN 
simply the  “information is physical”!


Friendly greetings

Krassimir

*From:*Burgin, Mark <mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>

*Sent:*Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM

*To:*fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>

*Subject:*Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear FISers,
   It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent 
and creative individuals participated expressing different points of 
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this 
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem 
based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.


   To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is 
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that 
here physical means the nature of information and not its substance, 
or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical, 
chemical biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum 
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier of 
information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar to 
the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are only 
forms or number representations and not numbers themselves.


  If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at 
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers 
assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate 
in our discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for 
example, Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).


   Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, 
namely, to admit that information is physical because only physical 
things exist.
   If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, 
we have three options assuming that information exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises 
three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of 
structures, we have seven options assuming that information exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
-

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

[Burgin, Mark]

lusionment,  
namely that humans are a combinatorial tautology.


Accordingly, may I respectfully express opposing views to what you 
state: that machines and humans are of incompatible builds. There are 
hints that as far as rational capabilities go, the same principles 
apply. There is a rest, you say, which is not of this kind. The 
counter argument says that irrational processes do not take place in 
organisms, therefore what you refer to belongs to the main process, 
maybe like waste belongs to the organism's principle. This view draws 
a picture of a functional biotope, in which the waste of one kind of 
organism is raw material for a different kind.


Karl

<tozziart...@libero.it <mailto:tozziart...@libero.it>> schrieb am Do., 
10. Mai 2018 15:24:


Dear Bruno,
You state:
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term,
i.e. “physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a
level of description of the brain/body such that I would survive,
or “not feel any change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital
machine emulating the brain/body at that level of description".

The problem of your account is the following:
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically
tested and it is not empirically testable. You are starting with a
sort of postulate: I, and other people, do not agree with it.  The
current neuroscience does not state that our brain/body is (or can
be replaced by) a digital machine.
In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does
not exist in our real world.  Here your entire building falls down.

--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android

giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

(This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I
resend it, with minor changes). Problems due to different
accounts. It was my first comment to Mark Burgin new thread
“Is information physical?”.


Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,


Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological
orders, as my new computer classifies them in some mysterious way!
This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if
    any, at the end of the week.



On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu
<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>> wrote:

Dear Colleagues,

I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion

Is information physical?



That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am
working on.

My result here is that
*_
_*
*_IF_* indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive
science,
*_
_*
*_THEN_*  “physical” has to be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e. “physical” becomes a mathematical notion.

The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive
physics from Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use
“reality” instead of “model" (logician’s term, because
physicists use “model" for “theory").

Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a
level of description of the brain/body such that I would
survive, or “not feel any change” if my brain/body is replaced
by a digital machine emulating the brain/body at that level of
description.

Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space,
and all physical objects become part of the universal machine
phenomenology. Physics is reduced to arithmetic, or,
equivalently, to any Turing-complete machinery. Amazingly
Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of arithmetic)
is Turing complete (Turing Universal).

The basic idea is that:

1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by
an arithmetical reality or by a physical reality. And,

2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they
are necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its
continuations emulated in arithmetic.

That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations
relative to my actual state, and see from some first person
points of view (something I can describe more precisely in
some future post perhaps).

Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are
machine, we cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s
incompleteness can be used to recover this constructively for
a simpler mach

Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

[Burgin, Mark]

Dear Colleagues,

I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion

  Is information physical?

My opinion is presented below:

Why some people erroneously think that information is physical

The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong 
belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is only 
physical reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, people 
encounter something that they call information.


When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information 
because with the letter they receive information. The letter is 
physical, i.e., a physical object. As a result, people start thinking 
that information is physical. When people receive an e-mail, they 
comprehend that it is information because with the e-mail they receive 
information. The e-mail comes to the computer in the form of 
electromagnetic waves, which are physical. As a result, people start 
thinking even more that information is physical.


However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical 
objects are only carriers or containers of information.


