[Fis] Fwd: The shadows are real !!!
Dear Joseph, Merleau-Ponty is undoubtedly a philosopher, but I would surmise that when "foundations", as you say, are a matter of discussion, it is difficult to keep philosophy out of the door. More to the point, would you absolutely exclude the relevance of self- organisation for the construction of information science ? If not, allow me to mention how significant was the influence of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy in Francisco Varela's work—see Varela, Francisco J., Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch. 1991. *The embodied mind: **Cognitive science and human experience*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Best regards,-dino On 26 February 2018 at 03:58, joe.bren...@bluewin.chwrote: > Dear FISers, > > With all due respect to Krassimir, Sung, and his son, it is becoming a > matter of scientific interest that statements by them and others to the > effect that "systematic research of what the 'shadows' are a part" has not > been done are made routinely. First of all, the logic in reality of > Lupasco about which I have been talking here for 10 years, includes a new > mereology in which the dynamic relations between part and whole are set out > for discussion. Second, while the 'diagram' of Merleau-Ponty may be > considered interesting as philosophy and as a foundation of religious > belief, I see no reason to include it, without heavy qualification, in a > discussion of the foundations of information science. > > Thank you, > > Joseph > > > > Message d'origine > De : s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu > Date : 25/02/2018 - 15:04 (PST) > À : ag...@ncf.ca, fis@listas.unizar.es > Objet : Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!! > > Hi Krassimir, > > > I agree with you that "*The shadows are real* but only a part of the > whole. What is needed is a systematic research from what they are part." > > > In my previous post, I was suggesting that Shadows are a part of > the irreudicible triad consisting of *Form (A), Shadow (B) *and* Thought > (C)*. The essential notion of the ITR (Irreducible Triadic realrtion) is > that A, B, and C cannot be reduced to any one or a pair of the triad. This > automatically means that 'Shadow' is a part of the whole triad (which is, > to me, another name for the Ultimate Reality), as Form and Thought are. In > other words, the Ultimate Reality is not Form nor Shadow nor Thought > individually but all of them together, since they constitute an irreducible > triad.This idea is expressed in 1995 in another way: The Ultimate > Reality is the *complementary union* of the *Visble* and the *Invisible > World* (see *Table 1* attached). Apparently a similar idea underlies the > philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), according to my son, > Douglas Sayer Ji (see his semior research thesis submitted in 1996 to the > Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University under the guidance of B. > Wilshire, attached). > > > All the best. > > > Sung > > > > -- > *From:* Fis on behalf of John Collier < > ag...@ncf.ca> > *Sent:* Sunday, February 25, 2018 2:51 PM > *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es > *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The shadows are real !!! > > Daer Krassimir, List > > I basically support what you are saying. I understand the mathematics you > presented, I am good at mathematics and studied logic with some of the > best. However, and this is a big however, giving a mathematical or logical > proof by itself, in its formalism, does not show anything at all. One has > to be able to connect teh mathematics to experience in a comprehensible > way. This was partly the topic of my dissertation, and I take a basically > Peircean approach, though there are others that are pretty strong as well. > > I fgenerally skip over the mathematics and look for the empirical > connections. If I find them, then generally all becomes clear. Without > this, the formalism is nothing more than formalism. It does not help to > give formal names to things and assume that this identifies things, Often > trying to follow up approaches kine this is a profound waste of time. I try > to, and often am able to, express my ideas in a nonformal way. Some > mathematically oriented colleagues see this as automatically defective, > since they think that formal representation is all that really rigorously > explains things. This sort of thinking (in Logical Positivism) eventually > led to its own destruction as people started to ask the meaning of > theoretical terms and their relation to observations. It is a defunct and > self destructive metaphysics. Irt leads nowhere -- my PhD thesis was about > this problem. It hurts me to see people making the same mistake, especially > when it leads them to bizarre conclusions that are compatible with the > formalism (actually, it is provable that almost anything is compatible with > a specific formalism, up to numerosity). > > I don't like to waste my time with such emptiness, > > John > > On 2018/02/25 6:22 PM,
[Fis] New Year Lecture wrap-up
Dear Hans, Thank you very much again for your lecture and your subsequent comments and replies. I dare posting a new comment as an aftermath to your wrap-up and to Pedro's official closure. But I am sure you agree with me, that the matter cannot be settled yet and that a continuation of the discussion is a sign of the fruitfulness of your lecture. As a matter of fact, when I received Pedro's official closure announcement I was a little disappointed because I had been gathering some evidence in support of a previous comment of mine, which probably was not clear enough. I would not like to bother you any more, but since you mention the usefulness of a philosophical outlook, here is a philosophical observation I was able to find. According to Jules Vuillemin (*Necessity or Contingency*, Stanford CA, CSLI Publications, 1996), “probability in the classical sense,” as is well known, is “relative to our ignorance only” (p. 261), but “probability amplitude is something altogether different” (264). For “when physicists today make reference to [...] probability amplitudes [...] they indeed allude to second order probabilities” (167). Therefore, the distinction “between a probability and a probability amplitude” entails a “new distinction in the history of modal notions,” a distinction that Vuillemin describes in the following way: “Classical physics was content with the opposition 'This particle passes through A' versus 'This particle has the probability π of passing through A'. This opposition has nothing to do with ontology: it incorporates what is due to our ignorance into the