Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-25 Thread Christophe Menant
Dear Soren,
What I try to say is that the Piercean triadic pragmatic semiotics includes 
‘meaning’ as generated by the Interpreter but does not tell much about the 
nature of that meaning. And this lack makes difficult to adress questions like: 
what is the reason of being of a meaning?, what can be its content? its 
purpose?, what are its relations with information?, how can it be applied to 
animals and humans (and to AAs)?,  is a meaning always meaningful? and for 
which entities?, ...
Theses questions should be part, I feel, of a transdiciplinarity semiotic 
process philosophy. And I don’t see very well how they can be taken into 
account without the availability of a description or modeling of the 
Interpreter.
Did I miss something?
Best
Christophe





De : Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk>
Envoyé : vendredi 25 mai 2018 13:13
À : Christophe Menant; fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : RE: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis


Dear Christoph



I am not sure what you mean. In my understanding the important dynamics in 
Peirce’s pragmaticist semiotics is that symbols grow and create habits in a web 
of signs in nature as well as in culture viewing the central dynamic process in 
the cosmos as well as man  to be of symbolic nature that through evolution and 
history develops reasoning in many interlocking dimension.



Best

   Søren



From: Christophe Menant <christophe.men...@hotmail.fr>
Sent: 25. maj 2018 09:08
To: Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk>; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: RE: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Soren,
You are right to recall that a transdisciplinary theory of cognition and 
communication has to include meaning. But I’m not sure that the Peircean 
approach is enough for that.
The triad (Object, Sign, Interpretant) positions the Interpretant as being the 
meaning of the Sign created by the Interpreter. But Peirce does not tell much 
about a possible content of the Interpreter. He does not tell what is for him a 
process of meaning generation. And this, I feel,  should bring us to be 
cautious about using Peirce in subjects dealing with meaning generation.
Best
Christophe





De : Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>> de 
la part de Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk<mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>
Envoyé : jeudi 24 mai 2018 17:44
À : Loet Leydesdorff; Burgin, Mark; Krassimir Markov; 
fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Mark, Loet and others



My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is 
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality is 
bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements can be 
useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at transdisciplinary 
theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then we have to include 
meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural science do not have 
experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations. We can try to develop a 
logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where Mark stays in the structural 
dimension and Loet wants to  enter res cogitans by probability measures, , 
maybe because a  philosophical framework that does not allow meaning to be 
real. But Peirce keeps working with the metaphysical stipulations until he 
reaches a framework that can integrate experience, meaning and logic in one 
theory, namely his triadic pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it 
because I think it is unique, but many researcher do not want to use it, 
because its change in metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all 
though most of us agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern 
scientific ontology of irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other 
than Peirce has developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary 
semiotic process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution, 
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development of 
human consciousness?



Best

   Søren





From: l...@leydesdorff.net<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> 
<leydesdo...@gmail.com<mailto:leydesdo...@gmail.com>> On Behalf Of Loet 
Leydesdorff
Sent: 24. maj 2018 07:45
To: Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>>; Søren 
Brier <sbr@cbs.dk<mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>; Krassimir Markov 
<mar...@foibg.com<mailto:mar...@foibg.com>>; 
fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,



The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and res 
extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

2018-05-25 Thread Christophe Menant
Dear Soren,
You are right to recall that a transdisciplinary theory of cognition and 
communication has to include meaning. But I’m not sure that the Peircean 
approach is enough for that.
The triad (Object, Sign, Interpretant) positions the Interpretant as being the 
meaning of the Sign created by the Interpreter. But Peirce does not tell much 
about a possible content of the Interpreter. He does not tell what is for him a 
process of meaning generation. And this, I feel,  should bring us to be 
cautious about using Peirce in subjects dealing with meaning generation.
Best
Christophe



De : Fis  de la part de Søren Brier 

Envoyé : jeudi 24 mai 2018 17:44
À : Loet Leydesdorff; Burgin, Mark; Krassimir Markov; fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis


Dear Mark, Loet and others



My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is 
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality is 
bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements can be 
useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at transdisciplinary 
theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then we have to include 
meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural science do not have 
experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations. We can try to develop a 
logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where Mark stays in the structural 
dimension and Loet wants to  enter res cogitans by probability measures, , 
maybe because a  philosophical framework that does not allow meaning to be 
real. But Peirce keeps working with the metaphysical stipulations until he 
reaches a framework that can integrate experience, meaning and logic in one 
theory, namely his triadic pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it 
because I think it is unique, but many researcher do not want to use it, 
because its change in metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all 
though most of us agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern 
scientific ontology of irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other 
than Peirce has developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary 
semiotic process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution, 
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development of 
human consciousness?



Best

   Søren





From: l...@leydesdorff.net  On Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: 24. maj 2018 07:45
To: Burgin, Mark ; Søren Brier ; 
Krassimir Markov ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis



Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,



The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and res 
extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that things 
could have been different is not out there in the world as something seizable 
such as piece of wood.



Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it 
can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The 
grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize 
Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the measurement as information.



Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a 
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to 
call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is embedded. 
One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as Bateson-type 
information. The latter can be debated as physical.



In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical 
entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a distribution 
of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this distribution will change in 
the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 
(.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 – .37 = .49 bits of information. One thus can 
prove that this information is not physical.



Best,

Loet





Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net  ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU,  University of Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor, ISTIC,  Beijing;

Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck, University of London;

http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ=en





-- Original Message --

From: "Burgin, Mark" >

To: "Søren Brier" 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

2018-02-14 Thread Christophe Menant
Dear Soren,
Thanks for your comments.
Interpretation and agency are indeed key items. An approach based on internal 
constraint saisfactiont allows to address them together, with autonomy also.
In a few words:
An agent is an entity submitted to internal constraints and capable of actions 
for the satisfaction of the constraints (ex: animals submitted to a ‘stay 
alive’ constraint).
An autonomous agent can satisfy its internal constraints by its own.
Interpretation is meaning generation by an agent when it receives information 
that has a connection with a constraint. The generated meaning is precisely 
that connection. It will be used for the determination of an action that the 
agent will implement to satisfy the constraint.
Normativity and teleology can also be added to the ‘internal constraints’ 
thread.
More details on these subjects at https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCSA-2 where the 
contributions of Peirce and Uexkull are highlighted.
However, the concept of internal constraint is not enough to understand the 
relations between animals and human minds. Philosophy of mind makes available 
several entry points (the hard problem, phenomenal consciousness, qualia, first 
person perspective, transcendental/empiric self, transitive/untransitive 
self-consciousness, .. ).
What is interesting is that these entry points need to consider more or less 
explicitly some aspect of self-consciousness. This is why I look at a possible 
evolutionary nature of self consciousness based on an evolution of meaningful 
representations where meaning generation comes in again (in above ref also).
A lot is to be done on these interesting subjects..
All the Best
Christophe


De : Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk>
Envoyé : mardi 13 février 2018 15:22
À : Christophe Menant; Terrence W. DEACON
Cc : FIS Group
Objet : RE: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory


Dear Christophé



I think you hit on a most interesting problem of how to establish 
interpretation and agency in a philosophical framework that is compatible trans 
disciplinarily from the natural over the social and into the human sciences, 
here especially encompassing phenomenological and hermeneutical descriptions of 
meaningful perception, cognition and communication. The interpreter in Peirce 
is described as a phenomenological triadic process, but I agree with you  that 
the embodiment is not well described in the Peircean framework. Therefore 
biosemiotics are integrating Peircean semiotics with Bateson concept of mind,  
Uexkülls funktionskreis and Maturana’ and Varela’s autopoietic models. Uexküll 
has similarities with the cybernetics that inform autopoiesis theory. Neither 
has a full philosophy  with a phenomenological grounding as Peirce. I do not 
think that cybernetics have a theory of experiential mind, Von Foerster has a 
few reflections on cognition in his establishing of second order cybernetics 
not encompassing the experiential aspect, the quality problem or the problem of 
spontaneity that must be there to establish agency, which are all theory in 
Peirce’s idea of the self as a symbolic process. Uexküll seems to have a 
phenomenological idea of experiential mind in order to establish his Umwelt 
concept, but how that is related to the biologically described body is still 
not clear for me. Uexküll seem to be an anti-evolutionary sort of Platonist. 
The relation between animals and human are not clear to me. I do not think he 
has a full philosophy. So the problem is how we establish an ontological view 
encompassing natural science, evolution and the phenomenology of experiential 
mind’s agency. Process philosophy seems to be a way out and so far only Peirce 
and Whitehead has produced acceptable ones and of those only Peirce has 
produced a semiotics. I wonder in which ontology you establish your concept of 
agency?



Best

   Søren



From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Christophe Menant
Sent: 13. februar 2018 14:20
To: Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>
Cc: FIS Group <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory



Dear Terry and FISers,
It looks indeed reasonable to position the term 'language' as ‘simply referring 
to the necessity of a shared medium of communication’. Keeping in mind that 
communications exist only because agents need to manage meanings for given 
purposes.
And the concept of agent can be an entry point for a ‘general theory of 
information’ as it does not make distinctions.
The Peircean triadic approach is also an available framework (but with, alas, a 
limited development of the Interpreter).
I choose to use agents capable of meaning generation, having some compatibility 
with the Peircean approach and with the Biosemiotics 
Umwelt.(https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCSA-2)

All t

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

2018-02-13 Thread Christophe Menant
Dear Terry and FISers,
It looks indeed reasonable to position the term 'language' as ‘simply referring 
to the necessity of a shared medium of communication’. Keeping in mind that 
communications exist only because agents need to manage meanings for given 
purposes.
And the concept of agent can be an entry point for a ‘general theory of 
information’ as it does not make distinctions.
The Peircean triadic approach is also an available framework (but with, alas, a 
limited development of the Interpreter).
I choose to use agents capable of meaning generation, having some compatibility 
with the Peircean approach and with the Biosemiotics 
Umwelt.(https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCSA-2)

All the best
Christophe







De : Fis  de la part de Terrence W. DEACON 

Envoyé : mardi 13 février 2018 06:33
À : Sungchul Ji
Cc : FIS Group; Jose Javier Blanco Rivero
Objet : Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory

To claim that:

"without a language, no communication would be possible"

one must be using the term "language" in a highly metaphoric sense.

Is scent marking a language?
Music?
Sexual displays, like a peacock's tail?
How about a smile or frown?
Is the pattern of colors of a flower that attracts bees a language?
Was the evolution of language in humans just more of the same, not
something distinct from a dog's bark?
When a person is depressed, their way of walking often communicates
this fact to others; so is this slight modification of posture part of
a language?
If I get the hiccups after eating is this part of a language that
communicates my indigestion?

Is this usage of the term 'language' simply referring to the necessity
of a shared medium of communication? Is it possible to develop a
general theory of information by simply failing to make distinctions?

— Terry




On 2/12/18, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
> Hi FISers,
>
>
> (1) I think language and communication cannot be separated, since without a
> language, no communication would be possible (see Figure 1).
>
>
>
>f
>g
>  Sender --->  Message
> >  Receiver
>   |
>^
>   |
> |
>   |
> |
>
> |_|
>
> h
>
> “Language and communication are both irreducibly triadic; i.e., the three
> nodes and three edges are essential for communication, given a language or
> code understood by both the sender and receiver.”   f =  encoding; g =
> decoding; h = information flow.
>
> Figure 1.  A diagrammatic representation of the irreducibly triadic nature
> of communication and language.
>
>
>
>
> (2) I think it may be justified and useful to distinguish between
> anthropomorphic language metaphor (ALM) and non-athropomorphic language
> metaphor (NLM).  I agree with many of the members of this list that we
> should not apply ALM to biology uncritically, since such an approch to
> biology may lead to  unjustifiable anthropomorphisms.
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus) and the anthropocentric theory of
[https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/07/Alchemische_Vereinigung_aus_dem_Donum_Dei.jpg/1200px-Alchemische_Vereinigung_aus_dem_Donum_Dei.jpg]

Homunculus - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
A homunculus (/ h oʊ ˈ m ʌ ŋ k j ʊ l ə s /; Latin for "little man") is a 
representation of a small human being. Popularized in sixteenth-century alchemy 
and ...



> creatiion.
>
>
> (3) Table 1 below may represent one possible example of NLM.  Although the
> linguistic terms such as letters, words, sentences, etc. are used in this
> table, they  are matrially/ontologically  different from their molecular
> coutner parts; e.g., letters are  different from nucleotides, protein
> domians , etc.,and  words are different from genes, proteins, etc., but
> there are unmistakable common formal features among them.
>
> Table 1.  The formal and material aspects of the cell language (Cellese).
>
> \  Material Aspect
> \(Function)
> \
> \
> \
>  \
> \
> Formal Aspect \
>(Function) \
>   \
>
> DNA Language
> (DNese;
> Information transmission in time)
>
> RNA Language
> (RNese;
> Information transmission in space, from DNA to proteins)
>
> Protein Language
> (Proteinese;
> Energy transduction
> from chemical to mechanical; i.e., conformon production)
>
> Chemical Language
> (Moleculese;
> Source of free 

[Fis] TR: some notes

2017-11-13 Thread Christophe Menant
Thanks for that Pedro,
Just a few comments.

All the best,

Christophe


De : Fis  de la part de Pedro C. Marijuan 

Envoyé : lundi 13 novembre 2017 14:30
À : 'fis'
Objet : [Fis] some notes

Dear All,

Herewith some notes on the exchanges of past weeks (sorry, I was away in
bureaucratic tasks).

1. Agents & Information. There were very good insights exchanged;
probably both terms make a fertile marriage. Actually I have been
writing about "informational entities" or "subjects" as
receivers/builders of information but taking into account the other
disciplines around, "agents" look as the most natural companion of
information. The only thing I don't quite like is that they usually
appear as abstract, disembodied communicative entities that do not need
self-producing. Their communication is free from whatever life
maintenance...

Yes, agents naturally go with information as they are the source of meaning
generation, of sense making. Agents can be organic, human and artificial.
(I look at agents as  identifyable entities submitted to internal
constraints and capable of actions for the satisfaction of the constraints).
Artificial agents can be looked at as disembodied but their  being is
derived from our human ones. So their self (if any) is part of the
human designer's self.

2. Eigenvectors of communication. Taking the motif from Loet, and
continuing with the above, could we say that the life cycle itself
establishes the eigenvectors of communication? It is intriguing that
maintenance, persistence, self-propagation are the essential motives of
communication for whatever life entities (from bacteria to ourselves).
With the complexity increase there appear new, more sophisticated
directions, but the basic ones probably remain intact. What could be
these essential directions of communication?


Perhaps it could be interesting here to highlight  that physics/chemistry
and biology/psychology cannot address information the same way.
Physics and chemistry use tools with precise definitions allowing to
model our environment in a deterministic and predictable way
(QM and Chaos deserving more investigations).
Biology/psychology do not benefit of such rigorous mathematical
support. We do not even know how to define life or consciousness,
and our models are incomplete.
So what about separating the two domains and looking at their relations
as a third domain?
1) Thermodynamics, entropy, quantity of information, channel capacity,
data transmission.
2) Meaning generation, biology and self-consciousness
3) Emergence and locality of constraints, emergence of meanings
This puts again the focus on meaning generation, a key evolutionary
step without which we would not be here.
Also, let's not forget that data transmission and quantification of
information are about meaningful information.
So why not consider internal constraint satisfaction, the source of
meaning generation,  as an essential direction of communication?

3. About logics in the pre-science, Joseph is quite right demanding that
discussion to accompany principles or basic problems. Actually
principles, rules, theories, etc. are interconnected or should be by a
logic (or several logics?) in order to give validity and coherence to
the different combinations of elements. For instance, in the
biomolecular realm there is a fascinating interplay of activation and
inhibition among the participating molecular partners (enzymes and
proteins) as active elements.  I am not aware that classical ideas from
Jacob (La Logique du vivant) have been sufficiently continued; it is not
about Crick's Central Dogma but about the logic of pathways, circuits,
modules, etc. Probably both Torday and Ji have their own ideas about
that-- I would be curious to hear from them.

4. I loved Michel's response to Arturo's challenge. I think that the two
"zeros" I mentioned days ago (the unsolved themes around the cycle and
around the observer) imply both multidisciplinary thinking and
philosophical speculation...

Best wishes--Pedro

-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta 0
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
[https://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/_/rsrc/1468865628625/home/DSC00254-1.JPG?height=420=346]

Pedro.C.Marijuan
sites.google.com
Personal Webpage of Pedro C. Marijuán



-

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[Fis] TR: What is “Agent”?

2017-10-22 Thread Christophe Menant


Yes Stan,
the Moreno-Mossio book is an interesting and recent treatment of autonomy but, 
as the title indicates, it is focused on biological autonomy.
FYI there is also a 2009 paper by Barandiaran & all (some from the Moreno IAS  
team) that addresses agency and autonomy in a different way, allowing to 
consider artificial agents:  "Defining Agency individuality, normativity, 
asymmetry and spatiotemporality in action". The paper is available at:
 
https://xabierbarandiaran.files.wordpress.com/2009/07/barandiaran_dipaolo_rohde_-_defining_agency_v_1_0_-_jab_20091.pdf

Best
Christophe



De : Fis  de la part de Stanley N Salthe 

Envoyé : jeudi 19 octobre 2017 21:47
À : Terrence W. DEACON; fis
Objet : Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?

Here is an interesting recent treatment of autonomy.


Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio: Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical

and Theoretical Enquiry (History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences 
12);

Springer, Dordrecht, 2015, xxxiv + 221 pp., $129 hbk, ISBN 978-94-017-9836-5


STAN

On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 11:44 AM, Terrence W. DEACON 
> wrote:

AN AUTONOMOUS AGENT IS A DYNAMICAL SYSTEM ORGANIZED TO BE CAPABLE OF INITIATING 
PHYSICAL WORK TO FURTHER PRESERVE THIS SAME CAPACITY IN THE CONTEXT OF  
INCESSANT EXTRINSIC AND/OR INTRINSIC TENDENCIES FOR THIS SYSTEM CAPACITY TO 
DEGRADE.


THIS ENTAILS A CAPACITY TO ORGANIZE WORK THAT IS SPECIFICALLY CONTRAGRADE TO 
THE FORM OF THIS DEGRADATIONAL INFLUENCE, AND THUS ENTAILS A CAPACITY TO BE 
INFORMED BY THE EFFECTS OF THAT INFLUENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE AGENT’S CRITICAL 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.

On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 6:00 PM, Koichiro Matsuno 
> wrote:
On 19 Oct 2017 at 6:42 AM, Alex Hankey wrote:

the actual subject has to be non-reducible and fundamental to our universe.

   This view is also supported by Conway-Kochen’s free will theorem (2006). If 
(a big IF, surely) we admit that our fellows can freely exercise their free 
will, it must be impossible to imagine that the atoms and molecules lack their 
share of the similar capacity. For our bodies eventually consist of those atoms 
and molecules.

   Moreover, the exercise of free will on the part of the constituent atoms and 
molecules could come to implement the centripetality of Bob Ulanowicz at long 
last under the guise of chemical affinity unless the case would have to 
forcibly be dismissed.

   This has been my second post this week.

   Koichiro Matsuno



From: Fis 
[mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On 
Behalf Of Alex Hankey
Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2017 6:42 AM
To: Arthur Wist >; FIS 
Webinar >
Subject: Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?

David Chalmers's analysis made it clear that if agents exist, then they are as 
fundamental to the universe as electrons or gravitational mass.

Certain kinds of physiological structure support 'agents' - those emphasized by 
complexity biology. But the actual subject has to be non-reducible and 
fundamental to our universe.

Alex



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[Fis] TR: What is ³Agent²?

2017-10-22 Thread Christophe Menant

Dear Gordana,
Your proposal for elementary particles and social institutions as two limit 
cases for agency is interesting as it also positions limit cases for 
normative/teleological properties
highlighted as implicit parts of agency by Terry. And it brings in perspectives 
on your subject.
Social institutions clearly have final causes (a long and complex list..) but 
associating agency and teleology to elementary particles may be problematic as 
it introduces final causes in a material universe. This looks close to an 
"intelligent design" option that we prefer to avoid.
Why not introduce  a possible "trend to increasing complexity" (TIC) in our 
universe, with steps since the big bang:
energy => elementary particles=> atoms=>molecules=> life=>humans=> (perhaps 
pan-computationalism has a say there?).
Agency and normative/teleological properties can then be looked at as emerging 
during the TIC at the molecules=>life transition (Terry's morphodynamics).
Rather than being  a limit case for agency,  elementary particles are then part 
of the thread leading to teleology/agency via the TIC.
How would you feel about such wording?
Best
Christophe




De : Fis  de la part de Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic 

Envoyé : vendredi 20 octobre 2017 11:02
À : Terrence W. DEACON; 'Bob Logan'; l...@leydesdorff.net; 'fis'
Objet : Re: [Fis] What is ³Agent²?


Dear Terry, Bob, Loet

Thank you for sharing those important thoughts about possible choices for the 
definition of agency.

I would like to add one more perspective that I find in Pedro’s article which 
makes a distinction between matter-energy aspects and informational aspects of 
the same physical reality. I believe that on the fundamental level of 
information physics we have a good ND simplest example how those two entangled 
aspects can be formally framed.
As far as I can tell, Terrys definition covers chemical and biological agency.
Do we want to include apart from fundamental physics also full cognitive and 
social agency which are very much dominated by informational aspects (symbols 
and language)?
Obviously there is no information without physical implementation, but when we 
think about epistemology and the ways we know the world, for us and other 
biological agents there is no physical interaction without informational 
aspects.
Can we somehow think in terms those two faces of agency?
Without matter/energy nothing will happen, nothing can act in the world but 
that which happens and anyone registers it, has informational side to it.
For human agency (given that matter/energy side is functioning) information is 
what to a high degree drives agency.

Do you think this would be a fruitful path to pursue, with “agency” of 
elementary particles and agency of social institutions as two limit cases?

All the best,
Gordana



__
Gordana Dodig Crnkovic, Professor of Computer Science
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Chalmers University of Technology
School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Mälardalen University
http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/
[http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/IMG_1101-20150801-G.jpg]

Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
www.mrtc.mdh.se
GORDANA DODIG-CRNKOVIC Professor of Computer Science. 
gordana.dodig-crnko...@mdh.se gordana.dodig-crnko...@chalmers.se. Mobile MDH: 
+46 73 662 05 11


General Chair of is4si summit 2017
http://is4si-2017.org
[http://media.is4si-2017.org/2016/06/IS4SI-2017-2.jpg]

IS4SI-2017 - International Society for Information 
Studies
is4si-2017.org
IS4SI-2017 Summit - International Society for Information Studies - 
DIGITALISATION FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY Embodied, Embedded, Networked, 
Empowered...




From: Fis > 
on behalf of Loet Leydesdorff 
>
Organization: University of Amsterdam
Reply-To: "l...@leydesdorff.net" 
>
Date: Friday, 20 October 2017 at 08:40
To: 'Bob Logan' >, 
'fis' >
Subject: Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?

Dear Bob and colleagues,

I agree with the choice element. From a sociological perspective, agency is 
usually defined in relation to structure. For example, in terms of 
structure/actor contingencies. The structures provide the background that bind 
us. Remarkably, Mark, we no longer define these communalities philosophically, 
but sociologically (e.g., Merton, 1942, about the institutional norms of 
science). An interesting extension is that we nowadays not only perceive 
communality is our biological origins (as species), but also in terms of 

[Fis] TR: What is “Agent”?

2017-10-19 Thread Christophe Menant
Resent to FIS correct address


De : Christophe Menant
Envoyé : jeudi 19 octobre 2017 11:15
À : is
Cc : Krassimir Markov
Objet : RE: [Fis] What is “Agent”?


Dear FIS colleagues,

Looking at defining agency is an interesting subject, somehow close to 
information and meaning. Thank you Krassimir for bringing it up.
Let me propose here an approach based on what we can call ‘agents’ in our 
everyday life. This can highlight characteristics possibly leading to a 
definition.for agents.
Based on laymen’s understanding of the world most of us would agree about items 
that can be considered as agents and items that cannot.
Obviously, animals, humans and plants are agents (Natural Agents).
Also, robots and most of our programmable builds up are agents (Artificial 
Agents).
But stones, puddles, smokes (inert items) are not generally considered as 
agents (‘non-agents’).
In terms of characteristics it is pretty obvious that both agents and 
non-agents obey physico-chemical laws that exist everywhere.
But in contrast it is worth noticing that agents are local entities submitted 
to internal constraints.
Natural Agents are submitted to ‘intrinsic constraints’ like ‘stay alive’ 
(individual & species) and ‘live group life’, with other specific constraints 
for humans.
AAs are different as they have to satisfy ‘derived constraints’ coming from 
their designer.
All these internal constraints are satisfied by actions implemented by the 
agents. These actions can be physical, biological or mental and take place in 
or out the agent.
Inert items (non-agents) are not submitted to internal constraints and do not 
act for constraint satisfaction.
Such characterization of agents as different from non-agents brings us to the 
following:
Agents are local entities.
Agents are submitted to internal constraints.
Agents are capable of action for constraint satisfaction.
This leads to a possible definition for an agent as being ‘an identifiable 
entity submitted to internal constraints and capable of actions for the 
satisfaction of the constraints’ (a more detailed presentation of that 
definition is available at https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCSA-2).

Such definition of an agent focused on action for internal constraint 
satisfaction positions meaning generation at the core of agency (a meaning is 
generated as being the connection between received information and an internal 
constraint).
And such relations between agency and meaning allow to look at some AI concerns 
in quite simple terms. Characterizing agents and meanings by intrinsic or 
derived constraints leads to positions on the Turing Test, on the Chinese Room 
Argument and on the Symbol Grounding Problem (short paper on subject at 
https://philpapers.org/rec/MENTTC-2).

Best
Christophe


De : Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> de la part de Krassimir Markov 
<mar...@foibg.com>
Envoyé : dimanche 15 octobre 2017 23:27
À : Foundation of Information Science
Objet : [Fis] What is “Agent”?

Dear FIS Colleagues,

After nice collaboration last weeks, a paper Called “Data versus
Information” is prepared in very beginning draft variant and already is
sent to authors for refining.
Many thanks for fruitful work!

What we have till now is the understanding that the information is some
more than data.
In other words:
 d = r
 i = r + e
where:
 d => data;
 i => information;
 r => reflection;
 e => something Else, internal for the Agent (subject, interpreter,
etc.).

Simple question: What is “Agent”?

When an entity became an Agent? What is important to qualify the entity as
Agent or as an Intelligent Agent? What kind of agent is the cell? At the
end - does information exist for Agents or only for Intelligent Agents?

Thesis: Information exists only for the Intelligent Agents.

Antithesis: Information exists at all levels of Agents.

Friendly greetings
Krassimir





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[Fis] TR: Data - Reflection - Information

2017-10-10 Thread Christophe Menant

Thanks for these comments Terry.

We should indeed be careful not to focus too much on language because 'meaning' 
is not limited to human communication. And also because starting at basic life 
level allows to address 'meaning' without the burden of complex performances 
like self-consciousness or free will. (The existing bias on language may come 
from analytic philosophy initially dealing with human performances).
Interestingly, a quite similar comment may apply to continental philosophy 
where the 'aboutness' of a mental state was invented for human consciousness. 
And this is of some importance for us because 'intentionality' is close to 
'meaning'. Happily enough 'bio-intentionality' is slowly becoming an acceptable 
entity (https://philpapers.org/rec/MENBAM-2).
Regarding Peirce,  I'm a bit careful about using the triadic approach in FIS 
because non human life was not a key subject for him and also because the 
Interpreter which creates the meaning of the sign (the Interpretant) does not 
seem that much explicited or detailed.
The divisions you propose look interesting  (intrinsic, referential, 
normative). Would it be possible to read more on that (sorry if I have missed 
some of your posts)?
Best
Christophe


De : Fis  de la part de Terrence W. DEACON 

Envoyé : lundi 9 octobre 2017 02:30
À : Sungchul Ji
Cc : foundationofinformationscience
Objet : Re: [Fis] Data - Reflection - Information

Against "meaning"

I think that there is a danger of allowing our anthropocentrism to bias the 
discussion. I worry that the term 'meaning' carries too much of a linguistic 
bias.
By this I mean that it is too attractive to use language as our archtypical 
model when we talk about information.
Language is rather the special case, the most unusual communicative adaptation 
to ever have evolved, and one that grows out of and depends on 
informationa/semiotic capacities shared with other species and with biology in 
general.
So I am happy to see efforts to bring in topics like music or natural signs 
like thunderstorms and would also want to cast the net well beyond humans to 
include animal calls, scent trails, and molecular signaling by hormones. And it 
is why I am more attracted to Peirce and worried about the use of Saussurean 
concepts.
Words and sentences can indeed provide meanings (as in Frege's Sinn - "sense" - 
"intension") and may also provide reference (Frege's Bedeutung - "reference" - 
"extension"), but I think that it is important to recognize that not all signs 
fit this model. Moreover,

A sneeze is often interpreted as evidence about someone's state of health, and 
a clap of thunder may indicate an approaching storm.
These can also be interpreted differently by my dog, but it is still 
information about something, even though I would not say that they mean 
something to that interpreter. Both of these phenomena can be said to provide 
reference to something other than that sound itself, but when we use such 
phrases as "it means you have a cold" or "that means that a storm is 
approaching" we are using the term "means" somewhat metaphorically (most often 
in place of the more accurate term "indicates").

And it is even more of a stretch to use this term with respect to pictures or 
diagrams.
So no one would say the a specific feature like the ears in a caricatured face 
mean something.
Though if the drawing is employed in a political cartoon e.g. with exaggerated 
ears and the whole cartoon is assigned a meaning then perhaps the exaggeration 
of this feature may become meaningful. And yet we would probably agree that 
every line of the drawing provides information contributing to that meaning.

So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our discussions and 
recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways to many different 
contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate the framing, whether 
physical, formal, biological, phenomenological, linguistic, etc.
For this reason, as I have suggested before, I would love to have a 
conversation in which we try to agree about which different uses of the 
information concept are appropriate for which contexts. The classic 
syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction introduced by Charles Morris has often 
been cited in this respect, though it too is in my opinion too limited to the 
linguistic paradigm, and may be misleading when applied more broadly. I have 
suggested a parallel, less linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) 
way of making the division: i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and normative 
analyses/properties of information.

Thus you can analyze intrinsic properties of an informing medium [e.g. Shannon 
etc etc] irrespective of these other properties, but can't make sense of 
referential properties [e.g. what something is about, conveys] without 
considering intrinsic sign vehicle properties, and can't deal with normative 

Re: [Fis] TR: Principles of IS

2017-10-03 Thread Christophe Menant
Dear John,
It is interesting you bring us to the Interpretant in the Peircean triad where 
“meaning” is indeed key.
The Interpretant is understood as the meaning of a sign, created by the mind of 
the Interpreter (Nöth, Handbook of Semiotics).
But the triad Sign/Object/Interpretant does not explicit the Interpreter and 
considers it as somehow implicit. The many writings about the Object, the Sign 
and the Interpretant tell almost nothing about the Interpreter. This is 
surprising.
The Interpreter looks to me as key as it is the place where the meaning 
generation happens in the Peircean triad, allowing the Interpretant to exist.
Your knowledge of Peirce being much higher than mine, could you tell us how you 
feel about the neglected Interpreter?
All the best
Christophe


De : Fis  de la part de John Collier 

Envoyé : lundi 2 octobre 2017 08:28
À : fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] TR: Principles of IS


Dear list,

As Floridi points out in his Information. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010. A volume for the Very Short Introduction series. data is often taken to 
be information. If so, then the below distinction is somewhat arbitrary. It may 
be useful or not. I think that for some circumstances it is useful, but for 
others it is misleading, especially if we are trying to come to grips with what 
meaning is. I am not sure there is ever data without interpretation (it seems 
to me that it is always assumed to be about something). There are, however, 
various degrees and depths of interpretation, and we may have data at a more 
abstract level that is interpreted as meaning something less abstract, such as 
pointer readings of a barometer and air pressure. The pointer readings are 
signs of air pressure. Following C.S. Peirce, all signs have an interpretant. 
We can ignore this (abstraction) and deal with just pointer readings of a 
particular design of gauge, and take this to be the data, but even the pointer 
readings have an important contextual element, being of a particular kind of 
gauge, and that also determines an interpretant. Just pointer readings alone 
are not data, they are merely numbers (which also, of course, have an 
interpretant that is even more abstract.

So I think the data/information distinction needs to be made clear in each 
case, if it is to be used.

Note that I believe that there is information that is independent of mind, but 
the above points still hold once we start into issues of observation. My belief 
is based on an explanatory inference that must be tested (and also be useful in 
this context). I believe that the idea of mind independent information has been 
tested, and is useful, but I am not going to go into that further here.

Regards,

John

PS, please note that my university email was inadvertently wiped out, so I am 
currently using the above email, also the alias 
coll...@ncf.ca If anyone has wondered why their mail to 
me has been returned, this is why.

On 2017/09/30 11:20 AM, Krassimir Markov wrote:

Dear Christophe and FIS Colleagues,

I agree with idea of meaning.

The only what I would to add is the next:

There are two types of reflections:

1. Reflections without meaning called DATA;

2. Reflections with meaning called INFORMATION.

Friendly greetings
Krassimir


--
Krassimir Markov
Director
ITHEA Institute of Information Theories and Applications
Sofia, Bulgaria
presid...@ithea.org
www.ithea.org





Dear FISers,


A hot discussion indeed...
We can all agree that perspectives on information depend on the context.
Physics, mathematics, thermodynamics, biology, psychology, philosophy, AI,
...

But these many contexts have a common backbone: They are part of the
evolution of our universe and of its understanding, part of its increasing
complexity from the Big Bang to us humans.
And taking evolution as a reading grid allows to begin with the simple.
As proposed in a previous post, we care about information ONLY because it
can be meaningful.  Take away the concept of meaning, the one of
information has no reason of existing.
And our great discussions would just not exist. 
Now, Evolution + Meaning => Evolution of meaning. As already highlighted
this looks to me as important in principles of IS.
As you may remember that there is a presentation on that subject
(http://www.mdpi.com/2504-3900/1/3/211,
https://philpapers.org/rec/MENICA-2)
The evolution of the universe is a great subject where the big questions
are with the transitions: energy=> matter => life => self-consciousness =>
...
And I feel that one way to address these transitions is with local
constraints as sources of meaning generation.
Best

Christophe



De : Fis  de 

[Fis] TR: Principles of IS

2017-09-30 Thread Christophe Menant

Dear FISers,

A hot discussion indeed...
We can all agree that perspectives on information depend on the context. 
Physics, mathematics, thermodynamics, biology, psychology, philosophy, AI, ...

But these many contexts have a common backbone: They are part of the evolution 
of our universe and of its understanding, part of its increasing complexity 
from the Big Bang to us humans.
And taking evolution as a reading grid allows to begin with the simple.
As proposed in a previous post, we care about information ONLY because it can 
be meaningful.  Take away the concept of meaning, the one of information has no 
reason of existing.
And our great discussions would just not exist. 
Now, Evolution + Meaning => Evolution of meaning. As already highlighted this 
looks to me as important in principles of IS.
As you may remember that there is a presentation on that subject 
(http://www.mdpi.com/2504-3900/1/3/211,  https://philpapers.org/rec/MENICA-2)
The evolution of the universe is a great subject where the big questions are 
with the transitions: energy=> matter => life => self-consciousness => ...
And I feel that one way to address these transitions is with local constraints 
as sources of meaning generation.
Best

Christophe

De : Fis  de la part de tozziart...@libero.it 

Envoyé : vendredi 29 septembre 2017 14:01
À : fis
Objet : Re: [Fis] Principles of IS


Dear FISers,
Hi!
...a very hot discussion...
I think that it is not useful to talk about Aristotle, Plato and Ortega y 
Gasset, it the modern context of information... their phylosophical, not 
scientific approach, although marvelous, does not provide insights in a purely 
scientific issue such the information we are talking about...

Once and forever, it must be clear that information is a physical quantity.
Please read (it is not a paper of mine!):
Street S.  2016.  Neurobiology as information physics.  Frontiers in Systems 
neuroscience.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5108784/

In short, Street shows how information can be clearly defined in terms of 
Bekenstein entropy!

Sorry,
and BW...

Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2­Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.w­ebnode.it/

--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android

venerdì, 29 settembre 2017, 01:31PM +02:00 da Rafael Capurro 
raf...@capurro.de:

Dear Pedro,

thanks for food for thought. When talking about communication we should not 
forget that Wiener defines cybernetics as "the theory of messages" (not: as the 
theory of information) (Human use of human beings, London 1989, p. 15, p. 77 
"cybernetics, or the theory of messages" et passim) Even for Shannon uses the 
(undefined) concept of message 'as' what is transmitted (which is not 
information) is of paramount importance. And so also at the level of cell-cell 
communication.

The code or the difference message/messenger is, I think, a key for 
interpreting biological processes. In this sense, message/messanger are 
'archai' (in the Aristotelian) sense for different sciences (no reductionism if 
we want to focus on the differences between the phenomena). 'Archai' are NOT 
'general concepts' (as you suggest) but originating forces that underline the 
phenomena in their manifestations 'as' this or that.

>From this perspective, information (following Luhmann) is the process of 
>interpretation taking place at the receiver. When a cell, excuse me these 
>thoughts from a non-biologist, receives a message transmitted by a messenger, 
>then the main issue is from the perspective of the cell, to interpret this 
>message (with a special address or 'form' supposed to 'in-form' the cell) 'as' 
>being relevant for it. Suppose this interpretation is wrong in the sense that 
>the message causes death (to the cell or the whole organism), then the 
>re-cognition system (its immune system also) of the cell fails. Biological 
>fake news, so to speak, with mortal consequences due to failures in the 
>communication.

best

Rafael
Dear FISers,

I also agree with Ji and John Torday about the tight relationship between 
information and communication. Actually Principle 5 was stating : 
"Communication/information exchanges among adaptive life-cycles underlie the 
complexity of biological organizations at all scales." However, let me suggest 
that we do not enter immediately in the discussion of cell-cell communication, 
because it is very important and perhaps demands some more exchanges on the 
preliminary info matters.

May I return to principles and Aristotle? I think that Rafael and Michel are 
talking more about principles as general concepts than about principles as 
those peculiar foundational items that allow the beginning of a new scientific 
discourse. Communication between principles of the different disciplines is 
factually impossible (or utterly 

Re: [Fis] INFORMATION: JUST A MATTER OF MATH

2017-09-16 Thread Christophe Menant
Interesting points  Guy,
Let me proposed a few things that can come in addition.
“Fitness” could be worded “conformance to a demand”, or “satisfaction of a 
constraint”. And there we are talking about existing relations, like satisfying 
a ”stay alive” constraint for animals, a ”look for happiness “ one for humans 
and an “avoid obstacles “ one for a robot.
Also distinguishing between ‘information’ and ‘meaning’ is indeed key.
I believe that we have first to agree that the concept of information exists by 
the meanings that can be associated to information. Humans have invented 1+1=2 
because 1 apple + 1 apple = 2 apples to avoid starving. The modeling of reality 
is not for free. Take away the concept of meaning, the one of information 
disappears. The relations between the two can be pretty complex but a thread is 
that meanings are the results of interpretation of information by agents.  So 
the concept of “meaning generation” by an agent submitted to an internal 
constraint, as already addressed in our FIS forum.
Best
Christophe



De : Fis  de la part de Guy A Hoelzer 

Envoyé : vendredi 15 septembre 2017 20:25
À : Foundations of Information Science Information Science
Cc : tozziart...@libero.it
Objet : Re: [Fis] INFORMATION: JUST A MATTER OF MATH

I agree with Arturo.  I understand information exclusively as matter and 
energy, and the diversity of their states through space/time.  What else it 
there?  The alternative would be to accept ‘information’ as merely an heuristic 
concept that helps us to communicate and make sense of our lives without the 
goal of identifying real phenomena.  I think the freedom to create and use such 
heuristic concepts is essential for many reasons, but we are constantly 
challenged as scientists with distinguishing between these terms and those we 
think and hope approximate real phenomena.  A grad student I worked with 
suggested the term “tool words” to label terms we recognize as mainly 
heuristic.  As an evolutionary biologist, I would suggest the term “fitness” 
has been a very useful heuristic term, but that “fitness” does not actually 
exist.  This statement might surprise or even put off many of my colleagues, 
which I think illustrates the problem caused by failing to make this 
distinction explicit.  As I have argued before, I think clearly distinguishing 
between ‘information’ and ‘meaning’ would be a good first step in this 
direction.

Regards,

Guy

Guy Hoelzer, Associate Professor
Department of Biology
University of Nevada Reno

Phone:  775-784-4860
Fax:  775-784-1302



On Sep 15, 2017, at 6:16 AM, 
tozziart...@libero.it wrote:

Dear FISers,
I'm sorry for bothering you,
but I start not to agree from the very first principles.

The only language able to describe and quantify scientific issues is 
mathematics.
Without math, you do not have observables, and information is observable.
Therefore, information IS energy or matter, and can be examined through 
entropies (such as., e.g., the Bekenstein-Hawking one).

And, please, colleagues, do not start to write that information is subjective 
and it depends on the observer's mind. This issue has been already tackled by 
the math of physics: science already predicts that information can be 
"subjective", in the MATHEMATICAL frameworks of both relativity and quantum 
dynamics' Copenhagen interpretation.
Therefore, the subjectivity of information is clearly framed in a TOTALLY 
physical context of matter and energy.

Sorry for my polemic ideas, but, if you continue to define information on the 
basis of qualitative (and not quantitative) science, information becomes 
metaphysics, or sociology, or psychology (i.e., branches with doubtful 
possibility of achieving knowledge, due to their current lack of math).



Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/


Messaggio originale
Da: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
>
Data: 15/09/2017 14.13
A: "fis">
Ogg: [Fis] PRINCIPLES OF IS

Dear FIS Colleagues,

As promised herewith the "10 principles of information science". A couple of 
previous comments may be in order.
First, what is in general the role of principles in science? I was motivated by 
the unfinished work of philosopher Ortega y Gasset, "The idea of principle in 
Leibniz and the evolution of deductive theory" (posthumously published in 
1958). Our tentative information science seems to be very different from other 
sciences, rather 

[Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

2012-03-16 Thread Christophe Menant








Dear FISers, 

Indeed information can be considered downwards (physical  meaningless) and
upwards (biological  meaningful). The difference being about
interpretation or not. 

It also introduces an evolutionary approach to information processing and
meaning generation.

There is a chapter on that subject in a recent book 
(http://www.amazon.co.uk/Information-Computation-Philosophical-Understanding-Foundations/dp/toc/9814295477).
 

“Computation on Information, Meaning and
Representations.An Evolutionary Approach”

Content of the chapter:

1. Information and Meaning. Meaning Generation

1.1. Information.Meaning of information and
quantity of information

1.2. Meaningful
information and constraint satisfaction. A systemic approach

2. Information, Meaning and Representations. An
Evolutionary Approach 

2.1. Stay alive constraint
and meaning generation for organisms

2.2. The Meaning Generator System (MGS). A systemic and evolutionary approach

2.3. Meaning transmission

2.4. Individual and species constraints. Group life constraints. Networks of
meanings

2.5. From meaningful information to meaningful representations

3. Meaningful Information and Representations in
Humans

4. Meaningful Information and Representations in Artificial Systems

4.1. Meaningful information
and representations from traditional AI to Nouvelle AI. Embodied-situated AI

4.2. Meaningful representations versus the guidance theory of representation

4.3. Meaningful information and representations versus the enactive approach

5. Conclusion and Continuation

5.1. Conclusion

5.2. Continuation

A version close to the
final text can be reached at 
http://crmenant.free.fr/2009BookChapter/C.Menant.211009.pdf



As Plamen says, we may be at the beginning of a new scientific revolution. But 
I’m
afraid that an understanding of the meaning of information needs clear enough an
understanding of the constraint at the source of the meaning generation process.
And even for basic organic meanings coming from a “stay alive” constraint, we 
have
to face the still mysterious nature of life. And for human meanings, the even 
more
mysterious nature of human mind.

This is not to discourage our efforts in investigating these questions. Just to
put a stick in the ground showing where we stand. 

Best,

Christophe


Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 13:47:28 +0100
From: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] [Fwd: Re:  Physics of computing]--Plamen S.








 Mensaje original 

  

  Asunto: 
  Re: [Fis] Physics of computing


  Fecha: 
  Fri, 16 Mar 2012 13:24:38 +0100


  De: 
  Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com


  Para: 
  Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es


  Referencias: 
  20120316041607.66ffc68000...@1w8.tpn.terra.com
4f6321c3.5000...@aragon.es

  







+++



Dear All,



I could not agree more with Pedro's opinion. The referred article is
interesting indeed. but, information is only physical in the narrow
sense taken by conventional physicalistic-mechanistic-computational
approaches. Such a statement defends the reductionist view at nature:
sorry. But information is more than bits and Shanno's law and biology
has far more to offer. I think we are at the beginning of a new
scientific revolution. So, we may need to take our (Maxwell) daemons
and (Turing) oracles closer under the lens. In fact, David Ball, the
author of the Nature paper approached me after my talk in Brussels in
2010 on the Integral Biomathics approach and told me he thinks it were
a step in the right direction: biology driven mathematics and
computation. 



By the way, our book of ideas on IB will be released next month by
Springer: 
http://www.springer.com/engineering/computational+intelligence+and+complexity/book/978-3-642-28110-5

If you wish to obtain it at a lower price (65 EUR incl. worldwide
delivery) please send me your names, mailing addresses and phone
numbers via email to: pla...@simeio.org.
There must be at least 9 orders to keep that discount price..



Best,



Plamen





On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Pedro C.
Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
wrote:


  
Dear discussants,

  

I tend to disagree with the motto information is physical if taken
too strictly. Obviously if we look downwards it is OK, but in the
upward direction it is different. Info is not only physical then, and
the dimension of self-construction along the realization of life cycle
has to be entered. Then the signal, the info, has content and
meaning. Otherwise if we insist only in the physical downward
dimension we have just conventional computing/ info processing. My
opinion is that the notion of absence is crucial for advancing in the
upward, but useless in the downward. 

By the way, I already wrote about info and the absence theme in a 1994
or 1995 paper in BioSystems...

  

best

  

---Pedro

  

  

  

  walter.riof...@terra.com.pe

[Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: FW: Meaning Information Theory] ---From Gavin

2011-10-24 Thread Christophe Menant





Dear Gavin,
As you find some interest for a Theory of Meaningful Information, it may be 
pertinent to recall a systemic approach to meaning generation:
When a system submitted to a constraint (stay alive, avoid obstacle, ...) 
receives from its environment an information that has a connection with the 
constraint , it generates a meaning (a meaningful information) that willl be 
used to implement an action aimed at satisfying the constraint.
The approach makes available a simple Meaning Generator System applicable to 
all cases where you can define the system and the constraint. Is not Shannon 
information theory. It links with Dretske and philosophy of mind. It has been 
used in several evolutionary approaches. 
 2003 Entropy paper on subject: http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020193.pdf
2010 short paper: http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/MGS.pdf
Part of IACAP 2011 presentation: http://cogprints.org/7584/
Best 
Christophe 
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2011 18:22:08 +0200
From: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: FW: Meaning Information Theory] ---From Gavin








Message from Gavin Ritz









On Fri, Oct 21, 2011 at 12:02 AM, Gavin Ritz garr...@xtra.co.nz
wrote:



  

Stan, John list members

 

I have had a number of off list email dialogue with list members, from
this

list and others.

 

There seems to be a group of listers that have a Theory of Meaningful

Information (It’s not Shannon’s mathematical Information theory), it’s
all

about meaning and electrical communication (I guess in this case

neurological).

 

The common links seem to be Dawkins, Dennett, Searle and a few others.

 

Does anyone have any clear propositions, with their logical arguments,

evidence. tests, corroboration, modeling, conceptual mathematics,
proofs,

for this Meaning Theory of Information. It also seems to include memes.

 

I am unable to find any clear propositions with their proofs, it all
seems

like smoke and mirrors too me. At one point it becomes sort of Shannon’s

mathematical theory then it spoofs into something like Philosophy
meaning

arguments (Like Ogden Richards), then it spoofs into living matter and
DNA,

then reappears as cultural units, then energy/matter representations.

 

Is The Meaning Information Theory a shape shifter. Is it the one size
fits

all, theory.

 

What exactly is this Theory, where did it come from, what is it, what
is its

proposition, and if there is one how can it be tested, corroborated,
where

and how can we gather the evidence.

 

 

Regards

  Gavin

  

  




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Re: [Fis] replies to several

2011-05-11 Thread Christophe Menant

Loet, 
Commenting the points 2 to 5, you write:
“Yes, but the differentia specifica is that meaning can be communicated using 
human language as an evolutionary achievement. Biological systems generate 
meaning, but cannot communicate it.” 
Human language is indeed a great evolutionary advantage. It is a human 
specificity involving human consciousness and free will by means we do not 
understand that well.
Regarding communication of meaning as related to constraints satisfaction, I 
feel it can be introduced for a group of agents sharing a group constraint. The 
animal world makes available some examples. Alert signals can be looked at as a 
communication implemented to satisfy the species “stay alive” constraint (ex 
Vervet monkey alarm calls informing conspecifics about presence of danger, so 
corresponding protective action can be implemented).
More generally, communication of meanings can be looked at as a transmission of 
meaningful information from an agent that generated it to another agent that 
will generate a meaning with the received information. The meaning generated by 
the receiving agent can be different from the one transmitted (different 
constraints, ..). Systemic approach allows to apply this to any kind of system 
submitted to a constraint.
Best
Christophe
(let me share this with the List)
 


From: l...@leydesdorff.net
To: christophe.men...@hotmail.fr
Subject: RE: [Fis] replies to several
Date: Wed, 11 May 2011 07:43:07 +0200








1) A “meaning” does not exist by itself. It is a “meaningful information” 
(Shannon type information) related to a system that creates it or uses it in 
order to satisfy some constraint (ex: stay alive for species by ADN 
transmission, stay alive for organism by catching food, be happy for humans). 
And it is true that “mathematically derived “meaning” for antibodies is a pale 
representation of meaning in the human context”. This is why trying to 
understand what is a “meaning” by a systemic approach can be interesting. 
 
I fully agree.

2) Any meaning has an origin, more or less iterated from other meanings. As 
already expressed at FIS, a basic meaning generation process can be modeled 
through the MGS (Meaning Generator System) where a system submitted to a 
constraint generates a meaning when it receives an information from its 
environment that has a connection with the constraint. The generated meaning is 
precisely the connection existing between the received information and the 
constraint (http://crmenant.free.fr/FIScience/Index.htm , 
http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/MGS.pdf). The received information can already be 
meaningful. 
3) The MGS is a building block populating agents that have different 
constraints to satisfy 
(http://www.idt.mdh.se/ECAP-2005/INFOCOMPBOOK/CHAPTERS/10-Menant.pdf).
4) Networks of meanings for an agent about an item of its environment 
constitute a meaningful representation of the item for the agent. Meanings link 
agents to their environments  (“ “).
5) Meaning generation by the MGS can be used as an evolutionary tool beginning 
with bacteria. It brings to highlight the specificities of organisms and humans 
in terms of systems and constraints where our understanding is sometimes 
limited (“ “). 
 
Yes, but the differentia specifica is that meaning can be communicated using 
human language as an evolutionary achievement. Biological systems generate 
meaning, but cannot communicate it. 
 
Best wishes, Loet
 

Best
Christophe

 



From: l...@leydesdorff.net
To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; fis@listas.unizar.es
Date: Sun, 8 May 2011 21:16:01 +0200
Subject: Re: [Fis] replies to several

Dear Joe: 
 

1. If I follow Loet, I must accept that Information Theory is essentially a 
mathematical theory that requires abstractions for extension to complex 
contexts. But Bob says that the mathematically derived “meaning” for antibodies 
is a pale representation of meaning in the human context and only reflects how 
wanly quantitative models in general prefigure more complicated human 
situations. CONCLUSION: something else that is non-mathematical and 
non-abstract beyond IT as so defined is required to capture meaning. 
 
Yes, I would agree. Shannon-type information is yet meaningless. Information 
can only be provided with meaning by the substantive specification of a system 
of reference. For this reason, one needs not only a formal theory of the 
exchange, but also substantive theories. For example, a theory about the 
exchange of molecules in biology, and of atoms in chemistry, or of transactions 
in economy. These theories of specific communications cannot be expected to be 
unified because the substances (of “what is communicated and why”) are 
different. The formal theory of communication serves us, among other things, 
for moving from one substantive theory to another and for developing metaphors 
that can thus heuristically be transported, because of the abstraction 
involved. Additionally, these confrontations can lead to 

Re: [Fis] replies to several

2011-05-09 Thread Christophe Menant

Dear Loet, Joe and all, 
We are reaching again the question of “meaning” as attached to information. 
Let me remind a few points addressed more or less explicitly in some previous 
posts:
1) A “meaning” does not exist by itself. It is a “meaningful information” 
(Shannon type information) related to a system that creates it or uses it in 
order to satisfy some constraint (ex: stay alive for species by ADN 
transmission, stay alive for organism by catching food, be happy for humans). 
And it is true that “mathematically derived “meaning” for antibodies is a pale 
representation of meaning in the human context”. This is why trying to 
understand what is a “meaning” by a systemic approach can be interesting. 
2) Any meaning has an origin, more or less iterated from other meanings. As 
already expressed at FIS, a basic meaning generation process can be modeled 
through the MGS (Meaning Generator System) where a system submitted to a 
constraint generates a meaning when it receives an information from its 
environment that has a connection with the constraint. The generated meaning is 
precisely the connection existing between the received information and the 
constraint (http://crmenant.free.fr/FIScience/Index.htm , 
http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/MGS.pdf). The received information can already be 
meaningful. 
3) The MGS is a building block populating agents that have different 
constraints to satisfy 
(http://www.idt.mdh.se/ECAP-2005/INFOCOMPBOOK/CHAPTERS/10-Menant.pdf).
4) Networks of meanings for an agent about an item of its environment 
constitute a meaningful representation of the item for the agent. Meanings link 
agents to their environments  (“ “).
5) Meaning generation by the MGS can be used as an evolutionary tool beginning 
with bacteria. It brings to highlight the specificities of organisms and humans 
in terms of systems and constraints where our understanding is sometimes 
limited (“ “). 
Best
Christophe

 


From: l...@leydesdorff.net
To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; fis@listas.unizar.es
Date: Sun, 8 May 2011 21:16:01 +0200
Subject: Re: [Fis] replies to several






Dear Joe: 
 

1. If I follow Loet, I must accept that Information Theory is essentially a 
mathematical theory that requires abstractions for extension to complex 
contexts. But Bob says that the mathematically derived “meaning” for antibodies 
is a pale representation of meaning in the human context and only reflects how 
wanly quantitative models in general prefigure more complicated human 
situations. CONCLUSION: something else that is non-mathematical and 
non-abstract beyond IT as so defined is required to capture meaning. 
 
Yes, I would agree. Shannon-type information is yet meaningless. Information 
can only be provided with meaning by the substantive specification of a system 
of reference. For this reason, one needs not only a formal theory of the 
exchange, but also substantive theories. For example, a theory about the 
exchange of molecules in biology, and of atoms in chemistry, or of transactions 
in economy. These theories of specific communications cannot be expected to be 
unified because the substances (of “what is communicated and why”) are 
different. The formal theory of communication serves us, among other things, 
for moving from one substantive theory to another and for developing metaphors 
that can thus heuristically be transported, because of the abstraction 
involved. Additionally, these confrontations can lead to further developments 
of the algorithms that are relevant for studying the dynamics. 
 
The dynamics in the communication of meaning is different from the 
communication of information! Information can also circulate as noise (without 
meaning). I doubt it that meaning can be communicated without communication of 
information. Meaning is generated when information can be related by “an 
observing system” or more precisely in a discourse. It seems to me that 
semioticians focus exclusively on the communication of meaning without relating 
it to the communication of information. The latter, for example, has to confirm 
to the entropy law, while the former does not. The possibility of generating 
negative information has first been discussed by Brillouin as negentropy (- 
Delta H). 
 
Meaning circulation generates redundancies because the historical case is one 
of possible cases from the perspective of hindsight and thus the maximum 
entropy (of possible states) can be continuously enlarged. This is further 
reinforced when meanings are codified in terms of models. Models enable us to 
consider more possible case in the future. Such systems – e.g., scientific 
discourses – can be considered as strongly anticipatory. They act against the 
axis of time.
 
[…] 
 
3. Two aspects of the exchange between Koichiro and Loet merit attention: 1) 
Loet said that his point of replacing “why” with “what” did not seem necessary 
to him. In my mind, however, when Koichiro refers to “what is communicated by 
what”, 

[Fis] FW: BBC Doco; Cell

2011-03-31 Thread Christophe Menant




Gavin, 
Let me put it a bit differently, in terms of systems and types of laws. 
Prior the emergence of life in evolution we have only physico-chemical laws. 
Energy exchanges just obey these laws. There is no purpose, just matter in the 
interaction of laws (putting aside the question of the trend to increasing 
complexity in our universe).
When life appears in evolution, something new is to be taken into account in 
terms of law: the final causes law. A living entity is not only submitted to 
the existing physico-chemical laws, but also to the constraint; “stay alive”. 
Behaviors of organisms are guided by this constraint (look for food/energy, 
avoid predators, …). Behaviors are goal directed. The concept of final causes 
has been introduced by Aristote. Cybernetics has built up a model to apply the 
concept to artefacs (the constraint of the system is to reach the goal, hit the 
target).
In a guided missile, the information collected by the infrared sensors is used 
(data processing) to control the energy guiding the missile.
In a frog looking for food to stay alive, the visual information of a moving 
black dot is used to control the tongue flicking in order to catch the fly. 
We can compare the systems in terms of data processing and energy control for 
constraint satisfaction. Both the missile and the frog process information to 
control their energy and actions in order to satisfy their constraint. 
But we must be careful when comparing artificial systems to organisms: living 
entities have performances that we do not understand and that we can only 
partially transpose to artefacts, like autonomy. Autonomy is a performance of 
life that we do not understand as of today. The pseudo autonomy of a robot is 
only derived from ours.
So I feel that comparing living and artificial systems brings to consider that 
they both process information to control their energy in order to satisfy their 
constraints.
Christophe
 


From: garr...@xtra.co.nz
To: christophe.men...@hotmail.fr
CC: ssal...@binghamton.edu; colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Subject: RE: [Fis] BBC Doco; Cell
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2011 10:54:00 +1300






 
Hi Christofe
 
Gavin, 
Perhaps to be introduced here is the evolution from matter to life. 
Prior to life in the universe, there are only physicochemical laws valid 
everywhere. 
When life comes in, something local to the living entity is added: a “stay 
alive” 
constraint that applies only to the living entity, not elsewhere. 
Such constraint that is to be locally satisfied by the entity carrying it goes 
with the 
process of interpretation, or meaning generation, that links the living entity 
(the organism)
to its environment. 
 

Organisms have the possibility to receive information incident from their 
environment 
(light, sound, information from other organism, ….) and process it.
 
This is the problem living organisms do not have anything to do with processing 
information. It seems to me that many people clever and astute have been 
hoodwinked into thinking this is the case.
 
There is not one piece of evidence to show that organisms process information. 
 
Let’s break it down. Using Occam’s Razor.
Sight (photons), sound (phonons and energy waves in air), taste, smell 
(chemical energy), touch (pressure and heat energy). All transduced at the 
sensory processing-structures (eyes, ears etc) into an electrical signal in the 
neural system. There is no information energy at the transduction 
processing-structure. The ears do not contain any organ that transduces 
information only energy.
 
The bottom line is this “It’s the shape, hues and intensities of energy that we 
control biologically that gives this false sense of something else called 
information. And so famously found on spectrums, the very basis of our 
understanding of matter.
 
Even language is really a control of sight and sound energies. The difference 
between a biological organism and dead matter is not information (so famously 
touted by Richard Dawkins), but the ability of a living organism to control its 
own energies.
 
No such thing as information as being exchanged by living organism.
 
Sure we can use information theory to analyze some of these things, but saying 
a living organisms processes information is false.
 
Regards
Gavin
 
The information processing exists so it can initiate action aimed at satisfying 
the constraint.
Easy for a “stay alive” constraint that will bring a paramecium to move away 
from acid water. 
Much more complex for humans exchanging language where other constraints and 
performances come in. 
But I feel that the basic notion of constraint satisfaction coming during 
evolution in addition to 
physico-chemical laws can be a simple and useful tool (see 
http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/MGS.pdf)
Christophe


 
 From: garr...@xtra.co.nz
 To: colli...@ukzn.ac.za; fis@listas.unizar.es
 Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2011 13:09:02 +1300
 Subject: Re: [Fis] BBC Doco; Cell
 
 Well then we totally agree on that.
 
 The 

[Fis] Closing Comments?‏‏

2010-12-22 Thread Christophe Menant

Dear Colleagues, 
In a few sentences, a summary of my contribution addressing some of Pedro’s 
formulations of Yixin's questions:
It is difficult to consider a unique perspective on the relations between 
intelligence and information as they depend upon the agent being considered 
(bacteria, human, robot, ..).
An evolutionary approach can provide a thread as it allows starting with easy 
cases.
Considering agent meaning generation for constraint satisfaction as an 
elementary case of intelligence, we can start by a simple systemic model 
linking meaning generation and information (1, 2) 
An evolutionary approach can then be addressed through the evolutions of agents 
and of constraints (3,4). 
Meaningful information and representations (intelligence) link the agents to 
their worlds (4).
However, some characteristics of agents, like being alive, autonomous or 
conscious, are badly understood or still mysterious. Such lack of understanding 
needs to be explicated in our evolutionary route (4).
All the best for this year end
Christophe
(1) http://crmenant.free.fr/FIScience/Index.htm
(2) http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020193.pdf
(3) http://crmenant.free.fr/Biosemiotics3/INDEX.HTM
(4) http://www.idt.mdh.se/ECAP-2005/INFOCOMPBOOK/CHAPTERS/10-Menant.pdf
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[Fis] FW: Fw: INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

2010-11-24 Thread Christophe Menant

Resent to the correct address
 


From: christophe.men...@hotmail.fr
To: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
Subject: FW: [Fis] Fw: INTELLIGENCE  INFORMATION
Date: Tue, 23 Nov 2010 21:33:12 +0100




Dear Colleagues,
Looking at relations between information and intelligence brings in the need to 
explicit the agents we are considering, as the intelligence of a unicellular 
organism has not much to do with the intelligence of a human being.
An evolutionary approach may be a usable path. Begin with simple organisms and 
progressively chain on more complex ones.
In order to begin with simple enough a definition of intelligence, we can use 
Gordana’s one where the intelligence of an agent is «the ability to face the 
world in a meaningful way», and also use Stan's linking of this point to a 
process of interpretation by the agent relatively to its needs. 
Putting these two perspectives together can lead to define intelligence as the 
«interpretation of a received information to generate a meaningful information 
(a meaning) that will be used by the agent to satisfy its needs thru action 
implementation ». The agent can be a simple organism or a human being, with of 
course different needs to satisfy. So the evolutionnary perspective, where 
intelligence is linked with information (using an already presented approach: 
http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020193.pdf). 
Needs of a paramecium, like «stay alive» are much simpler to define than human 
needs like «increase happyness». But in both cases we have information (coming 
from the environment or from the organism) that is related to the needs in 
order to generate meaningful information used to produce an action (physical or 
mental) aimed at the satisfaction of the needs (i.e. behave intelligenly by 
«facing the world in a meaningful way»). 
(more on meaning generation vs needs/contraints satisfaction at 
http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/MGS.pdf ).
But there is an important difference between animals and humans that brings in 
heavy concerns. It is human consciousness, be it first person type (phenomenal 
consciousness: what it is like to experience something) or third person type 
(self-consciousness: perceiving oneself as existing in the environment). The 
problem is that the nature of human consciousness is today a mystery for 
science and philosophy. So the nature of human intelligence (with its relations 
with information and knowledge) has to be considered as unknown. Only its 
behavioral consequences are understandable to some extend. 
However, we can work on the relations between information and intelligence for 
animals and limit the human case to intelligent behaviour.
All the best
Christophe



From: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
To: l...@leydesdorff.net; fis@listas.unizar.es
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2010 09:09:52 +0100
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: INTELLIGENCE  INFORMATION: A Charicature. Psychology






Dear Loet,
 
You have opened up what may be an important box, and we need to see if it is 
Pandora's or Sophia's! Does not your note imply the following questions:
 
1. Intelligence is a well-defined subject of studies in psychology, but is it a 
well-defined subject? 
2. If intelligence is a well-defined subject of studies, should not this be 
part of the solution, rather than the problem?
3. Are we to conclude that all we non-psychologists can know is that, with due 
respect to your wife, psychologists know better what intelligence is? Is 
there a process view of intelligence in psychology?
4. Since we have more or less agreed that consciousness, information and 
knowledge are all critical to the understanding of intelligence, do we conclude 
that psychologists also have appropriate, adequately complex notions of these 
that we can learn from or contribute to?
5. Thus, are you saying that if we are using an inappropriate paradigm for 
studying intelligence, psychology is the appropriate one? 
6. If so, that is, if psychology is the most appropriate paradigm, what support 
does it have or require from other disciplines that are relative to point 4 
above, especially information?
 
Shall we see where this track might lead?
 
Best wishes,
 
Joseph
  
 
 
 
 
 
 

- Original Message - 
From: Loet Leydesdorff 
To: 'Joseph Brenner' ; 'fis' 
Sent: Sunday, November 21, 2010 10:39 PM
Subject: RE: [Fis] Fw: INTELLIGENCE  INFORMATION: A Charicature



Dear Joseph, 
 
It seems to me that part of the problem is that “intelligence” is a 
well-defined subject of studies within psychology. (I happen to be married with 
a psychologist.) 
 
Perhaps, this is an example of scholars discussing a subject using an 
inappropriate paradigm. J
 
Best wishes, 
Loet
 




Loet Leydesdorff 
Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
 


From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] 

Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal

2009-11-30 Thread Christophe Menant

Yes Joseph, you are right. 
As the satisfaction of the constraint is mandatory for the system to maintain 
its nature, system and constraint are indeed tightly linked.
The “stay alive” constraint came up on earth with the first organisms that had 
to maintain a local far from equilibrium status. The existence of the 
constraint goes with the being of the living entity.
As we are all more or less Cartesian networked, we are naturally brought to 
identify components. (“divide each of the problems I was examining in as many 
parts as I could”).
More on this in a wider perspective at 
http://www.idt.mdh.se/ECAP-2005/INFOCOMPBOOK/CHAPTERS/MenantChristophe.pdf
All the best
Christophe 

 


From: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
To: christophe.men...@hotmail.fr; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal
Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2009 10:01:35 +0100




Dear Christophe,
 
I like your approach. Here is something even simpler: the system is the meaning 
of the information. System and meaning are not totally separable. One's 
perspective focuses on one or the other, as the case may be.
 
Best wishes,
 
Joseph

- Original Message - 
From: Christophe Menant 
To: fis@listas.unizar.es 
Sent: Monday, November 30, 2009 9:30 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal


Dear all,
As the notion of information is again (and interestingly) put on the forefront, 
let’s not forget the evolutionary approach that naturally introduces the notion 
of meaning and allows to bring in a system oriented perspective.
Assuming we put aside the reason of being of the universe, there is no entity 
to care about information before the coming up of life on earth. 
Information is a notion that we humans have invented as a set of tools to help 
the understanding and managing of our world. And animals also manage 
information.
A basic tool is the measurement of the quantity of information with the Shannon 
transmission capacity of a channel, whatever the meaning of the information 
being transmitted thru the channel.
The meaning of an information can be called many names: content, purpose, 
aboutness, goal, target, sense, aim, …
As already presented in the FIS discussions, I feel that the meaning of 
information (whatever it’s naming) exists because there is a system that needs 
this meaning, a system that creates this meaning or uses it in order to satisfy 
a constraint. The system being an animal, a human or an artificial system. The 
constraints guiding the meaning generation can be very many. Constraints are 
then organic (stay alive, maintain the species, …), human (valorise ego, look 
for happiness, …), artificial (obey a process, …). And following such an 
approach allows to model meaning generation by a simple system usable for 
animals and humans and robots (1), (2). 
This does not pretend answering all the questions related to the complex 
subject of meaningful information, but it introduces that needed notion in 
simple terms.
All the best
Christophe
(1) http://cogprints.org/6279/2/MGS.pdf
(2) 
http://www.eucognition.org/uploads/docs/First_Meeting_Hamburg/Workshop_A__menant-web.pdf
  Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2009 08:53:48 +0200
 To: l...@leydesdorff.net; fis@listas.unizar.es
 From: colli...@ukzn.ac.za
 Subject: Re: [Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal
 
 At 11:13 PM 2009/11/27, you wrote:
 Dear Joseph,
 
 Be my guest and have some Irish children for breakfast!
 
 I did not mean my intervention as directed against substantive theorizing.
 In addition to a mathematical theory of communication, we need substantive
 theories of communication. This became clear to me when Maturana formulated
 life as a consequence of the communication of molecules. If atoms are
 communicated, one obtains a theory of chemical evolution (Mason), etc. All
 these special theories of communication can usefully be matched with a
 mathematical theory of communication (or perhaps more generally non-linear
 dynamics).
 
 The special case, of course, is when one multiplies H with k(B) that one
 obtains S (Joule/Kelvin). John seems to imply that there is another unit of
 information in physics which is a conserved entity. John: Can you perhaps
 provide the dimensionality of this unit and provide the derivation?
 
 Dear Loet,
 
 It is usually defined as a bit, which is understood as a binary distinction,
 wherefore the it from bit formulation found in a number of places, but
 the term is due, I believe, to John Wheeler. More typically the term is
 related to entropy considerations (as in the black hole case). My
 derivation is by dimensional analysis. Entropy is the compliment
 of information. If we take the maximal entropy of a system by
 relaxing all constraints with no other change in macroscopic
 parametres (impossible in practice, but possible in the imagination),
 and subtract from this the statistical entropy using Boltzman's
 formulation based on the number of complexions of the system,
 we get

[Fis] FW: Fw: Definition of Knowledge?

2009-10-06 Thread Christophe Menant

Dear FIS colleagues,
Knowledge is a wide and interesting subject as applied to us humans. But what 
about knowledge in the world of animals ?
What about an evolutionary approach to knowledge that takes into account 
simpler forms of knowledge management as existing in animals ? 
We Humans can consciously manage knowledge. But the performance of human 
consciousness does not imply that knowledge is absent in animals. We also 
manage knowledge unconsciously.
And knowledge is a personal and social construction. It is a tool we use all 
the time in our everyday life to satisfy various constraints. For finding our 
way in a city as well as for doing math. We acquire and use knowledge 
automatically as well as consciously by introspection. But the difference is 
more about complexity than about nature. In both cases we manage meaningful 
information for some purpose. 
Animals also have constraints to satisfy, the key one being to stay alive. Most 
animals miss a conscious self to be in a position of conscious introspection 
(perhaps some of our cousins like chimpanzee or bonobo have a minimum sense of 
conscious self that allow them a minimum of introspection). 
So I feel that the concept of knowledge deserves being addressed in an 
evolutionary background in order to allow a bottom-up approach highlighting 
simpler cases than human one (just to work as long as possible without the 
“hard problem”, and bring it back in explicitly later). Animals are submitted 
to constraint satisfaction processes as we humans are (with different 
constraints coming in addition). So the foundations of knowledge look to me as 
constraint satisfaction driven.
Such a bottom-up approach allows to bridge knowledge with meaning generation, 
and perhaps what is available for the latter can be used for the former 
(http://cogprints.org/6279/2/MGS.pdf).
Following the same thread, let me tell you also about an extension of the 
notion of meaningful information to the one of meaningful representation. It is 
proposed that a meaningful representation of an entity for an agent submitted 
to constraints is the network of meanings relative to that entity. These 
networks of meanings contain the dynamic aspect of meaning generation with the 
consequences of implemented actions, as well the action scenarios with past 
experiences or simulations making available anticipation performances. We are 
far from the GOFAI types of representations. Such meaningful representations 
are interactive and imbed the agent in its environment (more on this at 
http://www.idt.mdh.se/ECAP-2005/INFOCOMPBOOK/CHAPTERS/MenantChristophe.pdf).
To echo Jose Maria, we could consider that meaningful information and 
representations are somehow ‘nourishing’ knowledge.
All the best
Christophe
 
 Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2009 12:32:46 +0200
 From: jnaf...@uax.es
 To: fis@listas.unizar.es
 Subject: [Fis] Fw: Definition of Knowledge? (FIS Digest, Vol 530, Issue 1)
 
 -- Mensaje reenviado --
 De: Rafael Capurro raf...@capurro.de
 Fecha: 6 de octubre de 2009 02:28
 Asunto: Re: [Fis] Definition of Knowledge? (FIS Digest, Vol 530, Issue 1)
 Para: José María Díaz Nafría jnaf...@uax.es
 
 
 dear jose maria and fis colleagues,
 
 greetings from japan
 
 I very much agree with pedro's suggestions about naturalizing the
 concept of knowledge i.e. of not reducing it to the propositional
 traditional (platonic and partly arisotelian) concept (as suggested
 also by floridi building a hierarchy where the top is propositional
 scientific knowledge). the concept of implicit knowldge or
 fore-knowledge in hermeneutic terms is a key issue that links in some
 way the 'typical' human propositional knowledge with knowledged in
 non-human agents. we should diversify our concepts and avoid
 hierarchical and dogmatic human-centered views also through a classic
 connection of data becoming information becoming knowledge, where
 'becoming' is some kind of black box that explains nothing.
 
 kind regards
 
 rafael
 
 
 
 
 Zitat von José María Díaz Nafría jnaf...@uax.es:
 
  Dear FIS colleagues:
 
  I apologize for being so quiet, considering the interesting topics
  arisen with the occasion of our proposal to the COST open call of past
  March, which we thank once again. This proposal as revisited by FIS
  came to coincide in time with a call for themes proposal by the
  European Science Foundation (Eurocores Theme Proposal), which we also
  presented with a short timing. We may not succeed in the first
  attempt, but anyhow it aims at opening a new scientific topic in the
  ESF. If the proposed theme were selected, new projects in the
  delimited field (well fitted to FIS interests) from any European state
  could be presented to joint the research network. I say that, to
  justify our silence in the FIS arena, while we were actually working
  on it, although in the background. Afterwards, it was too late to
  answer, when already other issues were under discussion… To keep on
  the argument 

Re: [Fis] The notion of meaning... (impredicativity)

2009-04-02 Thread Christophe Menant

Real interesting, Pedro.
Regarding impredicativity, I was quite simply expecting quantum mechanics to 
answer (encapsulate) the question. But I don’t know really if unpicturability 
of enzyme function can somehow hooked at quantum randomness. 
When you write that “living cells are enacting a new way of existence”, I 
follow you but would be careful about the concept of self being still active as 
it is key for the nature of organisms and (I feel) deserves some more 
development in philosophical terms. The best I have in this area is D. Legrand 
thesis (1).  But more is needed. Anything available from your side ?
Also, as you may know, the Enactive approach is highly demanding in terms of 
meaning generation (2, 3, 4, 5).
But coming back to the reason of my post, I’m surprised that the notion of 
meaning is not an explicit item in a proposal entitled “Interdisciplinary 
elucidation of the information concept. Theories, Metaphores and Applications“
If I have missed something, pls  let me know.
Best
Christophe
(1) 
http://sites.univ-provence.fr/wceperc/sem-epist-perm/Legrand_D/doroth%E9elegrandattache/Legrand%20These.pdf
(2) T. Froese, T Ziemke  « Enactive Artificial Intelligence »
(3) S. Torrance “In search of the enactive: Introduction to special issue on 
Enactive Experience » Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4) December 
2005, pp. 357-368
(4) Di Paolo, E., Rohde, M.,  and De Jaegher, H. 2007. “Horizons for the 
Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play” To appear in Enaction: 
Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. 
Di Paolo (Eds), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming.
(5) * Colombetti, G.  2008 « Enaction, sense-making and emotion » (To appear in 
Stewart, J., Gapenne, O.  Di Paolo, E. (eds). Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm 
for Cognitive Science. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 2008. Forthcoming.) . 

 
 Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2009 11:18:30 +0200
 From: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
 To: christophe.men...@hotmail.fr
 CC: fis@listas.unizar.es
 Subject: Re: [Fis] The notion of meaning... (impredicativity)
 
 Thanks, Christophe.
 
 These days I am involved in a paper on prokaryotic intelligence, and 
 have laterally approached the problem of cellular meaning. I am copying 
 a fragment below (not corrected yet). Rosen's impredicativity looks to 
 me an important concept to clarify things. However, rather than 
 establishing it based on dynamic, open systems (boundary conditions) as 
 he does, I would join Michael Conrad's viewss, in that protein folding 
 and unpicturability of enzyme function are the deep causes of factual 
 impredicativity in living cells... but perhaps my Conradian 
 interpretation is forced.
 
 Anyhow, the overall idea may be that the signal becomes symmetry 
 breaking for the cell, and the elaboration of meaning becomes symmetry 
 restoration.
 
 best ---Pedro
 
 
 
 ...Along this view, living cells are enacting a new way of existence, 
 an active “informational” one that is based on the capability to keep 
 the own structures in a permanent state of flow. Cells would respond to 
 signals from the environment, and produce the “meaning” they imply, by 
 letting the signals themselves interfere with the ongoing molecular 
 dynamics of the cellular self-production flow. Completion of the cell 
 cycle would always appear as the fundamental reference... And on the 
 other side, the/ impredicative /nature of biological information has to 
 be taken into account (Rosen, 1993). It conduces to realizing that the 
 information processing of living cells is not of the same class than the 
 processes of formal, predicative nature (computation). Rather, 
 biomolecular processing is a “tactilizing” phenomenon based on a myriad 
 of specific “molecular recognition” events (Conrad, 1998; Marijuán, 
 2003); and there is no syntactic procedure or amount of computation that 
 can fill in the modelling gap, in formal terms, between the sequences 
 found in genomes and the emergent dynamics of protein  enzyme  RNA 
 networks. The degree to which biological complexity can be efficiently 
 fathomed in computational terms is a highly debatable question; it has 
 also practical implications regarding the mentioned integration of 
 signaling processes within the life cycle, and the cut-offs and 
 trade-offs to establish in the models. Whatever the modelling option, 
 the real biomolecular elaboration of meaning in the living cell and in 
 the living brain would always keep the upper hand of complexity with 
 respect any syntactic, computational procedures...
 
 
 
 
 Christophe Menant escribió:
 
  Thanks Stan, 
  Biosemiotics can indeed be part of the story 
  (http://crmenant.free.fr/Biosemiotics3/INDEX.HTM ), but part only.
  My point is about the importance of the notion of ”meaning” when 
  talking about information. Interpretation of information (meaning 
  generation) is key when information is processed by finalized

[Fis] FW: Denumerability of information (II)

2009-03-31 Thread Christophe Menant

Dear all, 
Comments from Michel and Rafael bring up an aspect of the proposal that has 
perhaps been underestimated. It is the interpretation of information which 
generates its content, its meaning. From “Information in cells” to “information 
for cells” we precisely have the interpretating function where an agent creates 
meaning for its own usage. Different agents generate different meanings. And 
information in antennas is not for antennas as they contain no interpretating 
function. 
Can the paragraph “Semantics” cover this point? Perhaps, but I’m not sure that 
semantics for bioinformation is currently used. 
The concept of interpretation looks to me as key when talking about information 
in agents. If the proposal takes it into account from a different perspective, 
perhaps it would be worth expliciting it.
Best regards
Christophe

 
 Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2009 13:57:53 +0200
 From: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
 To: fis@listas.unizar.es
 Subject: [Fis] Denumerability of information (II)
 
 
 (message II, responses from Díaz Nafría and Rafael Capurro)
 
 --
 
 Dear Michel:
 
 Thank you for your good remarks. I agree about both. Of course, data
 banks may be considered in the list. In any case, that list should be
 too long if it were exhaustive. That is to say, “…” concern to a much
 larger list that the enunciated one (and considering length I may say
 that there were only 1 character left to fulfil the “text of
 proposal” and we use them all). Anyway, data banks are certainly a
 relevant case so they will be mentioned in next submissions.
 
 About (2), I remember the controversy which arose from a question you
 stated in December –I think-. I also keep in mind the interesting
 answer from Rafael. I wrote him some remarks about the controversy. I
 will try to find them to give you my point of view about that
 interesting question.
 
 Grateful and cordial greetings,
 
 José María Díaz Nafría
 
 -
 
 Dear Michel and all,
 
 yes, the formulation there is information in cells... could be 
 misleading as it means, IMO, there is information for cells or 
 messages that cells are able to process as information, i.e., through 
 a process of selection and integration in them according to their 
 specific way of life. What is stored in data banks is in fact not 
 information but potential information for a system capable of 
 understanding or processing it. The question of numerability is one 
 possible framework of interpretation which means particularly since 
 modern science, that we think we understand something as far as we are 
 able to interpret it as countable using particularly digital media. In 
 the 19th century this framework was mainly related to matter (what is 
 not material is not understandable). Of course different frameworks or 
 (metaphysical) paradigms compete with each other unless they are 
 viewed as the only true ones... And: they have consequences for 
 society, politics etc. as we can see everyday
 
 kind regards
 
 Rafael
 
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Re: [Fis] Information - Meaning - Knowledge

2008-09-21 Thread Christophe Menant

Robin, Wittgenstein’s “meaning as use” is mostly related to meaning of words 
and sentences. And analytic philosophy is not in favour of considering 
evolutionary approaches.As the systemic approach goes with a bottom-up 
perspective usable for simple organisms, I do not feel that it can be basically 
considered as a reformulation of W’s “meaning as use”. However, if we consider 
the application of the systemic approach to the case of human language 
precisely, then the generation of meaning by constraint satisfaction can be 
compared to W’s “meaning as use” assuming we know the corresponding 
constraints. And this brings us to another level of analysis: what are, for us 
humans, the constraints to be satisfied ?We have of course in the background 
all our biological constraints. But human specific constraints are not that 
well known (or ignorance about the nature of consciousness being a heavy 
contributor of the problem). On a general basis, we can say that a generic 
human constraint is the search of happiness which indeed conditions many of or 
meaning generations and actions. Various sub-constraints come from this generic 
one like combine pleasure  reality, limit anxiety, satisfy Maslow pyramid, 
valorise ego, … (1). This looks to me as an open subject because psychology of 
motivation is still in its infancy (also as a consequence of our ignorance 
regarding the nature of consciousness).All the best Christophe(1) 
http://crmenant.free.fr/Biosemiotics3/INDEX.HTM
 



Date: Sat, 20 Sep 2008 09:56:43 +0100From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: [EMAIL 
PROTECTED]: Re: [Fis] Information - Meaning - Knowledge



Friday, September 19, 2008, 12:27:06 AM, Christophe wrote:








Folks,   Answering to Joseph, I relate meaning to information by a systemic 
approach based on constraint
satisfaction that allows an evolutionary/bottom-up usage 
(http://cogprints.org/6014/). 
So with this, a meaning exists relatively to a system submitted to a 
constraint. A meaning (a meaningful information) is the result of an 
interpretation by a system that has
a constraint to satisfy.

Isn't this a reformulation or generalisation of Wittgenstein's meaning as use?

-- 
Robin Faichney
http://www.robinfaichney.org/
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TR: SV: [Fis] info meaning

2007-10-05 Thread Christophe MENANT
Steven, 

In a few words, what I understand by “meaning”. 

1) We all agree that the Shannon theory of information addresses the
capacity of transmission of a communication channel. It does not deal at all
with the possible meaning associated with the information. A different
approach is needed.

2) The notion of meaning associated to information is a complex subject as
it covers a wide area of different applications (focusing on meaning
associated to human language may be misleading as it is one of the most
complex cases). 

First clarification is to define different domains of complexity. Gross
sizing: matter, life, human. 
Then, put aside for a while the case of matter and focus on life and human
in the context of a pragmatic approach.  

With this background, we can consider that a meaningful information (a
meaning) does not exist per se but comes from a system submitted to a
constraint that has generated the meaning in order to satisfy the
constraint. (stay alive for an organism, valorize ego for a human …). A
meaning can be defined only when a system submitted to a constraint is in
relation with its environment.

The environment of the system makes available a lot of information that the
system can receive. Only the received information having a connection with
the constraint of the system will generate a meaning within the system. And
we can consider that the content of the meaning is precisely that connection
existing between the received information and the constraint of the system.
A systemic approach can be formalized on this subject with the introduction
of a Meaning Generator System (MGS). See short paper
http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/index.HTM

3) As you may have noted, such approach on meaning generation is triadic and
can be part of the neighborhood of the Peircean  theory of sign (in a much
simpler and less elaborated form). 

The MGS is also in the domain of the Von Uexkull biosemiotics where a
meaning is generated by the connection of the constraints of the organism
(Internal world of the organism, Umwelt) with the external world.

4) Going from simple organisms to humans in the field of meaning generation
is not an easy task. The constraints to satisfy cumulate and are more and
more elaborated. The systems also become more complex and are inter-related.
And the mysterious function of human consciousness comes in. 

However, looking at MGS as a building block can offers some possibilities
(see  http://cogprints.org/4531/ ).

All the best

Christophe

-Message d'origine-
De : Steven Ericsson-Zenith [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Envoyé : vendredi 5 octobre 2007 01:26
À : Christophe Menant
Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: SV: [Fis] info  meaning

 

 

I read Pedro's post differently. What definition of meaning are you  

using exactly?

 

I was going to express agreement with Pedro too, but I do not agree  

with either Soren of Christophe's interpretation of Pedro's posting.  

Can Pedro clarify? And can we be more precise in what we mean when we  

use the term meaning?

 

With respect,

Steven

 

 

--

Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith

Institute for Advanced Science  Engineering

http://iase.info

http://senses.info

 

 

On Oct 4, 2007, at 3:38 PM, Christophe Menant wrote:

 

 Dear Soren,

 I agree with your reading of Pedro’s  proposal as to start with  

 cellular meaning, and then go thru the higher levels of evolution.  

 It has the advantage of beginning with the simplest case and then  

 look at more complex ones. See (1) for a corresponding approach.

 But I’m afraid I disagree with your point regarding first person  

 consciousness as not representing anything real, as just being a  

 bio-cultural artefact as you say. I take human consciousness as  

 being a reality resulting from an evolution of representations. But  

 this is not our today subject.

 Coming back to it, Walter Riofrio, (New FIS member) has an  

 interesting approach to the notion of meaning where he groups  

 together the emergence of autonomy, function and meaning (2). I  

 understand his work as associating inside a system a meaningful  

 information with a function that needs it in order to use it, in a  

 background of autonomy. Such evolutionary link between meaningful  

 information and function looks as an interesting tool.

 

 All the best

 Christophe

 (1) - Short paper: http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/index.HTM

   - Full paper: http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020193.pdf

 (2) http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00114521/en/

 

 

 

  Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2007 22:13:27 +0200

  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

  Subject: SV: [Fis] info  meaning

  To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; fis@listas.unizar.es

 

  Dear Pedro

 

  Do I understand you right when I see your models as:

 

  1. There is no meaning in inanimate nature.

  2. Meaning is constructed on a first level by life in the form of  

 single

  cell life forms.

  3. Second level is (chemical) communication between cells.

  4

FW: SV: [Fis] info meaning

2007-10-04 Thread Christophe Menant

Dear Soren,  I agree with your reading of Pedro’s  proposal as to start with 
cellular meaning, and then go thru the higher levels of evolution. It has the 
advantage of beginning with the simplest case and then look at more complex 
ones. See (1) for a corresponding approach.But I’m afraid I disagree with your 
point regarding first person consciousness as not representing anything real, 
as just being a bio-cultural artefact as you say. I take human consciousness as 
being a reality resulting from an evolution of representations. But this is not 
our today subject. Coming back to it, Walter Riofrio, (New FIS member) has an 
interesting approach to the notion of meaning where he groups together the 
emergence of autonomy, function and meaning (2). I understand his work as 
associating inside a system a meaningful information with a function that needs 
it in order to use it, in a background of autonomy. Such evolutionary link 
between meaningful information and function looks as an interesting tool.  
All the best Christophe(1) - Short paper: 
http://crmenant.free.fr/ResUK/index.HTM  - Full paper: 
http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/papers/e5020193.pdf(2) 
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00114521/en/ Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2007 
22:13:27 +0200 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: SV: [Fis] info  meaning To: 
[EMAIL PROTECTED]; fis@listas.unizar.es  Dear Pedro  Do I understand you 
right when I see your models as:  1. There is no meaning in inanimate 
nature. 2. Meaning is constructed on a first level by life in the form of 
single cell life forms. 3. Second level is (chemical) communication between 
cells. 4. Third level is multicellular organisms as species with a gene pool. 
5. Fifth level is their communication. 6. Sixth level human construction of 
meaning in 'life worlds'.   But there is no object of meaning in itself. 
Energy and mathematical information are the basic reality. First person 
meaningful consciousness is a bio-cultural artifact useful for the 
construction of life and culture, but it is not an image of anything real.  
Best wishes  Søren   -Oprindelig meddelelse- Fra: [EMAIL 
PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] På vegne af Pedro Marijuan Sendt: 4. 
oktober 2007 14:23 Til: fis@listas.unizar.es Emne: Re: [Fis] info  meaning 
 Dear colleagues,  What if meaning is equivalent to zero?  I mean, if we 
backtrack to the origins of zero, we find those obscure philosophers related 
to Buddhism in India, many centuries ago (Brahmagupta, 600 ad). It was 
something difficult to grasp, rather bizarre, the fruit of quite a long and 
winding thought, and frankly not of much practicity. Then after not many 
developments during a few centuries, another scholar in central Asia 
(al-Kwarismi) took the idea and was able to algorithmize the basic arithmetic 
operations. Mathematics could fly... and nowadays any school children learns 
and uses arithmetics  algebra so easily.  The idea is that if we strictly 
identify (we zero on) meaning as a biological construct, work it rigorously 
for the living cell as a tough problem of systems biology (and not as a 
flamboyant autopoiectic or autogenic or selftranscence doctrines of 
Brahmaguptian style), then we work for a parallel enactive action/perception 
approach in neuroscience, and besides pen a rigorous view in social-economic 
setting under similar guidelines --and also find the commonalities with 
quantum computing and information physics... finally information science will 
fly.  Otherwise, if we remain working towards the other direction, the 
undergrounds of zero downwards, we will get confined into bizarre, voluminous, 
useless discussions  doctrines on information. Cellular meaning is our zero 
concept: we should go for it.  best  Pedro  
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