To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to 
say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that 
the textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same 
way, the textbook contains information but is not information itself. 
The same is true for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other 
physical objects because all of them only contain information but are 
not information. For instance, as we know, different letters can contain 
the same information. Even if we make an identical copy of a letter or 
any other text, then the letter and its copy will be different physical 
objects (physical things) but they will contain the same information.


Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge, 
data and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on 
physical objects (physical bodies) and this action also misleads people 
who think that information is physical.


One more misleading property of information is that people can measure 
it. This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure 
only physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous 
conclusion that information is physical. However, measuring information 
is essentially different than measuring physical quantities, i.e., 
weight. There are no “scales” that measure information. Only human 
intellect can do this.


It is possible to find more explanations that information is not 
physical in the general theory of information.


Sincerely,
Mark Burgin


On 4/24/2018 10:46 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

Dear FIS Colleagues,

A very interesting discussion theme has been proposed by Mark Burgin 
--he will post at his early convenience.
Thanks are due to Alberto for his "dataism" piece. Quite probably we 
will need to revisit that theme, as it is gaining increasing momentum 
in present "information societies", in science as well as in everyday 
life...

Thanks also to Sung for his interesting viewpoint and references.

Best wishes to all,
--Pedro

  
-

Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-

 
	Libre de virus. www.avast.com 
 



<#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>


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Re: [Fis] Welcome to Knowledge Market and the FIS Sci-coins

[Burgin, Mark]

*Dear Arturo,
Set theory is a particular case of named set theory. If s**et theory 
solves some problem, then **named set theory solves the same problem. 
Use logic and some knowledge and you'll see truth.


Sincerely,
Mark
*
On 3/21/2018 11:48 PM, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:


Dear Mark,

the named set theory does not solve the Russell paradox.

Therefore  it would be better to use, in such approaches, the best 
theory available, i.e., the Fraenkel-Zermelo sets.


In turn, the latter displays some limits: for example, the need of a 
set with infinite elements.


Therefore, set theory is not able to tackle information problems.

You have to go back to other mathematical approaches.


Il 21 marzo 2018 alle 23.42 "Burgin, Mark" <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> ha 
scritto:


Dear Krassimir and other FISers,

After reading the interesting contribution of Krassimir, I would like 
to share with you some of my impressions and ideas.


I like very much the term INFOS suggested by Krassimir. It’s possible 
to suggest that Krassimir assumed the following definition.
An INFOS is a system functioning (behavior) of which is regulated by 
information.

This definition implies that each INFOS has an information processor.
Then it is possible to distinguish different categories and types of 
INFOS. For instance:

 INFOS only with acceptors/receptors
 INFOS only with effectors
 INFOS with both acceptors/receptors and effectors
Then it is possible to develop an interesting theory of INFOS.

At the same time, the difference between reality and consciousness 
needs improvement because what many people mean using the word 
reality is actually only one of the variety of realities, namely, the 
physical or material reality, while consciousness is a part of the 
mental reality. It is possible to find more information about 
different realities and their interaction in the book (Burgin, 
Structural Reality, 2012). Please, don’t confuse Structural Reality 
with virtual reality.


One more issue from the interesting contribution of Krassimir, which 
allows further development, is the structure of a model. Namely, the 
relation (s, e, r) between a model s of an entity r forms not simply 
a triple but a fundamental triad, which is also called a named set.


Why this is important? The reason to conceive the structure (s, e, r) 
as a fundamental triad or a named set is that there is an advanced 
mathematical theory of named sets, the most comprehensive exposition 
of which is in the book (Burgin, Theory of Named Sets, 2011), and it 
is possible to use this mathematical theory for studying and using 
models. For instance, the structure from Figure 1 in Krassimir’s 
letter is a morphism of named sets. Named set theory describes many 
properties of such morphism and categories built of named sets and 
their morphism. The structures from Figure 2 in Krassimir’s letter 
are chains of named sets, which are also studied in named set theory.


To conclude it is necessary to understand that if we want to apply 
mathematics in some area it is necessary to use adequate areas of 
mathematics. As Roger Bacon wrote, All science requires mathematics, 
but mathematics provides different devices that are suited to 
different input. In this respect, when you give good quality grains 
to a mathematical mill, it outputs good quality flour, while if you 
put the same grains into a mathematical petrol engine, it outputs trash.


The theory of named sets might be very useful for information studies 
because named sets and their chains allow adequate reflection of 
information and information processes.


Sincerely,
Mark

On 3/11/2018 3:34 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:


Dear Colleagues,

This letter contains more than one theme, so it is structured as follow:

- next step in “mental model” explanation;

- about “Knowledge market”, FIS letters’ sequences and FIS Sci-coins.

*1. The next step in “mental model” explanation:*

Let remember shortly my letter from 05.03.2018.

To avoid misunderstandings with concepts Subject, agent, animal, 
human, society, humanity, living creatures, etc., in [1] we use the 
abstract concept “INFOS” to denote every of them as well as all of 
artificial creatures which has features similar to the former ones.


Infos has possibility to reflect the reality via receptors and to 
operate with received reflections in its memory. The opposite is 
possible - via effectors Infos has possibility to realize in reality 
some of its (self-) reflections from its consciousness.


The commutative diagram on Figure 1 represents modeling relations. 
In the frame of diagram:


- in reality: real models: s is a model of r,

- in consciousness: mental models: s_i is a mental model of r_i ;

- between reality and consciousness: perceiving data and creating 
mental models: triple (s_i , e_i , r_i ) is a mental model of triple 
(s, e, r).


It is easy to imagine the case when the Infos realizes its 
reflections using its effector

Re: [Fis] Welcome to Knowledge Market and the FIS Sci-coins

[Burgin, Mark]

Dear Krassimir and other FISers,

After reading the interesting contribution of Krassimir, I would like to 
share with you some of my impressions and ideas.


I like very much the term INFOS suggested by Krassimir. It’s possible to 
suggest that Krassimir assumed the following definition.
An INFOS is a system functioning (behavior) of which is regulated by 
information.

This definition implies that each INFOS has an information processor.
Then it is possible to distinguish different categories and types of 
INFOS. For instance:

 INFOS only with acceptors/receptors
 INFOS only with effectors
 INFOS with both acceptors/receptors and effectors
Then it is possible to develop an interesting theory of INFOS.

At the same time, the difference between reality and consciousness needs 
improvement because what many people mean using the word reality is 
actually only one of the variety of realities, namely, the physical or 
material reality, while consciousness is a part of the mental reality. 
It is possible to find more information about different realities and 
their interaction in the book (Burgin, Structural Reality, 2012). 
Please, don’t confuse Structural Reality with virtual reality.


One more issue from the interesting contribution of Krassimir, which 
allows further development, is the structure of a model. Namely, the 
relation (s, e, r) between a model s of an entity r forms not simply a 
triple but a fundamental triad, which is also called a named set.


Why this is important? The reason to conceive the structure (s, e, r) as 
a fundamental triad or a named set is that there is an advanced 
mathematical theory of named sets, the most comprehensive exposition of 
which is in the book (Burgin, Theory of Named Sets, 2011), and it is 
possible to use this mathematical theory for studying and using models. 
For instance, the structure from Figure 1 in Krassimir’s letter is a 
morphism of named sets. Named set theory describes many properties of 
such morphism and categories built of named sets and their morphism. The 
structures from Figure 2 in Krassimir’s letter are chains of named sets, 
which are also studied in named set theory.


To conclude it is necessary to understand that if we want to apply 
mathematics in some area it is necessary to use adequate areas of 
mathematics. As Roger Bacon wrote, All science requires mathematics, but 
mathematics provides different devices that are suited to different 
input. In this respect, when you give good quality grains to a 
mathematical mill, it outputs good quality flour, while if you put the 
same grains into a mathematical petrol engine, it outputs trash.


The theory of named sets might be very useful for information studies 
because named sets and their chains allow adequate reflection of 
information and information processes.


Sincerely,
Mark

On 3/11/2018 3:34 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:


Dear Colleagues,

This letter contains more than one theme, so it is structured as follow:

- next step in “mental model” explanation;

- about “Knowledge market”, FIS letters’ sequences and FIS Sci-coins.

*1. The next step in “mental model” explanation:*

Let remember shortly my letter from 05.03.2018.

To avoid misunderstandings with concepts Subject, agent, animal, 
human, society, humanity, living creatures, etc., in [1] we use the 
abstract concept “INFOS” to denote every of them as well as all of 
artificial creatures which has features similar to the former ones.


Infos has possibility to reflect the reality via receptors and to 
operate with received reflections in its memory. The opposite is 
possible - via effectors Infos has possibility to realize in reality 
some of its (self-) reflections from its consciousness.


The commutative diagram on Figure 1 represents modeling relations. In 
the frame of diagram:


- in reality: real models: s is a model of r,

- in consciousness: mental models: s_i is a mental model of r_i ;

- between reality and consciousness: perceiving data and creating 
mental models: triple (s_i , e_i , r_i ) is a mental model of triple 
(s, e, r).


It is easy to imagine the case when the Infos realizes its reflections 
using its effectors, i.e. relation between consciousness and reality: 
realizing mental models and creating data. In this case the receptors’ 
arrows should be replaces by opposite effectors’ arrows. In this case 
triple (s, e, r) is a realization of the mental model (s_i , e_i , r_i ).


clip_image002

Figure 1

After creating the mental model it may be reflected by other levels of 
consciousness. In literature several such levels are described. For 
instance, in [2], six levels are separated for humans (Figure 2). The 
complexity of Infos determines the levels. For instance, for societies 
the levels are much more, for animals with no neo-cortex the levels a 
less.


image

Figure 2.   [2]

This means that the mental models are on different consciousness 
levels and different types (for instance - 

Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!

[Burgin, Mark]

Dear Sung,

Thank you for sharing with us your interesting ideas based on the 
Peircean triadic approach. It is not by chance that your triad exactly 
corresponds to the Existential Triad, which stratifies the whole World 
into three interrelated components:


Physical World

Mental World

Structural World

*Form (A) corresponds to the **Structural**World*

*Shadow (B) ***corresponds to *the **Physical World***

*Thought (C)* *corresponds to the **Mental World*


So, shadows are indeed real as they belong to the physical world, in 
which we live.



Sincerely,

Mark Burgin



On 2/25/2018 3:04 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:


Hi Krassimir,


I agree with you that  "/The shadows are real/ but only a part of the 
whole. What is needed is a systematic research from what they are part."



In my previous post,  I was suggesting that Shadows are a part of 
the irreudicible triad consisting of *Form (A), Shadow (B) 
*and*Thought (C)*.  The essential notion of the ITR (Irreducible 
Triadic realrtion) is that A, B, and C cannot be reduced to any one or 
a pair of the triad.  This automatically means that 'Shadow' is a part 
of the whole triad (which is, to me, another name for the Ultimate 
Reality), as Form and Thought are.  In other words, the Ultimate 
Reality is not Form nor Shadow nor Thought individually but all of 
them together, since they constitute an irreducible triad.    This 
idea is expressed in 1995  in another way: The Ultimate Reality is the 
/complementary union/ of the /Visble/ and the /Invisible World/ (see 
*Table 1* attached).  Apparently a similar idea underlies the 
philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), according to my son, 
Douglas Sayer Ji (see his semior research thesis submitted in 1996 to 
the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University under the guidance 
of B. Wilshire, attached).



All the best.


Sung



*From:* Fis  on behalf of John Collier 


*Sent:* Sunday, February 25, 2018 2:51 PM
*To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!
Daer Krassimir, List

I basically support what you are saying. I understand the mathematics 
you presented, I am good at mathematics and studied logic with some of 
the best. However, and this is a big however, giving a mathematical or 
logical proof by itself, in its formalism, does not show anything at 
all. One has to be able to connect teh mathematics to experience in a 
comprehensible way. This was partly the topic of my dissertation, and 
I take a basically Peircean approach, though there are others that are 
pretty strong as well.


I fgenerally skip over the mathematics and look for the empirical 
connections. If I find them, then generally all becomes clear. Without 
this, the formalism is nothing more than formalism. It does not help 
to give formal names to things and assume that this identifies things, 
Often trying to follow up approaches kine this is a profound waste of 
time. I try to, and often am able to, express my ideas in a nonformal 
way. Some mathematically oriented colleagues see this as automatically 
defective, since they think that formal representation is all that 
really rigorously explains things. This sort of thinking (in Logical 
Positivism) eventually led to its own destruction as people started to 
ask the meaning of theoretical terms and their relation to 
observations. It is a defunct and self destructive metaphysics. Irt 
leads nowhere -- my PhD thesis was about this problem. It hurts me to 
see people making the same mistake, especially when it leads them to 
bizarre conclusions that are compatible with the formalism (actually, 
it is provable that almost anything is compatible with a specific 
formalism, up to numerosity).


I don't like to waste my time with such emptiness,

John

On 2018/02/25 6:22 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:

Dear Sung,
I like your approach but I think it is only a part of the whole.
1. */The shadows are real/* but only a part of the whole. What is 
needed is a systematic research from what they are part.
2. About the whole now I will use the category theory I have seen you 
like:

/CAT_A => F => CAT_B => G => CAT_C /
//
/CAT_A => H => CAT_C /
//
/_F ○ G = H /
where
/F/, /G/, and /H/ are /*functors*/;
/CAT_II Î CAT/ is the category of /*information interaction categories*/;
/CAT_A Î CAT_II / and /CAT_C Î CAT_II /  are the categories of 
*/mental models’ categories/*;

/CAT_B Î CAT_II / is the category of */models’ categories/*.
Of course, I will explain this in natural language (English) in 
further posts.

Smile
;
Dear  Karl,
Thank you for your post – it is very useful and I will discus it in 
further posts.

;
Dear Pedro,
Thank you for your nice words.
Mathematics is very good to be used when all know the mathematical 
languages.
Unfortunately, only a few scientists are involved in the mathematical 
reasoning, in one hand, and, as the 

Re: [Fis] Platonic information theories

[Burgin, Mark]

Dear Dr. Edwina Taborsky,
  In January 2017, A Panel on Philosophy of Plato in the 21st century 
was organized in Athens, Greece as part of the 4th Annual International 
Conference on Humanities & Arts in a Global World.
  Based on this panel and inviting other researchers, who work in this 
area, a special issue on Philosophy of Plato of the Athens Journal of 
Humanities and Arts will be published. The special issue aims to present 
recent new research on philosophy of Plato.
  I have pleasure to invite you to contribute a paper to this special 
issue.
  As usual, it is responsibility of the author to make certain that the 
content of the paper is significantly new and not submitted for 
publication in any other journal or conference.

The schedule is the following:
- paper submission: before May 30, 2017
- notification of the review: September 1, 2017
- submission of an updated version of the paper: before October 1, 2017.
- notification of acceptance/rejection: October 1, 2017
- submission of the final version of the paper: before November 1, 2017.
To the expression of intention to contribute, please add the tentative 
title, an abstract, and a tentative length of the proposed paper.

The final version of all papers should be in Word or LaTeX.
If you do not wish to submit a paper, please let me know as soon as 
possible.


Sincerely,
Dr. Mark Burgin
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