determination of natural phenomena. Instead of attributing a property or magnitude to a physical system, we attribute it a disposition or propensity to have that property or magnitude. Probability measures that disposition or propensity that belongs to the system in act. A probability amplitude is something altogether different. We can compare it to an embryonic probability as the inventors of the infinitesimal calculus compared the moment of motion to an embryonic motion that an integration would bring to a state of whole motion. But the comparison limps. For the probability amplitude, which is generally a complex quantity, does not figure among the elements of reality. To obtain a probability we must multiply two conjugated probability amplitudes. This means that, when we attribute that amplitude to a system, it is attributed neither as an actual property or magnitude nor as an actual disposition or propensity to having such property or magnitude, but as a purely virtual disposition or propensity to having it. The second- order potentiality, as it were, thus put into play is no longer the measure of an ignorance that might have some chance of being only provisional. It is physical. It describes nature.” (264-65) This is just the conclusion of a long-winded argument, but if Vuillemin is right, then, the interpretation of a superposition of probability amplitudes cannot be Bayesian, or “relative to our ignorance only.” (261) As S. Barry Cooper observes ( *Definability in the Real Universe*, http://arxiv.org/abs/1109.1416 ), “the Laplacian model has a deeply ingrained hold on the rational mind. For a bromeliad-like late flowering of the paradigm we tend to think of Hilbert and his assertion of very general expectations for axiomatic mathematics. Or of the state of physics before quantum mechanics.” From this point of view, QBism might be described, to use Barry Cooper's own words, as “a defensive response to an uncompleted paradigm change” (p. 4). Kind regards, -dino buzzetti On 18 January 2014 18:47, Hans von Baeyer henrikrit...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Friends: In keeping with the message of my lecture, that knowledge of the world is based on the ensemble of individual experiences, more than on assumed objective, actual properties of an external reality, I will tell you about my experiences of writing and discussing the New Year Lecture. I enjoyed the entire process enormously, and wish once more to applaud Pedro for inventing this new tradition! Even as I started this email I learned something that piqued my interest. Gregory Bateson was quoted: Kant argued long ago that this piece of chalk contains a million potential facts (Tatsachen) but that only a very few of these become truly facts by affecting the behavior of entities capable of responding to facts. Google.de informed me that Tatsache is probably an 18th century translation of the English matter of fact. Tat is a deed, a factum, something done or performed, while Sache means a thing or a matter. This tenuous etymology connects factuality with action rather than with some intrinsic essence. Kant's words affecting, behavior and responding are QBist to the core. More and more I realize that philosophy matters. Chris Fuchs, the chief spokesman for QBism, is among the rare physicists who give credit to philosophers for the contributions
Re: [Fis] Probability Amplitudes
Dear Hans, Thank you for your explanation about probability amplitudes, that clarifies a lot. My only worry was about the *epistemological* implications of quantum mechanics in its standard formulation, that in my opinion point to a paradigm shift, which is felt not only in this domain, but in all fields where *emergent* phenomena are accounted for—a process that I thought was hinted to by Wheeler's famous words It from Bit, that I remember reading for the first time precisely in your book on information. That's the ground for expressing my worry that reverting to classical probability theory might entail a drawback to this decisive epistemological turn. But I might misunderstand the whole story, that is certainly not over yet :-) -dino On 22 January 2014 00:21, Hans von Baeyer henrikrit...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Dino and friends, thanks for bringing up the issue of probability amplitudes. Since they are technical tools of physics, and since I didn't want to go too far afield, I did not mention them in my lecture. The closest I came was the wavefunction, which, indeed, is a probability amplitude. In order to make contact with real, measurable quantities, it must be multiplied by its complex conjugate. This recipe is called the Born rule, and it is an ad hoc addition to the quantum theory. It lacks any motivation except that it works. In keeping with Einstein's advice (which he himself often flouted) to try to keep unmeasurable concepts out of our description of nature, physicists have realized long ago that it must be possible to recast quantum mechanics entirely in terms of probabilities, not even mentioning probability amplitudes or wavefunctions. The question is only: How complicated would the resulting formalism be? (To make a weak analogy, it must be possible to recast arithmetic in the language of Roman numerals, but the result would surely look much messier than what we learn in grade school.) Hitherto, nobody had come up with an elegant solution to this problem. To their happy surprise, QBists have made progress toward a quantum theory without probability amplitudes. Of course they have to pay a price. Instead of unmeasurable concepts they introduce, for any experiment, a very special set of standard probabilities (NOT AMPLITUDES) which are measurable, but not actually measured. When they re-write the Born rule in terms of these, they find that it looks almost, but not quite, like a fundamental axiom of probability theory called Unitarity. Unitarity decrees that for any experiment the sum of the probabilities for all possible outcomes must be one. (For a coin, the probabilities of heads and tails are both 1/2. Unitarity states 1/2 + 1/2 = 1.) This unexpected outcome of QBism suggests a deep connection between the Born rule and Unitarity. Since Unitarity is a logical concept unrelated to quantum phenomena, this gives QBists the hope that they will eventually succeed in explaining the significacne of the Born rule, and banishing probability amplitudes from quantum mechanics, leaving only (Bayesian) probabilities. So, I'm afraid dear Dino, that the current attitude of QBists is that probability amplitudes are LESS fundamental than probabilities, not MORE. But the story is far from finished! Hans ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis