### Re: [Fis] No, this is not the reason

```The utility of logarithms? I've always thought using a slide rule was more
esthetic than pushing buttons on a calculator. Perhaps few people still know
what a slide rule can do. Of course, the result might be a little less
accurate . . .

Best,

Joseph

-Original Message-
From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson
Sent: dimanche, 3 juin 2018 22:07
To: Krassimir Markov
Cc: Foundation of Information Science; Sungchul Ji
Subject: Re: [Fis] No, this is not the reason.

Dear Krassimir and Sungchul,

I suppose this bears out Von Neumann's tongue-in-cheek advice to
Shannon! (http://www.eoht.info/page/Neumann-Shannon+anecdote)

Krassimir, just to ask about Boltzmann's use of the logs... I first
understood this to be a measure of the probability distribution of a
whole thermodynamic system which factorises into the product of
probabilities of microstates in the system. Hence the logs (and hence
Shannon equating of "microstate" for "alphabet", which seems
reasonable at first glance)...

EXCEPT I very much like the explanation that Bob Ulanowicz gives here
(in http://www.mdpi.com/2078-2489/2/4/624) - which doesn't mention the
factorising of the probabilities of microstates, but instead argues
that -log (p(i)) gives a value for what isn't there (the "apophatic",
"absence"), and Bob's criticism of Shannon for inverting this by
turning his H into a measure of surprise:

"Boltzmann described a system of rarefied, non-interacting particles
in probabilistic fashion. Probability theory quantifies the degree to
which state i is present by a measure, p(i). Conventionally, this
value is normalized to fall between zero and one by dividing the
number of times that i has occurred by the total number of
observations. Under this "frequentist" convention, the probability of
i not occurring becomes (1 - p(i)). Boltzmann's genius, however, was
in abjuring this conventional measure of non-occurrence in favor of
the negative of the logarithm of pi.  (It should be noted that
-log(p(i)) and (1 - p(i)) vary in uniform fashion, i.e., a one-to-one
relationship between the two functions exists). His choice imposed a
strong asymmetry upon matters. Conventionally, calculating the average
nonbeing in the system using (1 - p(i)) results in the symmetrical
parabolic function (p(i) - p(i)^2). If, however, one calculates
average absence using Boltzmann's measure, the result becomes skewed
towards smaller p(i) (or larger [1 - p(i)]), i.e., towards nonbeing."

It's such a useful equation, and I agree, "Why are the logs there?" is
an important question.

Best wishes,

Mark

On 3 June 2018 at 20:22, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
> Dear Sung,
>
> You wrote:
>> I think the main reason that we express 'information'  as a logarithmic
> function of the number of choices available, n, may be because the human
> brain finds it easier to remember (and communicate and reason with)  10
> than  100, or 100 than 10. . . . 0, etc.
>>
>
> No, this is not the reason.
> The correct answer is that Shannon assume the n=0 as possible !!!
> Because of this, to avoid dividing by zero he used log(s).
> But this is impossible and many years the world works with log(s) not
> understanding why !
>
> log(s) is(are) no needed.
>
> It is more clear and easy to work without log(s) :=)
>
> Friendly greetings
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

--
Dr. Mark William Johnson
Institute of Learning and Teaching
Faculty of Health and Life Sciences
University of Liverpool

Phone: 07786 064505
Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com
Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com

___
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Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

---
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antivirus Avast.
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___
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```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Stan,

Good, but things can also run in the opposite direction. How about variety
(plus more energy) generating more variety, more possibilities and allowing
new information to emerge? Standard logical analysis is inadequate because
it cannot handle this picture.

Joseph

_

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N
Salthe
Sent: jeudi, 31 mai 2018 16:21
To: Burgin, Mark; fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Mark -- What Shannon referred to as 'entropy' was 'variety'. 'Information'
per se was achieved by way of a reduction or winnowing of this variety of
possibilities, leaving 'information' to survive.

STAN

On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:24 PM, Burgin, Mark
wrote:

Dear Loet,
Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is Shannon's
measure of information, which is called entropy.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and
res extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that
things could have been different is not out there in the world as something
seizable such as piece of wood.

Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it
can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The
grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize
Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the measurement as information.

Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to
call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is
embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as
Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as physical.

In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical
entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a
distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this distribution
will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic
entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86  .37 = .49 bits of
information. One thus can prove that this information is not physical.

Best,

Loet

_

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net ;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty,   SPRU, University of
Sussex;

Guest Professor   Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou;
Visiting Professor,   ISTIC,
Beijing;

Visiting Fellow,   Birkbeck, University of London;

http://scholar.google.com/

citations?user=ych9gNYJ=en

-- Original Message --

From: "Burgin, Mark"

To: "Søren Brier" ; "Krassimir Markov" ;
"fis@listas.unizar.es"

Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM

Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the
Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is real, or
it cannot be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other
realities, as it was demonstrated in my book Structural Reality, allows
understand information as real but not physical.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:

Dear Mark

Using physical this way it just tends to mean real, but that raises the
problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödels theorem or
mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is subjectivity and
self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a conscious subject with
feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure it. Is it physical then?? I
only see what you write and your behavior. And are the meaning of your
sentences physical? So here we touch phenomenology (the experiential) and
hermeneutics (meaning and interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the
meaning of signs in cognition and communication). We have problems
encompassing these aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the
technical sciences that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of
information science.

Best

Søren

Fra: Fis
På vegne af Krassimir Markov
Sendt: 17. maj 2018 11:33
Til: fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark

Emne: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to publish it
in IJ ITA.

It will be nice ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

```Dear All,

Information is physical and non-physical, simultaneously and sequentially.

Best regards,

Joseph

_

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of
tozziart...@libero.it
Sent: jeudi, 31 mai 2018 08:34
To: fis@listas.unizar.es; Emanuel Diamant
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

Dear Emanuel,

Hi!
I'm sorry, but the UCLA finding does not put an end to any question.
Indeed, this paper about memory transfer has been highly criticized:

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/neuroskeptic/2018/05/18/epic-snail-about-t
hat-injectable-memory-study/#.Ww-V81UzYps

The term "material" for the definition of information is less correct than
"physical": indeed, "pyhsical" encompasses also the quantum fields, the
solitons, the oscillations that, although not being properly "material",
nevertheless are able to tranfer "information".

Il 31 maggio 2018 alle 5.55 Emanuel Diamant  ha
scritto:

Dear FIS Colleagues,

For most of the time, I restrain myself from taking part in the FIS
discussions - we speak different languages and adhere to different
principles. My paper invited for publication in MDPI Informatics Special
Issue: Selected Papers from the ISIS Summit Vienna 2015 has been declined
for publication. (Never mind, it was published afterwards in the Research
Gate repository https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291352419 ).

In the concluding part of the paper I enumerate 8 topics in Neuroscience
research that require immediate revision taking into consideration the new
principles that follow from my definition of information. For example, that
information is a material, palpable string of letters and linguistic signs,
a piece of text, a textual description. That means that all derivatives of
semantic information (thoughts, memories, feelings, and so on) are material
entities ("Information as a thing" - once there was a fierce debate around
this subject). Or, as Mark Burgin claims: "Now assuming that information
exists, we have only one option, namely, to admit that information is
physical because only physical things exist". (I do not use the term
"physical", I distinguish Physical and Semantic Information. In place of
Burgin's "physical" I prefer to use the term "material").

I would not remind you of our old controversies but recently UCLA
researchers reported that they have transferred a memory from one marine
snail to another (Biologists 'transfer' a memory,
Neuroscience ,
May 14, 2018, University of
California, Los Angeles,

https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-05-memory-snails.html ).

I hope that the UCLA finding will put an end to the question "Is information
material (physical, in Burgin's inquiry)?" Yes, information is material.
Other options do not exist.

Best regards, Emanuel.

___
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Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/

---
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antivirus Avast.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus
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http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

```

### Re: [Fis] INFORMATION IS PROCESSING. Information as process

```Perhaps you will also be interested in my brief comments on
information-as-process in my 2011 paper in Information 2(3), 560-578. It
seems a bit too simple to say that a computer, machine, whatever can process
all reflections if these include high-level complex exchanges of energy in
and between human brains Does not something get lost in that process?

Best,

Joseph

_

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Krassimir
Markov
Sent: vendredi, 11 mai 2018 16:13
To: karl.javors...@gmail.com; Arturo Tozzi
Cc: fis
Subject: [Fis] INFORMATION IS PROCESSING the reflections

Dear Colleagues,

During activity of Infos consciousness, reflections are combined and as a
result the new ones may be created and stored in the Infos memory.

Processing of some reflections may cause some activity, too.

In other words, it doesn't matter what kind of Infos is active  the result
is the same!

INFORMATION IS PROCESSING the reflections that has as final result an
activity or new reflections.

Usually, the results of such processing are called Information.

Of course, to be active means to be real (material, physical) and to have
energy for processing.

To store reflections, material objects are needed, i.e. carriers.

This is the main interconnection between mater, energy, and information.

No Information exist anywhere  only reflections  REAL, PHYSICAL
REFLECTIONS!

Reflections in real, physical objects, including living creatures.

Including Brain!

Main difference between living and not living mater is possibility for
processing of reflections.

Of course, many levels of such processing exist.

Maybe, the most complex is the social one.

Maybe, the simplest one is in the cells...

Could the Machine process reflections? Still no answer ...

But the Computer can!

"That's All Folks!"

Friendly greetings

Krassimir

From: Karl   Javorszky

Sent: Friday, May 11, 2018 1:20 PM

To: Arturo Tozzi

Cc: fis

Subject: Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?

Dear Arturo,

There were some reports in clinical psychology, about 30 years ago, that
relate to the question whether a machine can pretend to be a therapist. That
was the time as computers could newly be used in an interactive fashion, and
the Rogers techniques were a current discovery.

(Rogers developed a dialogue method where one does not address the contents
of what the patient says, but rather the emotional aspects of the message,
assumed to be at work in the patient.)

They then said, that in some cases it was indistinguishable, whether a human
or a machine provides the answer to a patient's elucidations.

Progress since then has surely made possible to create machines that are
indistinguishable in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called "expert
systems ", are widely used in many fields. If the interaction is rational,
that is: formally equivalent to a logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, the
difference in: "who arrived at this answer, machinery or a human", becomes
irrelevant.

Artistry, intuition, creativity are presently seen as not possible to
translate into Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are not yet
well understood. But!: there are some who are busily undermining the current
fundamentals of rational thinking. So there is hope that we shall live to
experience the ultimate disillusionment,  namely that humans are a
combinatorial tautology.

Accordingly, may I respectfully express opposing views to what you state:
that machines and humans are of incompatible builds. There are hints that as
far as rational capabilities go, the same principles apply. There is a rest,
you say, which is not of this kind. The counter argument says that
irrational processes do not take place in organisms, therefore what you
refer to belongs to the main process, maybe like waste belongs to the
organism's principle. This view draws a picture of a functional biotope, in
which the waste of one kind of organism is raw material for a different
kind.

Karl

schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24:

Dear Bruno,
You state:
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
THEN physical has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e.
physical becomes a mathematical notion.
...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of
description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or not feel any
change if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the
brain/body at that level of description".

The problem of your account is the following:
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested
and it is not empirically testable.  You are starting with a sort of
postulate: I, and other people, do not agree with it.  The ```

### Re: [Fis] Response to Sungchul. Generative Logic

```Dear All again,

Terry has introduced an absolutely essential concept on which we need to
focus, that of a generative logic of informational relationships. I would
just like to point out that we are not starting from zero. Some of us, for
example Mark J. and I have already recognized the need for a new logic, in
which understanding the dynamic relationships is central. In Logic in
Reality, for example, Terry's suggestion of the need to avoid "the tendency
to use language-like communication as the paradigm exemplar" is already
achieved by focus on the non-linguistic dynamic process properties of
information.

If Terry could expand his concept of the contours of a 'generative logic',
it might be possible to show this even more clearly.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph

_

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Terrence W.
DEACON
Sent: samedi, 13 janvier 2018 19:33
To: Alex Hankey
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es; Emanuel Diamant; Sungchul Ji
Subject: Re: [Fis] I salute to Sungchul

Hi all,

I would be very encouraged if we are trying to develop beyond mere lists of
different uses of the term 'information' TO structured taxonomies of
distinct types of information TO a generative logic of how these distinct
modes of a complex information relationship are interrelated.

Dualistically distinguishing intrinsic properties of an informing medium
from relational properties that determine its reference provides an
important first step in growing the concept to encompas its full usefulness.
But I hope that we will also eventually begin to attend to the functional
value that the coveyed reference provides, since this too is often also
implicitly part of the various uses of the term 'infomation' in colloquial
and even scientific use. This requires more careful parsing of the term
"meaning" that is often invoked.

For instance, one can receive information that is unambiguously "about"
something but where that which it is about is already known and therefore is
"functionally redundant" (not to be confused with signal redundancy). Or
this information can be about something that is irrelevant to a given
function or end, while still being information about something.

An example would be telling me the time when I already know what time it is.
The statement about the time does indeed "mean" something-i.e. it is not
meaningless as gibberish woiuld be. Similarly, if I ask to know the current
temperature and I am instead told the time, the reference provided would be
useless to me-i.e. it wouldn't "make a difference" in the colloquial English
sense of that phrase. The concept of "meaning" tends to collapse or conflate
these two distinctions-reference and significance-which I think we should
endeavor to distinguish.

In this respect I like the suggestion by Alex Hankey that we consider an
example like the barely conscious "feeling" of being watched which both
conveys information about an extrinsic state of affairs and additionally has
a functional relevance which is implicit in the discomfort it typically
elicits. Both the aboutness and the significance are relational, not
intrinsic properties of information. They are are distinct relations because
they are asymmetrically dependent on one another. Thus if I am entirely
unaware of being watched I am nnot discomforted by it.

Note also the difference in these relational attrributes: aboutness or
reference is "in relation to" some state of affairs, whereas significance or
value is "in relation to" some telos intrinsic to an interpreting agent or
system.

Exploring such nondiscursive examples can help us to escape the tendency to
use language-like communication as the paradigm exemplar. The analysis of
the information intrinsic to and conveyed by music might in this respect
provide a useful platform for future discussion.

Are there other critical distinctions that we additionally need to
highlight?

Happy New Year, Terry

On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 9:24 PM, Alex Hankey  wrote:

And what about the Kinds of Information that you cannot put in a data set?

The information that makes you turn your head and meet the gaze of someone
staring at you.

No one could do that, which we humans and all animals do constantly,

unless we had received such information at a subliminal level in the brain.

We all have that capacity, it is vital for survival in the wild. All animals
do it.

The 'Sense of Being Stared At' is a common experience for most animals,

how far down the tree of life no one yet knows.

Whatever triggers it is definitely 'A Difference that Makes a Difference',

so fits in your definition of 'Meaningful Information' - it has to!

BUT IT CANNOT BE DIGITAL INFORMATION.

Please Face Up to This Fact.

All best wishes,

Alex

On 13 January 2018 at 07:30, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

Hi Emmanuel and FISers,

Thank you, Emmanuel, for your generous remarks.  It is heartening to ```

### Re: [Fis] The Problem with Sungchul's Approach. Data

```Dear All,

The problem that I see with the approach of Sungchul and others like it is
its reference to data, specifically, quantitative data or their semiotic
equivalent. Without a robust theory of information-as-process, there is no
way of capturing the qualitative aspects of information and communication,
above all human-human. For this, a new logic is required; will take me to my
second note of this week in a response to Terry.

Best wishes,

Joseph

_

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji
Sent: dimanche, 14 janvier 2018 04:37
To: Alex Hankey
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es; Emanuel Diamant
Subject: Re: [Fis] I salute to Sungchul

Hi Alex,

Thanks for raising the thought-provoking question.

According to the dual theory of information (i.e, the physical vs. semantic
information theory (PSIT)) [1] as I understand it, there is no  "Information
that you cannot put in a data set ".  That is, all the information discussed
in natural and human sciences must be grounded in the physical upon which
the semanticity (or functionality) of any structure must arise.  For
example, all heritable traits (including the kind of sensory experiences you
described) must be grounded in DNA structures as clearly pointed out by
Petoukhov [2, 3], for instance.   Unlike the current textbook version of DNA
viewed as a set of linear sequences of genes composed of just one alphabet
of 4 letters, A, C. G and T,  my interpretation of the mathematical analyses
of DNA-sequences (as summarized in the concept of the tetra-groups of DNA
sequences [4]) carried out by Petoukhov [2, 3] indicates that DNA is a
linear sequences of the 4 nucleotides structured (or partitioned) into n
alphabets (or languages), each consisting of 4^n letters, where n = 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, etc., of which we may currently be aware of only the simplest alphabet
with n = 1.  The n = 5 alphabet (i.e., the n^th alphabet or the n^th cell
language) should consist of 4^5 = 1,024 letters, and the n = 6 alphabet
should contain 4,096 letters, etc.  Having these multiple alphabets or
molecular languages may have been beneficial for biological evolution,
probably because they increased the information storage and processing
capacities of the cell.   I am not a computer scientist but it seems to me
that the situation is similar to computer scientists using two different
alphabets -- one with 2 digits (i.e., o, 1) and the other with 2^3 = 8
digits (i.e., , 1000, 1100, 0011, . . .) in order to
increase the information storage and processing capacities of computers.

All biological communications including cell-cell, cell-organ, cell-human,
humnan-human communications must be mediated by messages (or signs) (i)
written in an alphabet with n letters, where n can be 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, . . .
.10^6?, thus having varying information storage and processing capacities,
and (ii) obeying a set of syntactic rules  so that (iii) the sender and the
receiver can understand the messages using a common set (or dictionary) of
rules of interpretation.

In conlusion, my breif answer to Alex's question would be that human brains
have evolved to perform the kind of sensory functions you describe based on
"molecular data", not necessarily macroscopic physical or linguistic data
employed in macrosciences and engineering.

All the best.

Sung

References:

[1] Emanuel Diamant, The brain is processing information, not data. Does
anybody care?, ISIS Summit Vienna 2015, Extended Abstract.
http://sciforum.net/

conference/isis-summit-vienna-2015/paper/2842

[2] Petoukhov, S. (2017).  Genetic
coding and united-hypercomplex systems in the models of algebraic
biology.BioSystems 158: 31-46.[3] Petoukhov, S. (2016).
The system-resonance approach in modeling genetic structures. BiosySystems
139:1-11.
[4] Petoukhov, S. (2018). The rules of long DNA-sequences and
tetra-groups of oligonucleotides. arXiv:1709.04943v4 [q-bio.OT]

[4] Ji, S. ```

### [Fis] FW: New Year Lecture. Logic of Recursive Transductions

```Dear Mark, Dear FISers

Mark's term "logic of recursive transductions" cuts to the heart of the
current debate. If one objects that this is 'just' physics or biology, my
answer is that it is both logic and physics and biology, and that many
problems have come simply from our separation of them, and characterizing
them without including their dynamics as processes.

Energy is involved when I "go back over something", as I have with John
Torday's stimulating approach, in order to see what is in it that I must
take into account (and vice versa I hope).

At this point, I feel I need a 'refresher' on Loet Leydesdorff's important
distinction, with reference to information, between recursion and incursion.
Loet?

When one thinks outside the box, as Bob U. will have us do, the air may seem
a little thin, for a while. However, one can soon get acclimatized, with
some good will.

Cheers,

Joseph

-Original Message-
From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Mark Johnson
Sent: mercredi, 10 janvier 2018 11:08
To: JOHN TORDAY
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] New Year Lecture

Dear John,

Thank you very much for this - a great way to start the new year!

I'd like to ask about "communication" - it's a word which is

understood in many different ways, and in the context of cells, is

hard to imagine.

When you suggest that "the unicellular state delegates its progeny to

interact with the environment as agents, collecting data to inform the

recapitulating unicell of ecological changes that are occurring.

Through the acquisition and filtering of epigenetic marks via meiosis,

fertilization, and embryogenesis, even on into adulthood, where the

endocrine system dictates the length and depth of the stages of the

life cycle, now known to be under epigenetic control, the unicell

remains in effective synchrony with environmental changes." It seems

that this is not communication of 'signs' in the Peircean sense

supported by the biosemioticians (Hoffmeyer). But is it instead a

recursive set of transductions, much in the spirit of Bateson's

insight that:

"Formerly we thought of a hierarchy of taxa-individual, family line,

subspecies, species, etc.-as units of survival. We now see a different

hierarchy of units-gene-in-organism, organism-in environment,

ecosystem, etc. Ecology, in the widest sense, turns out to be the

study of the interaction and survival of ideas and programs (i.e.,

differences, complexes of differences, etc.) in circuits." (from his

paper "Pathologies of Epistemology" in Steps to an Ecology of Mind)

Recursive transduction like this is a common theme in cybernetics -

it's in Ashby's "Design for a Brain", Pask's conversation theory, and

in Beer's Viable System Model, where "horizon scanning" (an

anticipatory sub-system gathering data from the environment) is an

important part of the metasystem which maintains viability of the

organism (It's worth noting that Maturana and Varela's autopoietic

theory overlooks this).

"Communication" would then be much more like "conversation".

etymologically, "con-versare". "to turn together". dancing! Does this

fit?

A further point is to then ask whether a logic of evolutionary biology

is a logic of recursive transductions over history. The critical point

is what Joseph Brenner argued before Christmas in objecting to Peirce:

we struggle to express the specificity and basis for change in our

logic. Do we need a different kind of logic?

Best wishes and Happy new year,

Mark

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### Re: [Fis] Comes the Revolution. The Real

```Dear Søren,

Thank you for a positive and constructive note and question. Although I
maintain my critique of Peirces tychism and synechism and his concepts of
and manipulations of signs and diagrams, I have always seen value in many of
his intuitions. I would be glad to consider him a humanist with a semiotic
worldview. It takes all kinds . . .

I think for participants in this list to say what they mean by reality,
exactly for, as you put it, a discussion of the ontology and science behind
various informational paradigms, would be very useful. Pedro, what do you
think? For me reality is change and stability, being and becoming,
appearance and, contradictorially, the reality behind appearance. This is
why standard logic doesnt work.

Best Seasons Greetings,

Joseph

P.S. Perhaps a typo, but what is the sense of treading in treading
processual concept?

_

From: Søren Brier [mailto:sbr@cbs.dk]
Sent: samedi, 16 décembre 2017 13:28
To: Joseph Brenner; fis
Subject: RE: [Fis] Comes the Revolution

Dear Joseph

This very Peircean of you as The challenge is to reconcile our roles as
informational organisms and agents within nature and as stewards of nature.
is at the centre of Peirces thinking instead that he uses the treading
processual concept of sign instead of information as his basic concept . I
know that many call Peirce an objective idealist, although it is a form of
realism I am not sure that this concept covers his combination of Tychism
and synechism with a semiotic worldview. I think Peirces view is unique.
But your mail does put the focus on the importance of discussion the
ontology behind the various informational paradigms.

What do we mean when we use the term real for instance about Lupascos
physical  biological  contradictorial information? As I understand the
term has been pretty important for your view.

Best

Søren

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Joseph Brenner
Sent: 16. december 2017 10:15
To: fis <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: [Fis] Comes the Revolution

Dear Pedro, Dear FISers,

I regret that I have difficulty in relating to the current FIS discussion,
but that is my problem. I see little progress since the appearance of
Lupascos physical  biological  contradictorial information; Kauffman,
Logans biotic and Ulanowicz apophatic information; Deacons Shannon 
Boltzmann  Darwin information; and Wus revolution. Sungchuls intuition of
an irreversible triadic relation reflects the power of triads as cognitive
attractors, but discussion is blocked by his use of the word irreversible,
required by the underlying idealist Peircean structure of his argument.

What I would like to see is the foundations of information being discussed
in relation to the real problems of society, beyond questionnaires. Some of
these led yesterday to a prohibition of the use of seven words including
foetus, diversity and science-based from certain U. S. Government documents.
I think we need to have in the forefront of our minds the statement made by
Floridi in his 2010 book, Information. A Very Short Introduction (which all
of you have read, of course): The challenge is to reconcile our roles as
informational organisms and agents within nature and as stewards of nature.

I believe that such a perspective, placed as a criterion for selection of
pertinent concepts, would make our discussions a lot deeper and more
relevant.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joesph

<https://www.avast.com/sig-email?utm_medium=email_source=link_campai
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Garanti sans virus.
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### [Fis] Comes the Revolution

```Dear Pedro, Dear FISers,

I regret that I have difficulty in relating to the current FIS discussion,
but that is my problem. I see little progress since the appearance of
Lupasco's physical - biological - contradictorial information; Kauffman,
Logan's biotic and Ulanowicz' apophatic information; Deacon's Shannon -
Boltzmann - Darwin information; and Wu's revolution. Sungchul's intuition of
an "irreversible triadic relation" reflects the power of triads as cognitive
attractors, but discussion is blocked by his use of the word 'irreversible',
required by the underlying idealist Peircean structure of his argument.

What I would like to see is the foundations of information being discussed
in relation to the real problems of society, beyond questionnaires. Some of
these led yesterday to a prohibition of the use of seven words including
foetus, diversity and science-based from certain U. S. Government documents.
I think we need to have in the forefront of our minds the statement made by
Floridi in his 2010 book, Information. A Very Short Introduction (which all
of you have read, of course): "The challenge is to reconcile our roles as
informational organisms and agents within nature and as stewards of nature."

I believe that such a perspective, placed as a criterion for selection of
pertinent concepts, would make our discussions a lot deeper and more
relevant.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joesph

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### Re: [Fis] some notes: Precise Qualitative Terms

```Dear All,

Terry's phrase deserves at least the attention, if not the agreement of all of
us. In my view, qualitative terms belong in science if they follow some sort of
logic. There are risks, of fraud and pseudo-science, but these risks cannot be
avoided in reality by relying on mathematics alone.

Two comments, one negative and one positive:
How is it that despite the risk most of us are able to recognize pseudo-science
when we see it?
In the sciences indicated by Terry, are not abductions  to the best
explanations and implications to process dynamics doing some of the necessary
work?

There seems to be no alternative to living partly with uncertainty, then, at
all levels, and this is not congenial to some people. The existence of this
non-congeniality is an example of the science I am talking about.

Best wishes,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Terrence W. DEACON
To: fis
Sent: Saturday, November 18, 2017 5:38 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] some notes

If the definition of science requires quantification and mathematical
representation then most of biology won't qualify, including molecular and
cellular biology, physiology, psychology, and neuroscience. Physics envy has
long ago been abandoned by most working scientists in these fields. This is not
to say that just any sort of theorizing qualifies, nor can we be sure that
today's non-quantifiable science won't someday be susceptible to precise
empirically testable mathematical modeling—even semiotic analyses may someday
be made mathematically precise—but being empirically testable, even if just in
precise qualitative terms, is pretty close to being a core defining attribute.

On Fri, Nov 17, 2017 at 9:34 AM, Terrence W. DEACON
wrote:

On communication:

"Communication" needs to be more carefully distinguished from mere
transfer of physical differences from location to location and time to
time. Indeed, any physical transfer of physical differences in this
respect can be utilized to communicate, and all communication requires
this physical foundation. But there is an important hierarchic
distinction that we need to consider. Simply collapsing our concept of
'communication' to its physical substrate (and ignoring the process of
interpretation) has the consequence of treating nearly all physical
processes as communication and failing to distinguish those that
additionally convey something we might call representational content.

Thus while internet communication and signals transferred between
computers do indeed play an essential role in human communication, we
only have to imagine a science fiction story in which all human
interpreters suddenly disappear but our computers nevertheless
continue to exchange signals, to realize that those signals are not
"communicating" anything. At that point they would only be physically
modifying one another, not communicating, except in a sort of
metaphoric sense. This sort of process would not be fundamentally
different from solar radiation modifying atoms in the upper atmosphere
or any other similar causal process. It would be odd to say that the
sun is thereby communicating anything to the atmosphere.

So, while I recognize that there are many methodological contexts in
which it makes little difference whether or not we ignore this
semiotic aspect, as many others have also hinted, this is merely to
bracket from consideration what really distinguishes physical transfer
of causal influence from communication. Remember that this was a
methodological strategy that even Shannon was quick to acknowledge in
the first lines of his classic paper. We should endeavor to always be
as careful.

— Terry

--

Professor Terrence W. Deacon
University of California, Berkeley

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### [Fis] Fw: Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism

```Dear Jose Javier,

Thank you very much for your constructive response to my note. I respect your
view of Luhmann and his constructivism (?), which you have certainly correctly
summarized in a few words.

However, what the Lupasco theory of actuality and potentiality does is to offer
some ontological basis for both, grounded in physics and is hence in my opinion
hence worthy of some modicum of our attention. It is possible to talk about
reality without the pretty little diagrams and calculus of Spencer-Brown.

Luhmann talks about the "constant interplay" between actual and potential,
their ineinanderstehen, but there is no functional relation to the mundane
properties of real physical systems. As Loet showed at the time, Luhmannian
structures can be defined analytically, but that is not enough for me. And  a
key point: why 'constant' interplay? Is there something wrong, or is it just
too real, to include discontinuities as equally important as continuities?

It should be clear that I completely disagree with the place given to Luhmann
in current thought. Luhmann perhaps deserves some historical credit for basing
his theory on information. However, I follow Christian Fuchs who said in 2006
that "The function of Luhmann's theory for society is that it is completely
useless".

Society does not "contain" human beings: society is a group of human beings
composed of individuals and the group and their contradictorial relations and
dynamics. Luhmann stated that the "ground of being" is at the same time
actuality and potentiality, but tells us nothing about their nature and rules
for their evolution. Meaning cannot be a unity of actualization and
potentialization (or re- and re-). In unity, the two lose their necessary
specificity and basis for change. Luhmann took human beings as agents out of
his system, and replaced them with abstractions. Fascist ideology is not far
away.

If people would spend 1/20 the time on Lupasco that they do on Pierce and
Luhmann, . . .

Best regards,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Jose Javier Blanco Rivero
To: Joseph Brenner
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 11:20 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism

Dear Joseph,

Luhmann's concept of meaning (Sinn) is defined exactly as the unity of the
difference between actuality and potentiality. Maybe there an answer can be
found.
Besides, Luhmann's Sinn can also be translated as information since it regards
redundancy and selection. Luhmann self referred to Sinn (which I'd rather to
translate as sensemaking) as information processing.

Best regards

El nov 8, 2017 6:59 AM, "Joseph Brenner" <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> escribió:

Dear Colleagues,

This is simply to register a dissenting opinion, for similar reasons, with
the last two notes, if nothing else to say that there can be one:

1. Regarding John C.'s view of  the value of Pierce, there can be no common
ground. Scholastic, propositional logic is part of the problem. His metaphysics
has no ground in physics. Only Pierce's intuitions, to which he gives less
value, have some value for me.

2. Koichiro presents some good science, but it is misapplied. Nothing tells
us that information, or another complex natural process, evolves according to
the trajectories that he describes:

Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and biology must be
either clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an undisciplined mix of the
two.

Rather, like this discussion, such processes follow follow a 'mix' but is by
no means undisciplined, even if it is partly backwards and forwards at the same
time. Such scare words should not be used. Pace John, I think what underlies
both has been found in part, and it is the linked movement of systems from
actual to potential and vice versa.

What is missing from my picture, since no-one seems to point to it, are the
detailed values of the path from actuality to potentiality, which themselves
may go from maxima to minima, as discussed by Michel Godron. Michel has left us
. . .

Best regards,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Koichiro Matsuno
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 1:18 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism

On 6 Nov 2017 at 5:30AM, John Collier wrote:

In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics is
empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to
find what underlies both.

Yes, there have already been serious attempts in this direction, though
which may not yet have received due attention from the folks interested in the
issue of information.

One example is the entropy production fluctuation theorem by Gavin Crooks
(1999).  The agenda is on the distinction between states and events in
thermodynamics. An essence is seen in the uniqueness of th```

### [Fis] Fw: Idealism and Materialism - and Empiricism

```Dear Colleagues,

This is simply to register a dissenting opinion, for similar reasons, with the
last two notes, if nothing else to say that there can be one:

1. Regarding John C.'s view of  the value of Pierce, there can be no common
ground. Scholastic, propositional logic is part of the problem. His metaphysics
has no ground in physics. Only Pierce's intuitions, to which he gives less
value, have some value for me.

2. Koichiro presents some good science, but it is misapplied. Nothing tells us
that information, or another complex natural process, evolves according to the
trajectories that he describes:

Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and biology must be either
clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an undisciplined mix of the two.

Rather, like this discussion, such processes follow follow a 'mix' but is by no
means undisciplined, even if it is partly backwards and forwards at the same
time. Such scare words should not be used. Pace John, I think what underlies
both has been found in part, and it is the linked movement of systems from
actual to potential and vice versa.

What is missing from my picture, since no-one seems to point to it, are the
detailed values of the path from actuality to potentiality, which themselves
may go from maxima to minima, as discussed by Michel Godron. Michel has left us
. . .

Best regards,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Koichiro Matsuno
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, November 08, 2017 1:18 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism

On 6 Nov 2017 at 5:30AM, John Collier wrote:

In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics is
empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to
find what underlies both.

Yes, there have already been serious attempts in this direction, though
which may not yet have received due attention from the folks interested in the
issue of information.

One example is the entropy production fluctuation theorem by Gavin Crooks
(1999).  The agenda is on the distinction between states and events in
thermodynamics. An essence is seen in the uniqueness of thermodynamics allowing
for even the non-state or history-dependent variable such as heat. This
perspective is powerful enough to precipitate a dependable synthesis out of
integrating both the state and the process descriptions.

When a microscopic system of interest contacts a heat bath, its development
along an arbitrary trajectory of the state attributes of the system necessarily
accompanies the associated event of heat flow either to or from the bath. If
the trajectory is accompanied by the heat flow to the bath over any finite time
interval, it would be far more likely compared with the reversed trajectory
absorbing the same amount of heat flow from the bath. This has been a main
message from Crooks’ fluctuation theorem. One practical implication of the
theorem is that if the trajectory happens to constitute a loop, the likely loop
must be the one having the net positive heat flow to the bath. For the reversed
loop trajectory would have to come to accompany the same amount of heat flow
from the bath back into the inside of the system, and that would be far less
likely. Any robust loop trajectory appearing in biochemistry and biology must
be either clockwise or anti-clockwise, and by no means an undisciplined mix of
the two.

A lesson we could learn from this pedagogical example is that thermodynamics
is a naturalized tool for making macroscopic events out of the state attributes
on the microscopic level irrespectively of whether or not it may have already
been called informational. It is quite different from what statistical
mechanics has accomplished so far. Something called quantum thermodynamics is
gaining its momentum somewhere these days.

Koichiro Matsuno

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of John Collier
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2017 5:30 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Idealism and Materialism

Loet, I have no disagreement with this. at least in the detailed summary you
give. In fact I would argue that the notion of information as used in physics
is empirically based just as it is in the cognitive sciences. Our problem is to
find what underlies both.

My mention of the Scholastics was to Pierce's version, not the common
interpretation due to a dep misunderstanding about what they were up to. I
recommend a serous study of Peirce on te issues of meaning and metaphysics. He
wa deeply indebted to their work iin logic.

Of course there may be no common ground, but the our project is hopeless. Other
things you have said on this group lead me to think it is not a dead end of
confused notions. In that case we are wasting our time.

John

```

### Re: [Fis] Adding dimensions

```Dear Arturo,

I think this formulation is correct and very useful. It implies, in the formal
sense of real implication, a dynamics of emergence of the more complex states.
Gerhard Luhn has also pointed to this emergence (he calls it of 'new laws') as
a property of the universe, of which are our brains are a fairly interesting
part. . .

As in Terry's recent note, this 'enriched' input avoids the straitjackets of
binary values or simple self-contradiction.

Best wishes,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: tozziart...@libero.it
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Thursday, October 26, 2017 7:45 AM
Subject: [Fis] Adding dimensions

Dear FISers,

it is clear (and it has been demonstrated) that what you call "agent" is
something that... increases the dimensions of the discourse.

For example, our brain, rather than "extract" information from the
environment, makes exactly the opposite process, by "diluting" and "increasing"
it.
Starting from sensorial inputs from the 3D (plus time) environmental data,
our brain processes them in 4D plus time (or even more!) dimensions.  This
means that, when I see a cat in the street, my mind enriches it with other
dimensions (emotions: "how nice is that cat!"; higher brain activities: "that
cat is a feline"; and so on)

Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/

--

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### Re: [Fis] What is ³Agent²?. Nothing Extra Needed

```Dear Gordana, Dear All,

In a few carefully chosen words, Gordana has established a 'two faces' picture
of 'agency', involving energy where it should be and with reference to several
levels (the limit cases). All this is within the principles of physics, closure
and completeness, with no arbitrary entities thrown in. Process is the
consequence of agency and vice versa.

The two faces of agency, and the relation between them are thus within science
and have a logic, an informational logic. I suggest there may be value in
listing candidates for such a logic.

Best wishes,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
To: Terrence W. DEACON ; 'Bob Logan' ; l...@leydesdorff.net ; 'fis'
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2017 11:02 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] What is ³Agent²?

Dear Terry, Bob, Loet

Thank you for sharing those important thoughts about possible choices for the
definition of agency.

I would like to add one more perspective that I find in Pedro’s article which
makes a distinction between matter-energy aspects and informational aspects of
the same physical reality. I believe that on the fundamental level of
information physics we have a good ND simplest example how those two entangled
aspects can be formally framed.
As far as I can tell, Terrys definition covers chemical and biological agency.
Do we want to include apart from fundamental physics also full cognitive and
social agency which are very much dominated by informational aspects (symbols
and language)?
Obviously there is no information without physical implementation, but when
we think about epistemology and the ways we know the world, for us and other
biological agents there is no physical interaction without informational
aspects.
Can we somehow think in terms those two faces of agency?
Without matter/energy nothing will happen, nothing can act in the world but
that which happens and anyone registers it, has informational side to it.
For human agency (given that matter/energy side is functioning) information
is what to a high degree drives agency.

Do you think this would be a fruitful path to pursue, with “agency” of
elementary particles and agency of social institutions as two limit cases?

All the best,
Gordana

__
Gordana Dodig Crnkovic, Professor of Computer Science
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Chalmers University of Technology
School of Innovation, Design and Engineering, Mälardalen University
http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/
General Chair of is4si summit 2017
http://is4si-2017.org

From: Fis  on behalf of Loet Leydesdorff

Organization: University of Amsterdam
Reply-To: "l...@leydesdorff.net"
Date: Friday, 20 October 2017 at 08:40
To: 'Bob Logan' , 'fis'
Subject: Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?

Dear Bob and colleagues,

I agree with the choice element. From a sociological perspective, agency is
usually defined in relation to structure. For example, in terms of
structure/actor contingencies. The structures provide the background that bind
us. Remarkably, Mark, we no longer define these communalities philosophically,
but sociologically (e.g., Merton, 1942, about the institutional norms of
science). An interesting extension is that we nowadays not only perceive
communality is our biological origins (as species), but also in terms of
communicative layers that we construct and reproduce as inter-agency
(interactions).

The relation with the information issue is not obvious. I worked on this a
bit in the first half of the 90s:

a.. "Structure"/"Action" Contingencies and the Model of Parallel
Distributed Processing, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1993)
47-77.
b.. The Production of Probabilistic Entropy in Structure/Action Contingency
Relations, Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 18 (1995) 339-56.
Best,

Loet

--

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, University of Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck, University of London;

http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ=en

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Bob Logan
Sent: Friday, October 20, 2017 6:11 AM
To: Terrence W. DEACON
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?

Dear Terry and FIS friends - I agree with all that Terry has said about
agency. I do wish to however to point out that an agent has choice and a
non-agent has ```

### [Fis] Fw: TEN PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION, FROM YET ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE. A Newer Kind of Science. Logic and Principle 4

```Dear Gordana and Friends,

In 2002, the cybernetician Stephen Wolfram published a massive book with the
title, A New Kind of Science. For me, it was not: it was an attempt to explain
the simplest, quasi-non-living structures of living systems by recourse to
simple algorithms and a multitude of formal logics whose meaning in relation to
reality was largely non-existent. It was deconstructed in a review in Science.

