[Fis] _ Fwd: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self
I hope the following passage I’ve written on Nagarjuna will be of use for this discussion on the nature of self. The passage is from a manuscript I’ve just completed on silence and postmodernism. Nagarjuna’s thinking is deeply conversant with silence and with the use of paradox as well. For him, contradictory things are never “either/or,” but are always “both/and.” Refusing to choose between opposing metaphysical problems, he would recommend responding through silence instead. For an example of his reductive reasoning process, consider the following: Whatever is dependently co-arisen That is explained to be emptiness. That, being a dependent designation, Is itself the middle way. Something that is not dependently arisen Such a thing does not exist. Therefore a nonempty thing Does not exist. Nagarjuna is criticizing the common paradoxical occurrence that when we attribute abstract concepts (“something that does not dependently exist”) like emptiness to the status of “reality” (like we do with the Platonic forms), then they seem to be applicable to everything, while on the other hand when we emphasize instead the individual uniqueness and particularity of any one thing (“whatever is dependently co-arisen”), this emphasis makes it impossible to categorize its likeness with other things. Nagarjuna’s point is that the abstract concept of emptiness and the concrete nature of any particular empty thing are in fact codependent. He calls this codependency “Conditioned Arising.” His “middle way” resolves the paradox by viewing neither the abstract idea nor the concrete thing as having a separate reality — both instead are characterized as “‘thought constructions’ founded on experience.’ As such, they are not absolutely real or absolutely unreal. …This middle path could thus be adopted in understanding all forms of experience, whether they be linguistic, social, political, moral, or religious.” Another way of approaching an understanding of the middle way has to do with recognizing it as constituting a resolution of the identity/difference problem. According to standard Buddhist doctrine the most dangerous false view possible is the belief in a permanent, independent self (also commonly referred to as the concept of identity). This notion of self is symptomatic of our deepest fears, concerning things like death and the possibility of our personal nonexistence. The concept of difference, which is the other side of the problem, is the belief that nothing is real; it also asserts the absence of all identities. This position would lead to the most mundane things becoming unintelligible. Nagarjuna’s solution to this problem is his assertion that neither identity nor difference is real. Both notions, when seen properly, are “empty” of self-essence. They can exist only together and not separately. Nagarjuna’s way of resolving this problem, by pointing to the interdependency of identity and difference, is remarkably similar to the one proposed by Merleau-Ponty many years later. Steve Bindeman ___ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] _ Re: : Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self
way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them — as steps — to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) 7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. I find Nagarjuna’s reasoning to be reductive because he demonstrates how, whether you begin with a belief in the truth of either identity or difference, in either case you are led by implication to an untenable position. Since both notions are thus "empty of self-essence;” they can exist only together and not separately. Steve Bindeman On May 2, 2016, at 4:34 AM, Alex Hankey wrote: > It is good to note that Reductionism is not appropriate, > not in this particular context, maybe not in any context. > > Most of the oriental philosophers were not aware of any > reductionist approach, since their teachers were purely > concerned with integrated and holistic approaches to > understanding and solving any problem. > > Hence their attitudes to understanding experience" > the question of reductionism does not enter. > Thank you. > > On 30 April 2016 at 22:15, Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com> > wrote: > Search Alex e Stan, Search Tutti, > I fully share the epistemological philosophical-scientific approach of Alex > and logical-mathematical set theory and / or the "hierarchy of subsumption > evolving" Stan. However, reductionism does not satisfy neither pays. > A collective embrace the FIS network. > Francesco > > 2016-05-01 0:38 GMT+02:00 Alex Hankey : > It is good to see the discussion developing into deep considerations of the > history (histories?) of the metaphysical understanding of the nature of the > self, the soul, and the world(s) of experience, including the material > universe in which it finds itself. > > I do not claim to have any great expertise in understanding Nagarjuna's > approach, but we have to realise that both he and the great exponent of > Vedanta, Adishankara, also known as Shankaracharya (meaning teacher of > liberation), are said to have used almost identical formulations, albeit with > a different emphasis. While Nagarjuna used the concept of emptiness as the > foundation, Adishankara stayed within the traditional Vedic scheme where > 'fullness' or completeness / wholeness is regarded as fundamental. > > While it is certainly true that to experience the 'self' clearly, all mental > content has to allowed to settle down and fade away (one aspect of 'Chitta > Vritti Nirodha', a definition of Yoga) the condition for maintaining that > stably is that the subtle energy, prana (life-breath), should be enlivened > fully, which is why the enlivenment (ayama) of prana i.e. pranaayama (normal > spelling pranayama, in which the long 'a' is not explicitly emphasised) is a > fundamental Yoga exercise, usually practised before meditation (Dhyana) > practices in which the mind moves to its empty state (samadhi). As can be > seen, increasing the prana (life-energy) to a state of fullness is thus an > integral part of attaining a stable state of pure consciousness (samadhi). > > It is the fullness of the state of prana that stabilizes the mind from > influences that might bring it out of samadhi. In particular, various > emotions can block the flows of subtle energies (several websites explain > this in detail e.g. Google on acupuncture meridians - emotions). Fullness of > prana is thus considered equivalent to emotional stability, which requires > balanced positive emotions and feelings. > > Both Nagarjuna and Adishankara are then concerned with how it is that > all-that-exists emerges from the original absolute. Nagarjuna evidently shows > that all things including all sentient beings have a 'dependent' existence - > they do not exist in and of themselves. Adishankara on the other hand uses > Vedic physics and metaphysics to trace how they emerge at various levels of > perception. The essence of his argument is to show how the mental sensory > apparatus came from the original source / Absolute, and thus how all objects > of sensation can be traced back there. > > In modern terms, all things we have ever experientially encountered are > quantum fields, and all quantum fields seem to have emerged from the Big Bang > via the process of symmetry breaking at its source - the inflationary > process. But symmetry breaking is an instability, and when one inspects the > information states that that instability supports, they turn out to have a > similar structure to O===>, the one proposed in the material that was > distributed. > > I feel that the role and signif
[Fis] _ Re: : Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self
gt; 3. This made me present evermore > > With whatsoe'er I saw. > > An Object, if it were before > > My Eye, was by Dame Nature's law > > Within my Soul. Her Store > > Was all at once within me; all her Treasures > > Were my Immediate and Internal Pleasures > > Substantial Joys, which did inform my Mind. > > With all she wrought > > My soul was fraught. > > And every Object in my Soul a thought > > Begot, or was; I could not tell > > Whether the things did there > > Themselves appear, > > Which in my spirit truly seemed to dwell, > > Or whether my conforming Mind > > Were not alone even all that shined. > > > 4. But yet of this I was most sure > > That at the utmost length > > (So worthy was it to endure) > > My Soul could best Express its Strength. > > It was so indivisible and pure, > > That all my Mind was wholey Everywhere > > What e'er it was, twas ever wholey there; > > The Sun ten thousand legions off: > > The utmost star, > > Though seen from far, > > Was present in the Apple of my Eye. > > There was my Sight, my Life, my Sense, > > My Substance and my Mind > > My Spirit Shined > > Even there, not by a Transient Influence. > > The Act was Immanent, yet there. > > The Thing remote, yet felt even here. > > > 5. O Joy! O Wonder, and Delight! > > O Sacred Mystery! > > My Soul a Spirit infinite! > > An Image of the Deity! > > A pure Substantial Light! > > That Being Greatest, which doth Nothing seem! > > Why, twas my All, I nothing did esteem > > But that alone. A Strange Mysterious Sphere! > > A deep Abyss > > That sees and is > > The only Proper Place, and Bower of Bliss. > > To its Creator tis so near > > In Love and Excellence > > In Life and Sense, > > In Greatness Worth and Nature; And so Dear; > > In it without Hyperbole, > > The Son and Friend of God we see. > > > 6. A Strange Extended Orb of Joy > > Proceeding from within, > > Which did on every side convey > > Itself, and being nigh of kin, > > To God did Every way > > Dilate itself even in an instant, and > > Like an Indivisible Centre Stand > > At once Surrounding all Eternity. > > Twas not a sphere > > Yet did appear > > One infinite. Twas somewhat everywhere, > > And though it had a Power to see > > Far more, yet still it shined > > And was a Mind > > Exerted for it was infinity > > Twas not a Sphere, yet twas one Power > > Invisible, and yet a Bower. > > > 7. O Wondrous Self! O Sphere of Light, > > O Sphere of Joy most fair; > > O Act, O Power infinite; > > O subtle and unbounded Air! > > O Living Orb of Sight! > > Thou which within me art, yet Me! Thou Eye > > And Temple of His Whole Infinity! > > O what a World are Thou! A World within! > > All Things appear > > All Objects are > > Alive in Thee! Supersubstantial, Rare, > > Above themselves, and nigh of Kin > > To those pure Things we find > > In his Great Mind > > Who made the World! Though now eclipsed by Sin! > > There they are useful and Divine, > > Exalted, there they ought to Shine. > > > P.S. RE: And every Object in my Soul a thought > > Begot, or was; > > Question for Soren Brier: is this not essentially > > an expression of Cybersemiotics? > > > On 2 May 2016 at 09:03, steven bindeman wrote: > Unless I am misunderstanding Nagarjuna, he uses a form of reductionism to > show how all metaphysical positions are untenable. To illustrate this point > in further detail, I will provide the rest of my section on his thinking from > my manuscript on silence: > > Following the implications of the middle way, Nagarjuna uses what is called > the “four-cornered-negation,” whereby he refutes any specific idea by > disproving or negating all four of its appearances: as being, as nonbeing, as > both, and as neither. Belief in any of these four cases is an extreme thesis > in his view and must be transcended by a h
Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 33, Issue 41: On the relation between information and meaning
I would like to contribute to the current ongoing discussion regarding the relation between information and meaning. I agree with Dai Griffiths and others that the term information is a problematic construction. Since it is often used as an example of fitting the details of a specific worldly situation into a linguistic form that can be processed by a computer, this fact in itself introduces various distortions from the reality that is being represented. The degree of distortion might even be an example of the degree of uncertainty. I believe that reference to the early work of Wittgenstein might be of use in this context, especially since his work in his Tractatus text on problems related to logical atomism influenced the design of the von Neumann computer, led to the creation of the Vienna Circle group and later inspired the philosophical movement of logical positivism. Alan Turing was also one of his students. In this early work Wittgenstein had believed that a formal theory of language could be developed, capable of showing how propositions can succeed in representing real states of affairs and in serving the purposes of real life. He believed that language is like a picture which is laid against reality like a measuring rod and reaches right out to it. But in later years he eventually recognized that the possibility of relating propositions in language to facts concerning the world could not in itself be proved. Without proof, the house of cards collapses. Once the validity of using language to describe the world ini a rigorous and unambiguous way is questioned, not much is left. Although propositions are indeed capable of modeling and describing the world with a rigor not unlike that of mathematical representations of physical phenomena, they cannot themselves describe how they represent this world without becoming self-referential. Propositions are consequently essentially meaningless, since their meaning consists precisely in their ability to connect with the world outside of language. A perfect language mirrors a perfect world, but since the latter is nothing more than a chimera so is the former. Here are some quotes (taken out of their original contexts) from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that I believe are relevant to the discussion on information and meaning: The facts in logical space are the world. What is the case — a fact— is the existence of states of affairs. A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things). It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs. If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. Objects contain the possibility of all situations. The configuration of objects produces states of affairs. The totality of existing states of affairs is the world. The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality. States of affairs are independent of one another. A picture is a model of reality. A picture is a fact. Logical pictures can depict the world. A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of affairs. Situations can be described but not given names. (Names are like points; propositions like arrows — they have sense.) Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning. Finally, with regards to the problems about information, I would add that Alfred Korzybski (and later Marshall McLuhan) once wrote that “the map is not the territory.” The map is merely a picture of something that it represents. Increasing the amount of information may reduce the granularity of the picture, but it remains a picture. This means that accumulation greater and greater amounts of information can never completely replace or represent the infinite complexity of any real-lilfe situation — and this is an insight that Wittgenstein realized only in his later philosophical work. Steve Bindeman > On Dec 22, 2016, at 7:37 AM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote: > > Send Fis mailing list submissions to > fis@listas.unizar.es > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es > > You can reach the person managing the list at > fis-ow...@listas.unizar.es > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of Fis digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: What is information? and What is life? (Dai Griffiths) > > > -- > > Message: 1 > Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2016 12:44:59 + > From: Dai Griffiths > To: fis@listas.unizar.es > Subject: Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life? > Message-ID: > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"; Format="flowe
Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 33, Issue 41: On the relation between information and meaning
gt; > Thank you for this enjoyable year. > > > > Karl > > > > > > > > 2016-12-24 2 :39 GMT+01:00 Louis H Kauffman > > mailto:kauff...@uic.edu>>: > > > >> Dear Steve, > >> You write > >> "But in later years he eventually recognized that the possibility of > >> relating propositions in language to facts concerning the world could not > >> in itself be proved. Without proof, the house of cards collapses. Once > >> the > >> validity of using language to describe the world ini a rigorous and > >> unambiguous way is questioned, not much is left.” > >> > >> I do not think that the issue of proof was foremost for Wittgenstein. > >> Rather, he later understood that a pure mirroring of language and world > >> was > >> untenable and worked directly with language and its use to show how > >> complex > >> was the actuality. The result is that one can still read the Tractatus > >> meaningfully, knowing that it states and discusses an ideal of (formal) > >> language and a view of the world so created that is necessarily limited. > >> Indeed the later Wittgenstein and the Tractatus come together at the > >> point > >> of the Tractatus showing how meagre is that ‘that can be said’ from its > >> mirrored and logical point of view. > >> The Tractatus indicates its own incompleteness, and in do doing > >> invalidates its use by the logical positivists as a model for the > >> performance of science. It was in this background that (through Goedel) > >> the > >> Incompleteness Theorem arose in the midst of the Vienna Circle. And here > >> we > >> are in a world generated by formal computer languages, facing the > >> uncertainties of models that are sensitive enough (as in economics and > >> social science) to cross the boundary and affect what is to be modeled. > >> Best, > >> Lou Kauffman > >> > >> On Dec 23, 2016, at 11:27 AM, steven bindeman >> <mailto:bindem...@verizon.net>> > >> wrote: > >> > >> I would like to contribute to the current ongoing discussion regarding > >> the > >> relation between information and meaning. I agree with Dai Griffiths and > >> others that the term information is a problematic construction. Since it > >> is > >> often used as an example of fitting the details of a specific worldly > >> situation into a linguistic form that can be processed by a computer, > >> this > >> fact in itself introduces various distortions from the reality that is > >> being represented. The degree of distortion might even be an example of > >> the degree of uncertainty. > >> > >> I believe that reference to the early work of Wittgenstein might be of > >> use > >> in this context, especially since his work in his Tractatus text on > >> problems related to logical atomism influenced the design of the von > >> Neumann computer, led to the creation of the Vienna Circle group and > >> later > >> inspired the philosophical movement of logical positivism. Alan Turing > >> was > >> also one of his students. > >> > >> In this early work Wittgenstein had believed that a formal theory of > >> language could be developed, capable of showing how propositions can > >> succeed in representing real states of affairs and in serving the > >> purposes > >> of real life. He believed that language is like a picture which is laid > >> against reality like a measuring rod and reaches right out to it. But in > >> later years he eventually recognized that the possibility of relating > >> propositions in language to facts concerning the world could not in > >> itself > >> be proved. Without proof, the house of cards collapses. Once the validity > >> of using language to describe the world ini a rigorous and unambiguous > >> way > >> is questioned, not much is left. Although propositions are indeed capable > >> of modeling and describing the world with a rigor not unlike that of > >> mathematical representations of physical phenomena, they cannot > >> themselves > >> describe how they represent this world without becoming self-referential. > >> Propositions are consequently essentially meaningless, since their > >> meaning > >> consists precisely in their ability to connect with the world outside of > >> language. A perfect language mirrors a perfect world, but since
[Fis] my contribution to the ongoing information / meaning debate
While I sometimes feel as if I speak a different language than many of you, I believe that my initial notes for a book on creativity may shed some light on the ongoing current discussion. Simply put, information is what a machine has the capacity to produce. However, a machine cannot produce meaning -- which is essentially the interpretation of this information. For what it's worth, here are my notes on creativity: The Creative Process Meaning does not exist on its own in the world. Nor does it exist within the interiority of human consciousness. Rather it is something we actively create when we engage with the world around us. We create meaning — we don’t merely find it or discover it. Creativity, then, is an essential part of the process of meaning apprehension. This means that it is not merely a personality trait or a personality state; nor is it something special that some lucky people have more of than others. (While talent on the other hand is special, it’s not the same thing as creativity.) Our relationship to our surroundings is, then, necessarily creative. This means that we are constantly adjusting our understanding of our environment in a creative way at all times. We never merely engage with it in a passive way, but are always and actively either accepting or denying the apparent truth of our perceptions. This is we maintain our memory — and with the help of this memory we engage in the process of maintaining our identity, our sense of self. In this context we can see how a painter never paints the objective truth of his subject. He paints what he sees — and depicting the truth of his perception of what he sees is his essential challenge. This is true even for “realist” painters and for photographers as well. They arrange and organize what they have seen until they are satisfied that their art has captured the unique characteristics of their own perceptual acts. Their “art” consists in trying to make the viewer’s experience of this object seem “real” to them, too — whatever this term might mean. Creativity, then, is a process. It is an ongoing engagement by human consciousness with the gradual depiction, over time, of a particular object. As Bergson put it, “reality is that (which) creates itself gradually… that is, absolute duration” (Creative Evolution, 385). This means that for Bergson we cannot separate reality from temporality. Humanity for Bergson was essentially homo faber — tool-making, pragmatic, analytic. Yet life itself is essentially qualitative, and therefore only accessible otherwise — meaning, not through mere pragmatic analysis. “We see that the intellect, so skillful in dealing with the inert, is awkward the moment it touches the living. Whether it wants to treat the life of the body or the life of the mind, it proceeds with the rigor, the stiffness and the brutality of an instrument not designed for such use” (Selections from Bergson, 88). Throughout Creative Evolution, Bergson insisted that life must be equated with creation, because only creativity can adequately account for both the continuity of life and the discontinuity of thought. But if humans only possess analytic intelligence, then how are we ever to know the essence of life (which Bergson called the “élan vital”)? Bergson's answer was that at the periphery of intelligence a fringe of instinct survives, namely intuition, and because of it we are able to have access to the essence of life. In his view, instinct and intelligence are not simply self-contained and mutually exclusive states. They are both rooted in, and hence inseparable from, the duration that informs all life, all change, all becoming. Thanks to intuition, humanity can turn intelligence against itself in order to seize life itself. >From this point of view, creativity is not just something that only artists >can do; it is not their unique province. Even if we include mathematicians and >scientists and recognize the important place that creativity plays in their >work too, we miss the point if we try to delimit the extent that creativity >plays in our lives. Bergson is arguing here, then, that whenever we relate to >the world around us in a meaningful way, then we are engaged in a creative >act. For Bergson, though, poets and other artists start from a fuller view of reality than the rest of us. They plumb the depths in such a way that they can lay hold of the potential in the real, taking up with what nature has left, namely a mere outline or sketch of something, something which remains incompletely lodged in the memory, in order to make of it a finished work of art. The result enables us to discover, in the things which surround us, more qualities and more shades than we would otherwise naturally perceive. Our view of reality is thereafter altered, and we begin to realize that it is possible to move beyond the limits of our own perceptions. While art in this way
