Re: [Fis] Everett & quantum wave collapse

2018-05-17 Thread Lars-Göran Johansson
 
contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way, the textbook 
contains information but is not information itself. The same is true for 
letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical objects because all 
of them only contain information but are not information. For instance, as we 
know, different letters can contain the same information. Even if we make an 
identical copy of a letter or any other text, then the letter and its copy will 
be different physical objects (physical things) but they will contain the same 
information.
   Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge, data 
and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on physical objects 
(physical bodies) and this action also misleads people who think that 
information is physical.

OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how immaterial or non physical 
objects can alter the physical realm. It is the usual problem faced by dualist 
ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we recover many dualities, but they 
belong to the phenomenologies.




   One more misleading property of information is that people can measure it. 
This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure only 
physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous conclusion 
that information is physical. However, measuring information is essentially 
different than measuring physical quantities, i.e., weight. There are no 
“scales” that measure information. Only human intellect can do this.

OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he human one.

Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is always a form of the 
“knocking table” argument. They knocks on the table and say “you will not tell 
me that this table is unreal”.

I have got so many people giving me that argument, that I have made dreams in 
which I made that argument, or even where I was convinced by that argument … 
until I wake up.

When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this “dream argument” 
illustrates that seeing, measuring, … cannot prove anything ontological. A 
subjective experience proves only the phenomenological existence of 
consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that although there are plenty of 
strong evidences for a material reality, there are no evidences (yet) for a 
primitive or primary matter (and that is why, I think, Aristotle assumes it 
quasi explicitly, against Plato, and plausibly against Pythagorus).

Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the worlds of ideas is the world 
of programs, or information, or even just numbers, since very elementary 
arithmetic (PA without induction, + the predecessor axiom) is already Turing 
complete (it contains what I have named a Universal Dovetailer: a program which 
generates *and* executes all programs).

So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim that if we assume 
Mechanism (Indexical computationalism) matter itself is also not *primarily* 
physical: it is all in the “head of the universal machine/number” (so to speak).

And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough to find if there is a 
discrepancy between the physics that we infer from the observation, and the 
physics that we extract from “the head” of the machine. This took me more than 
30 years of work, but the results obtained up to now is that there is no 
discrepancies. I have compared the quantum logic imposed by incompleteness 
(formally) on the semi-computable (partial recursive, sigma_1) propositions, 
with most quantum logics given by physicists, and it fits rather well.

Best regards,

Bruno
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AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

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Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

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Seniorprofessor i teoretisk filosofi



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Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re[2]: Heretic

2017-10-05 Thread Lars-Göran Johansson
Dear all
It seems to me that the heat in the debate about the definition of the concept 
of Information is fuelled by deep metaphysical feelings: different people have 
different views about what is REALLY Information. Metaphysical debates can 
never be resolved. May I suggest that we agree on this: there are several 
different concepts, such as Shannon Information, Semantic Information, etc.. 
Each Information concept has its own distinct definition and each one may use 
whichever he/she finds useful.

Whether any of these concepts refers to any real thing, INFORMATION, cannot be 
determined by any empirical research. The reason is that empirical research can 
sometimes decide the truth of a sentence, but never whether the predicate in 
that sentence refers to anything.
 Suppose we have found, empirically, that a sentence of the form ’ X is 
information’ where ’information’ has  a clear definition. (Chose anyone you 
like.) The truth of this sentence entails that the object referred to by ’X’ 
must exist; this is a truth condition for any declarative sentence. But it does 
not follow that the predicate ’Information' refers to something. It suffice 
that the object X belongs to the extension of the predicate. This is the 
nominalist position.
Since 1000 years the core debate in metaphysics has been whether there are 
universals, i.e., properties and relations. The debate about Information is a 
debate about the existence of a property.
I am an empiricist and nominalist, accepting Occam’s razor: one should not 
assume more entities than necessary. And assuming that Information is a 
property, an entithy, is not necessary. We can proceed with scientific 
research, using any information  concept we think useful, without assuming it 
refers to anything.  Metaphysical issues can safely be put to rest.

Lars-Göran Johansson



4 okt. 2017 kl. 19:49 skrev tozziart...@libero.it<mailto:tozziart...@libero.it>:

 Messaggio inoltrato  Da: 
tozziart...@libero.it<mailto:tozziart...@libero.it> A: Alex Hankey 
alexhan...@gmail.com<mailto:alexhan...@gmail.com> Data: mercoledì, 04 ottobre 
2017, 07:37PM +02:00 Oggetto: Re[2]: [Fis] Heretic


Dear Prof. Hankey,
I come from a free country, where everybody can say his own opinion, in 
particular if his opinion is not totally stupid.
The times of Giordano Bruno and Inquisition are gone.


--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android

mercoledì, 04 ottobre 2017, 06:20PM +02:00 da Alex Hankey 
alexhan...@gmail.com<mailto:alexhan...@gmail.com>:

Dear Professor Tozzi,

Might I suggest that you graciously retire from the list,
as you evidently do not wish to participate in what
the rest of us find fascinating topics of discussion.

As a physicist, I have no difficulty in relating to the concept of 
'information',
and I am aware of no less than five conceptually totally different
mathematical structures, all of which merit the name, 'information'.

With all good wishes,

Alex Hankey


On 4 October 2017 at 02:30,  
<tozziart...@libero.it<mailto:tozziart...@libero.it>> wrote:

Dear FISers,
After the provided long list of completely different definitions of the term 
"information", one conclusion is clear: there is not a scientific, unique 
definition of information.

Nobody of us is able to provide an operative framework and a single (just one!) 
empirical  testable prevision able to assess "information".
For example, what does "semantics" and "meaning" mean, in empirical terms?
Therefore, to talk about information is meaningless, in the carnapian sense.

Judging from your answers, the most of you are foremost scientists.  Therefore, 
my proposal is to forget about information, and to use your otherwise very 
valuable skills and efforts in other fields.
It is a waste of your  precious time to focus yourself in something that is so 
vague.  It is, retrospectively, a mistake to state that the world is 
information, if nobody knows what does it mean.

--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android

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Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics and 
Phenomenological 
Philosophy<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>
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Re: [Fis] INFORMATION: JUST A MATTER OF MATH

2017-09-18 Thread Lars-Göran Johansson
 from other 
sciences, rather multifarious in appearance and concepts, and cavalierly moving 
from scale to scale. What could be the specific role of principles herein? 
Rather than opening homogeneous realms for conceptual development, these 
information principles would appear as a sort of "portals" that connect with 
essential topics of other disciplines in the different organization layers, but 
at the same time they should try to be consistent with each other and provide a 
coherent vision of the information world.
And second, about organizing the present discussion, I bet I was too optimistic 
with the commentators scheme. In any case, for having a first glance on the 
whole scheme, the opinions of philosophers would be very interesting. In order 
to warm up the discussion, may I ask John Collier, Joseph Brenner and Rafael 
Capurro to send some initial comments / criticisms? Later on, if the 
commentators idea flies, Koichiro Matsuno and Wolfgang Hofkirchner would be 
very valuable voices to put a perspectival end to this info principles 
discussion(both attended the Madrid bygone FIS 1994 conference)...
But this is FIS list, unpredictable in between the frozen states and the 
chaotic states! So, everybody is invited to get ahead at his own, with the only 
customary limitation of two messages per week.

Best wishes, have a good weekend --Pedro


10 PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION SCIENCE

1. Information is information, neither matter nor energy.

2. Information is comprehended into structures, patterns, messages, or flows.

3. Information can be recognized, can be measured, and can be  processed 
(either computationally or non-computationally).

4. Information flows are essential organizers of life's self-production 
processes--anticipating, shaping, and mixing up with the accompanying energy 
flows.

5. Communication/information exchanges among adaptive life-cycles underlie the 
complexity of biological organizations at all scales.

6. It is symbolic language what conveys the essential communication exchanges 
of the human species--and constitutes the core of its "social nature."

7. Human information may be systematically converted into efficient knowledge, 
by following the "knowledge instinct" and further up by applying rigorous 
methodologies.

8. Human cognitive limitations on knowledge accumulation are partially overcome 
via the social organization of "knowledge ecologies."

9. Knowledge circulates and recombines socially, in a continuous actualization 
that involves "creative destruction" of fields and disciplines: the 
intellectual Ars Magna.

10. Information science proposes a new, radical vision on the information and 
knowledge flows that support individual lives, with profound consequences for 
scientific-philosophical practice and for social governance.

--
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta 0
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526<tel:+34%20976%2071%2035%2026> (& 6818)
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es<mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-



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Re: [Fis] non-living objects COULD NOT “exchange information”

2017-03-24 Thread Lars-Göran Johansson

24 mars 2017 kl. 16:25 skrev Krassimir Markov 
<mar...@foibg.com<mailto:mar...@foibg.com>>:

Dear Arturo and FIS Colleagues,
Let me remember that:
The basic misunderstanding that non-living objects could “exchange  
information” leads to many principal theoretical as well as psychological 
faults.
For instance, photon could exchange only energy and/or reflections !
Sorry for this n-th my remark ...
Friendly greetings
Krassimir

And let me add: a photon is not something that can exchange information, or 
energy or anything whatsoever. A photon is portion of electromagnetic 
radiation, it comes into exitence when a material object decreases its energy 
and is destroyed when another (or the same) material object absorbs that 
portion. A photon cannot increase its energy, or decrease it. And, of course, 
we cannot attribute information or information change to it.

Furthermore, as was proved by Gegerfeldt and Malament quite some time ago, a 
particle interpretation of quantum electro dynmaics is impossible. So thinking 
that a photon is confined to well defined portion of  spacetime contradicts QED.

cheers
Lars-Göran



From: tozziart...@libero.it<mailto:tozziart...@libero.it>
Sent: Friday, March 24, 2017 4:52 PM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: [Fis] I: Re: Is information truly important?



Dear  Lars-Göran,
I prefer to use asap my second FIS bullet, therefore it will be my last FIS 
mail for the next days.

First of all, in special relativity, an observer is NOT by definition a 
material object that can receive and store incoming energy from other objects.
In special relativity, an observer is a frame of reference from which a set of 
objects or events are being measured.  Speaking of an observer is not 
specifically hypothesizing an individual person who is experiencing events, but 
rather it is a particular mathematical context which objects and events are to 
be evaluated from. The effects of special relativity occur whether or not there 
is a "material object that can recieve and store incoming energy from other 
objects" within the inertial reference frame to witness them.

Furthermore, take a photon (traveling at speed light) that crosses a cosmic 
zone close to the sun.  The photon "detects" (and therefore can interact with) 
a huge sun surface (because of its high speed), while we humans on the Earth 
"detect" (and can interact with) a much smaller sun surface.
Therefore, the photon may exchange more information with the sun than the 
humans on the Earth: both the photon and the humans interact with the same sun, 
but they "detect" different surfaces, and therefore they may exchange with the 
sun a different information content.
If we also take into account that the photon detects an almost infinite, fixed 
time, this means once again that it can exchange much more information with the 
sun than we humans can.

In sum, once again, information does not seem to be a physical quantity, rather 
just a very subjective measure, depending on the speed and of the time of the 
"observer".



Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/


Messaggio originale
Da: "Lars-Göran Johansson" 
<lars-goran.johans...@filosofi.uu.se<mailto:lars-goran.johans...@filosofi.uu.se>>
Data: 24/03/2017 14.50
A: 
"tozziart...@libero.it<mailto:tozziart...@libero.it>"<tozziart...@libero.it<mailto:tozziart...@libero.it>>
Ogg: Re: [Fis] Is information truly important?


24 mars 2017 kl. 13:15 skrev 
tozziart...@libero.it<mailto:tozziart...@libero.it>:

Dear Fisers,
a big doubt...

We know that the information of a 3D black hole is proportional to its 2D 
horizon, according to the Bekenstein-Hawking equations.

However, an hypotetical observer traveling at light speed (who watches a black 
hole at rest) detects a very large black hole horizon, due to Einstein's 
equations.
Therefore, he detects more information from the black hole than an observer at 
rest, who sees a smaller horizon…
An observer is by definition a material object that can recieve and store 
incoming energy from other objects. Since it requires infinite energy  to 
accelerate even a slighest object to the velocity of light, no observer can 
travel at the speed of light. That means that your thought experiment is based 
in inconsistent assumptions and no vaild conclusions from them can be drawn.
Lars-Göran Johansson


In sum, information does not seem to be a physical quantity, rather just a very 
subjective measure...


Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/

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Re: [Fis] Probability Amplitudes

2014-01-22 Thread Lars-Göran Johansson
 Dear Andrei, Hans and all
I agree with Andrei. And why make quantum theory more complex than it is? One 
may use all  kinds of mathematical tools in a scientific theory, and the more 
these tools simplify calculations the better. I see no reason to avoid using 
amplitudes or  matrices in quantum theory. Using a mathematical concept for 
making calculations doesn't entail that I accept that that concept represent a 
physical property.

To Hans: Where exactly did Einstein wrote that one should avoid unmeasurable 
concepts in the description of Nature? I can't remember having read that.

The issue is how we should interpret quantum theory, in particular the wave 
function, i.e., probability amplitudes; are they just mathematical tools, or do 
they describe real physical features of quantum systems? I believe the latter 
alternative is true and so did Schrödinger. But there are formidable 
difficulties to give a realistic interpretation of wave functions, and 
Schrödinger didn't succeed. But I think the difficulties can be overcome and I 
have published my views about these things (Lars-Göran Johansson: Interpreting 
Quantum Mechanics. A realist view in Schrödinger's vein, Ashgate, Aldershot 
2007).
Lars-Göran

22 jan 2014 kl. 10:59 skrev Andrei Khrennikov 
andrei.khrenni...@lnu.semailto:andrei.khrenni...@lnu.se:

  Dear Hans,

I would like just to point that 99,99% of people working
in quantum theory would say that the complex amplitude of
quantum probability is the main its intrinsic property, so
if you try to exclude amplitudes from the model
you can in principle do this and this is well known
long ago in so called quantum tomographic approach of Vladimir
Manko, but in this way quantum theory loses its simplicity and
clarity, yours, andrei

Andrei Khrennikov, Professor of Applied Mathematics,
International Center for Mathematical Modeling
in Physics, Engineering, Economics, and Cognitive Science
Linnaeus University, Växjö-Kalmar, Sweden

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es 
[fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] on behalf 
of Hans von Baeyer [henrikrit...@gmail.commailto:henrikrit...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 12:21 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Probability Amplitudes

Dear Dino and friends, thanks for bringing up the issue of probability 
amplitudes.  Since they are technical tools of physics, and since I didn't want 
to go too far afield, I did not mention them in my lecture.  The closest I came 
was the wavefunction, which, indeed, is a probability amplitude.  In order to 
make contact with real, measurable quantities, it must be multiplied by its 
complex conjugate. This recipe is called the Born rule, and it is an ad hoc 
addition to the quantum theory. It lacks any motivation except that it works.

In keeping with Einstein's advice (which he himself often flouted) to try to 
keep unmeasurable concepts out of our description of nature, physicists have 
realized long ago that it must be possible to recast quantum mechanics entirely 
in terms of probabilities, not even mentioning probability amplitudes or 
wavefunctions. The question is only: How complicated would the resulting 
formalism be?  (To make a weak analogy, it must be possible to recast 
arithmetic in the language of Roman numerals, but the result would surely look 
much messier than what we learn in grade school.)  Hitherto, nobody had come up 
with an elegant solution to this problem.

To their happy surprise, QBists have made  progress toward a quantum theory 
without probability amplitudes.  Of course they have to pay a price.  Instead 
of unmeasurable concepts they introduce, for any experiment, a very special 
set of standard probabilities (NOT AMPLITUDES) which are measurable, but not 
actually measured.  When they re-write the Born rule in terms of these, they 
find that it looks almost, but not quite, like a fundamental axiom of 
probability theory called Unitarity.  Unitarity decrees that for any experiment 
the sum of the probabilities for all possible outcomes must be one. (For a 
coin, the probabilities of heads and tails are both 1/2.  Unitarity states 1/2 
+ 1/2 = 1.)

This unexpected outcome of QBism suggests a deep connection between the Born 
rule and Unitarity. Since Unitarity is a logical concept unrelated to quantum 
phenomena, this gives QBists the hope that they will eventually succeed in 
explaining the significacne of the Born rule, and banishing probability 
amplitudes from quantum mechanics, leaving only (Bayesian) probabilities.

So, I'm afraid dear Dino, that the current attitude of QBists is that 
probability amplitudes are LESS fundamental than probabilities, not MORE.  But 
the story is far from finished!

Hans



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Re: [Fis] Probability Amplitudes in Macroscopic Processes

2014-01-22 Thread Lars-Göran Johansson
Let me clarify one point: by saying that probability amplitudes represent real 
physical features I reject the instrumentalist idea that they are mere 
calculational devices. But of course, the probability amplitude is no 
observable. But there is no need to claim that only observables have any 
physical significance.
Robert Chen has, in a couple of papers argued that the square of real part of 
the wave function could be interpreted as the system's kinetic energy, whereas 
the square of the imaginary part represents the potential energy of the system. 
It is as far as I can see a possible and reasonable interpretation.
Lars-Göran


22 jan 2014 kl. 15:14 skrev Joseph Brenner 
joe.bren...@bluewin.chmailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch:

Dear Lars-Göran, Andrei and Hans,

As you (I hope) have seen, I am trying to see how the evolution of macroscopic 
processes can be described in terms of changing probabilities, and I am 
encouraged to believe this is possible. If you allow the extension from QM, all 
of the following would seem to allow this
(I am not concerned about whether QM itself becomes more or less complex):

1. Andrei confirms that the probability (in LIR, degree of potentiality or 
actuality) of a phenomenon can have a direction.
2. Lars-Göran says that probability amplitudes can represent real physical 
features.
3. Even though /a contrario/, Hans wrote:

In order to make contact with real, measurable quantities, it (the probability 
amplitude) must be multiplied by its complex conjugate. This recipe is called 
the Born rule, and it is an ad hoc addition to the quantum theory. It lacks any 
motivation except that it works.
In my Logic in Reality, since there is a reciprocal relation between actuality 
and potentiality, each should be the complex conjugate of the other. I have no 
problem in the two summing to 1 if the values of 0 or 1 are excluded for either 
of them. This non-quantum aspect of reality could provide the missing 
motivation for the recipe in quantum theory ;-)

I am certainly looking for a measurable (or estimatable) quantity of the 
actuality and potentiality of interactive processes that is not a standard 
probability of outcomes, but of changing macroscopic states. This is of course 
an 'underdeveloped' concept, but I am encouraged to believe that this idea of 
another set of very special probabilities is neither totally wrong nor 
totally trivial.

Many thanks,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Lars-Göran Johanssonmailto:lars-goran.johans...@filosofi.uu.se
To: fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 12:45 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Probability Amplitudes

 Dear Andrei, Hans and all
I agree with Andrei. And why make quantum theory more complex than it is? One 
may use all  kinds of mathematical tools in a scientific theory, and the more 
these tools simplify calculations the better. I see no reason to avoid using 
amplitudes or  matrices in quantum theory. Using a mathematical concept for 
making calculations doesn't entail that I accept that that concept represent a 
physical property.

To Hans: Where exactly did Einstein wrote that one should avoid unmeasurable 
concepts in the description of Nature? I can't remember having read that.

The issue is how we should interpret quantum theory, in particular the wave 
function, i.e., probability amplitudes; are they just mathematical tools, or do 
 they describe real physical features of quantum systems? I believe the latter 
alternative is true and so did Schrödinger. But there are formidable 
difficulties to give a realistic interpretation of wave functions, and 
Schrödinger didn't succeed. But I think the difficulties can be overcome and I 
have published my views about these things (Lars-Göran Johansson: Interpreting 
Quantum Mechanics. A realist view in Schrödinger's vein, Ashgate, Aldershot 
2007).
Lars-Göran

22 jan 2014 kl. 10:59 skrev Andrei Khrennikov 
andrei.khrenni...@lnu.semailto:andrei.khrenni...@lnu.se:

  Dear Hans,

I would like just to point that 99,99% of people working
in quantum theory would say that the complex amplitude of
quantum probability is the main its intrinsic property, so
if you try to exclude amplitudes from the model
you can in principle do this and this is well known
long ago in so called quantum tomographic approach of Vladimir
Manko, but in this way quantum theory loses its simplicity and
clarity, yours, andrei

Andrei Khrennikov, Professor of Applied Mathematics,
International Center for Mathematical Modeling
in Physics, Engineering, Economics, and Cognitive Science
Linnaeus University, Växjö-Kalmar, Sweden

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es 
[fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] on behalf 
of Hans von Baeyer [henrikrit...@gmail.commailto:henrikrit...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 12:21 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis