### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
Dear Loet,
Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is
Shannon's measure of information, which is called entropy.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between/res
cogitans/ and/res extensa/ as two different realities. Our knowledge
in each case that things could have been different is not out there in
the world as something seizable such as piece of wood.

Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable,
but it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among
others). The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable
us to operationalize Descartes'/cogitans/ and make it amenable to the
measurement as information.

Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning
by a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of
us prefer to call only thus-meaningful information real information
because it is embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type
information as Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as
physical.

In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the
physical entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles
have a distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this
distribution will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the
probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 –
.37 = .49 bits of information. One thus can prove that this
information is not physical.

Best,
Loet

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;

Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;

-- Original Message --
From: "Burgin, Mark" <mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>>
To: "Søren Brier" mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>; "Krassimir
Markov" mailto:mar...@foibg.com>>;
"fis@listas.unizar.es" <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>

Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the
Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is
real, or it cannot be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes
other realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural
Reality,” allows understand information as real but not physical.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:

Dear Mark

Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that
raises the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s
theorem or mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is
subjectivity and self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a
conscious subject with feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it,
measure it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write and your
behavior. And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So here we
touch phenomenology (the experiential) and hermeneutics (meaning and
interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the meaning of signs
in cognition and communication). We have problems encompassing these
aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the technical sciences
that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of information science.

Best

Søren

*Fra:*Fis  *På vegne af *Krassimir Markov
*Sendt:* 17. maj 2018 11:33
*Til:* fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark
*Emne:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to
publish it in IJ ITA.

It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on

*Is information physical?*

was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss
and to come to some conclusions.

I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.

For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the
Infos consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”.

Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the
r```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis - Can it be Improved?

```
Dear Jerry, Joseph and all FISers,
The title of my contribution is Logical Analysis but not Formal Logical
Analysis. It means that I did not use any formal logic but thoroughly
applied simple mundane logic, which is frequently used in everyday life.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/18/2018 8:45 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

Mark, List:

I find your analysis to be curious from the perspective of scientific
information theories - that is, the nature of scientific beliefs that
are used to do science pragmatically - in physics, engr., chemistry,
biology and medicine. The practice of scientific information uses
well-established symbol systems, abstractions that relate meaning of
experience to symbolic meaning in the mind.  Mental images (indices,
icons, symbols, diagrams, etc,) are systematically manipulated within
the particular framework of the scientific problem at hand, the focus
of the inquiry.

The internal representation of the situation under investigation is
only a private interpretation of the external objects. It is created
by the various sense organs, for example the critical roles of the
senses of touch, smell, hearing, etc are essential to the natural
sciences.

So, who can define the meaning of the (mathematical?) varieties of
“our model of the world”?
How will such a “model” (path?, category?,)  relate the static to the
dynamic that we experience in our daily inquiries?

Let me skip directly to the categorizational logic:
Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which
comprises three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the
world of structures, we have seven options assuming that information
exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
- information is physical, structural and mental

Philosophically, how does this logic differ from the Vienna Circle
logic of “Unity of Science” of the 1930’s?

Can you expand the premises to include the processing of informational
flows in the natural sciences?

It seems to me that the meaning to be associated with this
categorization is obscured by the usage of the term, structural.

For examples:
Physical information can be considered structured.
Mathematical equations are often considered as structures.
Mental processes are dependent on anatomical structures.
Is time structured?

Where does this categorization take account of the mathematical
representations of molecular biology, genetics, biological dynamics,
human diseases, all of which depend on the handedness of biochemical
isomers and Penrose twistors?

Within this categorization, how are the processes of communication
represented?

Or, is communication not a component of the purposes for developing
the categorization?

My personal philosophy is that categorizations are always for a goal,
purpose, objective, intent, etc.  Thus, many many philosophers have
proposed categorical theories.

It appears that this proposed categorization of information could be
improved by addressing the symbol systems used in the biological and
other sciences. That is, addressing the forms of abstraction that
relate representation to (in-) forms of physical structures.

Cheers

Jerry

On May 16, 2018, at 9:20 PM, Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu
<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>> wrote:

Dear FISers,
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent
and creative individuals participated expressing different points of
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem
based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.

To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that
here physical means the nature of information and not its substance,
or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical,
chemical biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier of
information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar
to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are
only forms or number representations and not numbers themselves.

If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers
assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate
in our discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for
example, Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).

Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option,
namely, to admit that information is physical because only physical
```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the
Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is
real, or it cannot be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other
realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural Reality,”
allows understand information as real but not physical.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:

Dear Mark

Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that
raises the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s
theorem or mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is
subjectivity and self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a
conscious subject with feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure
it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write and your behavior.
And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So here we touch
phenomenology (the experiential) and hermeneutics (meaning and
interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the meaning of signs in
cognition and communication). We have problems encompassing these
aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the technical sciences
that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of information science.

Best

Søren

*Fra:*Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> *På vegne af *Krassimir Markov
*Sendt:* 17. maj 2018 11:33
*Til:* fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>
*Emne:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to
publish it in IJ ITA.

It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on

*Is information physical?*

was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and
to come to some conclusions.

I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.

For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the Infos
consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”.

Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the
relationships “between” and/or “in” real (physical) entities as well
as “between” and/or “in” mental (physical) entities.

I.e. “physical” include “mental” include “structural”.

Finally, IF  “information is physical, structural and mental” THEN
simply the  “information is physical”!

Friendly greetings

Krassimir

*From:*Burgin, Mark <mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>

*Sent:*Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM

*To:*fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>

*Subject:*Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear FISers,
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent
and creative individuals participated expressing different points of
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem
based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.

To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that
here physical means the nature of information and not its substance,
or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical,
chemical biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier of
information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar to
the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are only
forms or number representations and not numbers themselves.

If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers
assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate
in our discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for
example, Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).

Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option,
namely, to admit that information is physical because only physical
things exist.
If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical,
we have three options assuming that information exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises
three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of
structures, we have seven options assuming that information exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
-```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```lusionment,
namely that humans are a combinatorial tautology.

Accordingly, may I respectfully express opposing views to what you
state: that machines and humans are of incompatible builds. There are
hints that as far as rational capabilities go, the same principles
apply. There is a rest, you say, which is not of this kind. The
counter argument says that irrational processes do not take place in
organisms, therefore what you refer to belongs to the main process,
maybe like waste belongs to the organism's principle. This view draws
a picture of a functional biotope, in which the waste of one kind of
organism is raw material for a different kind.

Karl

<tozziart...@libero.it <mailto:tozziart...@libero.it>> schrieb am Do.,
10. Mai 2018 15:24:

Dear Bruno,
You state:
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term,
i.e. “physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a
level of description of the brain/body such that I would survive,
or “not feel any change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital
machine emulating the brain/body at that level of description".

The problem of your account is the following:
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically
tested and it is not empirically testable. You are starting with a
sort of postulate: I, and other people, do not agree with it.  The
current neuroscience does not state that our brain/body is (or can
be replaced by) a digital machine.
In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does
not exist in our real world.  Here your entire building falls down.

--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android

giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal
marc...@ulb.ac.be <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

(This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I
resend it, with minor changes). Problems due to different
accounts. It was my first comment to Mark Burgin new thread
“Is information physical?”.

Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,

Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological
orders, as my new computer classifies them in some mysterious way!
This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if
any, at the end of the week.

On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu
<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>> wrote:

Dear Colleagues,

I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion

Is information physical?

That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am
working on.

My result here is that
*_
_*
*_IF_* indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive
science,
*_
_*
*_THEN_*  “physical” has to be defined entirely in
arithmetical term, i.e. “physical” becomes a mathematical notion.

The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive
physics from Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use
“reality” instead of “model" (logician’s term, because
physicists use “model" for “theory").

Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a
level of description of the brain/body such that I would
survive, or “not feel any change” if my brain/body is replaced
by a digital machine emulating the brain/body at that level of
description.

Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space,
and all physical objects become part of the universal machine
phenomenology. Physics is reduced to arithmetic, or,
equivalently, to any Turing-complete machinery. Amazingly
Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of arithmetic)
is Turing complete (Turing Universal).

The basic idea is that:

1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by
an arithmetical reality or by a physical reality. And,

2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they
are necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its
continuations emulated in arithmetic.

That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations
relative to my actual state, and see from some first person
points of view (something I can describe more precisely in
some future post perhaps).

Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are
machine, we cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s
incompleteness can be used to recover this constructively for
a simpler mach```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

```
Dear Colleagues,

I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion

Is information physical?

My opinion is presented below:

Why some people erroneously think that information is physical

The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong
belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is only
physical reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, people
encounter something that they call information.

When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information
because with the letter they receive information. The letter is
physical, i.e., a physical object. As a result, people start thinking
that information is physical. When people receive an e-mail, they
comprehend that it is information because with the e-mail they receive
information. The e-mail comes to the computer in the form of
electromagnetic waves, which are physical. As a result, people start
thinking even more that information is physical.

However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical
objects are only carriers or containers of information.

To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to
say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that
the textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same
way, the textbook contains information but is not information itself.
The same is true for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other
physical objects because all of them only contain information but are
not information. For instance, as we know, different letters can contain
the same information. Even if we make an identical copy of a letter or
any other text, then the letter and its copy will be different physical
objects (physical things) but they will contain the same information.

Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge,
data and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on
physical objects (physical bodies) and this action also misleads people
who think that information is physical.

One more misleading property of information is that people can measure
it. This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure
only physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous
conclusion that information is physical. However, measuring information
is essentially different than measuring physical quantities, i.e.,
weight. There are no “scales” that measure information. Only human
intellect can do this.

It is possible to find more explanations that information is not
physical in the general theory of information.

Sincerely,
Mark Burgin

On 4/24/2018 10:46 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

Dear FIS Colleagues,

A very interesting discussion theme has been proposed by Mark Burgin
--he will post at his early convenience.
Thanks are due to Alberto for his "dataism" piece. Quite probably we
will need to revisit that theme, as it is gaining increasing momentum
in present "information societies", in science as well as in everyday
life...

Thanks also to Sung for his interesting viewpoint and references.

Best wishes to all,
--Pedro

-

Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
-

Libre de virus. www.avast.com

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

```

### Re: [Fis] Welcome to Knowledge Market and the FIS Sci-coins

```
*Dear Arturo,
Set theory is a particular case of named set theory. If s**et theory
solves some problem, then **named set theory solves the same problem.
Use logic and some knowledge and you'll see truth.

Sincerely,
Mark
*
On 3/21/2018 11:48 PM, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:

Dear Mark,

the named set theory does not solve the Russell paradox.

Therefore  it would be better to use, in such approaches, the best
theory available, i.e., the Fraenkel-Zermelo sets.

In turn, the latter displays some limits: for example, the need of a
set with infinite elements.

Therefore, set theory is not able to tackle information problems.

You have to go back to other mathematical approaches.

Il 21 marzo 2018 alle 23.42 "Burgin, Mark" <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> ha
scritto:

Dear Krassimir and other FISers,

After reading the interesting contribution of Krassimir, I would like
to share with you some of my impressions and ideas.

I like very much the term INFOS suggested by Krassimir. It’s possible
to suggest that Krassimir assumed the following definition.
An INFOS is a system functioning (behavior) of which is regulated by
information.

This definition implies that each INFOS has an information processor.
Then it is possible to distinguish different categories and types of
INFOS. For instance:

INFOS only with acceptors/receptors
INFOS only with effectors
INFOS with both acceptors/receptors and effectors
Then it is possible to develop an interesting theory of INFOS.

At the same time, the difference between reality and consciousness
needs improvement because what many people mean using the word
reality is actually only one of the variety of realities, namely, the
physical or material reality, while consciousness is a part of the
different realities and their interaction in the book (Burgin,
Structural Reality, 2012). Please, don’t confuse Structural Reality
with virtual reality.

One more issue from the interesting contribution of Krassimir, which
allows further development, is the structure of a model. Namely, the
relation (s, e, r) between a model s of an entity r forms not simply
a triple but a fundamental triad, which is also called a named set.

Why this is important? The reason to conceive the structure (s, e, r)
as a fundamental triad or a named set is that there is an advanced
mathematical theory of named sets, the most comprehensive exposition
of which is in the book (Burgin, Theory of Named Sets, 2011), and it
is possible to use this mathematical theory for studying and using
models. For instance, the structure from Figure 1 in Krassimir’s
letter is a morphism of named sets. Named set theory describes many
properties of such morphism and categories built of named sets and
their morphism. The structures from Figure 2 in Krassimir’s letter
are chains of named sets, which are also studied in named set theory.

To conclude it is necessary to understand that if we want to apply
mathematics in some area it is necessary to use adequate areas of
mathematics. As Roger Bacon wrote, All science requires mathematics,
but mathematics provides different devices that are suited to
different input. In this respect, when you give good quality grains
to a mathematical mill, it outputs good quality flour, while if you
put the same grains into a mathematical petrol engine, it outputs trash.

The theory of named sets might be very useful for information studies
because named sets and their chains allow adequate reflection of
information and information processes.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 3/11/2018 3:34 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:

Dear Colleagues,

This letter contains more than one theme, so it is structured as follow:

- next step in “mental model” explanation;

- about “Knowledge market”, FIS letters’ sequences and FIS Sci-coins.

*1. The next step in “mental model” explanation:*

Let remember shortly my letter from 05.03.2018.

To avoid misunderstandings with concepts Subject, agent, animal,
human, society, humanity, living creatures, etc., in [1] we use the
abstract concept “INFOS” to denote every of them as well as all of
artificial creatures which has features similar to the former ones.

Infos has possibility to reflect the reality via receptors and to
operate with received reflections in its memory. The opposite is
possible - via effectors Infos has possibility to realize in reality
some of its (self-) reflections from its consciousness.

The commutative diagram on Figure 1 represents modeling relations.
In the frame of diagram:

- in reality: real models: s is a model of r,

- in consciousness: mental models: s_i is a mental model of r_i ;

- between reality and consciousness: perceiving data and creating
mental models: triple (s_i , e_i , r_i ) is a mental model of triple
(s, e, r).

It is easy to imagine the case when the Infos realizes its
reflections using its effector```

### Re: [Fis] Welcome to Knowledge Market and the FIS Sci-coins

```
Dear Krassimir and other FISers,

After reading the interesting contribution of Krassimir, I would like to
share with you some of my impressions and ideas.

I like very much the term INFOS suggested by Krassimir. It’s possible to
suggest that Krassimir assumed the following definition.
An INFOS is a system functioning (behavior) of which is regulated by
information.

This definition implies that each INFOS has an information processor.
Then it is possible to distinguish different categories and types of
INFOS. For instance:

INFOS only with acceptors/receptors
INFOS only with effectors
INFOS with both acceptors/receptors and effectors
Then it is possible to develop an interesting theory of INFOS.

At the same time, the difference between reality and consciousness needs
improvement because what many people mean using the word reality is
actually only one of the variety of realities, namely, the physical or
material reality, while consciousness is a part of the mental reality.
their interaction in the book (Burgin, Structural Reality, 2012).
Please, don’t confuse Structural Reality with virtual reality.

One more issue from the interesting contribution of Krassimir, which
allows further development, is the structure of a model. Namely, the
relation (s, e, r) between a model s of an entity r forms not simply a
triple but a fundamental triad, which is also called a named set.

Why this is important? The reason to conceive the structure (s, e, r) as
a fundamental triad or a named set is that there is an advanced
mathematical theory of named sets, the most comprehensive exposition of
which is in the book (Burgin, Theory of Named Sets, 2011), and it is
possible to use this mathematical theory for studying and using models.
For instance, the structure from Figure 1 in Krassimir’s letter is a
morphism of named sets. Named set theory describes many properties of
such morphism and categories built of named sets and their morphism. The
structures from Figure 2 in Krassimir’s letter are chains of named sets,
which are also studied in named set theory.

To conclude it is necessary to understand that if we want to apply
mathematics in some area it is necessary to use adequate areas of
mathematics. As Roger Bacon wrote, All science requires mathematics, but
mathematics provides different devices that are suited to different
input. In this respect, when you give good quality grains to a
mathematical mill, it outputs good quality flour, while if you put the
same grains into a mathematical petrol engine, it outputs trash.

The theory of named sets might be very useful for information studies
because named sets and their chains allow adequate reflection of
information and information processes.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 3/11/2018 3:34 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:

Dear Colleagues,

This letter contains more than one theme, so it is structured as follow:

- next step in “mental model” explanation;

- about “Knowledge market”, FIS letters’ sequences and FIS Sci-coins.

*1. The next step in “mental model” explanation:*

Let remember shortly my letter from 05.03.2018.

To avoid misunderstandings with concepts Subject, agent, animal,
human, society, humanity, living creatures, etc., in [1] we use the
abstract concept “INFOS” to denote every of them as well as all of
artificial creatures which has features similar to the former ones.

Infos has possibility to reflect the reality via receptors and to
operate with received reflections in its memory. The opposite is
possible - via effectors Infos has possibility to realize in reality
some of its (self-) reflections from its consciousness.

The commutative diagram on Figure 1 represents modeling relations. In
the frame of diagram:

- in reality: real models: s is a model of r,

- in consciousness: mental models: s_i is a mental model of r_i ;

- between reality and consciousness: perceiving data and creating
mental models: triple (s_i , e_i , r_i ) is a mental model of triple
(s, e, r).

It is easy to imagine the case when the Infos realizes its reflections
using its effectors, i.e. relation between consciousness and reality:
realizing mental models and creating data. In this case the receptors’
arrows should be replaces by opposite effectors’ arrows. In this case
triple (s, e, r) is a realization of the mental model (s_i , e_i , r_i ).

clip_image002

Figure 1

After creating the mental model it may be reflected by other levels of
consciousness. In literature several such levels are described. For
instance, in [2], six levels are separated for humans (Figure 2). The
complexity of Infos determines the levels. For instance, for societies
the levels are much more, for animals with no neo-cortex the levels a
less.

image

Figure 2.   [2]

This means that the mental models are on different consciousness
levels and different types (for instance - ```

### Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!

```
Dear Sung,

Thank you for sharing with us your interesting ideas based on the
corresponds to the Existential Triad, which stratifies the whole World
into three interrelated components:

Physical World

Mental World

Structural World

*Form (A) corresponds to the **Structural**World*

*Shadow (B) ***corresponds to *the **Physical World***

*Thought (C)* *corresponds to the **Mental World*

So, shadows are indeed real as they belong to the physical world, in
which we live.

Sincerely,

Mark Burgin

On 2/25/2018 3:04 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:

Hi Krassimir,

I agree with you that  "/The shadows are real/ but only a part of the
whole. What is needed is a systematic research from what they are part."

In my previous post,  I was suggesting that Shadows are a part of
*and*Thought (C)*.  The essential notion of the ITR (Irreducible
Triadic realrtion) is that A, B, and C cannot be reduced to any one or
a pair of the triad.  This automatically means that 'Shadow' is a part
of the whole triad (which is, to me, another name for the Ultimate
Reality), as Form and Thought are.  In other words, the Ultimate
Reality is not Form nor Shadow nor Thought individually but all of
them together, since they constitute an irreducible triad.    This
idea is expressed in 1995  in another way: The Ultimate Reality is the
/complementary union/ of the /Visble/ and the /Invisible World/ (see
*Table 1* attached).  Apparently a similar idea underlies the
philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), according to my son,
Douglas Sayer Ji (see his semior research thesis submitted in 1996 to
the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University under the guidance
of B. Wilshire, attached).

All the best.

Sung

*From:* Fis  on behalf of John Collier

*Sent:* Sunday, February 25, 2018 2:51 PM
*To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!!
Daer Krassimir, List

I basically support what you are saying. I understand the mathematics
you presented, I am good at mathematics and studied logic with some of
the best. However, and this is a big however, giving a mathematical or
logical proof by itself, in its formalism, does not show anything at
all. One has to be able to connect teh mathematics to experience in a
comprehensible way. This was partly the topic of my dissertation, and
I take a basically Peircean approach, though there are others that are
pretty strong as well.

I fgenerally skip over the mathematics and look for the empirical
connections. If I find them, then generally all becomes clear. Without
this, the formalism is nothing more than formalism. It does not help
to give formal names to things and assume that this identifies things,
Often trying to follow up approaches kine this is a profound waste of
time. I try to, and often am able to, express my ideas in a nonformal
way. Some mathematically oriented colleagues see this as automatically
defective, since they think that formal representation is all that
really rigorously explains things. This sort of thinking (in Logical
Positivism) eventually led to its own destruction as people started to
ask the meaning of theoretical terms and their relation to
observations. It is a defunct and self destructive metaphysics. Irt
see people making the same mistake, especially when it leads them to
bizarre conclusions that are compatible with the formalism (actually,
it is provable that almost anything is compatible with a specific
formalism, up to numerosity).

I don't like to waste my time with such emptiness,

John

On 2018/02/25 6:22 PM, Krassimir Markov wrote:

Dear Sung,
I like your approach but I think it is only a part of the whole.
1. */The shadows are real/* but only a part of the whole. What is
needed is a systematic research from what they are part.
2. About the whole now I will use the category theory I have seen you
like:

/CAT_A => F => CAT_B => G => CAT_C /
//
/CAT_A => H => CAT_C /
//
/_F ○ G = H /
where
/F/, /G/, and /H/ are /*functors*/;
/CAT_II Î CAT/ is the category of /*information interaction categories*/;
/CAT_A Î CAT_II / and /CAT_C Î CAT_II /  are the categories of
*/mental models’ categories/*;

/CAT_B Î CAT_II / is the category of */models’ categories/*.
Of course, I will explain this in natural language (English) in
further posts.

Smile
;
Dear  Karl,
Thank you for your post – it is very useful and I will discus it in
further posts.

;
Dear Pedro,
Thank you for your nice words.
Mathematics is very good to be used when all know the mathematical
languages.
Unfortunately, only a few scientists are involved in the mathematical
reasoning, in one hand, and, as the ```

### Re: [Fis] Platonic information theories

```

Dear Dr. Edwina Taborsky,
In January 2017, A Panel on Philosophy of Plato in the 21st century
was organized in Athens, Greece as part of the 4th Annual International
Conference on Humanities & Arts in a Global World.
Based on this panel and inviting other researchers, who work in this
area, a special issue on Philosophy of Plato of the Athens Journal of
Humanities and Arts will be published. The special issue aims to present
recent new research on philosophy of Plato.
I have pleasure to invite you to contribute a paper to this special
issue.
As usual, it is responsibility of the author to make certain that the
content of the paper is significantly new and not submitted for
publication in any other journal or conference.

The schedule is the following:
- paper submission: before May 30, 2017
- notification of the review: September 1, 2017
- submission of an updated version of the paper: before October 1, 2017.
- notification of acceptance/rejection: October 1, 2017
- submission of the final version of the paper: before November 1, 2017.
title, an abstract, and a tentative length of the proposed paper.

The final version of all papers should be in Word or LaTeX.
If you do not wish to submit a paper, please let me know as soon as
possible.

Sincerely,
Dr. Mark Burgin
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```