We should not duplicate this error, and that is why I was and still am put off
by Arturo's introductory comment and in fact by all attempts to explain the
information and the world only by numbers and equations.

Regarding transdisciplinarity, I am sure that Sören will agree that his
Multiple Square diagram is only one part of one possible transdisicplinary
approach to information and other complex phenomena. The founding of the active
International Center for Transdisciplinary Research by Lupasco, Nicolescu,
Morin and Varela, among others in 1984 is of interest not only historically.
One of the 'pillars' (principles) of transdisciplinary in the acceptation of
Nicolescu is the Logic of the Included Third of Lupasco. In my view view, only
such a logic of processes is adequate "for the world and reality in all its
richness", since it is based on science and not on Peircean reductive
classifications.

I therefore welcome Gordana's double reference, in the same highly significant
short paragraph, to axioms and principles. Both can be part of our Newer
science. I will go farther and say that the axioms of the Lupasco logic, which
I have renamed Logic in Reality (LIR), fit in our New Science or Pre-Science at
Principle 4:

4. Information flows are essential organizers of life's self-production
processes--anticipating, shaping, and mixing up with the accompanying energy
flows.

LIR talks directly to the "saw-tooth" evolution of such real processes, seeing
their elements as energy as well. I strongly suggest that Principle 4 can be
amended to read as follows:

4. Information flows are essential organizers of life's self-and
hetero-production processes--anticipating, shaping, and mixing up with the
accompanying energy flows. These processes follow a non-binary,
non-truth-functional logic.

Criticisms welcome.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
To: Pedro C. Marijuan ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Friday, October 06, 2017 12:22 PM
Subject: [Fis] TEN PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION, FROM YET ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE

Dear Colleagues,

Following this interesting and enlightening discussion I have got several
thoughts that I would like to share with you. First of all it is a great
pleasure to read variety of contributions, deep thoughts and insights, profound
questions as well. This list so very often brightens my thoughts on information.

I agree with Arturo that what we have today is not a science (of information),
I also agree with Terry and Joseph that it might be rather seen as pre-science,
and I would also propose a further view that we might be working on a new kind
of science. It does not necessarily need to look exactly like the old
science(s). It might be a new, not only in the sense of exploration of
informational universe, but also because learning is interdisciplinary,
transdisciplinary and metadisciplinary, as we come from variety of backgrounds
and information is becoming central to all of them (Søren has written
extensively on the topic of transdisciplinarity in his Cybersemiotics research).

Information is a very complex phenomenon, as it stands for the world and
reality in all its richness – much more complex than matter-energy which is the
physical basis in which it is cast. It always depends on the receiver which is
as a rule implicit (like in Shannon and Kolmogorov-Chaitin information) but if
receiver is explicated as in cognitive computing, a whole new world opens of
relationships between the potential information of the world and perceived
meaningful information in a cognizing agent.

Complexity and transdisciplinarity (interdisciplinarity) are two important
features that must be kept in mind when we embark on the project of
> (I put brackets around the terms that
are not used as in common speech.) It is a huge project, unfinished, but truly
important. That is why it is so attractive too. It reminds of old days Natural
Philosophy, but this time with philosophy of human and other living beings and
cognitive artefacts integrated into it. There is a strong need of philosophical
perspective in this New Kind of Science, or New Kind of Natural Philosophy.
This time we will not stop at physics, which provides basic building blocks for
informational organization, but follow formation of increasingly more complex
structures, morphologies and their mutual interactions – processes unfolding
and enabling information to act in the world. There is a journal Philosophies
```

### [Fis] Fw: A Curious Story

```Dear Pedro and All,

Thanks to Pedro again for this thought-provoking theme. We are all in states of
greater or lesser ignorance regarding it!

Here is just, again, a thought about your quote of Conrad: "when we look at a
biological system we are looking at the face of the underlying physics of the
universe."

I.M.H.O., this statement is true but only partially so. There are
non-thermodynamic parts of the underlying physics of the universe that are not
visible at the biological level of reality, and a coupling between them remains
to be demonstrated. Quantum superposition and self-duality have analogies in
macroscopic physics, but quantum non-locality and sub-quantum fluctuations do
not.

Of course, if you allow slightly altered laws of nature, many things may be
possible as Smolin suggests. However, I suggest that the domain of interaction
between actual and potential states in our everyday 'grown-up' world also has
things to tell us, e.g., about information, that can be looked at more easily.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Pedro C. Marijuan
To: 'fis'
Sent: Friday, January 20, 2017 1:58 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] A Curious Story

Dear Otto and colleagues,

Thanks for the curious story and sorry that my absorption in low level
administrative themes has knocked me down-down during these weeks. But not
being a physicist, and even not a third rate aficionado, I can contribute very
little to the exchanges. At least I will try to remark a couple of lateral
aspects:

First, when I heard about this story, I was amazed how hysterical the web
records were. On the one side, the tabloid style comments and the malicious
personal attacks, and on the other side the offended, irritated scientists.
That your opinion deserved a "Charge of the Nobel Brigade" with all those big
names hurried together to smitten any possible doubt, was sort of humorous.
Wasn't from Horace that saying of "vociferant montes et parturient ridiculus
mus"? My impression is that all those hyperactive new media have deteriorated
the exchange and maturation of scientific opinion. The fate of your position on
those hypothetic risks was irrationally discounted.

And about the theme itself, I join one of the initial comments on the energy of
singular cosmic rays, probabilistically having to cause such microscopic
destructive  black holes in The Moon and somewhere else. The wide swaths of the
cosmos we watch today do not show sudden instances of planet or star
disappearance.  As many thousands and millions of those are well followed
nowadays without reports of sudden destruction: can this "stable" cosmos be an
extra argument in the discussion? Let me improvise some further views: Black
holes relate "quite a bit" to information matters. The controversy between
Hawking, Penrose, etc. about the fate of the quantum information engulfed
seemingly emitted is not the end of the story I think. If everything should
make functional sense in an integrated "organismic" cosmos, the functionality
of black holes is really enigmatic. They just become a reservoir of dark matter
for gravity? In this point our common friend Michael Conrad (1996) put "when we
look at a biological system we are looking at the face of the underlying
physics of the universe." Thereupon, I have always thought about the similarity
between cellular proteasomes (protein destructing machines) and the cosmic
(destructive) black holes. But the former RECYCLE and emit single amino acid
components for reuse, and then would the latter provide only residual gravity?
Lee Smolin said something bold: they recycle too, and produce "baby universes"
with slightly altered laws of nature. Our planet final blimps would have some
more fun incorporated (with the big IF, of course)...

Best wishes

--Pedro

lEl 11/01/2017 a las 11:33, Otto E. Rossler escribió:

I like this response from Lou,
Otto

--
From: Louis H Kauffman
To: Pedro C. Marijuan
Cc: fis
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2017 6:09 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] A Curious Story

Dear Folks,
It is very important to not be hasty and assume that the warning Professor
Rossler made is to be taken seriously.
It is relatively easy to check if a mathematical reasoning is true or false.
It is much more difficult to see if a piece of mathematics is correctly
alligned to physical prediction.
Note also that a reaction such as
"THIS STORY IS A GOOD REASON FOR SHUTTING DOWN CERN PERMANENTLY AND SAVING A
LOT OF LARGELY WASTED MONEY.”.
Is not in the form of scientific rational discussion, but rather in the form
of taking a given conclusion for granted
and using it to support another opinion that is just that - an opinion.

By concatenating such behaviors we arrive at the present political state of
the world.

This ```

### [Fis] Fw: A Curious Story

```Dear All,

I am sorry but I am still not satisfied with the evolution of this discussion
to date. I am still looking forward to some explicit comment on my initial
question of why mini black holes would not evaporate. I note that both Alex and
Bruno asked the same question, before we have seen Gyorgy's comment.

I can confirm from my own small experience as an organic chemist that entities
can be created in the laboratory that not only do not exist in nature but could
not be produced by 'Nature' on its own. The reactants, reaction vessels,
temperatures and pressures to produce certain fluorochemicals and
fluoropolymers could not be brought together in the same place and time without
human intervention.

In contrast, I see nothing in the discussion here of mini black holes that,
first, suggests they could be the consequence of intentionally prepared states,
with large energies 'brought together' in such a way that, second, their
development would not follow known paths. I do not claim that I could follow
the detailed mathematical physics of the demonstration of the existence of a
"5% probability" that such states would not evaporate. But I and probably
others of you much better could still follow a scientific discourse on the
basis of some background and internal structure.

For example, the following statement from one of Otto's notes seems to me to be
a non sequitur:

"If black holes are always uncharged, electrons cannot be point-shaped as is
usually assumed because they would then be black holes and hence uncharged.
They are bound to have a finite diameter large enough to prevent them from
becoming black holes and hence be uncharged."

It is no longer valid to say that electrons are dimensionless points;
experiments now establish a radius of the order of 10 to the -22 meters. If
they are 'point-shaped' in the sense of being effectively spherically
symmetrical, their putative fate as black holes seems irrelevant.

Would it still be possible to see some such new statements regarding both
formation and evolution of mini black holes? The reference article
(Szilamandee) simply repeats the statements we have seen, albeit in an
interesting poetic context.

Thank you.

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Otto E. Rossler
To: Gyorgy Darvas ; fis
Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2017 10:49 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] A Curious Story

https://www.researchgate.net/search.Search.html?type=publication=szilamandee

From: Otto E. Rossler
To: Gyorgy Darvas ; fis
Cc: Louis H Kauffman ; Pedro C. Marijuan

Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2017 3:12 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] A Curious Story

I conform with Geörgyi's tale.

From: Gyorgy Darvas
To: fis
Cc: Otto E. Rossler ; Louis H Kauffman ;
Pedro C. Marijuan
Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2017 2:09 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] A Curious Story

Dear All,
I follow O. Rössler's concerns for a few years.
As a physicist (who is probably not the best specialist in the black hole
physics), I do not want to involve in detailed physical explanations and
mathematical proofs for information specialists, not certainly specialised in
physics.

According to me, there is a misunderstanding that makes the story curious.
Stellar black holes are a result of a gravitational collapse. That collapse
takes place, when the mass of the star exceeds a critical value; it is a result
of the locally high gravitational field. that gravitational field is stronger
than the electromagnetic field that (in a very simplified picture) keeps the
electrons revolve in a distance around the nucleus.
In the course of that gravitational collapse the electron shells of the atoms
fall in the nucleus.  The properties of the black holes are defined for them.
The star becomes very small in size, but has a strong gravitational field, and
behaves like described in the bh literature.
Cause: high gravity; effect: collapse, emergence of a bh.

One can produce single atom collapse in extreme laboratory circumstances. Why
not? However, that single (or few) atom collapse will not produce a
gravitational field exceeding the critical value; since its mass is much less
than the critical. The reason is that it was "created" not by a self-generated
gravitational collapse. Therefore, it will not "eat" matter in its environment.
According to the lack of distance between the nucleus and electron shell(s)
around it, these "atoms" (sic!) are called mini-black-holes. However, they do
not behave like the stellar black holes over the critical mass. The name is
only an analogy, marked by the prefix "mini-".
Cause: not high gravity; ```

### [Fis] Fw: What is information? and What is life? Wisdom

```Dear FISers,

There is 'something' in Terry's approach that I would like to refer to as
wisdom. Wisdom need not be thought of as esoteric, but to describe at least one
further level of recursive information processing in which, echoing Terry,
absent properties are as essential as present ones. In my conception, absent
means not only what is 'not there', but also what is repressed, potentialized,
temporarily forgotten, ignored, devalued or minimized. This is just a tiny bit
of what 'higher-order' properties and an inversion of perspective might involve.

Best Season's and New Year's Greetings,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Terrence W. DEACON
To: Francesco Rizzo
Cc: fis
Sent: Saturday, December 24, 2016 7:22 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?

Dear colleagues,

I am entirely in agreement with the sentiments about mutual respect that Loet
recommends and the "harmony of knowledge" that Francesco promotes. But I
believe that this must also include a willingness to recognize that there isn't
a most basic theory; only what we might characterize as a currently most
thoroughly worked out analysis. But this is an analysis at the most stripped
down level—and which therefore necessarily ignores much that is essential to a
fuller analysis of information.

In this respect Loet comments:

"In my opinion, the status of Shannon’s mathematical theory of information is
different  from special theories of information (e.g., biological ones) since
the formal theory enables us to translate between these latter theories."

We are essentially in agreement, and yet I would invert any perspective that
prioritizes the approach pioneered by Shannon. This analysis of the signal
properties that are necessary for conveying information does not attempt to
address the "higher order" properties that we pay attention to in domains where
reference and functional value are relevant (e.g. biology, neuroscience,
sociology, art). It necessarily brackets these aspects from consideration. It
thereby provides a common necessary but not sufficient tool of analysis. More
than a half century of development along these lines has demonstrated that
there are critical features of the information relationship that cannot be
reduced to intrinsic signal properties.

I have argued that there are basically two higher-order general properties that
constitute information: the referential relation and the normative/functional
value relation (with the term 'meaning' often used somewhat ambiguously to
refer to one or both of these properties). I do not assume that these
completely characterize all higher-order properties, and so I would be open to
discussing additional general attributes that fall outside these domains, and
which we need to also consider.

So I am not a fan of prioritizing the statistical conception of information and
considering all others to be "special" theories.

My hope for the field is that we will continue to work toward formalization of
these higher-order properties with the aim of embedding our current "signal
property analysis" within this larger theory. In this respect, I would argue
that the "mathematical theory" as currently developed is in fact a "special
theory," restricted to analyses where reference and functional significance can
be set aside (as in engineering applications), and that the "general theory"
remains to be formulated.

Since its inception, it has been recognized that the "mathematical theory of
communication" has used the term 'information' in a highly atypical sense. I
think that we would do well to keep this historical "accident" in mind in order
to avoid "information fundamentalism." This demands a sort of humility in the
face of the enormity of the challenge before us, not merely a tolerance of
"special" domains of application that don't completely reduce to statistical
analysis.

My proposal is that agreeing on terminological distinctions that support such a
paradigm inversion might provide a first step toward theoretical convergence
toward a "general theory" of information. I would welcome such a discussion in
the new year.

Happy holidays to all, Terry

On Sat, Dec 24, 2016 at 2:22 AM, Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
wrote:

Cari Tutti,
ho scritto più volte le stesse cose per cui sono d'accordo con Voi,
specialmente con gli ultimi intervenuti. E dato che sono un forestiero rispetto
alle Vostre discipline, ma non uno straniero dell'armonia del sapere o del
sapere dell'armonia, questo è una bella cosa. Auguri di buon Natale e per il
nuovo anno.
Francesco

2016-12-24 7:45 GMT+01:00 Loet Leydesdorff :

Dear Terrence and colleagues,

I agree that we should not be fundamentalistic about “information”. For
example, one can also use “uncertainty” as an alternative word to Shannon-type
“information”. One can also make distinctions ```

### [Fis] Brenner and Lupasco logic. Emergent Simplicity

```s too much the scientifically untenable Aristotle…
How can you say what is potential and what is actual?  Actual and potential
compared to what?  The bullet that killed John Kennedy is actual when you think
that it reached Kennedy, but is potential if you think that it did not kill
Jaqueline… Therefore, your concept of actual and potential requires a
subjective observer who states what is actual and what is potential.  You may
argue that you are talking about Lagrangian and Hamiltonians, but it does not
help, in this case.  Indeed, the concept of energetic gradient descent, for
example in Fokker-Planck equations, this time, cannot help you, because they do
not talk of the EXISTENCE of  potentiality of actuality, but just of an
energetic path of a random walk towards lesser energetic levels (on the other
side, at which low energetic level can you say that potentiality finish and
actuality is present?).

3. Included Middle: An included or additional third element or T-state (‘T’ for
‘tiers inclus’, included third).

This axiom reminds me… the Borsuk-Ulam theorem!  Two antipodal points (call it
A and non-A) become a point T, when projected in a different dimension… The
only difference is that, according Lupasco,  A and non-A become T in a
dimension higher, while, according the Borsuk-Ulam theorem, A and non-A become
T in a dimension lower…

Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/

Messaggio originale----
Da: "Joseph Brenner" <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>
Data: 07/12/2016 15.15
A: "fis"<fis@listas.unizar.es>
Cc: <tozziart...@libero.it>
Ogg: Fw: [Fis] Fwd: R: Re: Who may proof that consciousness is an Euclidean
n-space ??? Logic

﻿
Dear Folks,

Arturo wrote:

"therefore logic, in general, cannot be anymore useful in the description of
our world. I'm sad about that, but that's all."

The answer is to change logic from one of propositions (Lesniewski-Tarski) or
mathematics (Zermelo-Fraenkel) to one of the states of real processes (Lupasco;
Logic in Reality). Why this is not even considered as an option for serious
discussion is a great mystery to me.

Arturo also said:

"The concepts of locality and of cause/effect disappear in front of the
puzzling phenomenon of quantum entanglement, which is intractable in terms of
logic."

Here, I fully agree; Logic in Reality also does not apply to quantum
phenomena. It is limited to description of processes involving thermodynamic
change in which there is a mutual interaction between elements as individuals,
including people. I do not claim it allows causal prediction, but logical
inference.

Arturo:

"The same stands for nonlinear chaotic phenomena, widespread in nature, from
pile sands, to bird flocks and  to brain function. When biforcations occur in
logistic plots and chaotic behaviours take place, the final systems' ouputs are
not anymore causally predictable."

Here, I agree with Arturo but for a different reason. The non-linear
phenomena mentioned are too simple. In crowd behavior, individual interactions
are absent or meaningless - information_as_data. Brain behavior of this kind is
of lower complexity and interest, involving mostly lower level functionalities,
although they they may accompany higher level cognitive functions.

I look forward to point by point refutation of or agreement with the above.

Best wishes,

Joseph

--

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

```

### [Fis] Fw: Fwd: R: Re: Who may proof that consciousness is an Euclidean n-space ??? Logic

```Dear Folks,

Arturo wrote:

"therefore logic, in general, cannot be anymore useful in the description of
our world. I'm sad about that, but that's all."

The answer is to change logic from one of propositions (Lesniewski-Tarski) or
mathematics (Zermelo-Fraenkel) to one of the states of real processes (Lupasco;
Logic in Reality). Why this is not even considered as an option for serious
discussion is a great mystery to me.

Arturo also said:

"The concepts of locality and of cause/effect disappear in front of the
puzzling phenomenon of quantum entanglement, which is intractable in terms of
logic."

Here, I fully agree; Logic in Reality also does not apply to quantum phenomena.
It is limited to description of processes involving thermodynamic change in
which there is a mutual interaction between elements as individuals, including
people. I do not claim it allows causal prediction, but logical inference.

Arturo:

"The same stands for nonlinear chaotic phenomena, widespread in nature, from
pile sands, to bird flocks and  to brain function. When biforcations occur in
logistic plots and chaotic behaviours take place, the final systems' ouputs are
not anymore causally predictable."

Here, I agree with Arturo but for a different reason. The non-linear phenomena
mentioned are too simple. In crowd behavior, individual interactions are absent
or meaningless - information_as_data. Brain behavior of this kind is of lower
complexity and interest, involving mostly lower level functionalities, although
they they may accompany higher level cognitive functions.

I look forward to point by point refutation of or agreement with the above.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: tozziart...@libero.it
To: fis
Sent: Wednesday, December 07, 2016 9:10 AM
Subject: [Fis] Fwd: R: Re: Who may proof that consciousness is an Euclidean
n-space ???

Messaggio inoltrato  Da: tozziart...@libero.it A: Jerry LR
Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com Data: martedì, 06 dicembre 2016, 11:17AM
+01:00 Oggetto: R: Re: [Fis] Who may proof that consciousness is an Euclidean
n-space ???

Dear Jerry,
thanks a lot for your interesting comments.
I like very much the logical approach, a topic that is generally dispised by
scientists for its intrinsic difficulty.
We also published something about logic and brain (currently under review),
therefore we keep it in high consideration:
http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2016/11/15/087874

However, there is a severe problem that prevents logic in order to be useful
in the description of scientific theories, explanans/explanandum, and so on.
The severe problem has been raised by three foremost discoveries in the last
century: quantum entanglement, nonlinear dynamics and quantistic vacuum.
Quantum entanglement, although experimentally proofed by countless scientific
procedures,  is against any common sense and any possibliity of logical
inquiry.  The concepts of locality and of cause/effect disappear in front of
the puzzling phenomenon of quantum entanglement, which is intractable in terms
of logic, neither using the successful and advanced approaches of
Lesniewski-Tarski, nor Zermelo-Fraenkel's.
The same stands for nonlinear chaotic phenomena, widespread in nature, from
pile sands, to bird flocks and  to brain function. When biforcations occur in
logistic plots and chaotic behaviours take place, the final systems' ouputs are
not anymore causally predictable.
Quantistic vacuum predicts particles or fields interactions occurring through
breaks in CPT symmetries: this means that, illogically,  the arrow of the time
can be reverted (!) in quantistic systems.

Therefore (and I'm sorry for that), the explanatory role of logic in
scientific theories is definitely lost.
Here we are talking about brain: pay attention, I'm not saying that the brain
function obeys to quantum behaviours (I do not agree with the accounts by, for
example, Roger Penrose or Vitiello/Freeman).  I'm just saying that, because
basic phenomena underlying our physical and biological environment display
chaotic behaviours and quantistic mechanisms that go against logic, therefore
the logic, in general, cannot be anymore useful in the description of our
world.
I'm sad about that, but that's all.

P.S.: A topological approach talks instead of projections and mappings from
one level to another, therefore it does not talk about causality or time and
displays a more general explanatory power.   But this is another topic...

Arturo Tozzi

AA Professor Physics, University North Texas

Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy

Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba

http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/

Messaggio originale
Da: "Jerry LR Chandler"
Data: 05/12/2016 0.50
A: "fis"
Cc:
Ogg: Re: [Fis] Who ```

### Re: [Fis] Commutativity

```Dear Karl and All,

I believe I have right to this message at the start of a new week. Apologies if
this is not the case.

Unfortunately, while I am glad to agree with some of Karl's remarks, I must
categorically reject others as 'dead fish', both those that are attributed to
me and some which are not:

You wrote:
1. ...whether one is more attracted to monotheistic or rather polytheistic
general explanations of reality. The model’s algorithms proposed are of the
polygenetic school of thought: aspects of a+b=c are in an eternal battle of
pre-eminence among each other.
Tokens are but symbols . . .

I can accept this approach provided a, b and c are no longer considered
'tokens'. What Logic in Reality does is to define the evolution of this battle
in energetic logical terms, where a, b, and c are elements of processes.

2. We will certainly agree on a Pythagorean basis, that meditating on the
relations among numbers will educate the open-minded about main properties of
Nature.
The model builds on cyclic permutations being the fundament of thinking and
counting, therefore the basic fundament of imaginations about Nature.

I disagree radically with these statements. If that makes me closed-minded so
be it.

3. The picture resulting will by all means benefit from a bit of getting used
to, but on the other hand, it is free of contradictions, consistent in itself,
appears to model Nature quite well

For the reasons stated in 3., these statements are also unacceptable.
Consistency and freedom from contradiction are characteristics of abstract
logic, mathematics and number theory, not of Nature, including information and
probability. I suggest they stay where they belong.

I do not want anything I say to be accepted as 'God's gift to information
theory'. That principle should apply generally.

Thank you.

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Karl Javorszky
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: Terrence Deacon ; fis ; John Collier ; Gyorgy Darvas ; Bob Logan ; Andrei
Khrennikov ; raf...@capurro.de
Sent: Monday, November 07, 2016 10:22 AM
Subject: Re: Commutativity

Dear Joseph,

your well-chosen words about the logical obsolescence of commutativity as a
basic rule express the idea on a verbal level. My approach was on the level of
combinatorics. Common is to both conceptions of the same problem that an era
has come to an end. We have to confront a new concept of reality.

The model investigates how logical conflicts will be consolidated. The
logical conflicts do not appear visible until one imposes sequential order on
the elements. The main idea is that we enter a field of schizophrenia: logical
systems do not contain contradictions but we have here a logical system that
does contain contradictions. Is the reality full of contradictions? Is it
possible to create a consistent, logical picture of the world that is
self-contradictory? How is it possible to have a logically sound current moment
in life while the process in which each transversal moment is logically true,
nevertheless the same process is, at least at times, along a longitudinal axis
logically inconsistent and ends in discontinuities?

The answer lies in the steps of transition from one sequence into a different
sequence. This is a very basic way of creating a picture of reality. Pythagoras
would have introduced it and Euclid had written a book on it – if they had had
computers at their disposal. One needs computers to deal with the sheer
quantity of numbers. No human brain can keep track of the complicated patterns
that stitch the elements of reality together.

The reorganisations weave a grid-cum-web of the patterns of movements of
parts. There are typical patterns of movements if one reorders logical tokens
that are individually numbered. The tokens are but symbols, like the symbols
one gives to one’s teddy bears or dolls or tin soldiers. Now one enters a
detailed dreamery about which teddy bear changes place with which other token.
One will want to make use of a computer to follow this exercise of imagination
through to the very end. The tokens are themselves devoid of movement. It is
the human brain that imagines that they move from a place to a different place
while the assembly is being reordered.

Your question, to which general concepts of the world will be of no use a
model that depicts Nature as being of a dual character, always in a compromise
between conflicting requirements: this question is comparable to a meditation
about whether one is more attracted to monotheistic or rather polytheistic
general explanations of reality. The model’s algorithms proposed are of the
polygenetic school of thought: aspects of a+b=c are in an eternal battle of
pre-eminence among each other and agree or do not agree on the occupation of
available places by transitory elements. It shows a much more Hindu variant of
a basic concept of the world than the monoideistic ones.

We```

### [Fis] Commutativity

```Well, Karl, it still takes some reading of what I have written to find
important points of agreement as well as disagreement. In my 2008 book I noted
that /both/ commutativity and distributivity should not be required in
descriptions of real systems:

In LIR, since no individual term is an identity, that is, unconnected to other
terms, one has the same relation as that between a term and the context that
perturbs it. Both the commutative law of standard logic, (a + b) + c  =  a + (b
+ c) and the distributive law between conjunction and disjunction

do not hold. Any applicable formalism is, accordingly, non-Abelian and
non-Boolean respectively, and the resulting probability distributions are
non-Kolmogorovian. The detailed mathematics remain to be worked out for the LIR
description of reality values as ‘probability-like’[1].
[1] These values are like objective probabilities which do not indicate limits
of knowledge, but are about the properties that things objectively have.

I feel that no notion of real use can be clear and concise. The elements of
logic are not 'tokens', a term that conveys something inert, lacking its own
dynamics (ability to change). There are, as I hope we could agree, details of
reality also lost in the use of your 'sequencing' tool.

You could help to resolve the issue with one simple comment: to what complex
processes does your approach NOT apply?

Thank you.

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Karl Javorszky
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: Terrence Deacon ; fis ; John Collier ; Gyorgy Darvas ; Bob Logan ; Andrei
Khrennikov ; raf...@capurro.de
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 9:43 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is quantum information the basis of spacetime?

Well, Joseph, you don't have to go far to get the desired definition of
information as an operator (produced quantity).

The only prerequisite is to be ready to discard the practice, ideas,
philosophy and ideology of the definitions relating to commutativity.

This is heresy, I understand. On the other hand, time may now have come to
face up the truth. We see that (a,b)->c is different to (b,a)->c. We have
learnt that this obvious difference is to be disregarded. We wish the clearly
visible difference away so we get a picture of the world which is easier to
work with. Of course, if I say that it makes no difference whether a or b has a
positional advantage /pace opinion research questionnaries/, I don't have to
worry about the endless complications arising from the question, which was
first, a or b.

The system simplified as it is in use presently is not versatile, detailed
and nuanced enough to allow for the introduction of words that describe the
ideas.

One cannot explain trigonometry as long as the definition is in power that
all triangles are to be seen in their unified variant and the proportion of the
sides to each other is by definition irrelevant.

Come the day you want to find a clear, concise, operator based tool to
measure information content (based on properties of natural numbers), please
look up my book Natürliche Ordnungen, available thru morawa or amazon etc.

It is a completely new world out there if one stops thinking in a world made
up by wishing away important details. There is power in them there sequences.
No wonder Nature uses them in perpetuating life. Let us no more pretend
commutativity is without alternatives. We have computers. We can keep track of
the problems arising from actually observing and using sequential properties of
logical tokens. That one can explain what the term "information" amounts to is
just one of the discoveries one makes while using the tool of sequencing.

Do look it up. It has been made for your use.

Respectfully
Karl

On 4 Nov 2016 18:06, "Joseph Brenner" <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:

Dear All,

I agree with the consensus I see emerging. Andrei shows the problem of
trying to pin down a complex process with a single term - information. And I
agree with Rafael that information must have a valence. On the other hand, as
such, information cannot be completely defined mathematically, pace Karl, any
more than anything living can be.

It is discouraging to see how reductionist theories like 'It-from-Bit' get
reproduced and disseminated by Scientific American, which used to be a good
journal. One cannot simply ignore the reactionary sub-text of such 'science',
even if a product of the "Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics".

One could say rather that quanta, not quantum information, are the basis
for spacetime. At the sub-quantum level, I think we have already said that
whatever the way in which energy is exchanged, nothing is gained by calling it
information. (We may make an exception for the case of non-locality defined by
Bell inequalities.)

The only nuance I would a```

### Re: [Fis] Is quantum information the basis of spacetime?

```Dear All,

I agree with the consensus I see emerging. Andrei shows the problem of trying
to pin down a complex process with a single term - information. And I agree
with Rafael that information must have a valence. On the other hand, as such,
information cannot be completely defined mathematically, pace Karl, any more
than anything living can be.

It is discouraging to see how reductionist theories like 'It-from-Bit' get
reproduced and disseminated by Scientific American, which used to be a good
journal. One cannot simply ignore the reactionary sub-text of such 'science',
even if a product of the "Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics".

One could say rather that quanta, not quantum information, are the basis for
spacetime. At the sub-quantum level, I think we have already said that whatever
the way in which energy is exchanged, nothing is gained by calling it
information. (We may make an exception for the case of non-locality defined by
Bell inequalities.)

The only nuance I would add is that although we can speak of biotic and Shannon
information (better, today, Shannon-Boltzmann-Darwin as in Terry's
explication), the properties of information_as_process have not been completely
described. I would like to see the concept of information as an operator,
causally effective because of its being energy, explored further.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Rafael Capurro
To: Bob Logan ; Andrei Khrennikov ; Gyorgy Darvas ; John Collier ; fis
Sent: Friday, November 04, 2016 3:47 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is quantum information the basis of spacetime?

Andrei, maybe the concept of message as already used by Shannon and Weaver in
specific engineering contexts (this must not be always the case) is more
appropriate and also able to speak about 'information' as what is 'in' a
message 'for' a receiver. Best. Rafael

Hello Andrei - I am with you - sharing you sentiment. Information only
pertains to living organisms and entails some signals that help them make a
choice. A black hole makes no choices - it is ruled by the laws of physics.
Abiotic systems have no information. A book is a set of signals that a reader
can convert into information if they know the language which the book is
written. A book written in Urdu contains no information for me other than this
appears to be a set of signals that contains information for a reader in the
language in which this book was written. Who reads a black hole. How does it
contain information that makes a difference. When we launch a satellite to
orbit the earth we do not say that the sun is informing the satellite how to
behave. The satellite is just following the laws of physics. It has no choice
and so it is not being informed. There are many different forms of information
(biotic and Shannon as found in the 2007 paper Propagating Organization: An
Inquiry by Kauffman, Logan et al. in Biology and Philosophy 23: 27-45)  so
we do not need to complicate things even more by ascribing the laws of physics
as the communication of information.
__

Robert K. Logan
Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto
Fellow University of St. Michael's College
Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan
www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications

On Nov 4, 2016, at 4:17 AM, Andrei Khrennikov
wrote:

Dear all,
I want to comment so called information approach to physics, by speaking
with hundreds of leading experts
in quantum foundations, I found that nobody can define rigorously the basic
term "information" which is so widely
used in their theories and discussions, the answers are as "information is
the basic entity" which cannot be defined
in other terms. Well, my impression is that without novel understanding and
definition of information all these "theories"
are practically empty, well very good mathematical exercises. May be I am
too critical... But I spent so much time by trying
to understand what people are talking about. The output is ZERO.

all the best, andrei

Andrei Khrennikov, Professor of Applied Mathematics,
Int. Center Math Modeling: Physics, Engineering, Economics, and Cognitive
Sc.
Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden
My RECENT BOOKS:
http://www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/p1036
http://www.springer.com/in/book/9789401798181
http://www.panstanford.com/books/9789814411738.html

http://www.cambridge.org/cr/academic/subjects/physics/econophysics-and-financial-physics/quantum-social-science
http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783642051005

From: Fis [fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] on behalf of Gyorgy Darvas
[darv...@iif.hu]
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2016 10:23 PM
```

### [Fis] Fw: Scientific communication. Objective and Subjective Probability

```Dear Francesco and All,

The implications of your note go far beyond scientific communication as such,
but we can start here.

1. Francesco, you are entirely right to 'open up' the otherwise inert standard
concepts of probability to include a qualitative (subjective-objective)
component. You also point correctly to the limitations of standard mathematics
in expressing complex phenomena such as economic evolution.

2. I also agree that there is a tight (and 'unholy') relationship between
standard concepts of logic and philosophy and the neo-capitalist system in
which we have the dubious privilege of being immersed.

3. I would just suggest that fuzzy logic as it is generally understood,
including the neutrosophic logic of Smarandache, remains a linguistic system
and is still incapable of capturing the dynamics of real processes. So far, the
only logic I have found that can describe the dialectics of the dynamic
evolution of such processes is that of Stéphane Lupasco, which I have reworked
as Logic in Reality (LIR).

I have just attended a Conference on 'Logic and Probability'. I was
disappointed, but not surprised, that for this group logic means only standard
bivalent, Boolean logic and probability means only standard Kolmogorovian
probability (limits [0,1]). LIR, I suggest, deserves more attention because it
can talk about non-linguistic logic, non-Boolean algebra, and non-Kolmogorovian
probabilities ([>0, <1]), one of which could be Francesco's. Comments wlecome.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Francesco Rizzo
To: Mark Johnson
Cc: fis
Sent: Sunday, October 30, 2016 7:43 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Scientific communication

Caro Mark e cari tutti,
non è facile esporre in poche parole una concezione economica diversa da quella
ritenuta "normale". Non v'è altro modo di comprendere una "Nuova economia" che
di leggere i vari saggi che raccontano la sua storia, analisi e critica.
Qui posso dire che la mia teoria del valore è basata sulla legge
dell'INFORMAZIONE come processo che tende a dare o (far)perdere forma a
qualunque idea o cosa. Sicché acquista rilevanza la FORMA DEL VALORE o VALORE
DELLA FORMA di tutto ciò che viene creato o prodotto. Negli anni passati nella
rete Fis  abbiamo discusso sul PROCESSO DI TRAS-INFORMAZIONE di cui v'ha
traccia su Internet.
I fatti o fenomeni economici, compresi i prezzi, non possono essere espressi
mediante la DISTRIBUZIONE GAUSSIANA O MATEMATICI-FREQUENTISTA, bensì con la
GEOMETRIA O LOGICA FRATTALE (Rizzo F.,"Il giudizio del valore", 1972).
Il giudizio del valore è basato sul VALORE NORMALE DAL PUNTO DI VISTA
SOGGETTIVO, cioè implica una PROBABILIT° SOGGETTIVA O PSICOLOGICA che non è
legata ad un fatto o evento (PROBABILITA' OGGETTIVA: fatti favorevoli/fatti
possibili), ma a un giudizio o proposizione che muta al variare del SISTEMA DI
CONOSCENZE posseduto (PROBABILITA' EPISTEMICA O SOGGETTIVA di J. M.  Keynes e
Bruno de Finetti).
Questo significa che il giudizio di valore è basato su un RAPPORTO DI
COMPLEMENTARITA' tra i beni e gli operatori economici di volta in volta
considerati.
Inoltre non bisogna trascurare la LOGICA O FILOSOFIA O INCERTEZZA FUZZY,
secondo cui un valore o prezzo ha la probabilità di verificarsi al 30% e la
probabilità di non verificarsi al 70%: il che non significa che si può
verificare 30 volte interamente su le 100 volte possibili e viceversa, bensì
che ogni stesso o unico elemento ha probabilità di verificarsi parzialmente o
in una certa misura, non esattamente. Quindi sono gli elementi degli insiemi,
non gli insiemi stessi ad essere FUZZY. Ad es., nella mia TEORIA DEL CAPITALE O
DELLA CAPITALIZZAZIONE, il valore di un bene capitale è funzione di due
componenti prese in proporzioni diverse: la capitalizzazione del flusso dei
redditi attesi o capitalizzazione della LIQUIDITA' O MONETITA' ESPLICITA e la
capitalizzazione della LIQUIDITA' O MONETITA' IMPLICITA.
Sono consapevole che le cose dette così risultano apodittiche, dogmatiche,
probabilmente incomprensibili (in senso soggettivo) in ragione delle conoscenze
di scienza economica-estimativa acquisite. Ma non v'è alternativa, se non
quella di studiare l'economia attraverso la lettura dei libri e degli articoli:
i soli articoli delle riviste non bastano. Lo stesso dicasi per quanto riguarda
l'apprendimento-assimilazione della NUOVA ECONOMIA che ho elaborato in 50 anni
di ricerca ed è contenuta in una trentina di libri.
Se qualcuno mi ha seguito, lo ringrazio; mentre mi scuso con coloro ai quali
questa mail non appare chiara.
Un saluto augurale e affettuoso.
Francesco

2016-10-30 1:34 GMT+02:00 Mark Johnson :

Dear Michel,

I'm mindful that we're breaking the rules of the forum so I will
follow this up off-list, but I think this is worth mentioning to the
group.

The starting point is a diagram, or a sequence of diagrams - certainly
that's most appropriate for a systems theoretical ```

### Re: [Fis] Scientific Communication and Publishing. Please resend article.

```
Dear Mark (if I may),

I quite agree with the thesis of your published article, which is what the
indicated link first took me to. Now, it takes me only to the Youtube and I
have lost the article!

One should continue: if it is a 'logic of the market' that is biasing
decisions in scientific publishing, maybe we should get rid of the
neo-capitalist market system for this as well as other reasons! I also have
some comments on Bhaskar but I would like to read the article again. Many
thanks.

Best regards,

Joseph Brenner

- Original Message -
From: "Mark Johnson" <johnsonm...@gmail.com>

To: "fis" <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 9:55 AM
Subject: [Fis] Scientific Communication and Publishing

Dear FIS Colleagues,

To kick-start the discussion on scientific publishing, I have prepared
a short (hopefully provocative) video. It can be found at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Bh3vqM98-U

(if anyone's interested, the software I used for producing it is
called 'Videoscribe')

I have also produced a paper which is attached.

I hope you find these interesting and stimulating!

Best wishes,

Mark
--
Dr. Mark William Johnson
Institute of Learning and Teaching
Faculty of Health and Life Sciences
University of Liverpool

Phone: 07786 064505
Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com
Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com

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### [Fis] An Agenda of Control

```Dear Pedro,

Most of us would agree that standard Western science does not give a complete
answer to questions about life and mind. As we try to seek better foundations
in general and for information science in particular, we may be able to benefit
from knowledge resources which have not been fully exploited, those of the
'Past' and those of the 'East'. I myself have written a paper suggesting that a
metalogical rejunction is possible in which logic recovers its original status
as inclusive of all other disciplines. As Brian Josephson writes in the
Abstract of one of his lectures, "Eastern mystics may have relevance to
scientific understanding." Fritjof Capra explored such parallels in his
important 1967 book The Tao of Physics.  However, many interpretations of what
mysticism is are possible.

There is a further major caveat to keep in mind: there are different ways of
understanding "what is missing" in science (see Terence Deacon's discussion of
information) and what kind of additions could be made. On the one hand, we may
legitimately associate quantum fluctuations with Indian (not Eastern) ideas of
things continuously moving in and out of existence. On the other, as we have
discussed in connection with Conrad's 'fluctuons' at least once in the FIS
Group, it may NOT be correct to say that such fluctuations are or can carry
meaningful information.

Recent postings to the FIS list have been made by people associated with a
project embedded in a major university (Cambridge, UK), the "Matter-Mind
Unification Project", now the "Theory of Condensed Matter Group" which
Josephson has directed. This effort has sought and still seeks to incorporate
doubtful, self-confirming forms of Western thought and activity. Personally, I
do not wish to be associated with the Circular Theory of Ilexa Yardley, in
which "the core dynamic is the conservation of a circle", which is a
misunderstanding of dynamics. I do not wish to accept nature as controlled by
some "Master Algorithm", any more than I do Peircean Thirdness. I do not wish
to be associated with paranormal phenomena, cold fusion and observer created
reality, all of which are part of Josephson's project.

A characteristic of this thought is its dogmatism of completeness, a theory of
everything, in which things are linked by a "subtler dimension which we have
identified with the Platonic realm" (Yardley). One might argue that the Tao is
also a theory of everything that also sees things linked in a way different
from that of, say, chemical bonds. The major difference is that understanding
the Tao does not require abrogating science in order to replace it by a
self-serving ideology. Deacon has characterized the 'homunculi' and 'golems',
disguised as physical principles, that interfere with thought; 'wishful
thinking' is the most charitable term that can be applied.

Other FIS members may find these ideas harmless, perhaps even amusing. I
consider them perversions of thought by people with an agenda of control. The
one positive result of these postings has been to cause me to re-examine the
assumptions in the logic of the included middle of Stéphane Lupasco. This as
some of you know is the basis of my 'Logic in Reality' and its Principle of
Dynamic Opposition (critical formulation by Lupasco ca. 1951). I conclude that
no new and doubtful physical concepts need to be introduced to address the
essential aspects of life, mind and information. That information has 'dual
aspects' has been more or less explicit in everything I have tried to write in
the last eight years. But these concepts are not simple; one cannot use the
principles of quantum mechanics directly. Hence I do not expect to find a large
audience nor, to be frank, a large market. I simply hope they may deserve some
more discussion on the FIS list.

Best wishes,

Joseph
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```

### [Fis] Fw: Clarifying Posting. Speculative Realism

```
Dear Friends and Colleagues,

The last couple of postings have opened the discussion in a direction their
authors may not have intended. Bob's felt personal plea for a
phenomenological approach to biology, and hence to other sciences, and as
the foundation of a philosophy, begs the question of non-phenomenological
approaches which may be equally or more valid.

We all agree the mind is capable of phenomenal experience and is not a
machine, but the (correct) arguments being made seem to me expressions, in
various styles, of the non-fundamentality of matter and energy. Unless I am
wrong, this is at least a still open question. Further, Terry's (again
correct) statements about the importance of the Liar and Goedel paradoxes
perhaps overlooks one aspect of them: they (the paradoxes) themselves are
only relatively simple binary cases that can be considered reduced versions
of some more fundamental, underlying princple governing relationships in the
real, physical world. These relationships are crucial to an understanding of
the non-binary properties of information.

A recent book by Tom Sparrow is entitled "The End of Phenomenology". It
proposes a new science-free doctrine, Speculative Realism, to provide a link
between phenomena and reality which in my opinion also fails, but may be of
interest to some of you. I wrote about this doctrine:

As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of
weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of
concepts embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include
an ontology of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the world,
a logic of non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has reason and
value, but excludes the possibility of a ground of existence which includes
incoherence and contradiction.

All for now, for various reasons,

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz"

To: "Stanley N Salthe"
Cc: "fis"
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 7:36 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Clarifying Posting

Dear Pedro,

Most of the discussion has centered about phenomenology in the sense of
Husserl. The topic is broader, however, and remains the foundation of the
engineering philosophy that has guided my career.

I have long advocated a phenomenological approach to biology as the only
way forward. I have devoted years to the phenomenological study of
ecosystems trophic exchange networks and have shown how hypothesis
falsification can be possible in abstraction of eliciting causes
.
I have gone so far as to propose an alternative metaphysics to
conventional mechanical/reductionist theory that followed from
phenomenological premises.

So I would submit that phenomenology is alive and well as a practical and
even quantitative tool in science. It's just that, as an engineer, I find
Husserl tough going. :)

Warm regards,
Bob

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### Re: [Fis] Fw: Information Conservation in black holes

```Dear Folks,

I return following absence due to travel to Bruno’s interesting note of
February 3. I appreciate the opportunity it provides for discussion and
comparison of two very different approaches as to what is important in the
Foundations of Information Science. The A sections below are my understandings
of Bruno and the B’s my position. Direct quotes from Bruno are so indicated.

1. A. Whatever ‘was’ present ‘when’ there was something rather than nothing,
natural numbers = Shannon information could be assigned to ‘it’, and the
generation of interpretations of that information by putative universal Turing
machines ‘became’ possible.

B. If this can be taken to mean that information and matter-energy are not
identical but emerged together from some unknown substrate I have no problem.

2. A. One can extend the putative operations of the Turing machines to the
numerical aspects of natural phenomena, which include the machines themselves,
and further ascribe their inability to operate in certain areas as a putative
cognition. This is ‘mathematical reality’.

B. We may, as an exercise which reminds one of the science-fiction of Stanislas
Lem, ascribe a degree of self-reference to the operations we are observing.

3. A. “None of the internal logics of the universal machine is classical logic.
It oscillates between intuitionist logic and quantum logic, with some
intuitionist quantum logic and quantum intuitionist logic.” In all intuitionist
logics, the Axiom of absolute Non-Contradiction is retained although that of
the Excluded Middle is weakened.

B. Such non-classical logics are fine for the universal machines as defined,
but they remain propositional logics. In my non-propositional logic in and of
non-arithmetical reality, key Axioms are of Conditional Contradiction and the
Included Middle. No intuitionist logics can be applied to real, contradictorial
and emergent processes in the thermodynamic world.

4. B I accept the correction that computers work according to data, etc. and
only interpret like algorithms.

5. A. A mechanistic view predicts empirical structures for universal machine
‘experiences’ = operations. “If we are not machines, this provides the tool to
measure the degree of (local) non-computationalism. In that case I would bet we
are in a (physical, in the computationalist sense described above) simulation.”

B. SINCE we are not machines, I am not sure that local non-computability can be
measured this way but it is a fair question. However, SINCE we are not
machines, I do not see the need for calling our existence a simulation!

We thus have available two sets of tools, one for reality and one for
mathematical reality. The key would seem to me to make sure they are used in
their proper respective informational domains.

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: fis
Sent: Tuesday, February 02, 2016 11:45 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Information Conservation in black holes

Dear Joseph,

On 30 Jan 2016, at 19:31, Joseph Brenner wrote:

Dear John,

Sorry you have been ill.

I agree fully with your statement: All of these explanations, and even
stating the problem, require information notions, not just energy as in
classical physics.

What I object to are statements or implications that information, whether
in boundaries or not, is ontologically prior to and/or independent of energy.

I beg to differ on this. I consider Shannon information as given freely by
the numeration of natural numbers in base two or higher, or sequence of them.

The interesting things is not information/number, but the interpretation of
such information, and this can be defined at first by what the universal
machines do when given such information/number.

This is how the positions of people like Lloyd and Tegmark come out, giving
'computation' an agential, anthropomorphically flavored role at the ground of
the universe.

Lloyd and Tegmark seem not really aware of the importance of the discovery of
the universal machine, by Emil Post, Alan Turing, Alonzo Church, and some
others. That is mainly a discovery in arithmetic, as a very weak segment of
arithmetic is already Turing universal, and so emulate all Turing universal
system.

This is not anthropomorphically flavored, it is Turing-machine, or universal
number-morphically flavored. A concept definable in elementary arithmetic. That
concept generalizes both human, bacteria, and the physical computer.

It is also a theorem of arithmetic, accessible to the universal machine
themselves, and once they "believe" in enough induction axiom, they get the
cognitive ability to deduce their own limitation, and to begin to measure the
gap between provable and true. A gap which entails many modal nuances in the
ways the machine can refer to itself, and what she can prove and expect,```

### [Fis] Fw: Information Conservation in black holes

```Dear John,

Sorry you have been ill.

I agree fully with your statement: All of these explanations, and even stating
the problem, require information notions, not just energy as in classical
physics.

What I object to are statements or implications that information, whether in
boundaries or not, is ontologically prior to and/or independent of energy. This
is how the positions of people like Lloyd and Tegmark come out, giving
'computation' an agential, anthropomorphically flavored role at the ground of
the universe. The establishment by Wu Kun and others of information as a
category implies separation only in classical logic and category theory, which
are just as limiting as the classical physics John refers to.

A basic problem is the inability of people to keep in mind the operation of two
aspects of phenomena, cooperative and antagonistic, at the same time. Computers
work according to algorithms. The ground of the universe, in my view, is in the
tension, not the separation, between being and non-being, and no algorithm can
handle that (now who is being anthropomorphic?!)

Cheers,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: fis
Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 4:58 PM
Subject: [Fis] Information Conservation in black holes

List,

Sorry I haven’t been able to respond to the interesting remarks on my last
post, but it took a while to digest them, and my current health concerns take
up a lot of my time, so I haven’t had time to come up with responses that are
properly thought out.

In the meantime, here is an interesting Nature news report about Hawking’s (and
Strominger’s) recent proposal for how information can be preserved in black
holes (which his 1976 paper set up as a problem for the laws of physics, which
imply information conservation at the most basic level. The solution involves a
way empty space can carry information in QM via “soft particles”. The answer is
apparently not completely worked out as yet, and there are critics.

http://www.nature.com/news/hawking-s-latest-black-hole-paper-splits-physicists-1.19236?WT.ec_id=NEWS-20160128=50572206=MTc2NjY1MTQ2NQS2=843774519=ODQzNzc0NTE5S0

Seth Lloyd described a different possible explanation in his book Programming
the Universe: A Quantum Computer Scientist Takes On the Cosmos, Knopf (2000)
that involves taking into consideration the information in boundaries, which I
found plausible, since the information preservation in physics follows from
consideration of basic laws together with the constraints of boundary
conditions, neither alone.

Perhaps the two approaches are not really distinct. They may eventually cast
light on each other. For the time being the Hawking/Strominger proposal also
looks like it can solve the “firewall” problem as well, which has the Black
Hole boundary being very hot (again, contrary to physical expectations),
because information can be transferred into radiation instead of energy, so the
information transfer doesn’t require a high temperature at the black hole
boundary, unlike other forms of radiation production.  All of these
explanations, and even stating the problem, require information notions, not
just energy as in classical physics.

John Collier

Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate

University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier

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### [Fis] A Meta(information)- scientific comment

```
Dear FISers,

The most scientific aspect of the recent exchanges is their existence. It is
obvious that some people feel more comfortable than others in ascribing
properties to quantum particles that are characteristic of the thermodynamic
world in which we exist, in particular difference (let us forget, if
possible, Peirce's 'mind').

At one point, I myself said that quantum particles are, following the
principles of Logic in Reality, distinguishable AND indistinguishable, the
former by virtue of a minimum difference in 'location' of two particles in
space-time, let alone any difference in properties. Today, I am less sure;
this description, and Bob's, begs the question of whether quarks change in
'time'; what 'position' means; and whether the term 'dynamic' can properly
be used with regard to them.

Pedro and others of you will note that we are returning to the questions
left unresolved in the discussion of Conrad's
'fluctuons', namely, is it proper to refer to changes that occur in levels
that we cannot access, even with extensions of our senses, and not even
characterize as temporal or spatial, as information. As noted in the first
paragraph above, this seems to be turning out to be as much a psychological
question as a physical one.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz"

To: "Pedro C. Marijuan"
Cc:
Sent: Friday, January 22, 2016 3:26 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] _ RE: _ Re: Cho 2016 The social life of quarks

Just a few words to follow on Pedro's concerning Howard's question:

From our perspective all quarks are completely indistinguishable and

homogeneous, so the practical answer to Howard's question is "No, quarks
cannot communicate --period!"

It is possible, however, to imagine that quarks, being in large measure
wave packets, would at any instant be different from one another. One can
imagine multiple wave forms, dynamically changing with time. The
particular phasing between two quarks in the quantum vacuum could take on
any number of possibilities, and which possibility pertains at the time of
encounter would inform what kind of boson might result. Then it becomes
possible to speak of communication between them. It's just that we are
unable to access that level of interaction.

Cheers to all,
Bob U.

Dear FIS Colleagues,

Thanks to Jerry and Koichiro for their insightful and deep comments.
Nevertheless the question from Howard was very clear and direct and I
wonder whether we have responded that way --as usual, the simplest
becomes the most difficult. I will try here.

There is no "real" communication between quarks as they merely follow
physical law--the state of the system is altered by some input according
to boundary conditions and to the state own variables and parameters
that dictate the way Law(s) have to intervene. The outcome may be
probabilistic, but it is inexorably determined.

There is real communication between cells, people, organizations... as
the input is sensed (or disregarded) and judged according to boundary
conditions and to the accumulated experiential information content of
the entity. The outcome is adaptive: aiming at the
self-production/self-propagation of the entity.

In sum, the former is blind, while the second is oriented and made
meaning-ful by the life cycle of the entity.

Well, if we separate communication from the phenomenon of life, from its
intertwining with the life cycle of the entity, then everything goes...
and yes, quarks communicate, as well as billiard balls, stones, cells,
etc. Directly we provide further anchor to the mechanistic way of
thinking.

best regards--Pedro

Koichiro Matsuno escribió:

At 2:43 AM 01/19/2016, Jerry wrote:

In order for symbolic chemical communication to occur, the language
must go far beyond such simplistic notions of a primary interaction
among forces, such as centripetal orbits or even the four basic forces.

The quark physicist is quirky in confining a set of quarks,
including possibly tetra- or even penta-, within a closed bag with use
of a virtual exchange of matter called gluons. This bag is
methodologically tightly-cohesive because of the virtuality of the
things to be exchanged exclusively in a closed manner. In contrast,
the real exchange of matter underlying the actual instantiation of
cohesion, which concerns the information phenomenologist facing
chemistry and biology in a serious manner, is about something
referring to something else in the actual and is thus open-ended.
Jerry, you seem calling our attention to the actual cohesion acting in
the empirical world which the physicist has failed in coping with, so
far.

Koichiro

*From:*Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Jerry
LR Chandler
*Sent:* Tuesday, January 19, 2016 2:43 AM
*To:* fis
*Subject:* [Fis] _ Re: Cho 2016 The social life of quarks

Koichiro, Bob U., Pedro:

Recent posts ```

### [Fis] Fw: Toyabe 2010 [ Information converted to energy ] / Van den Broeck 2010 Thermodynamics of Information: REQUEST TO TERRENCE DEACON

```Dear Folks,

I do not wish to be negative, but I think this example is contaminated by a
homunculus. There are so much energy coming into the system from various
sources that the alleged result is not surprising. I would be glad to be wrong
but the decision should be up to someone like Terry with far greater knowledge
than I.

Thank you,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: fis
Sent: Friday, January 15, 2016 8:09 AM
Subject: [Fis] Toyabe 2010 [ Information converted to energy ] / Van den Broeck
2010 Thermodynamics of Information / Cartlidge 2010 Information converted to
energy

Stan Salthe sent the item below to Pedro and myself, but not to the list, as he
had used up his posting allotment. With the permission of both of them, who
think that this is an important issue, I am posting some brief comments I made
back to Stan, as well as Stan’s email content, in the hope that the issue will
get more discussion this time.(I posted a link to the 2010 article when it came
out.)  The relevant material starts below the line, and Stan’s email forwarded
from Malcolm Dean is below that. It concerns the use of changed boundary
conditions to move things rather than energy differences, suggesting that
information can be used instead of energy to cause changes in a system (another
way of looking at this is that information can be a force in itself, not merely
a constraint on other actions). In particular, the final state has greater free
energy than the initial state (it is in end state potential energy of the
manipulated particles in an electric field), the energy arising from the
manipulation of the boundary conditions based on the particle location. The
original authors described this as information-to-energy conversion.

I posted a different pointer to this to fis some time ago, but the reaction
from the list was almost nothing, or skeptical, though the main objection was
that we could understand what was going on without using the information
concept. My response to that was that not  using the word does not mean that
the concept is not being used.

Of course, if you think that information is always meaningful to some
interpreter (alternatively, always a coding of something that has had meaning
to some mind, or the like) then the argument in the paper is a nonstarter. I
would argue that this puts unnecessary obstacles in the way of a unified
approach to information, and that the issue of the interpretation of
information gets obscured by presupposing information is carried only by
meaningful communication.

John Collier

Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate

University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu]
Sent: Thursday, 14 January 2016 4:56 PM
To: Pedro Marijuan; John Collier
Subject: Fwd: Toyabe 2010 [ Information converted to energy ] / Van den Broeck
2010 Thermodynamics of Information / Cartlidge 2010 Information converted to
energy

-- Forwarded message --
From: Malcolm Dean
Date: Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 6:13 AM
Subject: Toyabe 2010 [ Information converted to energy ] / Van den Broeck 2010
Thermodynamics of Information / Cartlidge 2010 Information converted to energy
To:

​http://www.nature.com/nphys/journal/v6/n12/full/nphys1821.html

​

Nature Physics 6, 988–992 (2010) doi:10.1038/nphys1821

Experimental demonstration of information-to-energy conversion and validation
of the generalized Jarzynski equality

Shoichi Toyabe,

​

Takahiro Sagawa,

​

Masahito Ueda,

​

Eiro Muneyuki

​

& Masaki Sano

In 1929, Leó Szilárd invented a feedback protocol1 in which a hypothetical
intelligence—dubbed Maxwell’s demon—pumps heat from an isothermal environment
and transforms it into work. After a long-lasting and intense controversy it
was finally clarified that the demon’s role does not contradict the second law
of thermodynamics, implying that we can, in principle, convert information to
free energy2, 3, 4, 5, 6. An experimental demonstration of this
information-to-energy conversion, however, has been elusive. Here we
demonstrate that a non-equilibrium feedback manipulation of a Brownian particle
on the basis of information about its location achieves a Szilárd-type
information-to-energy conversion. Using real-time feedback control, the
particle is made to climb up a spiral-staircase-like potential exerted by an
electric field and gains free energy larger than the amount of work done on it.
This enables us to verify the generalized Jarzynski equality7, and suggests a
new fundamental principle of an ‘information-to-heat engine’ that converts
information into energy by feedback control.

http://www.nature.com/nphys/journal/v6/n12/full/nphys1834.html

​[ <--- Please send this PDF if you have access.  -- M.   ]​

​

​
```

### [Fis] Fw: Sustainability through multilevel research: Bias

```
Dear Pedro, Guy and All,

Pedro raises an important point about the evolution of any principles and
their defence. The answer to Pedro's question of whether establishing those
of LIR could lead to a biased stance is "of course it could"! The difference
between LIR and other physical or physics-based theories is that it predicts
and assumes that that will happen, according to its own rules. A metalevel
of critique is therefore also established at which dialogue is favored, if
not insured. Nothing can do that.

Thus, Guy's view of the evolution of altruism in the emergence of social
organization is most interesting, but it should not lead to a utopian
conclusion that it /will/ happen. The principle at issue here is, of course,
the Maximum Entropy Production Principle (MEPP). As far as I am concerned,
its account (see the article by Skene, which refers to Guy's) of
directionality is partly OK, but it (the MEPP) fails to account
satisfactorily for the bidirectionality in nature. New forms of selfishness
are emerging every day . . .

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: "Pedro C. Marijuan" <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>

To: "'fis'" <fis@listas.unizar.es
Cc: "Joseph Brenner" <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>
Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 12:28 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Sustainability through multilevel research: Energetic
Realm-Informational Realm. Social Complexity

Dear Joseph and colleagues,

Thanks for the correction. You are right, the "disjunction" is unnecessary
and the "relation" is far more productive. The problem I see is that given
the far more advanced theoretical development of the physical side,
establishing the new principles might conduce to a biased stance, as
generally happens (could it also be the case with LIR?). In my humble
guess, the interplay of symmetry and information (& symmetry breaking and
restoration) is, in the most abstract approach, what runs most of the
complexity theater around. But there seems to be a big divide in the way
the symmetry-information game is played in the physical, the biological
and the economic... So the general interest of the discussion started
these days, around Nikhil's quest for parallels and common patterns. As
Xueshan pointed, this may be the essential question of information
science.

As for Loet's religious interpretation of the "medieval awakening", I
think that the change of social mentality was previous, mostly motivated
by a series of deep factors of several classes --one of them disregarded
until Joseph Needham's terrific work, was the intensity and magnitude of
the "technological loan" from the Oriental world to the Western world,
precisely in those times: gun powder, magnetic compass, paper making,
printing press... in combination they formed sort of a "dynamite" that
exploded into the Medieval way of life.

All the best--Pedro

Joseph Brenner wrote:

Dear Pedro,
I agree with your presentation here of the dynamics of informational
entities and the necessary dominance of the informational realm. But my
reaction to your placing the energetic and informational realm in a kind
of opposition was a Capurrian 'hm'. What is still and will be always
needed is a proper description of the relation between the two. The
principles of Logic in Reality may provide that relation without being
'thermodynamic inflation', and I believe more attention should be paid to
the relation than any disjunction. We have had too much of /those/.
Regarding social complexity, the long-term trend is probably
irreversible. Short-term, in spite of the 'inventions', processes of
regression and reduction are now flourishing world-wide. Fukuyama is one
of people I personally trust least to say what's wrong here.

Gloomily,
Joseph

- Original Message -
*From:* Pedro C. Marijuan <mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>
*To:* 'fis' <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
*Sent:* Friday, December 11, 2015 1:36 PM
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] Sustainability through multilevel research:

Dear FISers,

I agree with Loet's views (for once! :-) ).  The energy flow
supporting the biosphere and society as a whole have not much
explanatory power regarding the bonding complexity of contemporary
societies. Of course, it is an interesting exercise, particularly
concerning the limits of sustainability, but we have had so much
thermodynamic inflation that it is very difficult adding anything
relevant. Irrespective of its sophistication, the energetic realm
can hardly substitute for the informational realm.
About the intriguing interrelationship between kinship and
nonkinship modalities of human bonding, a very interesting view
was drafted by Francis Fukuyama (1995), centered on "trust". He
was distinguishing between "familial" centered s```

### [Fis] Fw: Sustainability through multilevel research: Energetic Realm-Informational Realm. Social Complexity

```Dear Pedro,

I agree with your presentation here of the dynamics of informational entities
and the necessary dominance of the informational realm. But my reaction to your
placing the energetic and informational realm in a kind of opposition was a
Capurrian 'hm'. What is still and will be always needed is a proper description
of the relation between the two. The principles of Logic in Reality may provide
that relation without being 'thermodynamic inflation', and I believe more
attention should be paid to the relation than any disjunction. We have had too
much of those.

Regarding social complexity, the long-term trend is probably irreversible.
Short-term, in spite of the 'inventions', processes of regression and reduction
are now flourishing world-wide. Fukuyama is one of people I personally trust
least to say what's wrong here.

Gloomily,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Pedro C. Marijuan
To: 'fis'
Sent: Friday, December 11, 2015 1:36 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Sustainability through multilevel research:

Dear FISers,

I agree with Loet's views (for once! :-) ).  The energy flow supporting the
biosphere and society as a whole have not much explanatory power regarding the
bonding complexity of contemporary societies. Of course, it is an interesting
exercise, particularly concerning the limits of sustainability, but we have had
so much thermodynamic inflation that it is very difficult adding anything
relevant. Irrespective of its sophistication, the energetic realm can hardly
substitute for the informational realm.
About the intriguing interrelationship between kinship and nonkinship
modalities of human bonding, a very interesting view was drafted by Francis
Fukuyama (1995), centered on "trust". He was distinguishing between "familial"
centered societies and "high trust" societies. In European terms
(exaggerating), it is the dichotomy between the Mediterranean societal culture
and the Anglosaxon culture. It is not a black and white narrative, as each
polarity has advantages and disadvantages (think on wine & Mediterranean
food!), and actually today each country and each culture has some terrible mix
of everything, but it is interesting just to see how the two kinds of bonding
may interact within a complex society.  I also penned a few ideas about the
matter in my recent "How the Living is in the world"  (DOI information:
10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.07.002.) I am copying below a paragraph (maybe a
little bit long--excuses).

This coarse reflection on the dynamics of successive “informational entities”
helps us make sense of fundamentals of social evolution. The transition to a
new social order, more or less ‘revolutionary’, tends to be produced by new
information channels and communication practices that support the emergence of
new ways to organize the structures of social self-production. Thus, the
development of social complexity appears as irreversibly linked to a chain of
historical inventions for communication and knowledge generation: numbers,
writing, alphabet, codices, universities, printing press, books, steam engines,
means of communication, computers, Internet, etc. (Stonier, 1990; Hobart and
Schiffman, 1998). This succession of fundamental inventions has dramatically
altered the “infostructure” of modern societies, and subsequently the
informational formula for being in the world has been applied with multiple
variants along that complexity runaway: with plenty of room generated by the
new information tools, not at the bottom but at the supra-individual top. We
should not forget that the momentous Scientific Revolution was preceded by what
has been called the silent “corporate revolution” (Huff, 2011), which opened
the way for collective organizations legally autonomous in European cities
during XIII and XIV centuries: universities, parliaments, counsels,
municipalities, professional colleges, guilds, mercantile associations,
charities, schools, etc. It was this Medieval awakening in the cities of
Western Europe what made possible the later hyperinflation of autonomous
collective organizations, –“information based”– growing exponentially and
propelling all the further complexity of modern societies.

All the best--Pedro

Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
Dear colleagues,

I don’t consider it as fruitful to recycle the argument that society were
to be modeled as a meta-biology. The biological explanation can perhaps explain
behavior of individuals and institutions; but social coordination more
generally involves also the dynamics of expectations. These are much more
abstract although conditioned by the historical layer. For example, one cannot
expect to explain the trias politica or the rule of law biologically. These
cultural constructs regulate our behavior from above, whereas the biological
supports existence and living from below. The historical follows the axis of
time, whereas the codification (albeit ```

### Re: [Fis] The Measurement Problem from the Perspective of an Information-Theoretic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

```Dear John and All,

I have read this paper, but it seems to me that the word 'idealization' has a
key place in it. Thus, the statement that 'quantum mechanics is about the
structure of information' begs the question of what information is being
discussed. Is it not conceivable, in the 'macroworld', that the elements of the
processes of energy transfer/transformation involved in information do not
commute and require a non-Boolean algebra?

I thus am unable, given my lack of knowledge of quantum mechanics, to see the
implications of the paper for the 'structure of information in a genuinely
partly deterministic world' such as the one (I think) we live in.' If there are
such implications, I would be sincerely interested in knowing them. If there
are no such implications, the paper gives a useful picture of the cut.

Best regards,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: fis
Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2015 8:28 PM
Subject: [Fis] The Measurement Problem from the Perspective of an
Information-Theoretic Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

A paper by my former graduate advisor, Jeff Bub, who was a student of David
Bohm’s.

http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/17/11/7374

The Measurement Problem from the Perspective of an Information-Theoretic
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

The aim of this paper is to consider the consequences of an
information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics for the measurement
problem. The motivating idea of the interpretation is that the relation between
quantum mechanics and the structure of information is analogous to the relation
between special relativity and the structure of space-time. Insofar as quantum
mechanics deals with a class of probabilistic correlations that includes
correlations structurally different from classical correlations, the theory is
about the structure of information: the possibilities for representing,
manipulating, and communicating information in a genuinely indeterministic
quantum world in which measurement outcomes are intrinsically random are
different than we thought. Part of the measurement problem is deflated as a
pseudo-problem on this view, and the theory has the resources to deal with the
remaining part, given certain idealizations in the treatment of macrosystems.

John Collier

Senior Research Associate and Professor Emeritus,

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier

--

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```

### [Fis] Five Momenta. A First Preferred Itinerary

```
Dear Pedro and Colleagues,

Pedro's note has brought out more clearly to me the concept of an
'Itinerary' as a path between Momenta. I for one would be willing to accept
the discipline that comments should address relations and movement between
Momenta in an AGREED UPON SEQUENCE. The one in Pedro's note is certainly a
valid option, and perhaps we should try to list just one or two others to
choose from. I think the term Pedro uses of 'itinerary elements' is
consistent with this.

This approach, if implemented, would have the advantage that I have often
urged: each of us would have to study something he or she has not
studied previously, or not in this context. There would be some unity in
this resulting diversity, at least in the order of the discussion.

The overlaps and interactions between Momenta other than the next one in
line should not be neglected, but they can remain in the background.
Comments welcome.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: "Pedro C. Marijuan"

To:
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2015 2:14 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Five Momenta. Five Itineraries

Dear FIS colleagues,

Thanks to all for the valuable insights. Responding briefly:

To Joseph: perhaps your points, although interesting, are not truly an
itinerary. For instance, WuKun and Lupasco belong to the First Momentum
(philos.). I agree that they can be adequate first steps (but there might
be some others, such as Merleau Ponty, Ortega y Gasset, etc.). Once some
temporary philo basis is attained, one has to visit --I think--the
neurodynamic counterpart of those tenets (Momentum 3, neuro). From there,
a complex evo-devo panorama opens (visiting Momentum 2). Then it would be
high time to return to M1, to consolidate the basis within an adequate
heuristic "neuro-biologic-ethologic.cognitive-philosophic" approach to
human prosocial capabilities, language included. Time for visiting M5
(infoeconomics of social complexity, development of human history). From
there, to M6 (contemporary info revolution, problems of our time). Back
to M1, proposing an overall new way of thinking, plus quite many further
movements of refinement and deeper analysis...

To Stan: if hierarchy helps to move into the previous multidisciplinary
entanglement fine, otherwise it is a useless item to be kept into the
lean mental "backpack" needed for this itinerary...

To Loet and Marcus: let us agree that disciplines are based on
"communities of inquiry" that follow strict laws of "intellectual
economy". Our limited capabilities force us to establish disciplinary
specialization, and that's good, but a healthy knowledge system would
also establish quite many "vertical" multidisciplines integrating the
"horizontal" disciplines that apply simultaneously into concrete subjects
(as happens in eg, medicine, engineering, anthrolpology, etc.).

To Steven and Soeren, Francesco, and all: Should'nt we distinguish the
above itinerary elements (actually smallish parts from a number of
disciples and subdisciplines) from the "instrumental" fields of knowledge
that can be used "on tap" but quite often are used "on top"? I mean,
classical and new Info theories, von Neumann theories (automata,
machines, games), Turing and computational approaches, symmetry studies,
entropy studies, quantum information, physical information, mathematical
optimization procedures, etc. should not occupy the leading seat in this
trip. To insist, they are instrumental just to help, strictly kept under
command, along the different elaboration stages of the itinerary.

In the extent to which a similar scheme would be valid intelectually,
would it be feasible too?  "If we were rich" a system of scientific
committees could be created, seriously working during several years, at
the style of the serious international cooperative work that have lead to
the International System of Measurement Standards. So important was and
has been the standardization of measurements, and we take it for granted.
Curiously, it has an essential informational content regarding the
"social brain"... Anyhow, only an important university could take charge
of this genuine FIS itinerary. Alternatively, "if we were Linus", a
Infopedia could organize the whole voluntary work... but how could we
find our Linus?

Best wishes to all,

--Pedro

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```

### Re: [Fis] Mark Johnson. Less is more

```
Dear Mark,

I find much novelty in your interesting approach as I read your note of
October 1 and this one. This novelty should not be lost by imposing standard
patterns of interpretation on it. If we really believe "it's time we confess
in science just how little we know about language, that we explore
language's mysteries", we might do well to consider the idea of Lao Tzu
(Wang. 2013. /The Logic of Tao Philosophy/ that the obscurity, contradiction
and ambiguity in linguistic description is not a 'mystery' but an indication
of the proper way to understand the complex logical nature of reality.

Any proper theory of information should be capable of giving
non-metaphorical meaning to the phrase, applicable to Chinese art and used
in poetry by Browning and architecture by van der Rohe that "less is more".

Briefly,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: "Mark Johnson"

To: "fis"
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 12:57 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Shannon-Weavers' Levels A, B, C.

Maybe I've missed something, but the subsumption I mentioned
(referring to Bateson) was not between A, B and C: these are
co-existent interacting dynamics as I understand them, and certainly a
very rigorous and powerful generative model.

I was worrying about subsumption of Bateson's "imagination" into
"rigour" Loet's model does have 'imagination' in it in the
generation of redundancies. But does it include the human imagination
capable of conceiving a model of itself?

I wonder if a possible answer to the question lies in Loet's work.
Human embodiment is a constraint which an abstract rigorous model can
never have. Within dynamics of mutual redundancy, won't the
complexities of mutual redundancies of embodied existence will always
outweigh the mutual redundancies that can be abstractly modelled?

best wishes,

Mark

On Wed, Oct 14, 2015 at 9:32 PM, Robert E. Ulanowicz
wrote:

On 2015-10-14, at 12:38 PM, Marcus Abundis wrote:

RE Mark Johnson's post of Thu Oct 1 09:47:13 on Bateson and imagination

Two quick remarks:

1. It's not at all clear to me that C is subsumptive of B.

2. I would lobby for Shannon/Bayesian relationships as an intermediary
between A. and B (i.e., preliminary to "meaning").

Cheers to all,
Bob U.

. . .
– Me Too!

RE Loet & Stan's postings beginning Thu Oct 1 21:19:50 . . .
>  I suggest to distinguish between three levels (following Weaver): <
> A. (Shannon-type) information processing ; <
> B. meaning sharing using languages;<
> C. translations among coded communications.<
> So, here we have a subsumptive hierarchy"<

I was wondering if this note means to imply an *all inclusive* list of
traits to be considered in modeling information? Or, alternatively . .
.

what would such an all inclusive list look like?

Thanks!

Marcus Abundis
about.me/marcus.abundis

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### Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark. Phenomenology and Speculative Realism

```Dear Mark,

Thank you for this note, which points correctly to the fact that there was
something missing in the debate. Intersubjectivity is a good word for it, but
phenomenology in general is probably no longer the answer, if it ever was.
Check out the new book by Tom Sparrow, The End of Phenomenology, Edinburgh,
2014; Sparrow is a key player in a new 'movement' called Speculative Realism
which is proposed as a replacement.

What does this have to do with information? I think a great deal and worth a
new debate, even in extremis. The problem with Husserlian phenomenology is that
it fails to deliver an adequate picture of reality, but speculative realism is
too anti-scientific to do any better. What I think is possible, however, is to
reconcile the key insights of Heidegger with science, especially, with
information science. This places information science in a proper
intersubjective context where its utility can be seen. For discussion, I hope.

Best,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Mark Johnson
To: fis
Sent: Saturday, August 01, 2015 1:18 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark

Dear Fernando,

Without wanting to spawn a new debate, I think it might be useful to flag
something up about the 'phenomenology' that you mention. I understand Joseph's
reaction to what to you say and I agree. However, phenomenology is a rich a
complex topic, and few scholars have the tenacity to delve deeply into the
difficult and detailed thinking of Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, tracing it's
evolution in French existentialism, hermeneutics, or from Schutz to Berger,
Luckmann, Parsons and then Luhmann. At the very least there is the division
between Husserlian transcendental phenomenology with its transcendental ego
to which Heidegger and many others objected, and the existential phenomenology
of everyday experience which Heidegger developed instead. Husserl, for his part
thought Heidegger had completely misunderstood him. To say he might have been
right is not to take away the genius of Heidegger's own insights.

The point is, when we say phenomenology, what do we mean?

Joseph's concern relates (I think) to what appears to be a missing account of
intersubjectivity in your paper. But of course, intersubjectivity was a
central concern for Husserl, and his ideas on it were much refined by Schutz,
who seems to me to be a critically important figure (I'm grateful to Loet for
pointing me in Schutz's direction!). To be 'phenomenological' does not preclude
intersubjectivity. However, if you are Heideggerian, then I think it is true
that Heidegger's understanding of human relations is rather weak (interesting
to reflect on this in relation to Heidegger's politics!)

I suspect that the phenomenological literature and its history is of
considerable relevance to current debates about information.

Best wishes,

Mark

On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 9:17 AM, Fernando Flores
fernando.flo...@kultur.lu.se wrote:

Dear Mark

Thanks for your commentaries. Our use of the term “foundational” is more
philosophical than practical. You are right; the term contradicts in some sense
our intentions which are “very” practical. (This is a term which we could leave
behind without hesitation.) In fact, we have no intentions in “instituting” a
new concept of “information”. Our work is “foundational” only in one aspect,
and that is in searching for methods to measure the informational value of
collective acts in everyday life. We found that it was necessary to classify
human acts in such a way that their informational value could be “operative”
(useful in practical tasks); we did that, grouping the acts in types depending
on their complexity. We found that these acts could also be distinguished in
relation to their consequences on the everyday world. We noticed that the
movement from the very complex acts to the simplest acts follows a reduction of
the surrounding world and that the human body is the natural reference in the
understanding of this reduction. We knew that we could express informational
value in relation to probabilities and found in the von Mises/Popper frequency
series a possible and easy solution (an accessible mathematics). We insist; we
have been working only with practical problems and we have not been thinking so
much of which concept of information we are using; we believe that cybernetics
does not address the practical problems we confront. However, we are sure that
if we succeed, some cybernetic theorem will explain our success. The question
is that the state of knowledge we have today is insufficient to understand the
simplest informational problems in our surrounding world. Informational theory
and cybernetics have been developed in the world of Physics; instead, we try to
develop solutions that work in everyday life. If you understand as “variety”
the measure of the “states of a system”, the series of von Mises/Popper could
be ```

### Re: [Fis] Answer to Mark

```Dear All,

This note from Fernando clearly spells out his universe of discourse (practical
problems; everyday life). However, in stating that

our acts are neither actions nor events... Our acts are
phenomenological;

but that current information theory is only mathematical, dealing with
'probabilities', he seems to me to be ignoring
applications of information theory made by several members of this group to
real problems, that is, to the subjects
of science.

The above description is, in my opinion, also somewhat abstract and static in
not viewing 'everyday life' as constituted not only by 'acts' but by complex
processes of constant change. This criticism is similar to that made by Loet
July 29 from his different perspective:

But human agency is not an isolated system, in my opinion. We are coupled
through our communications which generate non-linear loops. ... In sum, the
argument that action is only bodily and in relation to artifacts (as isolated
systems) seems questionable to me. ... Why would not the potentiality of matter
contain a plurality (multiplicity) of options?

There is here room for further reflection, I think.

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Fernando Flores
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2015 10:17 AM
Subject: [Fis] Answer to Mark

Dear Mark

Thanks for your commentaries. Our use of the term foundational is more
philosophical than practical. You are right; the term contradicts in some sense
our intentions which are very practical. (This is a term which we could leave
behind without hesitation.) In fact, we have no intentions in instituting a
new concept of information. Our work is foundational only in one aspect,
and that is in searching for methods to measure the informational value of
collective acts in everyday life. We found that it was necessary to classify
human acts in such a way that their informational value could be operative
(useful in practical tasks); we did that, grouping the acts in types depending
on their complexity. We found that these acts could also be distinguished in
relation to their consequences on the everyday world. We noticed that the
movement from the very complex acts to the simplest acts follows a reduction of
the surrounding world and that the human body is the natural reference in the
understanding of this reduction. We knew that we could express informational
value in relation to probabilities and found in the von Mises/Popper frequency
series a possible and easy solution (an accessible mathematics). We insist; we
have been working only with practical problems and we have not been thinking so
much of which concept of information we are using; we believe that cybernetics
does not address the practical problems we confront. However, we are sure that
if we succeed, some cybernetic theorem will explain our success. The question
is that the state of knowledge we have today is insufficient to understand the
simplest informational problems in our surrounding world. Informational theory
and cybernetics have been developed in the world of Physics; instead, we try to
develop solutions that work in everyday life. If you understand as variety
the measure of the states of a system, the series of von Mises/Popper could
be our kind of variety, but we are not sure. You are certain, our acts are
neither actions nor events, but they are not the hybrids of Latour either.
Our acts are phenomenological; they are intended to be congruent with concepts
as work, money, culture, thing, market, and the like. The concept
informational value for example, is very close to the concept of
information without meaning exact the same.

Fernando Flores PhD

Associate Professor

History of Ideas and Sciences

Lund University

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### [Fis] The Same and Not the Same

```
Dear Bob and All,

I have found many useful things in the recent postings, especially Bob U.'s
point about the parsing of entropy into two components, mutual information
and residual entropy; /qualitatively/, information and entropy are
(epistemologically) antithetical, and, I might add, ontologically
contradictorial. Also John's point about loops not being computable, as one
might expect if they reflect the evolution of real processes.

But what about mutual information itself? Mutual information is defined, I
believe, as a measure of the mutual dependence of random variables. But
suppose the variables or process elements are not random, but there is still
mutual dependence. What about the information content here?

Perhaps in this context, I can ask again the question of whether it makes
sense to 'parse' /information/ itself into two interactive components that
differ in their dimensionality, with meaning associated with the emergent
component with the higher dimensionality.

Curious,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Robert E. Ulanowicz u...@umces.edu

To: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Cc: l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Joseph Brenner' joe.bren...@bluewin.ch;
'Fernando Flores' fernando.flo...@kultur.lu.se; fis@listas.unizar.es

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2015 9:25 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Answer to the comments made by Joseph

Folks

I know there is a long legacy of equating information with entropy, and
dimensionally, they are the same. Qualitatively, however, they are
antithetical. From the point of view of statistical mechanics, information
is a *decrease* in entropy, i.e., they are negatives of each other.

This all devolves back upon the requirement that *both* entropy and
information require a reference state. (The third law of thermodynamics.)
Once a reference distribution has been identified, one can then quantify
both entropy and information. It actually turns out that against any
reference state, entropy can be parsed into two components, mutual
information and conditional (or residual) entropy. Change the reference
state and the decomposition changes.
http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/files/FISPAP.pdf (See also Chapter 5 in
http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/publications/ecosystems/gand/.)

Cheers to all,
Bob

Folks,

Doing dimensional analysis entropy is heat difference divided by
temperature. Heat is energy, and temperature is energy per degree of
freedom. Dividing, we get units of inverse degrees of freedom. I submit
that information has the same fundamental measure (this is a consequence
of Scott Muller¡¯s asymmetry principle of information. So fundamentally
we

are talking about the same basic thing with information and entropy.

I agree, though, that it is viewed from different perspectives and they
have differing conventions for measurement.

I agree with Loet¡¯s other points.

John

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### Re: [Fis] Answer to the comments made by Joseph

```Dear Fernando,

This is becoming very interesting. I understand your critique, but I do not
believe it applies exactly to what I am trying to say. I start from a position
that the apodictic statement by Wiener is not or in any case is no longer
valid. In my view, the following should be taken into account:
a) information is more than order; there is information in absence (Deacon), in
disorder, in incoherence as well as coherence;
b) information is not the same as matter-energy, but it is inseparable from it
and reflects its dualistic properties;
c) information is both energy and a carrier of meaning, which is not, in my
humble opinion, a hard physicalist approach;
d) it remains to be shown that digitalism or computationalism is or could be
the natural language for the description of the non-digital world, that is, of
the complexity of the world that is of interest. Rafael Capurro has talked
about the 'digital casting' of the world that we (or most of us) use in our
daily lives, but this philosophical concept, with which I agree, is not a
scientific description of the physics of informational processes as such. The
best synthesis here of which I am aware is the Informational-Computationalism
of Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic and even that is a framework, not an ontology.
e) it is possible to use probabilities to describe the evolution of real
processes, as well as as a mathematical language for describing acts;
f) your presentation of a parameter designated as 'freedom' is indeed original,
but it is a classificatory system, based on bits. It will miss the
non-algorithmic aspects of values. I am suspicious of things that have infinite
levels and represent 'pure' anything;
g) I do not feel you have added value to human acts by designating them as
∞-free This may not be intended as doctrine but it looks like it.
h) your conclusions about informational value are correct from what I will call
a hard neo-capitalist ;-) standpoint, but I am sure you agree there are other
ones.

In trying to learn through association with this FIS group, I have come to
believe that Informational Science is unique in that it can capture some of the
complexity of nature, culture and society. It is not a 'hard simplification' as
you suggest some sciences are.  The concept of (its) foundations is very broad,
and it can and should include careful binary analyses such as the one you have
made. However, I am pleading for a more directed positioning of your approach
with respect to others. Is this an acceptable basis for you for continuing the
debate?

Thank you again,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Fernando Flores
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 3:58 PM
Subject: [Fis] Answer to the comments made by Joseph

Hello everybody:

I will answer to the comments made by Joseph and Luis will answer to the
comments made by Moisés.

Dear Joseph:

Thank you for your comments. We are not sure about the usefulness of
identifying “information” (order) with “mater”. In this sense we are very
carefully to avoid any hard physicalist approach. In this sense we believe with
Norbert Wiener:

The mechanical brain does not secrete thought “as the liver does bile”, as
the earlier materialist claimed, nor does it put it out in the form of energy,
as the muscle puts out its activity. Information is information, not matter nor
energy. No materialism, which does not admit this, can survive at the present
day.

An informational description of the world must stand as a new branch of
science in which “digitalism” will be the natural language.  Of course as any
other science, it is a simplification of the complexity of
nature/society/culture. I believe that we are shown that we are very conscious
about the risks of a hard simplification, and that is why we introduced that
idea of freedom in a chain of acts and use probability as mathematical
language. We considered the vital acts as ∞-free.

Fernando Flores PhD

Associate Professor

History of Ideas and Sciences

Lund University

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### Re: [Fis] Information Foundation of the Act--F.Flores L.deMarcos

```Dear Fernando and Luis,

Your paper is very rich and very serious, and so I hope you will accept my
slightly different perspective and see it as a basis for further foundational
work, rather than just criticism. I will first make just two comments here:

1. Matter is potentiality, actuality and form. This is true, but the
relationships between the three need to be further specified, since the terms
themselves correspond to real physical properties. To come out with only
epistemological categories (knowledge and praxis) is too limiting. Real change
involves movement from potentiality to actuality (Aristotle) but also actuality
to potentiality, often at the same time (Aristotle missed this).

2. Decisions to create informational values can be represented as a series of
0's and 1's. This is also true, but it and your initial examples create a
binary framework that seems to refer primarily to quantitative value. This
approach is computationally tractable, but might fail  to capture qualitative
aspects of 'vital acts'. In fact, you present vital acts in terms of power and
competitive (survival) success, modernization as mechanization. In my opinion,
informational values include but are not limited to these.

I look forward very much to comments by you and others on these points.

Best,

Joseph

Joseph E. Brenner, Ph.D.
Les Diablerets, Switzerland
International Society for Information Studies, Vienna, Austria
International Center for the Philosophy of Information, Xi'An, China
- Original Message -
From: Pedro C. Marijuan
To: 'fis'
Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 2:33 PM
Subject: [Fis] Information Foundation of the Act--F.Flores  L.deMarcos

The informational foundation of the act
Fernando Flores
Lund University
fernando.flo...@kultur.lu.se

Luis de-Marcos
University of Alcalá
luis.demar...@uah.es

See the whole text at: http://fis.sciforum.net/resources/

Our introducing paper (35 pages) presents a theory that quantifies the
informational value of human acts. We argue that living is functioning against
entropy and following Erwin Schrödinger we call this tendency negentropy.
Negentropy is for us the reason behind order in social and cultural life.
Further, we understand order as the condition that the world reaches when the
informational value of a series of acts is low. Acting is presented as a set of
decisions and choices that create order and this is the key concept of our
understanding of the variation from simplicity to complexity in human acts. The
most important aim of our theory is to measure non-economic acts trying to
understand and explain their importance for society and culture. In their turn
such a theory will be also important to understand the similarities and
differences between non-economic and economic acts.
We follow the classical concept according to which informational value is
proportional to the unlikelihood of an act. To capture the richness of the
unlikelihood of human acts we use the frequency theory of probability developed
by Ludwig von Mises and Karl Popper. Frequency theory of probability allows us
to describe a variety of acts from the must most free to the least free
with respect to precedent acts. In short, we characterize human acts in terms
of their degree of freedom trying to set up a scale of the information and
predictability carried out in human decisions. A taxonomy of acts is also
presented, categorizing acts as destructive, mechanical, ludic or vital,
according to their degree of freedom (complexity). A formulation to estimate
the informational value in individual and collective acts follows. The final
part of the paper presents and discuss the consequences of our theory. We argue
that artifacts embed information and that modernization can be understood as a
one-way process to embed acts of high levels of complexity in simple devices.
However, our theory assumes that the total amount of information in the social
and cultural world is constant and that Modernity only enables us to
redistribute our informational potential. We also advocate for the development
of a new science named agnumetry, the science that quantify Modernity,
measuring the obsolescence of an environment (from agnumy the Greek word for
break).
In our study of human acts we found that acting can also be classified as
productive, consumptive and as acts of exchange or economical. The
informational value of acts can be the expression of any or all of these acting
forms. We outline the relation between the informational value of production
and the informational value of consumption (which we call operative
information), and conclude that these acts define the non-economic value.
Sometimes, and depending on the social level of informational value, the acts
of exchange emerge defining the informational value of an item at the market,
an informational value that assumes the shape of price justifying the use ```

### Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies! Reply to JC June 13 note

```Dear John,

I am pleased to return to the discussion of two, related points in your note:
1) scientists such as Scott Muller have been motivated by empirical issues
which have produced valid results, not by dogma; 2) I am not working on
empirical problems.

My position is that my work on real problems starts where some of that on
‘empirical’ problems leaves off, and I will try to use your reference to Scott
Muller’s Asymmetry: The Foundation of Information (2007, Springer) to
illustrate this. First, I should recommend the book for its excellent summary
of the relationship between Shannon and Boltzmann entropy. I also fully agree
with Muller that “information is an objective quantity capable of relational
representation”, and that there is a material manifestation of an inverse
relationship between symmetry and entropy. However, Terrence Deacon, as we all
know, has since shown that the above thermodynamic/statistical-mechanical view
can and must be supplemented by the addition of Darwinian ‘entropy’ for real
biological systems.

I also agree with Muller when he says that probability must be an objective,
physical property and his rejection of any subjective interpretation. However,
(‘dogma’? ‘standard view’?), he states that the only legitimate scientific use
of probability is as a property of a dynamic mass system, a collective within
which some attribute may be found (Von Mises). Isolated events have no
probabilistic significance.

Such a position ignores the interaction between two or some small number of
real events or processes, in which probability must be defined differently and
has different role. I suggest that probability is a measure of their respective
capacity (potential) for subsequent actualization or potentialization. In his
discussion of causal processes that generate and destroy information, Muller
correctly relates symmetry breaking to the resolution of potentiality into
actuality but he, like Aristotle, does not see the necessity for expressing the
contrary movement. This is part of the basis of my critique of ‘it-from-bit’
and my ‘proposal’ for going beyond it.

Thank you and best regards,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: fis
Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2015 12:45 PM
Subject: RE: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

Dear Joseph, List,

I am running past my allotment, so I will shut up after this for a while. (I
have to go to California for a workshop in any case, and won’t have much
internet access for the two days I am traveling.)

The “it from bit” view was developed (after its origins for other reasons I
will come to) partly to pose questions about black holes that cannot be posed
in terms of energy. It also applies to any horizon, including event and
particle horizons. Whatever the answer, it permits well-posed questions that
have not been able to be posed in other terms, at least so far.

The “it from bit” view is independent of, but strongly recommends a
computational view. I have argued for a transfer of information view of
causation on independent philosophical grounds as a development of Russell’s
at-at view of causation. The two approaches converge nicely.

My understanding of the “it from bit” view does not require a binary logic of
causation, but emergence of information comes from bifurcations (Layzer,
Frautschi, Collier, among others). So that is another happy convergence of two
approaches. I see no reason why trifurcations and other higher order splits
might not be possible, if unlikely. This is an empirical question, but makes no
difference to the underlying mathematics, which takes base 2 logarithms by
convention, for convenience. I don’t see this issue as empirical in itself, but
the convenience has some empirical force.

The stronger “it from bit” view that applies to everything was due originally
to Wheeler, not any of the physicists mentioned so far, and supported by
Gell-Mann. Their reason is that empirical values in quantum mechanics often
have been shown to arise from asymmetries, and they assume this will continue
(proton spin is one notable current problem, but the problem is being pursued
by this method, to the best of my understanding). My former student Scott
Muller was able to show that asymmetries in a system assign a unique
information content in the it from bit sense. In any case, the view has an
empirical motivation, and has produced empirically satisfying results, if not
universally so far.

With all due respect, Joseph, the scientists I have mentioned have been
motivated by empirical issues (problems), not dogma, but you are not working on
empirical problems. I have argued that the approach is motivated primarily by
empirical issues, and it is simply wrong to attribute it to “authority”, since
anyone in principle has access to the empirical issues```

### Re: [Fis] It from Bit redux . . . Loss of Information

```Dear Colleagues and Reasoned Opponents,

A scientific position may be the object of rational disagreement and
discussion, but the 'ganging up' of some individuals on a highly respected
colleague is disgraceful and unacceptable. By this note I am suggesting to
Pedro that Ericsson-Zenith, Sherman and Abundis be removed from the group.

The formulation of Loet's comment was somewhat rapid, since the key questions
are 'what physics, what mathematics (and what logic). As Loet knows well, he
and I do not agree on all issues surrounding information. Here I believe he
might have been over-reacting to speakers at the conference who took
superannuated postions on the physical grounding of information.

Among these positions is the idea that there must be exact, immutable
defintions and terminology, as if we were not all involved in a complex
learning process. Who is doing the alleged 'needless blurring of terms'? If
after all this Abundis is still wondering how he can contribute, as he has
already said, perhaps he should draw the obvious conclusion.

The inability to engage in civilized debate corresponds to an enormous LOSS of
information in our Information Society. I would not blame the new media, since
they are only tools, but they enable the very facile expression of some ideas
better left for other venues.

Sadly,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith
To: Marcus Abundis
Cc: Foundations of Information Science Information Science
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2015 8:28 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] It from Bit redux . . .

Trust me. You are in good company.

Steven

On Jun 14, 2015, at 5:22 PM, Marcus Abundis 55m...@gmail.com wrote:

From Loet's post:
During the recent conference in Vienna, I was amazed how many of our
colleagues wish to ground information in physics.
I would say that I was disappointed . . .

For me this exchange on It from Bit is problematic as its seems to simply
revisit the same problem introduced with Shannon's use of the term
“information“ in his Mathematical Theory of Communication – but dressed with a
slightly different face. I had this same problem with “lack of precise
thinking“ (or terminology?) in the It from Bit video from last month. This
endless(?) debate around an old issue of “meaningful information“ versus
“meaningless information“ (aka DATA awaiting MEANINGFUL interpretation) I find
unhelpful in addressing FOUNDATIONAL issues. If we cannot keep our terms
straight I am not sure how progress is made.

Yes, of course physics has a place in the conversation, but the needless
blurring of basic terms does not, I think, advance the project. If a basic
nomenclature and/or taxonomy cannot be agreed and then abided in these
conversations, it leaves me wondering how I might contribute. I am new to this
group, but this seems like it should have been dealt with from the start in
agreeing the FIS group goals.

Marcus Abundis
about.me/marcus.abundis

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### [Fis] Fw: It from Bit redux . . . Gain of Information

```Dear Pedro, Dear Loet and All,

My thanks first to Pedro for his note, especially for its emphasis on the
necessity of scholarly style. I thank Loet also for what may be a quite
unexpected result of my partial defense of his approach, his restatement of the
Cartesian dualistic position. This brings out some differences, whose value may
now be discussed, with the non-Cartesian dualisms of LIR.

Thus I agree that reality includes the res cogitans, and also physics as a
science as much as the object of physics, the res extensa. Uncertainty is, I
think, in reality, and not in our inability to define position and momentum at
the same time, vs. a unitary reality. It is perhaps easier to see in complex
emerging situations: the outcome of this discussion is uncertain, as we move
between something like knowledge and something like ignorance.  I assume  (Loet
please correct me) that the concept of the res cogitatum, the thing thought,
applied to the res cogitans, allows for self-reference.

The discussion now turns on the question of access. In contrast to Loet's
reading, Logic in Reality says that we have access to nature, the res extensa,
but not only as a referent to the former via discourse, epistemologically. In
addition, despite our incapacity of interacting directly with nature at
microphysical levels of reality, the laws which govern change at our level are
isomorphous with those at ours, making possible some cognition of nature,
ontologically, due to our inseparability from it.

Information, in this view, refers to the various processes that constitute both
'the act and the fact' of this access, and its subsequent processing at higher
levels of complexity (not abstraction). I see some of the difficulties in
semiotic approaches as coming from assuming that the necessary stage of
interpretation of information is not also a natural cognitive process following
the same rules as those at lower levels.

As I have tried to argue previously but look forward to doing again ;-), such a
view is relevant to Terry Deacon's approach to the dynamics of information,
adding something to the 'how' side, but there is a lot more to be done here.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Loet Leydesdorff
To: 'Joseph Brenner' ; 'fis'
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2015 12:42 PM
Subject: RE: [Fis] It from Bit redux . . . Loss of Information

Dear Joe and colleagues,

It “flamed” a bit. Thank you for the intervention. The confusion is not only
ours, but also in the literature. Indeed, we should not blame each other for it.

I know that you wish to ground information in “reality”: “logic in reality” or
LIR. But I understood during the conference for the first time, that “reality”
then includes res cogitans. For example, “uncertainty” would be “in reality” if
I correctly understand you.

Would this imply that physics as a science would be part of the reality as
would its object (“nature”)? I would classify the first as res cogitans (in
this case, cogitatum) and the second as res extensa. But we have no access to
the latter (“nature”) but as a referent to the former (discourse). Is this part
of the logic in reality? Is that in the neighbourhood of what you mean with LIR?

Best,

Loet

Loet Leydesdorff

Emeritus University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Honorary Professor, SPRU, University of Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor, Birkbeck, University of London;

http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Joseph Brenner
Sent: Monday, June 15, 2015 12:11 PM
To: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] It from Bit redux . . . Loss of Information

Dear Colleagues and Reasoned Opponents,

A scientific position may be the object of rational disagreement and
discussion, but the 'ganging up' of some individuals on a highly respected
colleague is disgraceful and unacceptable.

The formulation of Loet's comment was somewhat rapid, since the key questions
are 'what physics, what mathematics (and what logic). As Loet knows well, he
and I do not agree on all issues surrounding information. Here I believe he
might have been over-reacting to speakers at the conference who took
superannuated postions on the physical grounding of information.

Among these positions is the idea that there must be exact, immutable
defintions and terminology, as if we were not all involved in a complex
learning process. Who is doing the alleged 'needless blurring of terms'? If
after all this Abundis is still wondering how he can contribute, as he has
already said, perhaps he should draw the obvious conclusion.

The inability to engage in civilized debate corresponds to an enormous```

### [Fis] Fw: Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

```Dear Colleagues,

I completely agree with Krassimir's position and on the importance of the issue
on which it taken. Neither he nor I wish to say that there cannot be models and
insights for science in religious beliefs, such as the Kabbala, but then John's
diagram would be more appropriate if it had En Sof at the center rather than
It-from-Bit.

The statement It-from-Bit is just information, further, requires analysis: do
we 1) accept this as dogma, including the implied limitation of information to
separable binary entities? or 2) assume that the universe is constituted by
complex informational processes, in which the term 'It-from-Bit' is misleading
at best, and should be avoided?

I feel particularly uncomfortable when dogmatic computational views such as
those of Lloyd and Davies are presented as authoritative without comment,
except by appeal to the authority of 'some physicists'. Those FISers who would
like to see a reasonably considered rebuttal might look at my article in
Information: The Logic of the Physics of Information.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Krassimir Markov
To: John Collier ; Stanley N Salthe ; fis
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2015 11:18 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

Dear John and Stan,
Your two hierarchies are good only if you believe in God.
But this is belief, not science.
Sorry, nothing personal!
Friendly regards
Krassimir

From: John Collier
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2015 5:02 PM
To: Stanley N Salthe ; fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

Not quite the same hierarchy, but similar:

It from bit is just information, which is fundamental, on Seth Lloyd’s
computational view of nature. Paul Davies and some other physicists agree with
this.

Chemical information is negentropic, and hierarchical in most physiological
systems.

John

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2015 3:40 PM
To: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

Pedro -- Your list:

physical, biological, social, and Informational

is implicitly a hierarchy -- in fact, a subsumptive hierarchy, with the
physical subsuming the biological and the biological subsuming the social.  But
where should information appear?  Following Wheeler, we should have:

{informational {physicochemical {biological {social

STAN

On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 5:34 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
wrote:

Thanks, Ken. I think your previous message and this one are drawing sort of the
border-lines of the discussion. Achieving a comprehensive view on the
interrelationship between computation and information is an essential matter.
In my opinion, and following the Vienna discussions, whenever life cycles are
involved and meaningfully touched, there is info; while the mere info
circulation according to fixed rules and not impinging on any life-cycle
relevant aspect, may be taken as computation. The distinction between both may
help to consider more clearly the relationship between the four great domains
of sceince: physical, biological, social, and Informational. If we adopt a
pan-computationalist stance, the information turn of societies, of
bioinformation, neuroinformation, etc. merely reduces to applying computer
technologies. I think this would be a painful error, repeating the big mistake
of 60s-70s, when people band-wagon to developed the sciences of the artificial
and reduced the nascent info science to library science. People like Alex
Pentland (his social physics 2014) are again taking the wrong way... Anyhow,
it was nicer talking face to face as we did in the past conference!

best ---Pedro

Ken Herold wrote:

FIS:

Sorry to have been too disruptive in my restarting discussion post--I did not
intend to substitute for the Information Science thread an alternative way of
philosophy or computing.  The references I listed are indicative of some bad
thinking as well as good ideas to reflect upon.  Our focus is information and I
would like to hear how you might believe the formal relational scheme of
Rosenbloom could be helpful?

Ken

--
Ken Herold
Director, Library Information Systems
Hamilton College
198 College Hill Road
Clinton, NY 13323
315-859-4487
kher...@hamilton.edu mailto:kher...@hamilton.edu

--
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 ( 6818)
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-

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Fis@listas.unizar.es
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```

### [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

```
- Original Message -
From: Joseph Brenner
To: fis
Sent: Saturday, June 13, 2015 10:13 AM
Subject: Fw: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

Dear Colleagues,

I completely agree with Krassimir's position and on the importance of the issue
on which it taken. Neither he nor I wish to say that there cannot be models and
insights for science in religious beliefs, such as the Kabbala, but then John's
diagram would be more appropriate if it had En Sof at the center rather than
It-from-Bit.

The statement It-from-Bit is just information, further, requires analysis: do
we 1) accept this as dogma, including the implied limitation of information to
separable binary entities? or 2) assume that the universe is constituted by
complex informational processes, in which the term 'It-from-Bit' is misleading
at best, and should be avoided?

I feel particularly uncomfortable when dogmatic computational views such as
those of Lloyd and Davies are presented as authoritative without comment,
except by appeal to the authority of 'some physicists'. Those FISers who would
like to see a reasonably considered rebuttal might look at my article in
Information: The Logic of the Physics of Information.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Krassimir Markov
To: John Collier ; Stanley N Salthe ; fis
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2015 11:18 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

Dear John and Stan,
Your two hierarchies are good only if you believe in God.
But this is belief, not science.
Sorry, nothing personal!
Friendly regards
Krassimir

From: John Collier
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2015 5:02 PM
To: Stanley N Salthe ; fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

Not quite the same hierarchy, but similar:

It from bit is just information, which is fundamental, on Seth Lloyd’s
computational view of nature. Paul Davies and some other physicists agree with
this.

Chemical information is negentropic, and hierarchical in most physiological
systems.

John

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe
Sent: Friday, June 12, 2015 3:40 PM
To: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

Pedro -- Your list:

physical, biological, social, and Informational

is implicitly a hierarchy -- in fact, a subsumptive hierarchy, with the
physical subsuming the biological and the biological subsuming the social.  But
where should information appear?  Following Wheeler, we should have:

{informational {physicochemical {biological {social

STAN

On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 5:34 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
wrote:

Thanks, Ken. I think your previous message and this one are drawing sort of the
border-lines of the discussion. Achieving a comprehensive view on the
interrelationship between computation and information is an essential matter.
In my opinion, and following the Vienna discussions, whenever life cycles are
involved and meaningfully touched, there is info; while the mere info
circulation according to fixed rules and not impinging on any life-cycle
relevant aspect, may be taken as computation. The distinction between both may
help to consider more clearly the relationship between the four great domains
of sceince: physical, biological, social, and Informational. If we adopt a
pan-computationalist stance, the information turn of societies, of
bioinformation, neuroinformation, etc. merely reduces to applying computer
technologies. I think this would be a painful error, repeating the big mistake
of 60s-70s, when people band-wagon to developed the sciences of the artificial
and reduced the nascent info science to library science. People like Alex
Pentland (his social physics 2014) are again taking the wrong way... Anyhow,
it was nicer talking face to face as we did in the past conference!

best ---Pedro

Ken Herold wrote:

FIS:

Sorry to have been too disruptive in my restarting discussion post--I did not
intend to substitute for the Information Science thread an alternative way of
philosophy or computing.  The references I listed are indicative of some bad
thinking as well as good ideas to reflect upon.  Our focus is information and I
would like to hear how you might believe the formal relational scheme of
Rosenbloom could be helpful?

Ken

--
Ken Herold
Director, Library Information Systems
Hamilton College
198 College Hill Road
Clinton, NY 13323
315-859-4487
kher...@hamilton.edu mailto:kher...@hamilton.edu

--
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 ( 6818)
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan```

### Re: [Fis] It From Bit video. Collier and Muller

```Dear Srinandan, Dear John and All,

At the Vienna Information Summit, I will present a paper in the Symmetry
Section of Gyuri Darvas entitled Symmetry and Information; Brothers in Arms.
I wished by this title to convey the idea that symmetry and information somehow
emerged together from a prior state of some kind. I do not state explicitly
that asymmetry IS information and I was not aware of John's work on symmetry,
even if I had seen reference to it earlier. But then, is it not possible to be
aware of John's work 'all at once'. It requires several iterations; I have
purchased Muller's book to get myself to the next stage of knowledge here.

The point and possible value of the Logic in Reality approach, what it brings
to the table, still can I believe be seen in some of the implications of John's
note: some people talk only of the laws/symmetries, others only of asymmetries.
Darvas clearly shows that one cannot be considered without the other, and LIR
states that it logical hence scientific that both the energetic partly
symmetricalsubstrate of information and its ontological and epsitemological
properties influence one another (interact). Laws are both information and the
final cause of the regularities in the information, and Logic in Reality
addresses and tries, with difficulty, to express in what way words like 'both'
and 'at the same time' express how reality 'really' evolves.

I would be glad to forward a copy of my extended abstract for Vienna to anyone
who is interested.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: Srinandan Dasmahapatra ; u...@umces.edu
Cc: fis
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 11:19 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] It From Bit video

Dear Srinandan,

He relation of geometry to information theory (and also of particle theory in
the Standard Theory) is by way of group theory. Groups describe symmetries,
which are reversible. What is left over are the asymmetries, which are the
differences that can be identified as information. This is worked out in some
detail by my former student, Scott Muller, in Asymmetry: The Foundation of
Information. Springer: Berlin. 2007. Seth Lloyd relates the information concept
to quantum mechanics via group theory and other means in his Programming the
Universe: A Quantum Computer Scientist Takes on the Cosmos. More direct
connections can be made via the entropy concept where the information is the
difference between the entropy of a system and its entropy with all internal
constraints relaxed, but it comes to the same thing in the end. There are
several convergent ways to relate information to form, then, in contemporary
physics. But basically it is in the asymmetries.

As far as the relation between the asymmetries and symmetries go, I think
this is still a bit open, since the symmetries represent the laws. Some
physicists like Paul Davies talk as if the symmetries add nothing once you have
all the asymmetries, so the laws are a result of information as well. I don’t
see through this adequately myself as yet, though.

John

From: Srinandan Dasmahapatra [mailto:s...@ecs.soton.ac.uk]
Sent: May 26, 2015 10:20 PM
To: u...@umces.edu; John Collier
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] It From Bit video

Re: boundary conditions, etc.

I struggle to understand many/most of the posts on this list, and the
references to boundary conditions, geometry and information leave me quite
befuddled as well. Is it being claimed that geometry the same as information?
That the requirement of predictions makes the focus on physical laws irrelevant
unless the boundary conditions are specified? Or even that the continuum is at
odds with the speed of light, considering classical electromagnetism is a
well-defined continuum field theory. As for galactic distances, the only
scientific basis upon which we conceive of the large scale structure of the
universe is via the field equations of gravity, which brings a coherent package
of causal thinking built into it. I did understand the bit on Noether, as
energy conservation is indeed a consequence of time translation invariance, but
that comes embedded in a continuum description, typically.

In biological systems, energy input makes the picture specific to the system
one cordons off for study, and often it is hard to adequately describe
phenomena by scalar potentials alone due to the currents in the system. And
Noether cannot deliver reversibility.

To me the message of Sean Carroll in the YouTube video that an equivalent
redescription of physics (or biology) in terms of information is not enough,
strikes me as sane.

Cheers,

Srinandan

Original message
From: Robert E. Ulanowicz
Date:26/05/2015 16:16 (GMT+00:00)
To: John Collier
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] It From Bit video

I would like to strongly reinforce John's comments ```

### Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OFSCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? (R.Capurro)

```Dear FISers,

I have no difficulty in understanding Loet's approach as measuring one form of
interdisciplinarity. However, it requires well-defined quantitative entities -
classes, categories and journal articles to which they apply. I thus do not
think that it exhausts the possibilities of the informational domain with
regard to disciplines.

When John C. talks about references crossing ecology, management and poltical
science, what is of interest to me and perhaps others is the 'substance' so to
speak of the crossing. To make things difficult (rather than easy for a
change), let us assume that this substance includes, but is not limited to
common assumptions and common attitudes. (My informational exchanges today are
more interdisciplinary because I am paying more attention to the way in which
information is processed in the different disciplines.)

The task then becomes to express the 'substance' in informational terms. What
informational terms are possible that are not numbers or ad hoc Peircean
categories? The first thing I see is that the corresponding logic and category
theory must be non-standard or it will miss the interactions and overlaps
between disciplines. The next thing might be to change to a process
perspective, looking at the way in which the disciplines, considered as
informational entities, influence one another, and find some formal but
non-mathematical language for referring to this. Are there any suggestions for
such a language?

Looking over what I just wrote off the top of my head, I note that I used the
term 'way' twice. Does this suggest a new role for the informational domain?

Cheers,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Loet Leydesdorff
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2015 9:34 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OFSCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL?
(R.Capurro)

Dear colleagues,

For the measurement of interdisciplinarity, one can use, for example,
Rao-Stirling diversity which is defined as follows (Rao, 1982; Stirling, 2007):

Δ = Σij pi pj dij   (1)

where dij is a disparity measure between two classes i and j-the categories
are in the case below journals-and pi is the proportion of elements assigned to
each class i. As the disparity measure, we use the distances on an aggregated
journal-journal citation map (Leydesdorff, Heimeriks,  Rotolo, in press;
Leydesdorff, Rafols,  Chen, 2013).

For example, 23 publications can be retrieved as of today with the search
string au=Marijuan P* at WoS. The journal map is as follows:

and the Rao-Stirling diversity (interdisciplinarity) of this set is 01282.

If I repeat the analysis with the search string au=leydesdorff l*, I
retrieve 270 documents; Rao-Stirling diversity is 0.0805.

In other words, Leydesdorff is more prolific than Marijuan in terms of WoS
publications, but Marijuan's portfolio is more interdisciplinary than
Leydesdorff's.

One finds the relevant software at
http://www.leydesdorff.net/portfolio/index.htm

Reference:

Leydesdorff, L., Heimeriks, G.,  Rotolo, D. (2015 (in press)). Journal
Portfolio Analysis for Countries, Cities, and Organizations: Maps and
Comparisons. Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology.

--

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```

### Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

```Dear All,

Several of you have asked recently for a description of Logic in Reality (LIR)
that is more accessible that what I have written. Thank you for that. Let me
respond by simply saying here that LIR is a logic of /change/, better of change
and stability, non-change. The basic concept is that all complex processes or
states-of-affairs have two major components in an antagonistic or
contradictorial relation. If one component predominates, is more actual or
actualized, the other is less dominant, is potential or potentialized. It is
possible to refer to the states of these elements in terms of non-standard
probabilities, thus going one step further than just description :-).

To refer to Loet's examples, brain, culture and economy, LIR would say that
antagonistic processes in the brain, not a model of the brain, are isomorphic
to processes in culture and the economy in that the same movement from actual
to potential, and potential to actual and to emergence of new entities takes
place in all of them. The reason LIR is a logic and not physics or biology is
that it permits inferences to be made about the direction of development of
such processes. It is thus most interesting to read that there is also an
heuristic movement between domains in Loet's approach.

The relation to information, from my perspective, is that
information-as-process is now recognized as a complex of two elements, one
obviously energetic, the substrate or carrier and its 'meaning', which is less
obviously energy in some form. I suggest that the problem is how to understand
'meaning'. One should perhaps also talk of 'meaning-as-process' - the
experience of meaning in a human interpreter - which clearly involves physical
processes.

I would be glad to answer further questions, especially if they refer
specifically to the relation of LIR and information, on which I have two or
three papers easily accessible on-line in Information.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Loet Leydesdorff
To: 'Steven Ericsson-Zenith' ; 'fis'
Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2014 7:53 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

Dear Steven and colleagues,

I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read as an
introduction?

It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial
theories of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal apparatus:
the design and the results do not yet have meaning without an interpretation in
a substantial context. On the other side, a theory about, for example,
neuro-information is a special theory. One can in this context use information
theory as a statistical tool (among other tools). Sometimes, one can move
beyond description. J

The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special
theories, is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move between
domains heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can perhaps be used
metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice versa). The advantages have
to be shown in empirical research: which questions can be addressed and which
puzzles be solved?

Best,

Loet

--

Loet Leydesdorff

Emeritus University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Honorary Professor, SPRU, University of Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor, Birkbeck, University of London;

http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en

From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2014 10:13 PM
To: l...@leydesdorff.net
Cc: Joseph Brenner; fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my model,
can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point and
response covariance is impossible to consider.

It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors in
which I can express the explicit role of a base universal (per gravitation).

Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as information as
process.

On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net
wrote:

Dear colleagues,

Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it
allows for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition
analysis (North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information
measures. In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write:

in which can be considered```

### [Fis] Information-as-Process

```
Dear Carolina,  Bob L., Bob U., Sören and Krassimir,

First of all thanks to Carolina for having launched a most interesting
thread, of which I have changed the title since the issues are broader than
that of Neuroinformation alone, as Francesco has noted.

My first point is a response to Sören since I feel his book does not address
Information-as-Process as 'physically' as I think necessary. His reference
to the use of this term by Buckland (on p. 77 not 87), (which I had missed
when first reading /Cybersemiotics/), however, is followed by a reference to
information processing. (He later states that a new metatheory is required
to replace the information processing paradigm, and he proposes Peircean
semiotics, whereas I have proposed Logic in Reality.) I also note that
Buckland places Information-as-Process in the 'Intangible' column of his
matrix and one can question the ontological meaning of this.

In the compendium /Philosophers of Process/. 1998. Browning and Myers
(eds.). New York: Fordham University Press, Peirce is represented by four
papers: The Architecture of Theories, The Doctrine of Necessity
Examined, The Law of Mind  and Man's Glassy Essence. Unfortunately, in
none of these is the word 'process' used, let alone described as a concept.
'Process' is not an entry in the COMMENS Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce,
edited by Bergman and Paavola, so the most one can say is that process was
not a common concept in Peirce. If Information-as-Process is to be developed
as a concept, I doubt that Peirce's semiotics will help.

In the notes of both Bob. L and Bob U., however, one finds workable
properties than can be assigned to Information-as-Process, the verb-noun
dialectic and the concept of real trophic exchange. Krassimir's concept of
information being dynamic (a process) or static depending on what it
reflects does not give as complete a notion as I would like that information
is /in-itself/ a process, even it reflects (refers to) static or abstract
objects. Nevertheless, Krassimir clearly sees the dualism of information as
composed of dynamic and static entities, whose interaction, as in the case
of the first two approaches, can be discussed in the framework of Logic in
Reality. The problem is his use of the term 'reflection' whose nature is not
clear as I have remarked to him before.

I look forward to further discussion.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Robert E. Ulanowicz u...@umces.edu

To: Carolina Isiegas cisie...@gmail.com
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 6:30 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Neuroinformation?

Dear Dr. Isiegas:

I envision neuroinformation as the mutual information of the neuronal
network where synaptic connections are weighted by the frequencies of
discharge between all pairs of neurons. This is directly analogous to a
network of trophic exchanges among an ecosystem, as illustrated in
http://people.biology.ufl.edu/ulan/pubs/SymmOvhd.PDF.

Please note that this measure is different from the conventional
sender-channel-receiver format of communications theory. It resembles more
the structural information inhering in the neuronal network. John
Collier (also a FISer) calls such information enformation to draw
attention to its different nature.

With best wishes for success,

Bob Ulanowicz

Dear list,

I have been reading during the last year all these interesting
exchanges. Some of them terrific discussions! Given my scientific
backgound
(Molecular Neuroscience), I would like to hear your point of view on the
topic of neuroinformation, how information exists within the Central
Nervous Systems. My task was experimental; I was interested in
investigating the molecular mechanisms underlying learning and memory,
specifically, the role of the cAMP-PKA-CREB signaling pathway in such
brain
functions (In Ted AbelÂ´s Lab at the University of Pennsylvania, where I
spent 7 years). I generated several genetically modified mice in which I
could regulate the expression of this pathway in specific brain regions
and
in which I studied the effects of upregulation or downregulation at the
synaptic and behavioral levels. However, I am conscious that the
information flow within the mouse Nervous System is far more complex
that
in the simple pathway that I was studying...so, my concrete question for
you Fishers or Fisers, how should we contemplate the micro and macro
structures of information within the neural realm? what is
Neuroinformation?

Best wishes,

--
Carolina Isiegas
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```

### Re: [Fis] Neuroinformation?

```
Dear Dr. Isiegas,

I will add my support to the extended concept of information that inheres in
the work of Robert Ulanowicz and John Collier. I would just add that I like
to call it information-as-process, to call attention to its 'structure'
being dynamic, with individual neurones involved in a cyclic (better spiral
or sinusoidal) movement between states of activation and inhibition. I have
ascribed an extension of logic to this form of alternating actual and
potential states in complex processes at all levels of reality.

Best wishes,

Joseph B.

- Original Message -
From: Robert E. Ulanowicz u...@umces.edu

To: Carolina Isiegas cisie...@gmail.com
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 6:30 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Neuroinformation?

Dear Dr. Isiegas:

I envision neuroinformation as the mutual information of the neuronal
network where synaptic connections are weighted by the frequencies of
discharge between all pairs of neurons. This is directly analogous to a
network of trophic exchanges among an ecosystem, as illustrated in
http://people.biology.ufl.edu/ulan/pubs/SymmOvhd.PDF.

Please note that this measure is different from the conventional
sender-channel-receiver format of communications theory. It resembles more
the structural information inhering in the neuronal network. John
Collier (also a FISer) calls such information enformation to draw
attention to its different nature.

With best wishes for success,

Bob Ulanowicz

Dear list,

I have been reading during the last year all these interesting
exchanges. Some of them terrific discussions! Given my scientific
backgound
(Molecular Neuroscience), I would like to hear your point of view on the
topic of neuroinformation, how information exists within the Central
Nervous Systems. My task was experimental; I was interested in
investigating the molecular mechanisms underlying learning and memory,
specifically, the role of the cAMP-PKA-CREB signaling pathway in such
brain
functions (In Ted AbelÂ´s Lab at the University of Pennsylvania, where I
spent 7 years). I generated several genetically modified mice in which I
could regulate the expression of this pathway in specific brain regions
and
in which I studied the effects of upregulation or downregulation at the
synaptic and behavioral levels. However, I am conscious that the
information flow within the mouse Nervous System is far more complex
that
in the simple pathway that I was studying...so, my concrete question for
you Fishers or Fisers, how should we contemplate the micro and macro
structures of information within the neural realm? what is
Neuroinformation?

Best wishes,

--
Carolina Isiegas
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```

### Re: [Fis] The Travellers

```
Dear Pedro, Dear Sören,

Please let me call the attention of both of you to Sören's article in
Biosemiotics of 24 May 2012 What Does it Take to Produce Interpretation?
Informational, Peircean and Code-Semiotic Views on Biosemiotics. Judging
from the abstract, this article criticizes at least some points in Peircean
pragmaticist semiotic theory based on simulataneous types of evolution.

It is this balance - that one cannot accept the precepts of Peircean
semiotics automatically as science - that has been missing in the
discussion. Thus Stjernfelt's book, /Natural Propositions/ while showing the
movement of Peirce's thought toward greater realism, confirms over and over
that it is a narrow window of proposition and argument involving a
fundamental reliance on propositional truth in reasoning. I for one cannot
see that it enables us to attain idealized and general objectives in ...
arts, science, politics. technology and other large human endeavors.

Stjernfelt sees propositions throughout nature, not only in language, but he
then subjects them to the reductionist framework of a Peircean logic still
based on a binary, linguistic truth-functionality confirmed by mathematics.
I would like to suggest that what Pedro may be calling for is something like
an /inverse semiotics/, based on theories of information which reflect the
dynamics of existence, in which the primary truth is the truth of reality,
and secondarily that of signs which can be captured in propositions.

Thanks to all,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es

To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Cc: Søren Brier sb@cbs.dk
Sent: Thursday, October 30, 2014 2:28 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] The Travellers

Dear FIS colleagues,

I am responding to a mail from Soeren (below) that, curiously, was
retained by the list filter. Sorry, but some parts of his message are
written in a rather arrogant tone that does not match the unconditionally
polite style of our exchanges. This is a pluralistic list and quite
different positions may be defended, always within appropriate scholarly
bounds.

First, my comment on semiotics was as it was --not with the exaggeration
introduced by Soeren. Looking in positive, it is interesting that in the
80's I also started a PhD thesis on the parallel evolution of neuroanatomy
and behavior, with a pretty strong ethological content, but stopped it as
I could not converge to any relevant outcome. Instead I moved downwards,
and started the informational study of the cell and the evolution of
biological information processing... Later on the approach pleased Michel
Conrad, and the rest is part of fis history.

About my physicalist conception of signaling and biological information,
I think the two recent papers in BioSystems (On prokaryotic
Intelligence... and On eukaryotic Intelligence...) represent an
original view that can enrich the current system biology debates on
signaling bases of intelligence--or not!, people will tell. To keep the
explanation short, the way cellular life has channeled the energy flow
(eg, Morowitz, 1968) versus the channeling of the information flow
contains lessons for the further deployment of biological and social
complexity. In particular, the cellular processual distinction between
metabolite and signal looks fascinating, in human terms it is like
reading the newspaper vs, eating a sandwich (it can be found in my recent
paper of fis-Moscow, journal Information)...  Not far from these views,
engineer Adrian Bejan (2012) has recently proposed a constructal law
based on the circulation needs of the energy flow in nature and
society--could we devise a parallel or complementary scheme for the
information flow? Actually Bejan's attempt covers it but rather poorly, at
least compared with the depth of the energetic part.

In part, I am frustrated that we have been living the most momentous
changes in the social history of information and at fis have been able to
say very little about. Rather than struggling to achieve the true,
monolithic, universal theory of information, shouldn't we aspire to frame
a convivial multi-disciplinary space where plenty of both APPLIED and
theoretical research on informational entities can be developed and
cross-fertilize?

And this is my Second of the week.
Best regards

---Pedro

Søren Brier wrote:

Dear Pedro

This is a wonderful mail revealing all sorts of theoretical views and
philosophy of science prejudices. This one takes the price:   Semiotics
could be OK for the previous generation--something attuned to our
scientific times is needed now. The conclusion is that semiotics is not
something new and advanced but old-fashioned and outdated !!! The
Peircean biosemioticians are fooling themselves ! They are not
scientific.

This is a crucial discussion that many of us have with Marcello Barbieri
on a somewhat different theoretical platform. But he is wonderfully clear
and ```

### Re: [Fis] FIS 2015, Workshop on Combinatorics of Genetics, Fundamentals

```Karl,

I welcome the intent of your Workshop to deal with real contradictions but I
have some doubts that combinatorics by itself suffices. Earlier, you wrote:

Therefore, no methodology has evolved of appeasing, soothing,
compromise-building among equally valid logical statements that contradict each
other.

However, I would like to call your attention again to the fact that such a
logic and methodology exist, which I have designated as Logic in Reality (LIR).
LIR is non-linguistic and non-truth-functional, grounded in the physics of our
world, and can in principle do what you would like to do.

The reason I say 'in principle' is that the fact that neither standard, binary
logics nor paraconsistent logics can properly handle real phenomena does not
guarantee that one based on or describing 'sequences' or simple permutations is
capable of capturing the contradictorial characteristics of complex processes,
e.g. information. It is worth discussion but then the implications of Logic in
Reality - the logic of the included third term of Stéphane Lupasco and his
Principle of Dynamic Opposition - are also.

I think it is not so clear how to understand 'the logical contradictions that
exist' outside the linguistic or mathematical domain. It might be useful
(suggestion) to start out by discussing what the options here are.

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Karl Javorszky
To: Bruno Marchal
Cc: fis Science
Sent: Tuesday, October 28, 2014 10:50 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS 2015, Workshop on Combinatorics of
Genetics,Fundamentals

The workshop goes far deeper than the excellent remarks raised by Bruno
discuss. We try to make the participants understand that the workshop deals
with contradictions, not para-consistent or inconsistent variants of logic.

The subject is elementary in such a degree, that participants run the risk of
not seeing the forest for the trees. Let me offer a very simple example:

In your class at University there are 20 students. Each student has 1 first
name and 1 family name. For official, administrative reasons, you have to work
the list down according to the family name. This is the sequence A (for
Administrative). Here, Arthur Treehouse comes after Christopher Bellini. Then
you have a list for your own use, where you remember the first name of the
students and have them in your phonebook according to their first name. This is
the sequence P (for Private). Here, John Napolitano comes before Susan Ardenne.
(Please expand the example until the problem becomes obvious. In the workshop
we shall work it out in detail, encouraging collaboration.)

Both sequences A and P have been achieved by repetitive applications of the
operator “”, well known from elementary arithmetic. The logical operators
{|=|} are a part of logic. Their application should be free of contradictions.

Here, we see that the application of the logical operator “” on sets yields
contradicting results.

The workshop will address the methodology of consolidating logical
contradictions. To this end we shall look more in detail into, how sequence
contradictions are resolved. The fact, that logical contradictions exist and
are easily demonstrable has been shown, therefore we shall not discuss it any
more.

As a preparation, one may want to ask his/her students to line up a) once
according to family name and b) once according to first name; c) each student
shall note in both cases the sequential number of his place, d) compare the two
numbers, e) if these do not agree, decide, which is his “right” place, f) if he
cannot do so, go to the alternative place, g) observe, whether the person who
is on his alternative place will exchange place with him directly, h) if not,
observe, how many students have to change places, i) compare the number of
exchanges within a closed loop.

After these exercises, one may want to discuss the concept of something
called a “quantum”, which could be interpreted as an elementary unit of being
dis-allocated (maybe [stepskilogrammdistance]).

Let me repeat, the subject the workshop invites the participants to direct
their attention to is way more fundamental than the level of “language
semantics”, “mind-body problem” or “origin of beliefs”.

Karl

2014-10-22 15:59 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:

On 20 Oct 2014, at 13:44, Karl Javorszky wrote:

Workshop on the Combinatorics of Genetics, Fundamentals

In order to prepare for a fruitful, satisfying and rewarding workshop in
Vienna, let me offer to potential participants the following main innovations
in the field of formal logic and arithmetic:

1)  Consolidating contradictions:

The idea of contradicting logical statements is traditionally alien to
the system of thoughts that is mathematics. Therefore, no methodology has
evolved of appeasing, soothing, compromise-building among equally valid ```

### [Fis] John C. on The Travellers. Protestantism

```
Dear John,

Thank you for your note of October 27 which helped to bring several things
into focus for me. First, Pedro's The Travellers can be seen as a
questioning of all but some part of any single current approach to
information and meaning.

Suppose I assume that all existence, including our experience of it, has
meaning. The term information sciences refers to how we abstract from this
ontology to be able to 'handle' it within language, but information itself
has the complex properties of existence. The task is not so much, then, to
use semiotics to understand or extend a limited, reduced concept of
information, but to start with another description of the existential field
and the nature of complex information in it.

My opposition to placing semiotics 'between' reality and information is thus
a little like protestantism, which started out by rejecting the necessity of
an intermediary (the Pope) between man and God. (This thesis is something
like anti-representationalism in theories of the mind.)

Frederik Stjernfelt has just published a fascinating book /Natural
Propositions/, on Peirce's Theory of Dicisigns (discussed in the
Biosemiotics list). In it, he traces the evolution of Peirce's thinking
toward greater and greater realism and mentions Peirce's critique of dogma
as blocking inquiry. I feel we should now apply this critique to Peircean
semiotics itself and make sure that any semiotics we use does not depend on
an arbitrary classification of natural processes in which a linguistic
(propositional) framework determines the applicable logic.

Finally, I refer those who question my original assumption to Floridi whose
critical insight that all information (and therefore everything) has value
is at the foundation of his philosophy of information. I cannot separate
value and meaning.

Best regards,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za

To: Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Monday, October 27, 2014 7:12 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] The Travellers

Folks,

I agree with Pedro that the meaning issue is
important. After trying to give a coherent
account within established information theory for
a number of years (starting with Intrinsic
Information in 1990) I came to the conclusion
that information theory was not enough, and
admitted that at the Biosemiotics Gathering in
Tartu about ten years ago. I now believe that
semiotics is the way to go to understand meaning,
and that information theory alone is inadequate to the task.

Of course information theory could be extended,
but I think the correct extension is semiotics.
As Pedro said, we have not got agreement in many
years. I think it is time to give it up and move
into semiotics if we want to fully understand
information. In direct opposition to Pedro's
appeal to the Travellers metaphor, I think that
history has shown that semiotics is distinct from
information theory, and that information theory
should restrict itself to the grounds that it has
already accomplished. Oddly, Pedro seems to be
saying that information theory includes meaning
in exactly the opposite way to the way that
gypsies do not historically include Travellers. So I don't get his argument.

I believe that without an explicit theory of
signs, we cannot hope to get a theory of meaning
from the idea of information alone. I would not
be upset if I were proven wrong.

My best,
John

At 02:35 PM 2014-10-23, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

Dear FIS colleagues,

Regarding the theme of physical information raised by Igor and Joseph,
the main problematic aspect of information (meaning) is missing there.
One can imagine that as two physical systems interact, each one may be
metaphorically attributed with meaning respect the changes experimented.
But it is an empty attribution that does not bring any further
interesting aspect. Conversely we see real elaboration of meaning in
the cellular structures of life, particularly in brains, and we see in
our societies how scientific, technological, and economic advancements
are bringing together more and more flows of information around (social
complexity and information completely dovetail, and that's a very
important feature). Together with physical information (information
theory, logics, symmetry, etc.) each one of those realms has something
important to tell us regarding the unifying perspective necessary to
make sense of the different approaches to information: we have to
carefully listen to all of them. Thus, at the time being, the mission of
information science --or FIS at least-- would remind The Travellers,
those people in the UK and Ireland, pretendedly gypsies, who live a
nomadic life camping from site to site...  It may look unfortunate for
the disciplinarily specialized parties, but  we cannot settle any
permanent info camp --seemingly for quite a long time.

best --Pedro

-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo ```

### Re: [Fis] Physical Informatics… (J.Brenner)

```Dear Bob,

This is not wasted time or space. At their beginning, there was something
moving, call it ‘It’, that led to trees and us. Today, there is something in
us, call it ‘It’, that leads to love. This It became and now becomes us. Am I
to blame that I to try to understand It, from the beginning, as information?

Please do send me an E-mail copy of the latest version of your book. The one I
have is dated December 9, 2011.

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Bob Logan
To: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ ; fis ; Joseph Brenner
Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 8:53 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Physical Informatics… (J.Brenner)

Dear all - my take on this post is that the question of whether physical
processes are information is like the question: Is there a sound if a tree
falls in the forest and no one is there to listen? This is like the Zen koan:
what is the sound of one hand clapping If no one is in the forest are the
trees information? Well for sure they are trees but as to whether or not they
are information that is strictly dependent on the point of view of the
respondent. For me they are just trees and here is why I think so. For me
information is about a process. The noun information relates to the verb
inform. If no one is being informed there is no information. In the same way
that if no one or thing is there being loved (verb) their is no love (noun). If
no one is engaged in the activity of loving (a verb) there is no love (a noun).
If there is no one being informed (a verb) then there is no information (a
noun). Now one can talk about an object or a phenomenon having the possibility
of informing someone which to my mind is potential information which is what I
would call the physical processes that take place in our universe. A book
written in Urdu is potential information because an Urdu reader can be informed
by it. For me as a non-Urdu speaker there is very little information other than
someone went to the trouble of writing out a text with Urdu letters and hence
there is probably information there for an Urdu speaker reasoning why would any
one make the effort to create such an object unless that person wanted to
inform Urdu speakers. Just as one person's food is another person's poison so
it is that one person's information is just for another persons merely a
physical phenomenon such as processes in nature, ink on paper, sounds or EM
signals. Shannon developed a theory of signals in which some of those signals
have the ability to inform some recipients. I hope this collection of words has
informed you other than giving you the knowledge of my view as to what
constitutes information. Thanks to Joseph, Pedro, and Igor for the opportunity
to reflect on the nature of information. If you enjoyed my post and would like
to learn more about my views on information please send me an email off line
and I will send you an email version of my book What is Information?
Propagating Organization in the Biosphere, the Symbolosphere, the Technosphere
and the Econosphere  for free. And now you know what an infomercial is. This
was an infomercial because of my offer to share my book with you erudite
scholars of FIS whose posts I always enjoy. With kind regards - Bob

__

Robert K. Logan
Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto
Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan
www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications

On 2014-10-20, at 1:57 PM, PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ wrote:

- Original Message -
From: Joseph Brenner
To: Igor Gurevich ; Pedro C. Marijuan ; fis
Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 8:40 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Physical Informatics contains fundamental results which
impossible to get only by physical methods

Dear Igor, Dear Gerhard and Colleagues,

In Igor's summary of his recent work, I read the following absoutely
critical statement:
It is shown that the expansion of the Universe is the source of
information formation, wherein a variety of physical processes in an expanding
Universe provide information formation. I take this as meaning that the
expansion of the Universe as such does not produce information.

Gerhard's formulation is slightly different (my paraphrase):
The first assymetry in energy distribution, following the singularity, is
the source of information formation.

My question is, therefore, how best to combine these insights. For example,
we may say that the variety of physical processes are all the consequence of,
and subsequently reflect, a first assymetry.

It is also interesting to note that the approaches of both Igor and Gerhard
imply the emergence of information through the interactional impact
(informational interactions) of fundamental forces on particles, extended by
Gerhard to somewhat```

### Re: [Fis] The remote Maxwell demon as energy down-converter

```
John,

Please, if you would, explain the relationship of the theory in this paper
to a conception of information. If the 'demon' quote has access to a source
of energy unquote, then of course one can draw almost any conclusion one
wants. We know from Mark Burgin's note, about which I also comment today,
that information is a kind of energy so the need for a 'demon' to be
anything but another model is not clear.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za

To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2014 10:21 AM
Subject: [Fis] The remote Maxwell demon as energy down-converter

http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.3797

This article describes an intersting implementation of the use of
information instead of energy, something I have been arguing for on this
list for some time (see also my 1990 paper on Maxwell's demon).

John

--
Professor John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa

T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

```

### [Fis] Fw: Krassimir's Information Quadruple and GIT. Quintuples?

```Dear Mark and All,

I return belatedly to this short but key note of Mark's in which he repeats his
view, with which I agree, that  Energy is a kind of information and information
is a kind of energy.

My suggestion is that it may be useful to expand this statement by looking at
both Information and Energy (mass-energy) as emergent properties of the
universe. Since we agree they are not identical, we may then look at how the
properties differ. Perhaps we can say that Energy is an extensive property,
measured primarily by quantity, and Information is an intensive property. The
difficulty is that both Energy and Information themselves appear to have both
intensive and extensive properties, measured by vector and scalar quantities
respectively. I am encouraged to say that this approach might yield results
that are compatible with advanced theories based on the sophisticated
mathematics to which Mark refers.

I would say then that in our world it is not the question of which is more
fundamental that is essential, but that Energy and Information share properties
which are linked dynamically. In this dialectical interpretation, the need for
a 'demon' that accomplishes some function, as in the paper referred to in
John's note, is a formal exercise.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Burgin, Mark
To: Joseph Brenner
Sent: Friday, August 01, 2014 9:19 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Krassimir's Information Quadruple and GIT. Quintuples?

Dear Joseph and Colleagues,
An answer to the perhaps badly posed question of whether information or energy
is more fundamental is given in the book M.Burgin, Theory of information. The
answer is a little bit unexpected:
Energy is a kind of information and information is a kind of energy.
It's a pity that very few researchers read books with advanced theories based
on sophisticated mathematics.

Sincerely,
Mark Burgin

On 7/31/2014 2:40 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

Dear Krassimir and Colleagues,

I have followed this discussion with interest but not total agreement. As I
have commented to Krassimir previously, I feel that his system, based on
symbols as outlined in his paper, is too static to capture the dynamics of
complex information processes and their value (valence). It suffers from the
same problems as that of Peirce and of set-theoretic approaches, namely, a
certain arbitrariness in the selection and number of independent elements and
their grounding in nature (or rather absence of grounding).

If you will permit a naïve but well-intentioned question, why not have a
theory whose elements are quintuples? Would this not be a 'better', more
complete theory? This opens the possibility of an infinite regress, but that is
the point I am trying to make: the form of the theory is, to a certain extent,
defining its content.

The /development/ of any GIT should, from the beginning I think, recognize
the existence in real time, so to speak, of any new suggestions in the context
of other recent contributions of a different form, such as those of Luhn,
Hofkirchner, Marijuan, Deacon, Dodig-Crnkovic, Wu and so on. Several of these
already permit a more directed discussion of the perhaps badly posed question
of whether information or energy is more fundamental. Otherwise, all that work
will need to be done at the end. In any case, the GIT itself, to the extent
that it could be desirable and useful, would also have to have some dynamics
capable of accepting theories of different forms. 20th Century physics sought
only identities throughout nature and the balance is now being somewhat
restored. I think keeping the diversity of theories of information in mind is
the most worthwhile strategy.

One of the values of Krassimir's approach is that it recognizes the existence
of some of these more complex questions that need to be answered. I simply
suggest that process language and a recognition of dynamic interactions (e.g.,
between 'internal' and 'external') could be part of the strategy.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Krassimir Markov
To: Jerry LR Chandler ; FIS ; Pridi Siregar
Sent: Saturday, July 26, 2014 10:42 AM
Subject: [Fis] Information quadruple

Dear Jerry, Pridi, and Colleagues,

Thank you for the nice comments!

To answer to questions I have to present next step from the GIT (General
Information Theory) we are developing.

Let remember in words (below Infos is abbreviation from Information
Subject, it is an intelligent natural or artificial agent (system)):

Information is quadruple (Source, Recipient, Evidence, Infos) or formally i
= (s, r, e, I)

The nest step is to define elements of the quadruple:

s and r are structured sets;
e is a mapping from s in r which preserves (all or partial) structure of s
and resolves any information expectation of I

I expect new questions:
- what is an intelligent```

### [Fis] Energy and Information, Again. Consciousness Perceived

```Dear Mark and Colleagues (for which latter I attach Mark's message),

Thank you, Mark, for reminding us of your discussion, especially, on p. 104
energy is a kind of information. As we have discussed previously, however,
adding that information is a kind of energy does not resolve the problem
completely:

1. You yourself define information as 'multi-faceted', but this begs the
question of which facet energy is a kind.

2. We may agree that, if they are not identical, energy and information always
accompany one another and may have emerged together from some as yet
incompletely defined substrate. However, they may not be, do not have to be and
for me are not at the same ontological level, and energy is primary being less
abstract.

3. Even the sophisticated mathematics of your Theory of Information does not
capture, any more than any other mathematical theory, the complex qualitative
properties of information processes for which no algorithm can be written. On
the other hand, these processes do follow the logical laws for the evolution of
energetic processes. To state this in other terms, whatever the entire complex
set of properties of information, one of them is that it reflects the
underlying duality of a universe constituted by physical matter-energy.

4. As a further example of the importance of ontological priority, one that is
consistent with 'informational thinking', I mention the theory of Michael
Graziano, Consciousness and the Social Brain, Oxford, 2013*. According to this,
consciousness does not result in attention but is a consequence of the
reflexive processing of information obtained through attention. The 'hard
problem' of an isolated, subjective experience falls out. This is consistent
with the principles of my logic which I will not repeat here.

Comments welcome,

Joseph

*Reviewed in SCIENCE, 345:6193, p. 147, 11 July 2014
- Original Message -
From: Burgin, Mark
To: Joseph Brenner
Sent: Friday, August 01, 2014 9:19 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Krassimir's Information Quadruple and GIT. Quintuples?

Dear Joseph and Colleagues,
An answer to the perhaps badly posed question of whether information or
energy is more fundamental is given in the book M.Burgin, Theory of
information. The answer is a little bit unexpected:
Energy is a kind of information and information is a kind of energy.
It's a pity that very few researchers read books with advanced theories based
on sophisticated mathematics.

Sincerely,
Mark Burgin

On 7/31/2014 2:40 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

Dear Krassimir and Colleagues,

I have followed this discussion with interest but not total agreement. As I
have commented to Krassimir previously, I feel that his system, based on
symbols as outlined in his paper, is too static to capture the dynamics of
complex information processes and their value (valence). It suffers from the
same problems as that of Peirce and of set-theoretic approaches, namely, a
certain arbitrariness in the selection and number of independent elements and
their grounding in nature (or rather absence of grounding).

If you will permit a naïve but well-intentioned question, why not have a
theory whose elements are quintuples? Would this not be a 'better', more
complete theory? This opens the possibility of an infinite regress, but that is
the point I am trying to make: the form of the theory is, to a certain extent,
defining its content.

The /development/ of any GIT should, from the beginning I think, recognize
the existence in real time, so to speak, of any new suggestions in the context
of other recent contributions of a different form, such as those of Luhn,
Hofkirchner, Marijuan, Deacon, Dodig-Crnkovic, Wu and so on. Several of these
already permit a more directed discussion of the perhaps badly posed question
of whether information or energy is more fundamental. Otherwise, all that work
will need to be done at the end. In any case, the GIT itself, to the extent
that it could be desirable and useful, would also have to have some dynamics
capable of accepting theories of different forms. 20th Century physics sought
only identities throughout nature and the balance is now being somewhat
restored. I think keeping the diversity of theories of information in mind is
the most worthwhile strategy.

One of the values of Krassimir's approach is that it recognizes the
existence of some of these more complex questions that need to be answered. I
simply suggest that process language and a recognition of dynamic interactions
(e.g., between 'internal' and 'external') could be part of the strategy.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Krassimir Markov
To: Jerry LR Chandler ; FIS ; Pridi Siregar
Sent: Saturday, July 26, 2014 10:42 AM
Subject: [Fis] Information quadruple

Dear Jerry, Pridi, and Colleagues,

Thank you```

### [Fis] Krassimir's Information Quadruple and GIT. Quintuples?

```Dear Krassimir and Colleagues,

I have followed this discussion with interest but not total agreement. As I
have commented to Krassimir previously, I feel that his system, based on
symbols as outlined in his paper, is too static to capture the dynamics of
complex information processes and their value (valence). It suffers from the
same problems as that of Peirce and of set-theoretic approaches, namely, a
certain arbitrariness in the selection and number of independent elements and
their grounding in nature (or rather absence of grounding).

If you will permit a naïve but well-intentioned question, why not have a theory
whose elements are quintuples? Would this not be a 'better', more complete
theory? This opens the possibility of an infinite regress, but that is the
point I am trying to make: the form of the theory is, to a certain extent,
defining its content.

The /development/ of any GIT should, from the beginning I think, recognize the
existence in real time, so to speak, of any new suggestions in the context of
other recent contributions of a different form, such as those of Luhn,
Hofkirchner, Marijuan, Deacon, Dodig-Crnkovic, Wu and so on. Several of these
already permit a more directed discussion of the perhaps badly posed question
of whether information or energy is more fundamental. Otherwise, all that work
will need to be done at the end. In any case, the GIT itself, to the extent
that it could be desirable and useful, would also have to have some dynamics
capable of accepting theories of different forms. 20th Century physics sought
only identities throughout nature and the balance is now being somewhat
restored. I think keeping the diversity of theories of information in mind is
the most worthwhile strategy.

One of the values of Krassimir's approach is that it recognizes the existence
of some of these more complex questions that need to be answered. I simply
suggest that process language and a recognition of dynamic interactions (e.g.,
between 'internal' and 'external') could be part of the strategy.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Krassimir Markov
To: Jerry LR Chandler ; FIS ; Pridi Siregar
Sent: Saturday, July 26, 2014 10:42 AM
Subject: [Fis] Information quadruple

Dear Jerry, Pridi, and Colleagues,

Thank you for the nice comments!

To answer to questions I have to present next step from the GIT (General
Information Theory) we are developing.

Let remember in words (below “Infos” is abbreviation from “Information
Subject”, it is an intelligent natural or artificial agent (system)):

Information is quadruple (Source, Recipient, Evidence, Infos) or formally i =
(s, r, e, I)

The nest step is to define elements of the quadruple:

s and r are structured sets;
e is a mapping from s in r which preserves (all or partial) structure of s
and resolves any information expectation of I

I expect new questions:
- what is an “intelligent agent”
- what is “information expectation”
- ...

If it is interesting, answers to these questions may be given in further
letters.

***

Now I want to make some comments to letters received (their full texts are
given below my answers).

Pridi: “information cannot be viewed in any absolute sense but as internal
representations of external patterns”
Kr.:  Yes, the “reflection” is a property of Matter, “information” is a
reflection for which the information quadruple exists. But information is not
“internal representations of external patterns ”. It is result from resolving
the subjective information expectation which is process of comparing of
internal and external patterns. I know, this will cause new questions

Pridi: In this framework then, it seems that information cannot be
conceptualized without reference to the both something out there and the
internal structures of the receptor/cognitive system.
Kr.: Yes.

Pridi: How can we really quantify meaningful (semantic) information ... ?
Kr.: By distance between external patterns and “information expectation”
(sorry to be not clear but it is long text for further letters).

Pridi: All objective measures (entropy, negentropy,...) are actually
totally dependant of I1 and I2 and can never be considered as absolute.
Kr.: Yes, but the world humanity is an Infos and its information expectations
we assume as absolute.

Pridi: ... some researchers that posit that information may be more
fundamental than the fundamental physical (mass, time, space, amps).
Kr.: Yes, there are other paradigms which are useful in some cases, but in
our paradigm “information” is not fundamental but “reflection” is the
fundamental.

Pridi: ... no absolute truth (whatever this means) is really gained. Only
a richer more complete (subjective but coherent) world-view .
Kr.: Yes.

Jerry: ... assertion of a quadruple of symbols is rather close to the
philosophy of C S Peirce (hereafter CSP)
Kr.: Our ```

### [Fis] Fw: call for vienna 14

```
Dear Shu-Kun, Dear Pedro,

Please count me in for any assistance I can give - I live only a short
train ride away from Basel. As for participation, it would be very
helpful to know already the windows in September you are considering.
My personal preference would be as early in September as possible.
Thank you.

Joseph

- Original Message - From: Pedro C. Marijuan
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es

To: Dr. Shu-Kun Lin l...@mdpi.com; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, July 30, 2014 10:12 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] call for vienna 14

Thanks, Shu-Kun, having a FIS symposium in that Sustainability Forum in
Basel is a very good idea. It enriches our meeting possibilities for
next year... Perhaps some parties from the list would be interested in
presenting or in cooperating with the organization.

best wishes--Pedro

Dr. Shu-Kun Lin wrote:

Sustainable information society is a very interesting topic. MDPI will
organize a sustainability conference in Basel. FIS may have a symposium
on sustainable information society in Basel, to be held in September
2015 as part of our conference  World Sustainability Forum. We already
ran several times online since 2011:
1st World Sustainability Forum http://sciforum.net/conference/wsf/
2nd World Sustainability Forum http://sciforum.net/conference/wsf2/
3rd World Sustainability Forum http://sciforum.net/conference/wsf3/
4th World Sustainability Forum http://sciforum.net/conference/wsf-4/
Now we will run a realy physical conferences in Basel with several
thematic symposium.

On 24.07.2014 11:47, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

Dear Wolfgang,

Regarding the call for Vienna 2014, I think that the present text
forms a consistent unity, and that a slight rewording on the focus
paragraph may be enough:

Thus the focus needs to be twofold:

– on the impact of the sciences of information: how can we improve
the design and implementation of applications such that they allow
for more social autonomous usages and for the advancement of a viable
and sustainable information society?

– on the foundations of the sciences of information: how can we
improve the concepts we use for the study of information, at all
levels (from the physical and computational to the biological and
social), such that we open new vistas on the analysis of contemporary
problems?

best wishes

--Pedro

.

--
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 ( 6818)
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

```

### Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation

```
Dear John,

Thank you for this interesting perspective. Regarding the origin of the
limited band width of physical processes, could this have its origin in
some regularity other than circularity? For example, the continuous going
back and forth (the phrase is Botero's) between opposing attitudes or
states, alternately predominantly actual and potential?

All natural processes, then, have a capacity for continuous information
bearing. The problem is then the origin of /discreteness/, not only in your
countercase, which involves quantum particles, but at higher levels of
interactions between complex entities! For me, the only solution is that
continuity and discontinuity are properties of information which are
not totally separate from one another.

Perhaps Sri, there may be here the physical basis for the interplay
between analogue and digital that you see in Bialek's book, of which I have
only read the (free) introduction?

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za

To: fis@listas.unizar.es; Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 7:19 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation

Dear fis members,

I don't think that granularity per se is a
necessary basis for the application of
information theory to analog channels. In some
cases it might be, and I agree that studying the
relations between analog (continuous) and digital
(discrete) processes is likely to be both
interesting and productive. However the bandwidth
of an analog channel typically can be defined
even if there is no discreteness, for example if
the information bearing process consists of waves
so that the information bearing capacity is
limited by the wavelength. Virtually all physical
processes are cyclical in some way and thus have
a limited bandwidth. A countercase would be a
collision between particles that carries momentum
from one to another. I can't think offhand right
now (I just woke up), but I suspect that even in
such cases there is a finite amount of
information transferred. In any case, Shannon
discussed the bandwidth of continuous process channels. It is worth looking
at.

John

At 10:28 PM 2014-07-14, Srinandan Dasmahapatra wrote:

I think I agree with Joseph Brenner here.  Analogue computing is linked to
real processes, while living beings find ways of transducing information
out of dynamical states. The graininess that information theories rely on
to define measures may be directly linked to  physical limits in the
information carriers (such as photons) or they might be limitations of the
processing organism, extracting the sufficient difference that makes a
difference. And yes, there's often a too hasty rush to view analogue
computing through pixellated perspectives.

I'm not sure if this is well known to members of this list, but Bill
Bialek's biophysics text is a profound reflection of the interplay between
the analogue and the digital, with selection pressure forcing the
sufficiency of the grainy difference that makes a difference towards a
necessity for organisms, and hence pushing sensory systems close to the
physical limits of information transfer.
Cheers,
Sri

Original message
From: Joseph Brenner
Date:14/07/2014 18:12 (GMT+00:00)
To: Pridi Siregar ,Pedro C. Marijuan
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation

Dear Colleagues,

My first reaction to this suggested project is that the logic and
philosophy
of information (where I am more comfortable) would have little to
contribute. However, analogue computation is an area in which insights from
some complex theories of information might be useful. Analogue computation
has always appeared to me, perhaps incorrectly, as being closer to real
processes and therefore in principle better able to model their fuzzy,
qualitative aspects. But in some of the articles I've seen, the authors
seem
almost apologetic at not being able to claim the 'power' of the digital
computer . . .

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Pridi Siregar pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com
To: Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Monday, July 14, 2014 4:35 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna

Thanks for the news Pedro. Sounds really exciting! As you might recall
I'm
interested in applications and I would be very keen on having a
brainstorming session that would include pure researchers and
application-oriented guys like me to explore technology transfer
opportunities. I don't know if this could be part of some (possible)
future agenda but I'm sure that business people may find it more than
worthwile to attend such meetings! I'm sure Plamen would be interested
too.

best!

Pridi

- Mail original -
De: Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
À: fis@listas.unizar.es
Envoyé: Vendredi 11 Juillet 2014 14:41:42
Objet: [Fis] FIS in Varna

Dear FISers,

The fis summer conference in Varna```

### Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation

```
Dear Colleagues,

My first reaction to this suggested project is that the logic and philosophy
of information (where I am more comfortable) would have little to
contribute. However, analogue computation is an area in which insights from
some complex theories of information might be useful. Analogue computation
has always appeared to me, perhaps incorrectly, as being closer to real
processes and therefore in principle better able to model their fuzzy,
qualitative aspects. But in some of the articles I've seen, the authors seem
almost apologetic at not being able to claim the 'power' of the digital
computer . . .

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Pridi Siregar pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com

To: Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Monday, July 14, 2014 4:35 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna

Thanks for the news Pedro. Sounds really exciting! As you might recall I'm
interested in applications and I would be very keen on having a
brainstorming session that would include pure researchers and
application-oriented guys like me to explore technology transfer
opportunities. I don't know if this could be part of some (possible)
future agenda but I'm sure that business people may find it more than
worthwile to attend such meetings! I'm sure Plamen would be interested
too.

best!

Pridi

- Mail original -
De: Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
À: fis@listas.unizar.es
Envoyé: Vendredi 11 Juillet 2014 14:41:42
Objet: [Fis] FIS in Varna

Dear FISers,

The fis summer conference in Varna just took place 5-6 July --our 20
years of activities were celebrated too, FIS 20th. Rather unfortunately
not many people attended: half dozen from Spain related to Juan
Castellanos and me (from Madrid and Zaragoza); and a few parties around
Krassimir from Bulgaria and Ukraine. But we had a great time
(discussions and exchanges, banquets, beach) and the place is really
beautifull  prices quite affordable. The idea, quite possible to
realize,  is that every year that we do not have a plenary fis or isis
conference, we arrange a small summer school in Varna.

Among the exchanges this year, the retinue of basic concepts around
information generated the most intense debate--is there any concept
prior to information? Joseph's contribution was also discussed by
Krassimir addressed to the Russian colleagues (in Russian). Computer
related ontologies, new schemes to handle Big Data, and brain
exploration through AI and EEG  by a very advanced Egyptian team were
quite exciting discussion topics too. For the future, we think that
spinoff companies could be enticed to participate, developing new
products and taking profit from some of those initiatives. In any case,
the interaction with brilliant ITHEA colleagues from Bulgaria, Russia,
Ukraine,  Armenia, Belarus, Egypt... is a valuable experience itself.

And that's all!

best wishes---Pedro

--
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 ( 6818)
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
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```

### Re: [Fis] Information Science and the City. Trans-in-form-action

```Dear Francesco and All,

Here is a rough version of Francesco's comment. I think it deserves further
critical comments, for example, on the way it relates information and cultural
value and the co-generation of entropy and negentropy, usually implicit but not
spelled out.

Thanks for your words. In the early eighties I introduced the concept of
information-process (the action of giving or taking form in time). In The
Economics of Cultural Heritage (1983), which became Economics of an
“architectural-environmental heritage, in 1989 (Franco Angeli, Milan ), in
which, inter alia, I define a negentropic cultural value. I also applied to the
city, during a course on urban and regional economics at the Faculty of
Architecture of Palermo, in 1984-85, the compound word trans-form-in-action
(action of giving or taking form over time that can /not/ not trans-form) to
the city, But what matters most is to have conceived the activity of economic
production (in general) as a process of trans-information whose input
(matter, energy and information) and output (matter, energy and information)
are both negentropy and entropy. So my theory of value (which applies not only
to the economy in the strict sense) can be defined in simple-combination of
creative energy and information and, in a more complex triangle of the three
surpluses of negentropy: thermodynamic or natural, eco-biological and
cultural-historical. So, the marginal utility theory of value of neoclassical
economists is outdated and (should be) thrown to the winds. In fact, the new
economy is a psycho-physical, semiotic-hermeneutic and biological technology
sub-episteme. In summary, I really think a new science of economics or
economics of science has been invented. For Pedro’s re-discussion of
information encouraged me to send the above message (without wishing to take
any undue credit for myself).

Best,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Francesco Rizzo
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: Pedro C. Marijuan ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Friday, June 06, 2014 12:37 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information Science and the City. Trans-in-form-action

Caro Joseph,
grazie per le Tue parole. All'inizio degli anni Ottanta ho introdotto il
concetto-processo di informazione (azione del dare o prendere forma nel tempo)
In Economia dei beni culturali(1983), divenuto Economia del patrimonio
architettonico-ambientale nel 1989 (FrancoAngeli, Milano), in cui fra l'altro
definisco i beni culturali neg-entropici. Inoltre ho impiegato la parola
composta tras-in-form-azione (azione del dare o prendere forma nel tempo che
non può non tras-formarsi) alla città durante lo svolgimento del corso di
economia urbana e regionale nella Facoltà di Architettura di Palermo, nell'A.a.
1984-85. Ma quel che conta di più è l'avere concepito l'attività di produzione
economica (in senso generale) come un processo di tras-informazione i cui
input (materia, energia e informazione) e output (materia, energia e
informazione) sono neg-entropia ed entropia. Quindi la mia teoria del valore
(che non vale solo per l'economia in senso stretto) può definirsi- in modo
semplice- combinazione creativa di energia e informazione e, in modo più
complesso, triangolo dei tre surplus o neg-entropie: termodinamici o naturali,
eco-biologici e storico-culturali. Sicché la teoria del valore-utilità
marginale degli economisti neoclassici è sorpassata e da buttare alle ortiche.
Difatti la Nuova economia è in-centrata sull'episteme
psico-fisica,semiotico-ermeneutica e biologico-tecnologica. Insomma, penso
davvero  di avere inventato una nuova scienza dell'economia o  economia della
scienza. Per questo appena Pedro ha ri-parlato di informazione  sono stato
stimolato a mandare il messaggio precedente.
Ribadisco, però, che non intendo menare alcun vanto.
Cordiali saluti.
Francesco Rizzo.

2014-06-06 9:49 GMT+02:00 Joseph Brenner joe.bren...@bluewin.ch:

Dear Francesco,

Thank you for a most interesting overview of your work. What I would be
most interested in would be a summary of the real processes underlying
trans-in-form-action and its relation to information - and
trans-information. The use of the prefix 'trans-' in transdisciplinarity is
intended (by Nicolescu) to refer to something that lies within, between and
beyond specific disciplines. Another non-trivial use of 'trans-' was made by
Pedro.

(Some 14 years ago, I defined 'trans-creation' as the creation of artistic
documents or objects with some social relevance, that is, to the common good.
It is important to understand, in this connection, how information carries such
relevance.)

If you prefer to answer in Italian rather than English, unless there is
someone else in the group with Italian-language skills, I would undertake to
make a rough translation (or edit a machine-translation).

Best regards,

Joseph

(Joseph E. Brenner, Ph.D.)
VP-Inter```

### Re: [Fis] Information Science and the City. Trans-in-form-action

```Dear Francesco,

Thank you for a most interesting overview of your work. What I would be most
interested in would be a summary of the real processes underlying
trans-in-form-action and its relation to information - and
trans-information. The use of the prefix 'trans-' in transdisciplinarity is
intended (by Nicolescu) to refer to something that lies within, between and
beyond specific disciplines. Another non-trivial use of 'trans-' was made by
Pedro.

(Some 14 years ago, I defined 'trans-creation' as the creation of artistic
documents or objects with some social relevance, that is, to the common good.
It is important to understand, in this connection, how information carries such
relevance.)

If you prefer to answer in Italian rather than English, unless there is someone
else in the group with Italian-language skills, I would undertake to make a
rough translation (or edit a machine-translation).

Best regards,

Joseph

(Joseph E. Brenner, Ph.D.)
VP-Inter-and Transdisciplinarity, International Society for Information Science)
- Original Message -
From: Francesco Rizzo
To: Pedro C. Marijuan
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Thursday, June 05, 2014 4:31 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information Science and the City

Caro Pedro e cari tutti,
mi permetto di segnalarVi che la mia Nuova economia è basata sul  processo
di tras-in-form-azione. Si cfr. a tal proposito, fra i tanti altri:
-Rizzo F., Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia o l'economia
della scienza, FancoAngeli, Milano 1999;
-Rizzo F., Nuova economia. Felicità del lavoro creativo e della
conservazione della natura. Infelicità della speculazione finanziaria, Aracne
editrice, Roma, 2013;
-Rizzo F., Incontro d'amore tra il cuore della fede e l'intelligenza della
scienza. Un salto nel cielo, Aracne editrice, Roma 2014.
Ho dedicato mezzo secolo di ricerca per ri-comprendere e ri-significare la
scienza economica. Quello che scrivo non  è una presunzione.
Auguri per un'intensa ripresa e grazie.
Francesco Rizzo.

2014-06-05 14:25 GMT+02:00 Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es:

Dear FISers,

Among the many interesting themes where the information science perspective
may provide useful orientations, cities are one of the most singular. A recent
work by Michel Batty on the New Science of Cities (2013, MIT) makes a lot of
connections with our oft discussed info topics. A Communication Theory of Urban
Growth was developed by Richard Meier (1962); a fluxes perspective was already
attempted by Patrick Geddes (1949). In essence I have found that the idea of
information flows and material flows as catching and intertwining each other,
with their highly different regimes, heterogeneity and energy contents, appears
as an important focus in order to better understand the globalized city.
Scaling is one of the essential concepts...

I am not aware that scaling has been applied to the informational analysis
itself (obviously it is the cornerstone of self-similarity). What I mean is
that a micro-level of communication analysis may be quite different from the
meso-level, and the from macro-level. Thinking in the human case (biologically
it could make sense too) the micro level is dominated by syntaxis, by a
Shannonian type of analysis on messages emitted from a sourced to a receiver.
The meso level contains meaning, value (fitness), purpose, and in general it
implies the communication associated to the behavioral episodes and living
rhythms of individuals. While in the macro level, many individuals' actions,
works, products, etc. are aggregated into fluxes or flows, basically of two
kinds those devoted to the material (self-production) and those carrying the
info stuff devoted to communication; then it invites analysis of network
science, operations research, economic efficiency, etc., and of course the
direct flow perspective as Bejan and Peder (2011) have attempted in one of the
most interesting theories on self-constructing flow systems. Depending on the
information perspective in which we observe human communication, we will need
one or another lens to better make sense of what is happening.

My impression is that a more mature info science could be quite helpful in
this new field of urban development science --most people nowadays are living
in cities. Top down planning will fail if it is does not match with the bottom
up processes, both in communication and self-production aspects. Keeping an
adequate social flow of information, a well-mixed regime of communication, is
the essence of democracy. The contemporary epidemics of loneliness for
instance may be due among other social and demographic causes to failures in
bureaucratic high level planning...

best ---Pedro

PS. After the nasty computer crash months ago, we should try to enliven the
list--shouldn't we?

--
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
```

### [Fis] Fw: [Feedforward II and Anticipation] Joseph Brenner

```Dear Loet,

I am still hoping that there will be more comments on both my original note
and your significant emendation of it, for which many thanks. Here is my
response to you now. I have, more than before, the feeling that you have
agreed that LIR can add something to the sufficiency of the overall
picture.
Three things might make this even clearer:

1. You wrote:
From this perspective, the reality in Logic in Reality (LIR) is res
cogitans:  an inter-human construct about which we remain uncertain.

JEB: But LIR applies also INTRA-human constructs, that is how human agents
change one another, including their expectations. Thus,

2.   The codes in the reflexive communications can be considered as the
(hypothesized!) eigenvectors of the networks of relations among
expectations (carried
by human minds).

JEB: Same comment as above. The logical values of actuality and
potentiality
of real process elements, which include communications, have the dimensions
of vectors.

3.   However, this reality has the epistemological status of a hypothesis,
whereas you seem to reify it and identify it with nature (energy?) as a
given. From my
perspective, this presumes a reduction of the complexity using the
communicative codes of
physics and biology. There is nothing against this coding, but it can be
considered as one among an alphabet of possible ones.

JEB: This is an interesting expression of our different points of view. You
see my approach as reducing complexity and reifying 'this reality' and I
think it is your approach that reduces and reifies it!! Perhaps we are both
right!!
Logic in Reality does not deal with a /certain/ complexity, which can be
associated with complicated epistemological entities or states. Your theory
seems to me to abstract away qualitative, energetic highly complex
relational/cognitive states that are outside the hypothesis.

The specific reduction to the perspective of a sociology of
expectations
enables us to study the dynamics among differently coded expectations in
other domains.

JEB: If one includes, in the zoo of expectations, their dynamics in
energetic terms, one does not have to see the 'zoology' of expectations as
a
reduction. It is already and remains open since the dynamics is not only
between the coded expectations or other cognitive features but their
critical, non-coded dynamic properties. Application to all domains in which
there are significant dynamic interactions follows naturally. The dynamics
of LIR, however, is not a standard non-linear dynamics but rather an
extension of the concept of recursion as you and Dubois use it.

As I have remarked previously, but rephrasing it now the interpretation of
reality as involving a process of coding is something that I see necessary
for epistemology but not necessary for ontology. The entire Peircean
structure can be seen as a 'coding', and this makes it attractive to many
people because it seems manageable, but I much prefer yours.

I look forward very much to your comments on the above.

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Cc: 'Joseph Brenner' joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2014 11:53 AM
Subject: RE: [Fis] [Feedforward II and Anticipation] Joseph Brenner

Dear Joseph and colleagues,

I owe you a reply on the last mail in which you counter-positioned our two
approaches. I agree with some of what you say; for example, replacing the
concept of circularity by saw-tooth or spiral evolution. In my opinion,
the
two arrows have to be specified instead of being attributed to all living
and cognitive systems (as you state a few sentences later). What is
evolving?

My interest is in the evolution of expectations. Expectations can be
entertained by discourses (or other inter-human communication systems) and
be reflected (and reconstructed) specifically by human agency. Different
from other species, the expectations can be codified and therefore operate
at the supra-individual level. For example, many of your statements can be
considered as the specification of theoretically informed expectations.
From
this perspective, the reality in Logic in Reality (LIR) is res
cogitans:
an inter-human construct about which we remain uncertain. The uncertainty
co-evolves with the codification because of enabling us to process more
complexity.

More specifically, you formulate as follows:
I found I could differentiate between his and my perspective as follows:

- Dubois: anticipation is the potential future value of a system's
variables
- LIR: anticipation is the current potential value of a system's
variables

Dubois (1998) distinguishes between incursion and hyper-incursion. In the
case of incursion, the anticipation is based on the current value of a
system's variable, and in the case of hyper-incursion on the future value
(x[t+1]). Additionally```

### [Fis] Varna Conference. Principle for Papers

```Dear Friends and Colleagues,

Congratulations to Pedro and Krassimir on your design for a great meeting!

I just take this occasion to mention again an idea of mine, which I think is
important, of encouraging speakers to write critically, even primarily, about
the work of other active members of the group. I believe that it is important
for all participants to have their work constructively criticized, and I really
hope that a couple of people might pick up the idea, with which Pedro and
Krassimir agree. It really forces one to look carefully at someone else's
ideas, not only one's own.

Applying this to myself, for example, I would write a short paper about
Krassimir's work. My paper might be critical, but of course Krassimir will have
the chance of reading it, correcting it and deciding if he wants it to be
presented or not.

There should be no 'competition' here. If more than one person decides to talk
about the same colleague, that too could permit a new and useful comparison.
Comments welcome.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2014 5:27 PM
Subject: [Fis] FIS 20, Summer in Varna

Dear FISers,

this is a reminder about the FIS Summer Conference in Varna to celebrate the
20 years of this initiative. Below I include the basic technical information of
the meeting. An important point: the period for early inscription and important
discount in hotel prices will end the next 28 February. The meeting  will start
on 3th July with a celebratory Gala Dinner --and toasts!-- followed by two work
days in July 4-5. Given that we will hold the meeting conjointly with GIT
sessions (General Information Theory), the FIS conference might be extended to
the 6th July, depending on the number of inscriptions. Apart from the
individual presentations, some general discussions are planned:
definition/undefinition of information, consensus notion on information,
strategies for the renewal and extension of information science, the next 20
years... All parties from the germane organizations (IS4IS, ITHEA, Symmetry
Institute, Chinese Sections...) are cordially invited to share a nice time in
Varna.

Best regards,
--Pedro

--

ITHEA International Scientific Society-- ITA 2014

GIT  FIS 2014
XX-th anniversary of FIS initiative
XII-th International Conference
General Information Theory

DEADLINES for ITA 2014
- February 28, 2014: booking of hotel, submission of registration forms and
visa application forms by e-mail: i...@foibg.com and off...@hit-tourism.com
- March 31, 2014: submission of final paper by the ITHEA ISS Submission Web
System: http://ita.ithea.org
- April 15, 2014: notification of the paper acceptance by the ITHEA ISS
Submission Web System

SUBMISSION
The camera-ready copy of the manuscript should be received by the ITHEA
Journal Submission System ( http://ij.ithea.org ) or respectively by the ITHEA
Conference Submission System ( http://ita.ithea.org ); e-mail for questions:
i...@foibg.com.

Please observe the folling rules and deadlines!

MANUSCRIPTS
Manuscripts need to be formatted in DOC or TeX formats according the sample
sheets given at:
- DOC template:
http://www.foibg.com/conf/ithea_manuscripts_rules-2014_doc_template.doc
- TeX template:
http://www.foibg.com/conf/ithea_manuscripts_rules-2014_tex_template.tex

Accepted manuscripts will be published by ITHEA as follow:
- regular papers in English or Russian from 4 up to 12 pages and long papers
or surveys in English from 12 up to 20 pages will be published  in the
International Journal Information Theories and Application ®(IJ ITA),
International Journal Information Technologies and Knowledge®(IJ ITK), and
International Journal “Information Models and Analyses” ®(IJ IMA).

CONFERENCE FEES

Membership of ITHEA ISS is free and may be done by registration at the
www.ithea.org
Submit registration cards and visa forms to: Krassimir Markov, e-mail:
i...@foibg.com

Registration Fee is EURO 250 or 500 Leva per paper.
Registration fee for members of ITHEA ISS: EUR 150 or 300 Leva.
Registration fee includes publication fee and participation fee for one
person.

Publication Fee is EURO 125 or 250 Leva per paper.
Publication fee for members of ITHEA ISS: EURO 75 or 150 Leva per paper.
Publication fee includes only one exemplar of the issue in which the paper
has been published.

Participation Fee is EURO 125 or 250 Leva per presentation.
Participation Fee for members of ITHEA ISS: EURO 75 or 150 Leva per paper.
Participation fee includes participation for one person and permits
presentation of one paper without publishing.

Accompanying Persons’ Fee is EURO 50

-- ```

### [Fis] Probability Amplitudes in Macroscopic Processes

```Dear Lars-Göran, Andrei and Hans,

As you (I hope) have seen, I am trying to see how the evolution of macroscopic
processes can be described in terms of changing probabilities, and I am
encouraged to believe this is possible. If you allow the extension from QM, all
of the following would seem to allow this
(I am not concerned about whether QM itself becomes more or less complex):

1. Andrei confirms that the probability (in LIR, degree of potentiality or
actuality) of a phenomenon can have a direction.
2. Lars-Göran says that probability amplitudes can represent real physical
features.
3. Even though /a contrario/, Hans wrote:

In order to make contact with real, measurable quantities, it (the probability
amplitude) must be multiplied by its complex conjugate. This recipe is called
the Born rule, and it is an ad hoc addition to the quantum theory. It lacks any
motivation except that it works.

In my Logic in Reality, since there is a reciprocal relation between actuality
and potentiality, each should be the complex conjugate of the other. I have no
problem in the two summing to 1 if the values of 0 or 1 are excluded for either
of them. This non-quantum aspect of reality could provide the missing
motivation for the recipe in quantum theory ;-)

I am certainly looking for a measurable (or estimatable) quantity of the
actuality and potentiality of interactive processes that is not a standard
probability of outcomes, but of changing macroscopic states. This is of course
an 'underdeveloped' concept, but I am encouraged to believe that this idea of
another set of very special probabilities is neither totally wrong nor
totally trivial.

Many thanks,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Lars-Göran Johansson
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 12:45 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Probability Amplitudes

Dear Andrei, Hans and all
I agree with Andrei. And why make quantum theory more complex than it is? One
may use all  kinds of mathematical tools in a scientific theory, and the more
these tools simplify calculations the better. I see no reason to avoid using
amplitudes or  matrices in quantum theory. Using a mathematical concept for
making calculations doesn't entail that I accept that that concept represent a
physical property.

To Hans: Where exactly did Einstein wrote that one should avoid unmeasurable
concepts in the description of Nature? I can't remember having read that.

The issue is how we should interpret quantum theory, in particular the wave
function, i.e., probability amplitudes; are they just mathematical tools, or do
they describe real physical features of quantum systems? I believe the latter
alternative is true and so did Schrödinger. But there are formidable
difficulties to give a realistic interpretation of wave functions, and
Schrödinger didn't succeed. But I think the difficulties can be overcome and I
have published my views about these things (Lars-Göran Johansson: Interpreting
Quantum Mechanics. A realist view in Schrödinger's vein, Ashgate, Aldershot
2007).
Lars-Göran

22 jan 2014 kl. 10:59 skrev Andrei Khrennikov andrei.khrenni...@lnu.se:

Dear Hans,

I would like just to point that 99,99% of people working
in quantum theory would say that the complex amplitude of
quantum probability is the main its intrinsic property, so
if you try to exclude amplitudes from the model
you can in principle do this and this is well known
long ago in so called quantum tomographic approach of Vladimir
Manko, but in this way quantum theory loses its simplicity and
clarity, yours, andrei

Andrei Khrennikov, Professor of Applied Mathematics,
International Center for Mathematical Modeling
in Physics, Engineering, Economics, and Cognitive Science
Linnaeus University, Växjö-Kalmar, Sweden

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] on behalf
of Hans von Baeyer [henrikrit...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 12:21 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Probability Amplitudes

Dear Dino and friends, thanks for bringing up the issue of probability
amplitudes.  Since they are technical tools of physics, and since I didn't want
to go too far afield, I did not mention them in my lecture.  The closest I came
was the wavefunction, which, indeed, is a probability amplitude.  In order to
make contact with real, measurable quantities, it must be multiplied by its
complex conjugate. This recipe is called the Born rule, and it is an ad hoc
addition to the quantum theory. It lacks any motivation except that it works.

In keeping with Einstein's advice (which he himself often flouted) to try to
keep unmeasurable concepts out of our description of nature, physicists have
realized long ago that it must be possible to recast quantum mechanics entirely
in terms of probabilities, not even mentioning probability amplitudes or
```

### Re: [Fis] Probability Amplitudes

```Dear Hans and Dino,

This is a direct question to both of you, to which I have not found a clear
answer: are value and amplitude the only parameters that have been assigned to
probability?

In my theory, the changing value of actuality and potentiality of specific
antagonistic process elements are probability-like in not including 0 and 1, as
I have said. Can, in addition, probabilities have some vector-like properties,
that is, include a /direction/?

This concept would be moving toward (and past) Dino and away from Hans . . .

Your comments and those of others would be welcome.

Best wishes,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Dino Buzzetti
To: Hans von Baeyer ; fis
Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2014 3:53 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Probability Amplitudes

Dear Hans,

Thank you for your explanation about probability amplitudes,

that clarifies a lot.  My only worry was about the *epistemological*

implications of quantum mechanics in its standard formulation,

that in my opinion point to a paradigm shift, which is felt not only
in this domain, but in all fields where *emergent* phenomena are
accounted for—a process that I thought was hinted to by Wheeler's
famous words It from Bit, that I remember reading for the first
time precisely in your book on information.  That's the ground for
expressing my worry that reverting to classical probability theory
might entail a drawback to this decisive epistemological turn.

But I might misunderstand the whole story, that is certainly not
over yet  :-)  -dino

On 22 January 2014 00:21, Hans von Baeyer henrikrit...@gmail.com wrote:

Dear Dino and friends, thanks for bringing up the issue of probability
amplitudes.  Since they are technical tools of physics, and since I didn't want
to go too far afield, I did not mention them in my lecture.  The closest I came
was the wavefunction, which, indeed, is a probability amplitude.  In order to
make contact with real, measurable quantities, it must be multiplied by its
complex conjugate. This recipe is called the Born rule, and it is an ad hoc
addition to the quantum theory. It lacks any motivation except that it works.

In keeping with Einstein's advice (which he himself often flouted) to try
to keep unmeasurable concepts out of our description of nature, physicists have
realized long ago that it must be possible to recast quantum mechanics entirely
in terms of probabilities, not even mentioning probability amplitudes or
wavefunctions. The question is only: How complicated would the resulting
formalism be?  (To make a weak analogy, it must be possible to recast
arithmetic in the language of Roman numerals, but the result would surely look
much messier than what we learn in grade school.)  Hitherto, nobody had come up
with an elegant solution to this problem.

To their happy surprise, QBists have made  progress toward a quantum
theory without probability amplitudes.  Of course they have to pay a price.
Instead of unmeasurable concepts they introduce, for any experiment, a very
special set of standard probabilities (NOT AMPLITUDES) which are measurable,
but not actually measured.  When they re-write the Born rule in terms of these,
they find that it looks almost, but not quite, like a fundamental axiom of
probability theory called Unitarity.  Unitarity decrees that for any experiment
the sum of the probabilities for all possible outcomes must be one. (For a
coin, the probabilities of heads and tails are both 1/2.  Unitarity states 1/2
+ 1/2 = 1.)

This unexpected outcome of QBism suggests a deep connection between the
Born rule and Unitarity. Since Unitarity is a logical concept unrelated to
quantum phenomena, this gives QBists the hope that they will eventually succeed
in explaining the significacne of the Born rule, and banishing probability
amplitudes from quantum mechanics, leaving only (Bayesian) probabilities.

So, I'm afraid dear Dino, that the current attitude of QBists is that
probability amplitudes are LESS fundamental than probabilities, not MORE.  But
the story is far from finished!

Hans

___
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

--

___
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
___
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

```

### [Fis] Fw: Isms Healing the Subject-Object split

```Dear All,

I think I have discovered what it was that was bothering me about QBism: it was
only the particular 'detour' through atomic physics that Hans made, that is,
one that requires Bayesian probability to describe its terms (see New Year
Lecture). Here are two key tenets of QBism, however, with which I completely
agree: 1) personal experience is put front and center in any description of the
world, we now see, solving the problem of the apparent simultaneity of the
perception of the Now by two individuals. 2) it goes a long way toward healing
the subject/object split, which has been effective for physical science, but
has also impeded progress toward a more inclusive, holistic understanding of
the world.

I think it is wonderful that Hans von Baeyer puts these forth as desirable and
necessary objectives for scientists. This is indeed a long way. In my view, we
can look at the physics itself again and make further progress towards a
holistic understanding of the world. This is what Logic in Reality tries to do,
and the tools are a non-standard, non-Bayesian probability that excludes the
classical limits of 0 and 1; 2) a generalization of the dualities of physics to
higher levels of reality;  3) the removal of other classical 'splits' that have
been just as toxic for progress: between time and space, simultaneity and
succession, cause and effect, energy and information; and 4) the introduction
of a third term that is emergent from the original two. We thus have, for
example, subject, object and subject-object. The latter is not static, but can
behave as a new subject or object in this evolutionary picture.

Unlike all other logics, Logic in Reality is not topic-neutral, but defines
experiential notions of quality and value, providing a (more) scientific
foundation for individual and collective moral responsibility.

As you know, there is no 'literature' on the above other than my recent book
and articles and the original books and papers by Lupasco and Nicolescu. But I
am encouraged by Hans' work to think that the key points of LIR may begin to be
perceived as not so outrageous after all.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Hans von Baeyer
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Sunday, January 12, 2014 3:16 PM
Subject: [Fis] Isms

Physicists generally don't spend much time on distinguishing among
philosophical isms. However, since my New Year lecture was on an ism, I
can't very well avoid them!

Gordana speaks of Instrumentalist Epistemology and Epistemological
Instrumentalism.  As I understand it, instrumentalism was a term preferred by
Dewey to pragmatism, which I called the philosophy most closely related to
QBism.  So I would agree that pragmatism/instrumentalism is a good framework
for exploring both the implications of QBism beyond quantum mechanics, and,
conversely, for understanding the claims of QBism itself -- especially in
contrast to realism.

A new ism was introduced by David Mermin in a short paper submitted on the
eve of my New Year Lecture (arxiv.org paper id 1312.7825.) But since his
point of view, by his own admission, is that of QBism tout court, I won't dwell
on his new term. Mermin shows that the philosophy of QBism solves the Problem
of the Now, which has nothing to do with quantum mechanics or probability.
The question, which frustrated Einstein, is: Why can physics not deal with the
universal human experience of the unique moment called NOW?  Mermin answers
that the problem arises from a fundamental mistake.  Since the time of the
Greeks we have banished the subject (me -- myself) from any description of the
object (the rest of the universe.)  Since NOW is a personal experience, it
therefore played no role in physics. QBism, on the other hand, puts personal
experience front and center in any description of the world. The NOWs of
several people coincide only when they are in the same place -- another
universal human experience. With this realization Mermin reconciles the
personalist Weltanschauung of the QBist with the insights of special relativity.

By way of a detour through atomic physics, QBism goes a long way toward healing
the subject/object split, which has been effective for physical science, but
has also impeded progress toward a more inclusive, holistic understanding of
the world.  Since Pedro and many other members of the FIS community are
biologists, I hope that this conversation will  help to bring physical
scientists and life scientists closer to each other.

Joseph seeks to defend QBism against the charge of ignorantism.  Thank you!
When physicists calculate observed properties of the
electron to nine decimal points, they are hardly ignorant. But QBists insist
that we incapable of knowing the real essence of what an electron is.  What's
a rainbow?   I can't tell you in fewer than 300 words. I can't tell you without
telling you a story about light, water, eyes, ```

### [Fis] Fw: Responses

```Dear Hans and All,

This is a very useful form of responses, which enables further directed
comments. I start with Lars', which is perhaps as Hans says crucial:

Lars -- How does QBism differ from Copenhagen? This is  a crucial question.  It
differs not at all in the formalism, and only subtly in the interpretation.
Many users of quantum mechanics regard the wavefunction as a real property of
an electron. They talk about the wavefunction in the same way you might say
the speed of the car. They must then deal with perennial problems such as
action-at-a-distance and the collapse of the wavefunction.  QBists regard the
wavefunction the way Bruno de Finetti regarded probability, when he wrote, in
caps, PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST.  I think  he meant that the probability of a
coin falling heads is not a measurable property of a coin. All it is is a
personal belief of how much an agent should bet. And that belief changes
instantly and locally when you make a measurement, or hear that someone else
has made one.

Joseph (New) -- One does not learn much about the way things are by reference
to simple, binary phenomena (coins) or more complicated versions in game theory
(profit-loss). All these have little to do with processes, such as information,
which embody complex oscillations between presence and absence, non-meaning and
meaning, and so on.

Some people call the the Copenhagen wavefunction ontic, the QBist one epistemic.

Joseph (New) -- This is an extremely important statement by Hans whose
consequences, IMHO, should be discussed as they relate to information. We all
agree that one cannot surf on ontic Copenhagen waves, while we 'know what we
know'. But ontic positions, when some of the deficiencies of the original
Copenhagen interpretation are corrected, have a lot to say about /how/ we know,
what the properties of what we know are, and how the two are interrelated.
Rather than saddle QBism with an ignorantist position, I would like to see it
expand to include this relation.

Gordana -- I am out of my depth in a discussion of
phenomena/noumena/Dinge-an-sich. But when I agree that the Higgs exists out
there in the world, I am sure it's not an object like a marble, but a symbol
for a collection of experiences that many people have had, and have discussed,
and codified, so that if they perform another experiment where it might play a
role, they can be prepared with betting odds for what they might experience
next.

Joseph (New) - - That it is a collection of experiences does not exclude that
it is an object, or better process, of a kind other than a 'marble'. As such,
in discussing it, we can go beyond  binary game metaphors.

Joseph --   the electron is a point means that no experiment to date has
found evidence for a finite size.  In the theory (quantum electrodynamics)
there is no room for any parameter with dimensions of length, although there
are mass, charge, spin, and  magnetic moment. When you introduce a finite size
into the theory, it makes wrong predictions. (This is not true for protons, for
example.)

Joseph (New) -- Same as above. The fact that an electron does not have a
'finite size (diameter)' does not mean that is does not exist objectively. It
is fuzzy with a 'size' greater than the Planck length and less than that of a
hadron.

The gravitational field lives in 3D was not supposed to deny that Einstein's
elegant formulation treats time as a  fourth dimension.  But a quantum field
is an altogether different and much more complicated beast which lives in
infinite dimensions, and has no analog whatever in our everyday human world.

Joseph (New) -- In my opinion, 1) current theories of gravity add more to
Einstein's original number of four dimensions to the gravitational field; 2)
current quantum theories do not saddle the quantum field with a mathematical
infinity. There are no such infinities in nature. That there is no analog of
the quantum field at the macroscopic level does not mean that there are no
isomorphisms between levels. One aspect is that of the couple duality -
self-duality as I mentioned earlier.

Having a proper view of physics among the many possible is critical to placing
information theory on a sound basis. I have proposed Logic in Reality as one
way of giving meaning to the statement that energy and information processes
are non-separably related and how they are related. Are there others?

Thank you and best regards,

Joseph___
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

```

### [Fis] Fw: Social constructivism

``` principle of dynamic opposition that
states as one element of a complex process is primarily actualized, the other
is potentialized, alternately and reciprocally, without either ever going to
the limits of 0 or 1, and we can see this happening at macroscopic levels of
reality.

2. Social Constructivism

Stan Salthe deserves our heartfelt thanks for raising this social
issue, and I can agree with Hans’ rejection of it for QBism. But he appears
less categorical with regard to the Social Sciences. This is not good.
Anti-scientific attitudes anywhere lead to the catastrophes Hans refers to. In
fact this is the ‘worst’ thing about QBism, namely, that it implicitly gives
aid and support to a kind of anti-social anti-realism. Stan's comments on
epiphenomena are perfectly valid in the LIR process ontology.

3. Encoding of Experience

Hans writes that the QBism interpretation of quantum mechanics is a
very complex, abstract encoding of the experiences of generations of scientists
interacting with atomic systems. It disenfranchises a physicist from knowing
what an electron spin, for example, really is. Thing-ness resides in the real
external world that we both experience.  But he no longer believes that he can
understand anything essential about it.  All one can do is gather experiences
and to encode them in various abstract models in one’s mind (QM).

For me, as soon as the word ‘encoding’ is used, ‘abstract’ becomes
redundant. The issue is not that QBism as such, but that it appears to exclude
alternative ways of understanding essential non-abstract aspects of the world
in more human, and not just ‘personalist’ terms. There are some ways in which I
know my friend, to use Hans' example, better than a spoon.

Thanks and best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Stanley N Salthe
To: fis
Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 4:55 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Social constructivism

In my last posting for the week, I Reply to Hans --

QBism does not change any of the impressive successes of quantum mechanics.  It
simply says that quantum mechanics is a very complex, abstract encoding of the
experiences of generations of scientists interacting with atomic systems.

S: These generations of “scientists” are a subsystem of society as a whole.
They influence each other via language and other social constructions,
including theories and machines.  Through them, it is society that observes the
micro activities occurring with the experimental machinery.  ‘Proof’? -- each
individual could be replaced by another using the same social tools (including
education).

It disenfranchises a physicist from knowing what an electron spin, for example,
REALLY is, while celebrating her ability to predict correctly, albeit
probabilistically, what to expect in the next experiment. She and her
predecessors have created an abstract model, and validated it by appeal to
experiments, without appeal to any of the other considerations listed above

S: So QM, via QBism, is meaningless!  Is this an achievement? -- to render
meaningless the activities within the socially-constructed machinery guided by
the socially-constructed theories?

In conversation with Joseph Brenner and others I have used the rainbow as a
metaphor. The rainbow is a phenomenon that everyone experiences slightly
differently, but that we all agree on.

S: I would say that it is a biologically-constructed epiphenomenon.

The scientific model that explains it is very complicated and highly
abstract.  Is the rainbow real?  It certainly does not exist when nobody is
looking.  It is, in the end, a personal experience.  For me the experience is
enhanced considerably by my understanding of the scientific model of it,
because it allows me to look for and discover details I had never noticed, but
I would not presume to say I know what YOUR experience of it is.  Maybe you are
thinking of Iris or Noah, and feeling awe or curiosity, and remarking on its
(apparently) immense size and variable brightness.

S: But it’s physical interpretation, from the QBist perspective, is of no
interest as such.

QBism suggests that we look at the world as consisting of rainbows -- an
ensemble of complex phenomena about which we know some things, but whose
essences we cannot capture.  The QBist says: I don't know what the world is.
All I know is what I experience in my interactions with the world, as they are
illuminated and modified by what I have learned from other people,

past and present, who have had similar experiences and encoded them in the
succinct language of mathematics.

S: That is, our experiences are socially conditioned biological constructs.  In
this view physics becomes the theoretical basis for constructing the QM
machinery, which will display an epiphenomenon.

STAN

Hans

On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 6:52 PM, Hans von Baeyer henrikrit```

### Re: [Fis] Article on panpsychism

```Dear John,

The Koch article is worth reading as a kind of statement within the current
reductionist paradigm I believe it is necessary to get beyond. It is all the
more insidious because of Koch's research credentials, but it contains all the
'push-button' words that I have seen in his previous work, as well as that of
others. Two of these are, in this connection, 'measure' and 'integration'. That
'the mental is too radically different to arise gradually from the physical' is
a hypothesis, and begs the questions 'does it?' and 'why shouldn't it?' Despite
your comment on the utility of his measure, it seems much too scalar to
represent anything fundamental.

There is no indication of the essentiality of properties of process and
interaction in the concept of information used by Koch. It also opens the door,
as I said in my previous note, to misinterpretations supporting anti-realist
positions. I conclude that the lessons the article offers about how to think
about subjective experience are (ideologically) biased and miss the necessary
connection between subjective and objective.

In his 2010 book, Self Comes to Mind, Anthony Damasio discusses how the
consciousness is constructed as a result of what he calls master interoceptive
processes that occur between the multiple structures at the level of the brain
stem and the cerebral cortex. He first defines a protoself as an integrated
collection of separate neural patterns that map, moment by moment, the most
stable aspects of the organism's physical structure. The nuclei of the
homeostatic processes involved generate one of the two key components of the
self - the feelings of knowing. The other component, derived from
non-homeostatic processes in the brain stem, generate object saliency,
Damasio's term for the recognition of the self-as-object. The origin of the
invariance or relative invariance of a singular self has been the subject of
much discussion as we know, and a plausible basis for both the invariance and
that singularity must be established. For Damasio, this basis is neither more
or less than the organism's single body. Although this body is constantly
undergoing change, many internal parameters, both structural and chemical, vary
only within a very narrow range during the individual's lifetime. In Damasio's
view, the couplings between conscious perceptions and memories and underlying
processes at the physiological level are necessary but also sufficient to
generate the value-laden processes commonly designated as the conscious self.
No 'proto-self' is required at the levels at which Koch sees consciousness.

I had been an assiduous reader of Scientific American from high-school until
the late-eighties, when it stopped publishing original scientific work. For me,
today, it is not an acceptable reference.

Thank you for calling the article to our attention.

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Saturday, January 04, 2014 2:47 AM
Subject: [Fis] Article on panpsychism

Folks,

The article on the Scientific American site at
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=is-consciousness-universalprint=true
might be of interest to this group. It discusses an information based measure
of consciousness.

Is Consciousness Universal?
Panpsychism, the ancient doctrine that consciousness is universal, offers
some lessons in how to think about subjective experience today

By Christof Koch  | Wednesday, January 1, 2014 |

I am not a panpsychist, but this is the most reasonable version I have seen
(barring, perhaps, Leibniz', with its distinction between confused and clear
perceptions, which takes a similar route). I think the measure is of interest
independently of panpsychism.

John

--
Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier

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### [Fis] Fw: social flow. Finding correspondences

```Dear Colleagues

Pedro wrote:

Actually most of our social exchanges are supradetermined by status,
self-image, ambitions, affinity, collective identities, deception,
self-deception, attraction, etc. Rather than noise, it is life itself! Haven't
we a lot of work to be done in these essential matters?

Loet wrote:

It seems to me that one can use models from biology to study inter-human
communication; but inter-human communication is not alive. The dynamics are
non-linear, but probably very different from the dynamics among molecules.
Without the individual reflections on perceptions, the social distribution of
expectations would not be reproduced. However, one cannot reduce these
structural couplings to dependency relations, in my opinion.

Christophe wrote:

The only point I would disagree with you is the last part of the sentence, as
human behavior is much more than life itself. The constraints that humans have
to satisfy contain some specificities like valorize ego and limit anxiety. The
field of human constraints is not that well understood. Probably because it is
closely linked to these mysterious human specificities.
So we are looking at a difficult subject: understand information flow within
entities that we do not understand.

Joseph writes:
I think that the pessimism of Loet and Christophe could be helped by looking
for dynamic relations at the different levels that are grounded in basic
physics and chemistry, namely ones of changing actuality and potentiality. The
dynamics are not /the same/, but if they have some common principle, we have
something at least to work with. We do take over the biological model in its
totality, but that portion of it which applies throughout nature. The couplings
(Loet) are probably not simple dependency relations, but interactive relations
involving presence and absence, along the lines of Deacon. Christophe is right
that we do not understand completely the human entities within which
information flow occurs, but the rules (Luhn) they follow are not necessarily
totally different or mysterious. Someone with an oversized ego, A, is going to
behave accordingly until he runs, inevitably, into some resistance (someone
with a bigger ego, B). The subsequent dynamics will follow the same pattern as
at lower levels, A's usual behavior will be potentialized at the expense of
B's. Under good conditions, the A and B interaction will produce an emergent
behavior, AB, in which, however, the original 'egos' have not totally
disappeared. If this line is followed, there is not a total, but a minimum
continuity in the form of the interactions between non-life and life.
Information is in this form.

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Loet Leydesdorff
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Sunday, November 24, 2013 8:18 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] social flow

Dear colleagues,

It seems to me that one can use models from biology to study inter-human
communication; but inter-human communication is not alive. The dynamics are
non-linear, but probably very different from the dynamics among molecules.

For example, counterfactual orders can be shaped culturally among us such as
the rule of law. This cannot be reduced to biological principles (such as
survival of the fittest). The dynamics of expectations are very different from
that of historical events.

The psychological may be mediating reflexively between the cultural and the
biological, with a dynamics of itself. Without the individual reflections on
perceptions, the social distribution of expectations would not be reproduced.
However, one cannot reduce these structural couplings to dependency relations,
in my opinion.

Best,

Loet

Reference:

Niklas Luhmann's Magnificent Contribution to the Sociological Tradition: The
Emergence of the Knowledge-Based Economy as an Order of Expectations, in:
Nachtflug der Eule: 150 Stimmen zum Werk von Niklas Luhmann. Gedenkbuch zum 15.
Todestag von Niklas Luhmann (8. Dezember 1927 Lüneburg - 6. November 1998
Oerlinghausen), Magdalena Tzaneva (Ed.). Berlin: LiDi Europe Verlagshaus, 2013;
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2355880 .

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ
Sent: Saturday, November 23, 2013 9:53 PM
To: Joseph Brenner; Roly Belfer
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] social flow

Dear FIS colleagues,

Many thanks for the comments exchanged.
Welcome to Roly, the first party of the Xian's conference publishing in the
list (I mean concerning the invited speakers, as Bi-Lin who also posted
recently was a Xian participant too). I agree with Roli's interpretation and
Joseph's points, and also with the direction started by John. It is one of the
few times we are producing interesting ideas on social information
infrastructures. Perhaps at the time being the received wisdom on
communication```

### Re: [Fis] social flow

```Dear Roly, Dear Pedro,

Thank you for taking this thread in a for me very interesting direction. As you
know, interesting means what I find my logical system can confirm, improve,
validate, etc. The two notes share one feature that one might criticize,
namely, that they deal essentially with present, conscious material, whereas
information flow almost  by defintion seems to involve components that are
absent, potential, unconscious, etc.

Similarly, the application of the Square of Opposition in Roly's reference
would at first sight appear to be explanatory, but on closer inspection, I find
everything reduced back to binary logic, arrows in a box. What has to be added,
pace Jakobson, is some notion of the actual dynamics of what Roly calls a
mutual relateable framework. And let's not be too greedy: let's get the
pairwise interactions right and then see where we can go with more complex ones.

Cheers,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Roly Belfer
To: Pedro C. Marijuan
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Thursday, November 21, 2013 4:44 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] social flow

Dear Pedro

Thank you! there is some sort of synchronicity here: I was just recently
thinking about Roman Jakobson and his 6 levels of semiotic analysis. Especially
the phatic expression, as some kind of white noise that is necessary for the
interpersonal informational handshake. That is, an infosphere - be it organic
or more like artificial info networks - would need to have actants operate in a
mutually relateable framework (even if it is only pairwise).

The meaningless/senseless datum is important for establishing the lines of
communication, and perhaps some emergent properties (such as intimacy,
grouping, pre-communicative  acceptance).
Do you know of any quantified work re Jakobson? (I keep this around for
different purposes)

Best
Roly

On Thu, Nov 21, 2013 at 1:50 PM, Pedro C. Marijuan
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote:

Dear FIS colleagues,

Just a wandering thought, in part motivated by the highly formal
contents of the other discussion track. What are the major contents,
topics, and styles in our social, spontaneous exchanges? Seemingly the
response is that most of those exchanges are just casual, irrelevant,
performed for their own sake. There are scholarly references about
that---though our own perusal of social life may quite agree. The
information flow, the circulation of social information, becomes the
message itself (echoing McLuhan), amorphously gluing the different
networks of the social structure... Flowing naturally in spontaneous
exchanges and also fabricated and recirculated by the media. Our
talkative species needs the daily dose --otherwise mental health resents
quite easily.
I am these days reading Robert Trivers (2011) on self-deception and how
the info flow we are conscious of becomes a highly self-centered
concoction for for our own social self-promotion. I think it partially
dovetails with the above: we are the content.

best ---Pedro

--
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 ( 6818)
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-

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### Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 577, Issue 10; Joseph Reply to Jerry

```Dear Jerry,

Thank you as usual for your thought-provoking note, which nevertheless requires
the following clarification of your position. You ask, because I assume that
your answers to your four questions is no, that there is no tension in the
group between the empirical and abstract, given the success of Shannon, etc.

Do you not believe in the validity of Boolean algebra?
JEB: I do not, for complex informational and other non-Markovian processes.

Do you not believe in the validity of encoding processes?
JEB: Only in a very limited computational domain.

Do you not believe in the validity of transmission processes/error correction
codes?
JEB: Same as above. This picture excludes most of what is important in
information transmission in interpersonal interactions.

Do you believe that the genesis of mind is Turing computable?
JEB: I do not

This is, for me at least, a solid basis for 'tension'.

If all this is what the 'overwhelming majority' of people in this group
believe, then I accept my minority status. But then, I also find your more
general position that

The current foundation of information sciences does not meet the needs of
chemistry, biology or medicine. A second foundation must be built to express
the role of information in communications within living systems.

as an overly pessimistic statement of the situation. The FoundationS (plural)
of Information Science are developing due to the work of Pedro in
Bioinformatics and Bob L. and Bob U. in related areas; Gordana in natural
computational aspects of information; Loet and Deacon (by proxy) in dynamics;
myself in the logical grounding and patterns of evolution of all this in
physics; John Collier, José Maria, Sören in cybersemiotics, Krassimir and
others, all hopefully with the major foundational document of Mark Burgin in
mind.

My vision is that what is really needed is a new relational synthesis of this
foundational work that takes into account the most relevant aspects of all of
it. I look forward to seeing new contributions along these lines, emerging,
exactly from the tension between the abstract and non-abstract characteristics
of information.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Jerry LR Chandler
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Thursday, November 07, 2013 8:34 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 577, Issue 10

Pedro, List:

You write:
...a reference to the tension between the empirical and the abstract in
FIS. I quite agree, it is one of the essential tensions in any healthy
scientific development (whenever it is possible to maintain it).

Tensions?
Tensions between the empirical and the abstract?

From my reading of the posts of various contributors over the past 3-5 years,
I heartily disagree with this view of the current situation on this FIS list
serve.

Shannon's information theory was published about 65 years ago.
It has become the logical foundation of a huge industry employing millions of
workers, globally.

The principle abstraction of information theory can be roughly stated.  If
one encoded information (numbers, letters, images, mathematics, physics,
chemistry, biology, medicine, art, music, literature, feeling, emotions, etc.)
into a binary code, then the encoded information can be electronically encoded
and transmitted (transferred) to other electronic devices and decoded by other
machines or individuals. This dependency, in turn, relies upon Boolean Algebra
and associated mathematics. It now appears that the overwhelming majority of
contributors to list serve find this externalist's view of information to be in
complete harmony with the empirical and the abstract.

Where is the tension?
Do you not believe in the validity of Boolean algebra?
Do you not believe in the validity of encoding processes?
Do you not believe in the validity of transmission processes/error correction
codes?

The overwhelming majority of contributors find this externalist's view of
information to be acceptable, and seek to make it more acceptable by tweaking
the word-smithing a bit in order to become congruent with their personal
philosophy.  At least that is my view of the current status.

Why do I write this message, perhaps a bit on the side of harshness?

Quite simple.
The current foundation of information sciences does not meet the needs of
chemistry, biology or medicine. A second foundation must be built to express
the role of information in communications within living systems. For example,
central to the tree of life are the informative  feed-forwards processes that
transmit genetic information into individual anatomies and logical processes,
life itself. Of particular theoretical interest, from the perspective of FIS,
are the feed-forward processes that start with the messages encoded in a
fertilized egg and generate, through a sequence of biochemical process, the
mind.

Perhaps one or more of the ```

### Re: [Fis] THE SOCIOTYPE: From R. Zimmerman

```Dear Raquel, Dear Colleagues,

I have been following the development of this topic with an interest that is
not unmixed with concern. In particular, since we are supposed to deal with
'foundations', with some of the assumptions made by Rainer in his note.

First, the reference to levels is important, but in my opinion more
attention needs to
be paid to the applicable interactive relationships and movement between
levels.

Rainer writes:  . . . because evolution on the one level does not
necessarily entail the same evolution on the other, . . . To me, this
leaves totally
open the case that evolution on the two levels may be the same or share
important characteristics.

Further in the same paragraph we read: ...social groups consist of
individuals which are to the social field generated by that group a
singularity which is one source of this field at the same time. Hence, the
agglomeration of individuals in groups cannot be described by the
same language that is applied to describe the individuals. One is the
macro-level (sociology), the other is the micro-level (psychology).The first
is emergent with respect to the latter.

This, to me again, is another 'argument by separation', which assumes a
singularity that is limited to the psychologically trivial separate physical
existence of the individual, while eliminating /a priori/ the possibility of
psychologically significant individual - group mutual interaction. It seems
thus to ignore the entire literature on /group/ psychology.

The 'agglomeration' of individually into groups is not a random matter, (if
in fact random has any meaning in the real world) but follows a dynamics
involving the potential individual-group relations to which I referred
above.

My concern, then, is that the implied model may negatively influence the
methodology of your study, Raquel, with whose objectives I am certainly in
agreement. Thus, I was not encouraged by the statistical format implied
by your most recent note, with its emphasis on quantitative measures that
may miss key properties of the sociotype.

I hope you will take these comments in the spirit of inquiry in which they
are intended.

Best wishes,

Joseph

Dear Raquel,

may I just point out that your conception which I find quite promising,
should be modified somewhat as to the symmetry between micro- and
macrolevels(a point that is actually very important in order to
introduce any concepts of emergence into this): Hence, if visualizing
the sociality of human beings as a kind of biological selection criterium
that emerged some time during the hominization period and had to prove
its evolutionary advantages by becoming a dominating paradigm, then
sociality would have a micro-component (psychotype) which is the formal
equivalent of the biological genotype, and a macro-component (sociotype)
which is the formal equivalent of the biological phenotype.

The advantage of defining two of these levels is twofold: first, it is
more correct, because evolution on the one level does not necessarily
entail the same evolution on the other, second, social groups consist of
individuals which are to the social field generated by that group a
singularity which is one source of this field at the same time. Hence,
the agglomeration of individuals in groups cannot be described by the
same language that is applied to describe the individuals. One is the
macro-level (sociology), the other is the micro-level (psychology).The
first is emergent with respect to the latter.

Best,
Rainer

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### Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics. Bit from It

```Dear Folks,

Julian Barbour wrote a paper entitled Bit from It for the 2011 FQXi Essay
Contest, readily accessible on-line at Bit from It - FQXi. It won only 4th
prize, but it shows pretty clearly that the It-from-Bit position mistakes
abstraction for reality. As Barbour puts it, just because we can observe dots
on a screen in a carefully prepared experiment is no proof that at root the
world consists (or is constituted by) immaterial single-digit information.

Barbour errs, however, in drawing the conclusion that continuity is an illusion
and that nature is fundamentally digital. Reality can only be, in my logic,
continuous and discontinuous. It is this fact that supports the proper
meaning of John Collier's metaphysics that every /thing/ must go. Every /thing/
in the bad old sense must go, but not things as properties and relations, which
go all the way down.

I would really hope that all of you read this short article and that we return
to the discussion subsequently. Note that the subject of this year's Contest is
It from Bit or Bit from It . . .

Best,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Bob Logan
To: Bruno Marchal ; fis ; John Collier
Sent: Sunday, May 26, 2013 6:17 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics

Bruno - An interesting definition of God, omnipresent, omnipotent and
omniscient. And equally mysterious. Turing emulable and Robinson Arithmetic.
How does one derive an understanding of the real world (the acoustic world)
from axioms. The scientific method of observation, generalization, hypothesis
building and testing seems something worth emulating. Let's call it science
method emulable. You cannot derive science from math or logic and prove
anything with math or science about the real world. And I can prove it if you
accept Popper's axiom that for a proposition to be scientific it has to be
falsifiable. Well if you prove anything is true then it cannot be falsified and
hence is not a scientific proposition. I think the trouble with your fallacy,
Bruno, is that it is wrong (this is a Marshall McLuhan gag that he used all the
time and made famous in his cameo appearance in Annie Hall.) Bruno, do not take
this playful approach to your post as a personal attack. I am just playing with
the ideas you put out there for our enlightenment. And as McLuhan said, if you
don't like these ideas I have others. With kind regards and thanks for your
stimulating post - Bob

On 2013-05-26, at 11:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Jerry,

On 26 May 2013, at 16:58, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

John:

I have followed your writings for many years - perhaps more than two
decades now.

Frankly, from the perspective of a hardcore realist, I find much of your
written work to be highly metaphysical in nature, including the sentences which
I cited in the post of May 17, 2013.

Your notion of metaphysics appears to so extremely narrowly restricted
that you can exempt your own highly metaphysical writings from your definition
of metaphysics.  In fact, the traditional usage of the term metaphysics is
not narrowly restricted.

On numerous occasions, you assert your views as a MIT trained physicist.
Yet in this immediate exchange, the responsibility for the assertions are
attributed to others. Puzzling.

Have you every given any serious metaphysical thought to the scientific
meaning of the phrase it from bit?

Perhaps the dichotomy of your perspectives is amply illustrated by the
title of your book:

Every Thing Must Go

This title itself is a simple logical assertion. It expresses logical
necessity.

If this assertion is true, what would remain?

Life?
Matter?
Mentation?
John Collier?
MIT style physics?
Mathematics?
Philosophy of science?
Metaphysics?
Nothing?

This title alone expresses a deep and profound metaphysical perspective.

At heart, I am a simple man, in love with nature, logic and mathematics.
From my perspective, your voluminous metaphysical writings tend to be contrary
to my experience of nature, logic and mathematics.

It from bit?  Really?

My question of May 17, 2013 remains open:

How would a rational realist distinguish this metaphysical perspective
from witchcraft or magic?

Cheers

If we assume that there is a level of description such that we are Turing
emulable, then ontologically everything can go except some term of a first
order Turing universal theory. I use Robinson Arithmetic to fix the things.

Then nothing does go, as it can be shown how the appearances of the
physical laws can be explained in that theory (with computationalism at the
metalevel, or not). This leads to a derivation of physics from the additive and
multiplicative theory of numbers, making the theory testable (comp + classical
theory of knowledge). Then, thanks to ```

### Re: [Fis] Information and Conformal Cyclic Cosmology

```Dear John, Dear Sören and All,

I think John is basically correct in starting from a physical basis for the
origin of information in the universe, but Sören is also correct in that
something more is needed to get to meaning. My view is, however, that the
latter's cybersemiotics is based on a Peircean view of the properties of the
universe, and that this view is crtitically incomplete, especially with regard
to partial determinism, discontinuity and the operational nature of signs.

Logic in Reality provides the missing link between the physical and
non-physical positions by relating them to the synergetic/antagonistic
interactions between the actuality and potentiality of energy and energetic
processes at all levels of reality, between presence and absence (cf. Deacon),
etc. In my opinion, this is what gets us to experience. Floridi has
criticized my position since he assigns only epistemological value to levels of
reality, whereas I try to show that the epistemology and ontology of levels
cannot be totally separated.

The nexus of the debate is thus here, but it would require some actualization
of understanding of the relevance of LIR (or lack of it!) to continue along
these lines. Any takers?

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Søren Brier
To: John Collier ; joe.bren...@bluewin.ch ; Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez
; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2013 11:08 PM
Subject: SV: [Fis] Information and Conformal Cyclic Cosmology

Dear John

I think the discussion you have here, no matter how qualified it is, shows
that it is doubtful strategy to want to explain our world, meaningful
communication and our own consciousness from the physical view of  reality
alone. In my cybersemiotic model I suggest that we cannot reduce the physical
to the biological and that to the experiential psychological and the social
communicative and cannot expect to produce one unified story of the world based
on natural science. For those interested I give a PhD-course in Cybersemiotics
at CBS in Copenhagen 12-16. of August with invited speakers explain the idea.
Information here http://www.cbs.dk/en/node/254737 .

Best wishes

Søren Brier

Fra: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] På
vegne af John Collier
Sendt: 16. maj 2013 20:20
Til: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez;
fis@listas.unizar.es
Emne: Re: [Fis] Information and Conformal Cyclic Cosmology

Joseph, fisers,

I have been busy with teaching (250 students in an environmental ethics
course I have never taught before), so I set this aside to look at later. I am
getting 250 essays in tomorrow, less laggards, so I decided to get this out now.

At 02:42 AM 2013/03/17, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote:

Dear Pedro, Dear FISers,

In our search for the foundations of information two years ago, we looked
at Michael Conrad's fluctuon model of the universe. We came to the conclusion,
I think, that 1) any coupling of fluctuations in the quantum vacuum to
thermodynamic entities (biological macromolecules) has not been confirmed and
2) the concept of information as energy does not apply to the  timeless
vacuum background.

The vacuum background is random, and hence contains no information in the
negentropy sense (see my kinds at Kinds of Information in Scientific Use.
2011. cognition, communication, co-operation. Vol 9, No 2 ). However it from
bit information appears and disappears. It can be magnified in principle, but
I know of no detected cases. David Layzer, in his Cosmogenesis, argued that our
branch of the universe got a cold start from a large fluctuation, at least
part of which we reside in. In this case we get both an information and an
energy bulge, which produces negentropic information as the expansion rate
exceeds the relaxation rate. This happens as the universe expands, and
relaxation takes longer. Before that we have undifferentiated energy. After
that we have at least a phase separation between matter and energy that is not
just fluctuations in the background. I plan to present some stuff on the
relation between information and energy at the China meeting, and hope to have
things better worked out by then.

Roger Penrose's 2011 book, Cycles of Time, which I have just read, presents a
new view of the universe as described by a conformal cyclic cosmology (CCC). It
makes some remarkable statements about information which I believe are worth
discussion. His key point is to make information loss in black holes the
condition for the reduction in  the phase-space volume of the universe to
permit geometrical matching between a De Sitter end of one universe or aeon
and the smooth transition to an Einsteinian Big Bang in a new aeon, both
involving massless particles. Penrose thus goes back to Hawking's original
theory, as he finds it difficult to ```

### [Fis] Information and Logic

```Dear Sören,

Thank you for your prompt and pertinent response, which nevertheless allows me
to make three points about my differences with cybesemiotics, starting, you
will see why, from the last:

1. I am not a supporter of modern logics as these are generally understood
(Peirce's trivalent, modal, fuzzy, dynamic, abductive, etc.) precisely because
they are still propositional and truth-functional and do not provide a basis
for meaning.

2. All these logics, including Peirce's are or refer to the formal aspects of
semiosis, but Logic in Reality establishes a theory of the grounds of
perception and experiential quality.

3. My Logic in Reality is about making probable inferences, not about making
correct deductions.

In conclusion, if my logic, as I claim, is /sui generis/, it is not proper to
ascribe to it the properties of standard logics, all of which are included in
the Universal Logic of Béziau - He. The statements I make about information in
my logical perspective, accordingly, should if possible be judged on whether or
not they add something new to the resolution of still unresolved problems.
e.g., the relation to physics.

I note the oblique reference to Maimonides in de Waal's book and will be sure
to buy it, but those of you who are familiar with Maimonides will be aware of
his limitations . . .

Best regards,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Søren Brier
To: 'Joseph Brenner' ; John Collier ; Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez ; fis
Sent: Friday, May 17, 2013 2:03 PM
Subject: SV: [Fis] Information and Conformal Cyclic Cosmology

Dear Joseph

Logic does not in itself guide empirical research. It is just about how to
make correct deductions. What lead me to  Peirce from a traditional science
view was the lack of a theory of perception and experiential qualities and
therefore the whole basis for empirical work. Peirce established a
phenomenological basis for his semiotics and an empirical realistic
pragmaticism, where it is sign that carry perception, thinking and
communication and logic is only the formal aspect of semiosis. I have just
received Cornelis de Waal's wonderful little book: Peirce for the perplexed
that gives a very clear explanation of Peirce philosophy of science and how it
integrates with his theory

of semiotics. Peirce was one of the founders of the modern logic , which you
are so supportive of.

Best

Søren

Fra: Joseph Brenner [mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch]
Sendt: 17. maj 2013 12:26
Til: Søren Brier; John Collier; Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez; fis
Emne: Re: [Fis] Information and Conformal Cyclic Cosmology

Dear John, Dear Sören and All,

I think John is basically correct in starting from a physical basis for the
origin of information in the universe, but Sören is also correct in that
something more is needed to get to meaning. My view is, however, that the
latter's cybersemiotics is based on a Peircean view of the properties of the
universe, and that this view is crtitically incomplete, especially with regard
to partial determinism, discontinuity and the operational nature of signs.

Logic in Reality provides the missing link between the physical and
non-physical positions by relating them to the synergetic/antagonistic
interactions between the actuality and potentiality of energy and energetic
processes at all levels of reality, between presence and absence (cf. Deacon),
etc. In my opinion, this is what gets us to experience. Floridi has
criticized my position since he assigns only epistemological value to levels of
reality, whereas I try to show that the epistemology and ontology of levels
cannot be totally separated.

The nexus of the debate is thus here, but it would require some
actualization of understanding of the relevance of LIR (or lack of it!) to
continue along these lines. Any takers?

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -

From: Søren Brier

To: John Collier ; joe.bren...@bluewin.ch ; Pedro Clemente Marijuan
Fernandez ; fis@listas.unizar.es

Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2013 11:08 PM

Subject: SV: [Fis] Information and Conformal Cyclic Cosmology

Dear John

I think the discussion you have here, no matter how qualified it is, shows
that it is doubtful strategy to want to explain our world, meaningful
communication and our own consciousness from the physical view of  reality
alone. In my cybersemiotic model I suggest that we cannot reduce the physical
to the biological and that to the experiential psychological and the social
communicative and cannot expect to produce one unified story of the world based
on natural science. For those interested I give a PhD-course in Cybersemiotics
at CBS in Copenhagen 12-16. of August with invited speakers explain the idea.
Information here http://www.cbs.dk/en/node/254737```

### [Fis] Fw: The Information Flow

```Dear Pedro,

I and I am sure most of us are grateful when you open up the debate in this
way. To go farther, though, people must be ready to ask many questions about
familiar concepts such as the following:

1. Are there serious alternatives to Aristotelian causality?
2. Is it possible to combine insights from Heraclitus and Parmenides to get
the advantages of both in complex domains?
3. Can non-mechanistic thought be expressed in sufficiently rigorous terms to
avoid slipping into non-sense and non-science?
4. In reply to your Why?, can an explanation of the refusal of people to
accept the necessary changes in mind-set be related to genetic + environmental
factors that also determine other doubtful polarizations (like voting for
Romney-Ryan) or criminal behavior?

As I have tried to express them in this forum from time to time in relation to
other issues, my answer to all the above questions is yes. But it takes new
work and a new attitude. As a personal example, I have asked about 12 (!)
mathematicians to help me express the calculus of implications of my Logic in
Reality in alternative, more familiar terms. None has either done so nor said
that it is not possible.

As another example, after some effort, the first article in proper English by
Wu Kun of the Institute for the Philosophy of Information in Xi'An has just
been published on-line in Information. People who assume, however, that his
view of philosophy is not of critical importance to information science are
making just the kind of mistake Pedro tells us to avoid! It is a
metaphilosophy, a recasting of the underlying assumptions of scientific -
natural and social - thought in informational terms. I urge you all to look at
it.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Friday, October 26, 2012 10:32 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] The Information Flow

Dear FISers,

Is it interesting the discussion on whether those informational entities
contain realizations of the Aristotelian scheme of causality or not?

The cell, in my view, conspicuously fails --it would be too artifactual an
scheme. Some parts of the sensory paths of advanced nervous systems seem to
separate some of those causes --but only in a few parts or patches of the
concerned pathway. For instance, in visual processing the what and the
how/where seem to be travelling together undifferentiated along the optic
nerve and are separated --more or less-- after the visual superior colliculus
in the midbrain before discharging onto the visual cortex. The really big flow
of spikes arriving each instant (many millions every few milisec) are mixed and
correlated with themselves and with other top-down and bottom-up preexisting
flows in multiple neural mappings... and further, when those flows mix with the
association areas under the influence of language, then, and only then, all
those logic and conceptual categorizations of human thought are enacted in the
ephemeral synaptic networks.

I am optimistic that  a new Heraclitean way of thinking boils down in network
science, neuroinformatics, systems biology, bioinformation etc. Neither the
Parmenidean eliminative fixism of classical reductionists, nor the
Aristotelian organicism of systemicists. Say that this is a caricature. However
you cannot bathe twice in the same river not just because we all are caught
into the universal physical flow of photons and forces, but for the
Heraclitean flux of our own neurons and brains, for the inner torrents of the
aggregated information flows. The same for whatever cells, societies, etc. and
their physical structures for info transportation.

Either we produce an interesting new vision of the world, finally making sense
of those perennial metaphors among the different (informational) realms, or
information science will continue to be that small portion of incoherent
patches more or less close to information theory or to artificial intelligence.
In spite of decades of bla-bla- about information revolution and information
society and tons of ad hoc literature, the educated thought of our contemporary
society continues to be deeply mechanistic!

Why?

best wishes

---Pedro

-snip-

I think it of some interest that I have
previously ( 2006  On
Aristotle’s conception of causality.
General Systems Bulletin 35:
11.) proposed that the Aristotelian 'formal
cause' determines both
'what happens' and 'how it happens', and that
the combination of
this with material cause ('what it happens
to') delivers 'where' it
happens.

(For completeness sake I add that efficient
cause determines only
'when it happens', while final cause points
to 'why it happens'.  It
would be quite exciting to find that these
informations were also
carried on separate tracts.)

It would be exciting, as that would seem to refute the
Aristotelean ```

### Re: [Fis] Absence and life

```Dear Loet,

Thank you, Loet, but is there not still a disjunction between our views? I am
trying to say that the characteristics of /naturalistic/ information are
presence and absence and this is why a further inclusion of a non-Shannon
information is necessary for a more complete information theory.

That what you term a non-naturalistic theory also involves presence and absence
points to the fundamentality of the latter even in the formal domain of
dynamics, cf. Gödel. Can you please comment further on this?

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Loet Leydesdorff
To: Joseph Brenner ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Monday, May 21, 2012 7:57 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Absence and life

Dear Joe,

Yes, these two notions of interaction information were specified in debate
between Klaus Krippendorff and me. See:

Krippendorff, K. (2009). Information of Interactions in Complex Systems.
International Journal of General Systems, 38(6), 669-680.

Leydesdorff, L. (2010). Redundancy in Systems which Entertain a Model of
Themselves: Interaction Information and the Self-organization of Anticipation.
Entropy, 12(1), 63-79.

The naturalistic one is (Shannon-type) interaction information
I(ABC-AB:AC:BC), and the non-naturalistic one the difference between the
(absent) redundancy and the (present) information generated in interactions
among three or more (sub)dynamics.

I take the liberty to cc to fis since more colleagues may be interested.

Best,
Loet

On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 7:38 AM, Joseph Brenner joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
wrote:

Dear Loet,

Thank you very much for this message. It made my day!

The historical trail is present, but the evolutionary dynamics is
otherwise
absent since hypothesized as res cogitans.

I also can appreciate better the role of your res cogitans in this
formulation since the trail is obviously absent (potentialized) for any current
situation. (In line six you mean res extensa of course.)

Any discussion should therefore include reference to the analytical
division you make and the synthetic association I make. The nexus is the domain
of interaction information where our two interpretations of interaction,
naturalistic and non-naturalistic --- interact.

Onward!

Joe
- Original Message - From: Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net
To: 'Joseph Brenner' joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Friday, May 18, 2012 8:14 PM
Subject: RE: [Fis] Absence and life

Dear Joe,

Perhaps, this is the first time that I full-heartedly agree with the
central
tenet of Logic in Reality, for the following reasons. (I must admit
that I
stopped reading Deacon's new book because I found it a bit too long.)

Let's assume that reality can analytically be divided in res cogitans
and
res extensa. The res cogitans is not observable (absent), but its
operation can leave an imprint in res cogitans. For example, we can
reconstruct nature using knowledge-based technologies. (I am actually
looking into my garden which is six meters below sea level because of 17th
century technologies that are most common in the Netherlands.)

The imprint is partly interaction information (that is, Shannon
information)
and partly redundancy by proliferating options in the systems which are
reconstructed. Models open parameter spaces of other possibilities than
the
ones which occurred. From the model, one can assess the adjacent
possible
as Kauffman more metaphysically considered this. The ranges of other
options
expand the maximal (probabilistic) entropy of the system (H(max)). This
expansion is already possible at the biological level (Brooks  Wiley),
but
enormously expanded by the symbolic order (Deacon) and the communication
of
meaning in the development of discursive knowledge.

The models make future (ranges of possible) states available in the
present
and thus invert the axis of time: knowledge-based systems operate on the
basis of future possible states instantiated in the present. The
instantiations are the footprints that can be studied with the arrow of
time
(historically) since they are present. This dialectic between
self-organization of the discourse in res cogitans and organization in res
extensa provides meaning to the Logic of Reality. Reality is then no
longer
understood naturalistically, but in terms of a development of the
communication (e.g., discursive knowledge) which leaves a trail behind.
The
historical trail is present, but the evolutionary dynamics is otherwise
absent since hypothesized as res cogitans.

Best,
Loet

Loet Leydesdorff
Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX```

### Re: [Fis] Absence and life

```Dear Colleagues,

I am very glad this discussion has started, as (as perhaps no-one but I
remembers) I pointed to the potential importance  of Deacon's work a year
ago, after reading his article What is Missing from Theories of
Information?

My position is that what is good in this work can be made more useful by a
series of emendations using the principles of the Logic in Reality about
which I have talked from time to time. I have summarized my views and my
critique in a 48 page paper, part of which was to have been presented (with
Deacon's agreement) at the now deferred, till 2013, Moscow FIS Conference,
and parts are in the final Draft of a paper to be submitted in June to Bob
Logan's Special Issue of /Information/.

Here my brief replies to (a) Pedro, (b) Bob U. and (c) Robin:

(a) I fully agree that the whole story about autogens fails as support, due
to its being composed almost entirely of abstractions. However, if one takes
just the idea of absence as well as presence being causally efficient, then
if you allow for their not being absolute but overlapping, the approach in
terms of constraints and levels of interaction becomes very useful.

(b) LIR provides an alternative to the autocatalysis concept, essentially be
throwing out the auto and seeing all complex processes as resulting from
upward causation carried by their potentialities as well as actualities. On
the other hand, are constraints themselves absent or present? My answer
is both, in a dialectical relation that fleshes out the statement by
Kauffmann, Logan et al. that constraints are information and information is
constraints.

(c) Robin's term of intersubjective, applied to semantics, is a good one.
First, it brings semantics into the realm of real, energetic processes where
I believe it belongs. Once this is done, however, one can look at its
(semantics') absence not in an abstract manner, but in terms of its absent
and present properties, that I like to call actual and potential. The LIR
scheme then applies here too to the informational processes of interest.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Robin Faichney ro...@robinfaichney.org
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Friday, May 18, 2012 4:48 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Absence and life

Friday, May 18, 2012, 2:55:25 PM, Robert Ulanowicz wrote:

Another difference between Terry's narrative and my own is that he
keeps referring to the absential in terms of constraints. But
constraints are specific realities, not the absence thereof.

I'm a little doubtful about that, I got the impression that he views
constraints as causing absence, rather than being themselves
absential.

However, he seems to view semantics as absential, which to me is a
great mistake: inter/subjective, yes, but absent, no.

I must admit I have not read the book, merely viewed an on-line
presentation of some of the ideas:
http://fora.tv/2012/04/18/Incomplete_Nature_How_Mind_Emerged_From_Matter

--
Robin Faichney
http://www.robinfaichney.org/

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```

### [Fis] Fw: [Fwd: THEORY AND SCIENCE] From QTQ

```Dear FISers,

I also agree with Gyuri and disagree with QTQ. Sorry. I think it is clear that
manipulating chemicals or cells or even images of quasars is science and not
theory at a first level of understanding. But when one is involved in doing
those manipulations, theory is involved at a higher cognitive level, in a
dynamic relation to the experimental process, and both are informational in
nature.

There is nothing to be gained - no additional explanatory power in saying - A
is different from B
unless it is trivially the case. Where both physical actions and cognitive
processes are so closely intertwined as in science and theory, in the social
sciences as well as in my natural science examples, I think it is scientific
to look at logical overlaps or interactions. Information science is to be found
there, among other places.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Gyorgy Darvas
To: Pedro C. Marijuan ; fis@listas.unizar.es ; whhbs...@sina.com
Cc: mjs ; Joseph Brenner ; fislist
Sent: Tuesday, January 10, 2012 5:23 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: THEORY AND SCIENCE] From QTQ

I disagree!
Theory is a part, an important element of science.
Practice should check, can confirm or falsify a theory, but cannot replace or
discredit its mission.

As regards journals, my position is that they must give place to controversial
ideas. The task of a journal is to give forum for discussion. A journal (i.e.,
its editors) and the reviewers do not need to share the opinions put forward in
the submitted papers. Scientific truth can be met only if controversial ideas
are discussed. That means, scientific truth is shaped as a result of
discussion. The task of the reviewers is not to take over the responsibility
from the scientific community, to decide on the correctness of ideas, incl.
theories, expressed in the papers. (They can check whether the mathematical
derivations are not mistaken, experiments are documented and reproducible,
etc.) Ideas can be discussed if they are published for a wide circle of
scientists, so that anyone who wants could express her/his supporting or
controversial ideas and arguments. This is a key to the development of science.

Regards,
Gyuri

At 16:48 2012.01.10.ÿ, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

Mensaje original
Asunto: THEORY AND SCIENCE
Fecha: Tue, 10 Jan 2012 10:49:58 +0800
De: whhbs...@sina.com
Responder a: whhbs...@sina.com
Para: Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es, mjs m...@aiu.ac.jp,
Joseph Brenner joe.bren...@bluewin.ch , fislist fis@listas.unizar.es

Dear Pedro, Dear Marcin, Dear Joseph, Dear FIS Colleagues,

Theory is important and necessary, but theory is different from science,
theory is a growing view or hypothesis. We should remember Russell's paradox
and the third number of Math Crisis, we should remember Aristotle and Galileo,
and we shouldn't forget the article about MDMA by Jan Hendrik SchÃ¶n in 2002.
Let us remember history that go on record according to gubernatorial volition
usually. Furthermore, lie is not science, for example Hwang's cloning
experiments in stem-cell research.

Newton's mechanics is science, computer science is true, and however there is
no information science. The sole criterion for truth or science is practice.

Of course, after the Hwang affair, Scienceï¼ˆjournal ï¼‰gets its wrist
slapped for publishing a fraudulent stem-cell paper. Instead, the committee
recommends that papers received by the journal should be divided into
uncontroversial and controversial, and the latter gone over with a fine comb of
new check. Â This is a way to arrive at science, too.

BestÂ wishes

Â

QTQ

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fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Recent publications online:
- Mathematical description of a so far undisclosed symmetry of nature:
http://arxiv.org/abs/0811.3189v1
- Physical consequences of a new gauge-symmetry and the concluded
conservation law:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/g28q43v2112721r1/
- Spontaneous symmetry breaking in non-Euclidean systems:

http://www.springerlink.com/content/k272555u06q2074w/?p=14dd4c9c5b5e4c1396b3e4855a87e9e2pi=1

__
Gyorgy Darvas
E-mail / Skype;  S Y M M E T R I O N
Mailing address: c/o G. Darvas; 29 Eotvos St., Budapest, H-1067 Hungary
Phone: 36 (1) 302-6965;
Monograph: Symmetry;  Course of lectures
___

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```

### [Fis] Fw: There is no Information Science.

```Dear Pedro, Dear FIS Colleagues,

My thanks and I am sure that of all of us to Pedro for his clear statement of
FIS principles in relation to an informational science (IS) syllabus.

I would just like to suggest that reference to inter- and transdisciplinarity,
in some way, might help to avoid the artificial ordering of distinctions, by
focusing on what the disciplines involved in IS have in common.

Inter- and transdisciplinarity are taken quite seriously in Switzerland in
teaching and research in general at the university and doctoral levels, with
regular conferences at the Institut Kurt Boesch in Sion in the Valais. (Ref.:
Le défi de l'inter- et transdisciplinarité. Concepts, méthodes et pratiques
innovantes dans l'enseignement et la recherche. 2011. Darbellay, F. and T.
Paulsen. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes. In French
and German).

Best Season's Greetings,

Joseph

Dear FIS colleagues,

Thanks toMarcin for his well-thought reinterpretations of the blind men
parable. Time ago Iwas concerned about the reactions that the FIS project would
provoke amidst classical information science practitioners (very susceptible
blind men type).I was invited to some conferences in the field and could
realize that ingeneral the idea of a larger info science was very well
received, say the wayengineering minded parties would respond to ongoing
unification projects in paralleltheoretical fields. For them it was quite
timely, and sensible, in line withadvancements in quantum information science,
biological info-revolution, consciousnessstudies, information society, etc.
Besides it was seen within the convergence ofnew perspectives needed for data
driven research, data mining, network science, and so on.

It is quitedifficult, however, articulating a general syllabus for information
science –withouta previous consensus in some delicate matters, so often herein
discussed. Atthe time being an interesting option could be a “central themes”
core accompaniedby a spattering of introductory topics on info disciplines (or
subdisciplines).As I said, my experience teaching info history of societies and
bioinfo wasquite successful in terms of graduate students.  But I did not
venture in preparing the centralthemes part…Some posts have already made good
suggestions. The real teaching is the taste of the pudding, we badly need
that experience.

Finally, away to think on the relationship between the “mother” info science
and the “child”recombinatory info subdisciplines would again conduce to
something similar to theblind men parable. The problem is the inevitable loop
between info conceptions and disciplinary or philosophical stances. Let me put
it in this way: if information is taken as “distinction on the adjacent”, each
of the different science sbecomes “an artificial ordering of distinctions,
involving regimented perceptions, standardized actions, and logico-formal
structures and conceptualizations.”The syllabus discussion may continue more
easily through the distinctional bridge common to the informational and the
scientific... I think.

Best wishes

---Pedro

- Mensaje original -
De: m...@aiu.ac.jp
Fecha: Sábado, 17 de Diciembre de 2011, 2:00 pm
Asunto: Re: There is no Information Science.
A: whhbs...@sina.com, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es, fislist
fis@listas.unizar.es

Dear Tian-qing Qiao,

Thank you for sharing your view with us and for interesting
parable of five blind men and an elephant. However, I read the
moral of the story just the opposite way.

If we read this allegory with the elephant representing
information, it shows that Information Science with a broad
theory of information is necessary, unless we want to stay in
the position of the blind, who are using only practice, which
necessarily is limited to specific instances.

We know now that the view of Francis Bacon, who opposed
formulation of any theory which is not strictly a posteriori
result of inductive, purely empirical procedures faulty. Every
experiment or observation involves a priori theoretical
framework involving conceptualization of the problem (Kant) or
more down to earth simple fact that we need theoretical
description of the experimental procedures and equipment. We
know that positivistic idea of purely observational
statements is an illusion.

Moreover, there were many instances of important contributions
to scientific discoveries made by bold theoretical models
anticipating later experimental results. Schroedinger's little
book What is life? is a good example. It is his purely
theoretical concept of aperiodic crystals which stimulated
Crick in his later work with Watson on the structure of DNA.

Thus, we are in the position of the blind men who are
exploring an elephant, i.e. information, who can even measure
it. The actual breakthrough can come only when we have a
theory of information which ```

### Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

```Dear Gordana and Loet,

Ref.: Cat, Jordi. 2007. The Unity of Science. Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.

I think you are being too defensive vis à vis the conventional idea of
science. The authority of people who have decided to what information science
must be limited may be open to criticism as reductionist, and there are views
(see attached) that emphasize epistemological and ontological pluralism. As Cat
says, contra epistemological monism, there is no single methodology that
supports a single criterion of scientificity, nor a universal domain of its
applicability.

To keep the concept of information science as broad as possible, however,
implies a great deal of individual responsibility to insure high intellectual
standards, in or out of the mainstream. The definition of any science should
be determined by these and not by what is funded.

Cheers,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
To: Loet Leydesdorff
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 10:08 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

Dear Loet,

I think you made an important point.

It is really a problem if we use the same term Information Science for
different things.

What Information Science in the Web-of-Science's Science Citation Index
journals is about is something different from what we thought of.

Science in their case consists in systematization, description etc. - a
conventional idea of science about already existing artifacts and related
phenomena
addressed by already established methods.

That is why the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information
http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ (which is close to what we discuss within FIS)
is not titled Handbook on the Philosophy of Science of Information.

Maybe the field we have in mind is just Information or Foundations of
Information (that is how Brian Cantwell Smith calls it)?

Maybe that is why the journal Information is not in the Web-of-Science's
Science Citation Index.

Because we discuss things that are not mainstream and already existing.

However, this does not prevent us from trying to introduce into curricula
some basic knowledge that already is established in Foundations of Information.

In the similar way as it is introduced in the HPI, even though many things
are still under development.

Best,

Gordana

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: den 3 december 2011 18:08
To: m...@aiu.ac.jp; 'PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ'; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

Dear colleagues,

The category of Information and Library Science contains 40+ scholarly
journals in the Web-of-Science's Science Citation Index. Of these at least 10
can be identified as Information Science. The lead journal is the Journal of
the American Society for Information Science  Technology. May universities
have special schools for library and information science (LIS).

This is different from our discussions at this list about information
theory. Nevertheless, there is a problem with reinventing a wheel. J

Best wishes,

Loet

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor, University of Amsterdam

Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),

Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.

Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111

l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ ;
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en

-Original Message-
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of m...@aiu.ac.jp
Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 1:24 PM
To: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

Dear Colleagues:

There are some questions which periodically return to FIS discussions without
conclusive answers. For instance: What is information? However, the lack of
consensus regarding central concept is not an obstacle in the development of
Information Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question What
is life? But, this does not threaten the identity of Biology.

Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a commonly recognized
discipline. It is frequently confused with Computer Science, because of the
term Informatics which in Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or
with Library Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information, as
visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information
http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science interleave on many
levels.

Information Science will never receive recognition without an organized
effort of research community to introduce its philosophy, goals, methods, and
```

### [Fis] Fw: Discussion of Information Science Education

```Dear Marcin, Gordana, Loet, Krassimir and Colleagues,

I did not think I was going to participate in this discussion, being as I am so
far outside the place when curricula are established and syllabi needed.

Yet when I saw your message, Loet, I was concerned that something very
important in this exercise might be overlooked. Far from reinventing the
wheel, the necessity of the task, IMHO, is defined by the following snippets
from Marcin and Krassimir:

Information Science will never receive recognition without an organized
effort of the research  community to introduce its philosophy, goals,
methods, and achievements to the general

audience.

This is /our/  task, to lead such an effort, for which there may be little
precedent.

What we have to do? Of course, to establish a common paradigm !?! The great
problem here  is that every author stays on his own position and does not
accept the others. Well, I hope this  is temporary but it is not so short a
period.

Thus, the objective should not be a common, monolithic paradigm that everyone
will accept, but commitment to a reasoned, fallible process of selection and
commitment, with the goal of enabling something new to emerge.

Is this relevant to information science? Of course it is. Is what Loet refers
to relevant to information science? Of course it is. But both should find a
place in the syllabus.

Best wishes,

Joseph

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```

### Re: [Fis] Category Theory and Information. Back to Basics

```Dear Stan,

To return to your question, I think that there is a disjunction between our
usual logics and the actual, changing world but that it is fatal only in those
logics. Logic in Reality reduces to standard logic for simple process phenomena
involving minimal interactive aspects - those which science handles easily. But
LIR  applies to more complex phenomena whose evolution I would not consider
outside science. Could we say that LIR is a way of bringing change better
within science?

Thus my answer to your question is yes. LIR, to use your phrase, encompasses
change as it happens. It describes logical characteristics of the evolution of
processes in a multi-dimensional configuration space. The elements of the logic
are changing values of the actuality and potentiality of the elements in
interaction (e.g., system and environment). The disjunction thus becomes,
itself, a process describable by LIR.

I do not expect that people who wish to retain the characteristics of standard
category theory can accept the above any more than those who require that logic
refer only to propositions and their truth-values. I have said that a
conceptual mathematical theory applicable to my Logic in Reality is both
possible in principle and desirable. I only insist that none such yet exists,
since what does exist is eliminative with respect to the interactive realities
LIR attempts to discuss, among them information.

Cheers,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Stanley N Salthe
To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2011 11:16 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Category Theory and Information. Back to Basics

Joseph --

SS: Your objection seems to me to imply a fatal disjunction between our usual
logics -- the basis of science -- and the actual (changing) world.  For
example, in biological ontogeny we begin at one scale, and GRADUALLy assemble a
larger scale.  During this transition the system is ambiguous as to scale.  It
is CHANGE which faults our thinking here, not the idea that a developing embryo
can be modeled as existing at more than one scale.  I suppose you can then tell
us that your system of logic (LIR) takes care of this, by encompassing change
as it happens.  Yes?

STAN

For complex process phenomena such as information, involving
complementarity, overlap or physical interactions between elements, these
doctrines fail. The mathematical conceptualization they provide does not
capture the non-Markovian aspects of the processes involved for which no
algorithm can be written. If any algebra is possible, it must be a non-Boolean
one, something like that used in quantum mechanics extended to the macroscopic
level.

I have proposed a new categorial ontology in which the key categorial
feature is NON-separability. This concept would seem to apply to some of the
approaches to information which have been proposed recently, e.g. those of
Deacon and Ulanowicz. I would greatly welcome the opportunity to see if my
approach and its logic stand up to further scrutiny.

As Loet suggests, we must avoid confounding such a (more qualitative)
discourse with the standard one and translate meaningfully between them.
However this means, as a minimum, accepting the existence and validity of both,
as well as the possibility in principle of some areas of overlap, without
conflation.

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Gavin Ritz
To: 'Joseph Brenner'
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
Subject: RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
bothpractical and logical.

Hi there Joseph

This takes us

back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative

properties, or, better, over qualitative + quantitative properties.

Is this not a good reason to use category theory and a Topos (part of an
object), does not the axiom of “limits” and the axiom of “exponentiation- map
objects” deal philosophically with “quantity and limit” and “quality and
variety” concepts respectively.

Is this not the goal of category theory to explain the concepts in a
conceptual mathematical way.

Regards

Gavin

This for

me is the real area for discussion, and points to the need for both lines

being pursued, without excluding either.

- Original Message -
From: Gavin Ritz
To: 'Joseph Brenner'
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
Subject: RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
bothpractical and logical.

Hi there Joseph

This takes us

back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative

properties, or, better, over qualitative + quantitative properties.

Is this not a good reason to use category theory and a Topos (part of an
object), does not the axiom of “limits” and the axiom```

### [Fis] Fw: [Fwd: Re: FW: Meaning Information Theory]

```Dear Loet, Dear All,

Thank you, Loet, for this very clear expression of the state-of-the-art with
respect to a dynamic design or measure for meaningful information as associated
with negentropy. Today, I would view this position as the analytical skeleton
of the real three-level dynamics of information-as-process being described by
Deacon in his new book.

As I understand his view, one can only capture the origin of meaningful
information by reference to the detailed dynamics, basic thermodynamical,
biological and teleodynamical that are involved in real cogntive processes. At
several points, in discussing the role of constraints as /absences/ that
determine emergent phenomena, Deacon says that understanding this concept
requires a figure/background reversal in our thinking, a new metaphysical
sophistication and a willingness to intertwine perspectives. It also means
openness to rigorous thinking that must manage without proofs in the standard
sense, the failure of which should be obvious by now. Such an approach does,
however, take a lot more work and study.

I look forward to seeing ways of how best to accomplish this in future notes,
not only with respect to Deacon (and Brenner) but generally.

Best regards,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Loet Leydesdorff
To: 'Pedro C. Marijuan' ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Tuesday, October 25, 2011 8:53 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: FW: Meaning Information Theory] ---From Gavin

Dear Gavin,

The notion of meaningful information is associated with negentropy. It can only
be information within a system (e.g., an observer) which/who provides the
information with meaning. You can also consider it as observed information;
different from Shannon's information which remains expected information.

I agree that it is confusing. The origins are to be found with Brillouin (for
the formalism) and with Bateson who defined information as a difference which
makes a difference. Shannon-type information can be considered as only
differences (in a probability distribution). These first-order difference can
only make a difference for a system of reference. The specification of the
system of reference provides the information with dimensionality and thus
meaning.

The above is a static design. In the dynamic design (a la Brillouin), one can
use the Kullback-Leibler divergence measure to compare the a posteriori state
with the a priori one. However, this divergence (I) is necessarily positive
(Theil, 1972 for the proof); it is Shannon-type information. The only measure
of negative information (negentropy) is the mutual information in three or more
dimensions. Krippendorff (2009) showed that this signed information measure
(Yeung, 2008) can be considered as the difference between the redundancy
generated within the system and the Shannon-type information generated in the
interactions. One can compute with this measure (e.g., Leydesdorff, 2010). This
operationalized the difference which makes a difference: the result can be an
increase or decrease of the uncertainty that prevails in the observing system.

References:

Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York: Ballantine.

Brillouin, L. (1962). Science and Information Theory. New York: Academic Press.

Krippendorff, K. (2009). Information of Interactions in Complex Systems.
International Journal of General Systems, 38(6), 669-680.

Leydesdorff, L. (2010). Redundancy in Systems which Entertain a Model of
Themselves: Interaction Information and the Self-organization of Anticipation
Entropy, 12(1), 63-79; doi:10.3390/e12010063.

Theil, H. (1972). Statistical Decomposition Analysis. Amsterdam/ London:
North-Holland.

Yeung, R. W. (2008). Information Theory and Network Coding. New York, NY:
Springer.

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/

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### Re: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis - both practical and logical.

```Dear Michel, Jerry and Loet,

Welcome back to the fray, Jerry, but I recall a kind of gentlemen's
agreement we made at our meeting in Liège, namely, that I can find a place
for your theory, but you should reciprocally find a place for mine! In the
following, I will try to disentangle two major issues in the recent
exchanges.

1. Jerry's theory of Perplex Numbers, underlying his comments, is not a
physical theory. It is a model derived from some of the numerical
characteristics of the atomic structure of elements due in reality to
underlying physical constraints (e.g., the Pauli Exclusion Principle).

2. Mathematics captures some of the essential features of the information
content of chemical structures but by no means all of them. Are the
dynamics of atomic and chemical structures, and their potential for reaction
not also information?

3. There is no problem in talking about parity of iconic representations
as irregular, but if you say electrical, you bring in physics, the iconic
representations are no longer applicable, and modern chemical logic and
category theory are no longer adequate.

4. No practice of mathematics or proof theory could have applied to the
results of my own research nor could apply to recent major advances in, say,
organometallic catalytic chemistry (see any recent issue of SCIENCE).
Combinatorial chemistry and its efficacy for screening, in which I see Jerry
was personally successful, is only one, limited domain of chemistry.

5. Jerry's critique of Loet is perhaps justified, and I will pass on the
debate as whether chemoinformatics is a part of information theory or not.
My view is that talking about the identity of matter and three-tailed
Peircean graphs is diversionary. Jerry understates Rosen's contribution,
even if he is correct about the chemoinformatics aspects. Rosen's work is
valuable because his vision went beyond thermodynamic considerations to
concepts like anticipation which underlie some current systems approaches.

6. To conclude, the physical basis of chemical logic may be well
understood, but this chemical logic is an abstract, partial model of what
is going on. It cannot be an adequate basis for the informational processes
that occur in real chemical systems.

7. Loet and I can get back to a debate about morphology and information
theory on other grounds. As a reminder, on Oct. 14 Loet wrote: It seems to
me that the issue of morphology and its evolution is a red herring in a
discussion about information theory. A shape (e.g., a network) can be
described as a graph or also numerically. This numerical description can
easily be evaluated in terms of information theory. Information theory, also
offers options to develop measures for the evolution over time (such as,
Kullback-Leibler divergence, cf. Theil (1972).) This statement implies that
morphology or shapes cannot be dynamic processes and, again, if not fully
describable mathematically are lost to information theory. This takes us
back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative
properties, or, better, over qualitative + quantitative properties. This for
me is the real area for discussion, and points to the need for both lines
being pursued, without excluding either.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Michel Petitjean petitjean.chi...@gmail.com
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Monday, October 17, 2011 1:39 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis - both
practical and logical.

Dear Loet and dear Jerry,

2011/10/17 Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net:
Dear Jerry,
...
It may be easiest to raise some questions:

1. What is the equivalent in chemo-informatics of a bit of information?
Can
this be operationalized as a formula like Shannon's H?
2. Can one compute with this formula in fields other than chemistry? For
example, in economics; without using metaphors? (As if)
...

If (1) can be answered, thus chemoinformation enters in the field of
information theory. That would be a very strong result.
Alas, I am afraid that it can't. Sets of flexible 3D realized graphs
seem hard to give raise ti bits of information.
But I didn't proved that. Who knows, if a good mathematician can
answer to (1), it would be a great advance in the field.
And I did not speak about (2) ...

Best,
Michel.
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### [Fis] Category Theory and Information. Back to Basics

```Dear Gavin, Loet and Colleagues,

Gavin raises a fair question as to the reasons for my objection to the use of
category theory
with respect to information. My answer is that it suffers from the same
limitations as standard truth-functional logic, set theory and mereology:

Logic: absolute separation of premisses and conclusion
Set Theory: absolute separation of set and elements of the set
Mereology: absolute separation of part and whole
Category Theory: exhaustivity and absolute separation of elements of different
categories. (The logics of topoi are Boolean logics).

For complex process phenomena such as information, involving complementarity,
overlap or physical interactions between elements, these doctrines fail. The
mathematical conceptualization they provide does not capture the
non-Markovian aspects of the processes involved for which no algorithm can be
written. If any algebra is possible, it must be a non-Boolean one, something
like that used in quantum mechanics extended to the macroscopic level.

I have proposed a new categorial ontology in which the key categorial feature
is NON-separability. This concept would seem to apply to some of the approaches
to information which have been proposed recently, e.g. those of Deacon and
Ulanowicz. I would greatly welcome the opportunity to see if my approach and
its logic stand up to further scrutiny.

As Loet suggests, we must avoid confounding such a (more qualitative) discourse
with the standard one and translate meaningfully between them. However this
means, as a minimum, accepting the existence and validity of both, as well as
the possibility in principle of some areas of overlap, without conflation.

Best,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Gavin Ritz
To: 'Joseph Brenner'
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
Subject: RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
bothpractical and logical.

Hi there Joseph

This takes us

back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative

properties, or, better, over qualitative + quantitative properties.

Is this not a good reason to use category theory and a Topos (part of an
object), does not the axiom of limits and the axiom of exponentiation- map
objects deal philosophically with quantity and limit and quality and
variety concepts respectively.

Is this not the goal of category theory to explain the concepts in a conceptual
mathematical way.

Regards

Gavin

This for

me is the real area for discussion, and points to the need for both lines

being pursued, without excluding either.

- Original Message -
From: Gavin Ritz
To: 'Joseph Brenner'
Sent: Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
Subject: RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
bothpractical and logical.

Hi there Joseph

This takes us

back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative

properties, or, better, over qualitative + quantitative properties.

Is this not a good reason to use category theory and a Topos (part of an
object), does not the axiom of limits and the axiom of exponentiation- map
objects deal philosophically with quantity and limit and quality and
variety concepts respectively.

Is this not the goal of category theory to explain the concepts in a
conceptual mathematical way.

Regards

Gavin

This for

me is the real area for discussion, and points to the need for both lines

being pursued, without excluding either.

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### [Fis] Fw: Fw: On Varna and Deacon

```Dear Pedro, Dear Colleagues,

Pedro has suggested a very open framework for Varna next Summer which I think
we should all try to adapt for our own needs. What I mean by this is not to
follow it exactly but state explicitly what sort of form, of the kinds that
Pedro proposes, one is using in one's approach.

As to Deacon's work, I feel a little odd at having to defend it, but I see the
role he gives to thermodynamics is primarily as the necessary underlying
process. The focus of his book is on the further generation of form
(morphodynamics) and the characterization of living systems (teleodynamics) in
a rigorous manner. However, as in Logic in Reality, there are properties of
energy and aspects of absence which have been largely ignored, and it exactly
these that provide a further approach to the origin of life, evolution and the
information related to them. I do not think it is possible, from now on, to
talk about information without a minimum reference to the necessity of its
being defined in part negatively, by constraint, what is missing or the
informative power of absence.

People who insist on total proofs of a theory will not find them in Deacon's
work. What he has provided, in his own words, are proofs of principle that
should nevertheless lead one to rethink many of one's assumptions based on
standard notions of causality, emergence, signal and noise, etc. Especially,
Deacon insists on seeing the reciprocal complementarity of critical processes
at the chemical and biological level as a necessary, non-trivial feature of
evolution.

He has built on the work of people we know (or should know) - Kauffman,
Collier, Salthe and others. For an initial exposure to his approach, one can
try his 2010 article The Emergence of Self available on-line (open access).

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Pedro C. Marijuan
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Friday, October 14, 2011 10:43 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Information as form conveyed by data--Jamie Rose

Dear Joseph and colleagues,

Many thanks for the further reflections, which I share almost entirely --though
only partially regarding Deacon's approach. I have to read his new book, of
course, but a previous chapter in David  Gregersen book made me think that he
has not really exploited the constructive possibilities and opportunities of
the apophatic. Playing with absences is the bread and butter of biological
communication, and becomes quite a significant path to follow, but in a new
way, starting from it and without paying the thermodyn detour. My contention
(at least until I read the new book) is that rather than foundations for new
thought on information he has returned the thread to the thermodynamic
periphery. If we are explaining computers dynamisms for practical application
we should not enter into explaining the solid state physics of transistors;
obviously we can... but the backpack for the intellectual trip becomes full of
useless, boring stones.

What kind of definitory info consensus could we attempt this summer or in a
next FIS conference? My view on the usual multidisciplinary info discussions is
as follows:   we (eg, physicists) start from some X background, establish some
kinds of formal (or qualitative) relations M, and then conclude that Info is A.
Other disciplinary parties start from Y, apply relationships N, and conclude
that info is B. Further up, starting from Z, and applying relationships P, info
becomes C.

Then some parties try to directly interrelate A, B, and C (say, interconnecting
the different info forms); or more formally oriented people attempt a
pan-theorization on M,N,P (general theory); while the reflection on the X,Y,Z
commonalities and differences is scant. Actually in the current discussion we
are in one of the crucial points, chemical Y, say in the frontier between the
physical X and the biological Z. I would persist in it at the time being,
getting deeper than what we have trodden. In general, my view about an overall
strategy would be fixing the Z (bio) as the central paradigm, and subordinating
X and Y. Yes, naturalizing info at the center, and extending it to the other
realms with opportune modifications.

I have to leave Jamie's 2nd posting for next week (I have depleted my two
shots). It connects in my opinion with a very interesting message from Plamen
days ago that we have left undiscussed, on the complexity limits of biological
models. It dovetails with Rosen's and Conrad's works...

best wishes

---Pedro

Joseph Brenner escribió:
Dear Colleagues,

Taken together, the postings of Jamie and Pedro indicate a healthy
dissatisfaction with generally available conceptions of information and point
to the need for new ones. Their proposals here are certainly necessary but to
my mind not sufficient, at least as expressed. Thus, in my opinion,
applications of standards and norms for a definition of information, involving
a better```

### Re: [Fis] Fw: The General Information Theory of Sunik

```Dear Krassimir,

Thank you for bringing this document to our attention, for completeness. I
would have wished, however, that you had made some comment on it, putting it
into relation with your own work and, for example, that of Mark Burgin,
which are dismissed out of hand.

From my point of view, Sunik's work is another one of those major steps
backwards to an earlier, easier time when it was claimed that computer
algorithms could provide all you know, and all you need to know about
information. One example of a phrase the author presents as involving
meaning is Peter's shirt size. . .

From a methodological standpoint, I think it underlines, /a contrario/, the
danger of focus on a single approach to information. My current idea, which
I propose for discussion, is that a document purporting to offer a theory of
information should provide a reasoned, comparative discussion of 4 to 5
theories. This number is large enough for judgments to be possible on a
preferred approach and small enough for the average reader, like myself, to
keep the similarities and differences in mind.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Krassimir Markov mar...@foibg.com
To: FIS fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 12:00 PM
Subject: [Fis] Fw: General Information Theory

-Original Message-
From: boris.sunik
Sent: Monday, October 03, 2011 11:10 AM
To: ithea-...@ithea.org
Subject: General Information Theory

Dear Colleague,

For your information:
http://www.GeneralInformationTheory.com

Regards,
Boris Sunik

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### Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: CfP: Marx is Back - The Importance of...]

```Dear Colleagues,

I can understand Leslie's feeling that a discipline should not be reified -
this is the pathetic fallacy. But I completely agree with Pedro that science is
embedded in society and its role and function must be compatible with the
common good.

I note, in this connection, the recent book by the highly respected French
philosopher, François Flahault, What has happened to the Common Good? (Où est
passé le bien commun?)

Part of the force driving change, in part responsible for the resurgence of
interest in Marx and some of his followers, is the need to reestablish the
balance between individual rights and the duties that should accompany it, the
other half of the dialectic. New information science and technology have a
unique combination of factors that immediately raise ethical questions about
the use of resources by the society, the value of informational exchanges and
so on.

I would rather err on the side of too much emphasis on ethical aspects of
information science than of too little.

Best,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Pedro C. Marijuan
To: Leslie Smith
Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2011 1:29 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: CfP: Marx is Back - The Importance of...]

Thanks, Leslie, but I do not think that all disciplines are created equal.
For instance, electrotechnics and thermodynamics were crucial for the second
industrial revolution, and you can find in the writings of some of the most
prestigious researchers of that time the sense of social mission for their
research  applications, strongly in the wake of the social progress. In some
cases that we call revolutionary, maybe applying to the current info society
or info revolution, a new discipline promoting a new way of thinking becomes
not just like the typewriter writing a blank paper, but the general inspiration
for most of the authors, the canon to follow. In our times sustainability has
substituted for progress, and a mature info science, in the sense that Steven
and Shu-Kun were exchanging (I was happy to spend one of my two weekly shots
entering it), has interesting things to say about info-circulation, knowledge,
values, markets, planning, self-organization, democracy, etc. ---which
seemingly should be crucial for achieving sustainable societies.

best

---Pedro

Leslie Smith escribió:
Information science does not have a social mission, any more than
Mathematics or Statistics has a social mission.

Information scientists and Mathematicians often do have a social mission,
but that is not to say that their discipline has a social mission. Computers
(for example) can be used to aid democracy or tyranny, to help religions or
atheism or humanism, etc. You might as well ask what the social mission of a
typewriter is. It depends what is being typed.

--Leslie Smith

On 25 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

What is the social mission of information science?

Professor Leslie S. Smith B.Sc. Ph.D. SMIEEE,
Head, Institute of Computing Science and Mathematics, School of Natural
Sciences
University of Stirling,
Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland
l.s.sm...@cs.stir.ac.uk
Tel (44) 1786 467435 Fax (44) 1786 464551
www http://www.cs.stir.ac.uk/~lss/

The Sunday Times Scottish University of the Year 2009/2010
The University of Stirling is a charity registered in Scotland, number SC
011159.

--
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Telf: 34 976 71 3526 ( 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-

--

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### Re: [Fis] Greetings from Varna/FIS Summer School

```Dear Krassimir, Dear Pedro,

Many thanks again to you and your colleagues for all their hard work in making
the Varna Conference a success. I would just like to mention one aspect that
occurred to me of what might be called a New Information-Scientific Method, as
something that emerged from the Conference. This Method would involve looking
at the distinctions, but not absolute separations, that are associated with the
differences between mathematics and informatics, as defined by Krassimir, here,
just in terms of keywords:

· Mathematics: symbolic operators, standard logics, epistemology,
possibility, statics, subjects and objects, things, theoretical conclusions

· Informatics: natural operators, dialectical logics (Logic in Reality;
LIR), ontology, probability, dynamics, subject-objects, processes, practical
applications

Information is/is present in all these categories, and the Method would help to
insure that proper attention is given to opposites and their interaction.

In addition to the General Theory of Information of Mark Burgin and the General
Information Theory of Krassimir Markov, I consider that there are three major
additional approaches that should be taken into account for real progress in
the field of information: one is the Basic Theory of the Philosophy of
Information of Wu Kun, presented at the Beijing Conference in 2010, of which I
gave an overview in Varna, including its relation to LIR. The second is the
evolutionary approach of Terrence Deacon, who has recently defined What is
missing from theories of information in terms of an absence, giving functional
and ontological value to a negation that is very much in the spirit of LIR. The
third is the biologically-oriented Scientomics of Pedro Marijuan, in which
LIR has also a role to play. These five approaches will be, as far as I am
concerned, the base of any valid structure of information theory in the future.

As you will note, LIR is not proposed as a theory of information since it is
not one. However, it may be appropriate to consider it, in Pedro's metaphor, as
an oil for the wheels of the locomotive of information.

Cheers,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Pedro C. Marijuan
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Wednesday, June 29, 2011 1:32 PM
Subject: [Fis] Greetings from Varna/FIS Summer School

Dear FIS Colleagues,

The special GIT conference devoted to FIS topics just ended last Sunday. Five
people of this list (Marcin, Karl, Joseph, Krassimir and myself) plus other
researchers from Eastern countries participated in the sessions. The place was
a wonderful resort in the seaside, and the prices quite,quite economic. The
generous time slots for presentations and for relaxed general discussions have
been a novelty regarding the usual hurried fis conferences --and quite fruitful
an experience. Thanks are due to Krassimir for his knowhow, friendliness and
fine organization style.

So much we have enjoyed that we want to repeat the experience next year, now
with the novelty of expanding the schedule to a 4-5 days, as a FIS SUMMER
SCHOOL. The idea is that a few morning presentations (3-4 speakers) will be
followed by afternoon-evening discussions and by social activities open to
families and accompanying persons: trips, sailing, art exhibitions, bulgarian
musical performances  traditional dances, gastronomy...

As for contents, the proposal we elaborated has two main focus to develop
within an organized basis (mainly in the general discussions, but also in small
groups) :

-- The (un)definition of information: establishing a consensus on the most
parsimonious approach to the definition / undefinition of information, in the
quest of creating a future common standard. Coordinated by Marcin  Pedro.

-- The compendium of information theories: enlarging and deepening upon the
aspects discussed in our last fis focused-session, with the goal of compiling
the main approaches to info theory during last decades. Coordinated by Joseph
and Krassimir.

It is really difficult to summarize in a few lines how meaningful and
enjoyable was our time there. It will be even better next year!

Cordial regards

---Pedro

-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
50009 Zaragoza, Spain
Telf: 34 976 71 3526 ( 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
-

--

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### [Fis] The Key to Time. Naturalizing Matsuno

```
To: 'Koichiro Matsuno' ; 'Joseph Brenner' ; 'fis'
Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2011 7:42 AM
Subject: RE: [Fis] replies to several. The Key to Time

Dear Koichiro and colleagues,

Let me try to raise some questions. I find the language sometimes difficult.
Examples might help!

Ø  The underlying issue is how can we construct the flow of time from the
tenses.

In other words: time is a construct of language?

When the constant update of the present perfect tense in the present
progressive tense is referred to in the finished record,  we can perceive the
flow of time as driven by the transitive verb “update” in the present tense,
though only in retrospect.

This is a description of this construction process: how it works.

This updated version of the flow of time in retrospect exhibits a marked
contrast to the flow of time riding on the intransitive verb “flow” in the
present tense unconditionally, the latter of which is common to the standard
practice of physical sciences even including relativity.  The occurrence of the
perfect tense is due to the act of measurement of material origin
distinguishing between the before and after its own act, while its frequent
update in the progressive tense will be necessitated so as to meet various
conservation laws such as  material or energy flow continuity to be registered
in the record, e. g., not to leave the failure in meeting the flow continuity
behind. The KaiC hexamers of cyanobacteria are involved in the constant update
of the prefect tense in the progressive tense.

The “various conservation laws” are not a construct of language but
constraints on constructions in language? Have they always been these
constraints or only since the scientific revolution of the 17th century?

Ø   The flow of time read by the externalist, say, by Ptolemy-Newton, into an
invariant cyclic motion of the stellar configuration displayed over the sky is
enigmatic in relating a cyclic movement of physical bodies to a linear movement
of something else called time. A less ambitious approach could be to relate a
linear movement of physical bodies to the linear movement of time even if the
latter is an anthropocentric artifact, unless the artifact interferes with the
physical bodies. The flow of time read-into by the physicist implies no linear
flow of time in the absence of the physicist as leaving only the original
cyclic motions behind.

The original cyclic motions predate the reading. They are given? By whom and
in which language? (By God in the revelation of his creation, that is, in the
Bible?)

That must be quite stifling.  In contrast, appreciating the material
through-flow keeping the class identity of the supporting material aggregate as
being represented as the flow of time comes to imply that the through-flow is
informational in that it presumes both the message (e.g., the subunits to be
exchanged) and its dative (e.g., the aggregate processing their exchanges).
Both information and time, once set free from the read-into flow of time,  are
common in sharing the similar materialistic and energetic context in
incorporating the transitive verbs into themselves as holding the contrast
between the direct and the indirect object of a verb, that is to say, between a
message and its dative. Despite that, I am not quite sure at this moment
whether this synthetic view would merely be one step backward for the sake of
the likely two steps forward to come.

Is the dative of a message different from the third case in the declension?
Please, explain what you mean and provide perhaps an example.

“Both information and time”…? If “information” can be defined in terms of a
probability distribution, would “time” be definable as a frequency
distribution? Is that perhaps how I can understand these two to be juxtaposed
in this sentence?

(I would be inclined to consider time as “what is being communicated” when
frequencies are communicated.)

Best wishes,

Loet

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### [Fis] Fw: replies to several. The Key to Time

```Dear Koichiro,

I return to your pertinent summary of May 10 that led me to an unexpected
conclusion, half of which you may like and half you may not like. I apologize
in advance for the latter.

I feel that in point 3. of your note you describe a key to time but you do not
use it!

1. Cyanobacteria, and in my view all living and non-living systems, do not
exist in an external, background time, they synthesize or unroll it as they
develop, of course independently of language.  The absence of a background
space-time has also been proposed by Carlo Rovelli, among other cosmologists.

2. Synchronization, as I read your subsequent points 4. and 5., simply comes
out of the biochemistry, although no one is claiming, least of all I, that we
can know from basic principles why specific proteins do what they do.

3. Thus the difficulties you point to in your 2. could be just a consequence of
starting with the concept of time, defined as something that can progress
linearly, as an analytical tool.

4. In your points 6. and 7., you return to a concept of time that seems at
first to have been reified, separated from the real entities with which it is
associated, and made the product of a synthesis by information. The objective,
as you have written well earlier, is to better understand the interplay of what
we call the tenses in language.

5. In my view, however, phenomenological time is the consequence of the
interplay between real, physical entities. But then our views could be
reconciled if we could agree that, as I now propose, we consider information as
one of the energetic aspects of the existence of humans and other complex
systems! Time as the consequence of synthesis by information converges
towards, in this interpretation, time as the consequence of  synthesis by
(real) systems!

How is that for using time as a synthetic construction rather than as an
analytical tool?!

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Koichiro Matsuno
To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Tuesday, May 10, 2011 2:09 AM
Subject: RE: [Fis] replies to several

Folks,

Joseph wrote:

Two aspects of the exchange between Koichiro and Loet merit attention: 1) Loet
said that his point of replacing “why” with “what” did not seem necessary to
him. In my mind, however, when Koichiro refers to “what is communicated by
what”, he is insisting on not losing the qualitative components of the
information involved.

Let me make my points a little bit clearer.

1. Being empirical is not necessarily rational (e.g., Galilei’s empirical
inertia v.s. Aristotle’s rational telos).

2. Linear progression of time, say time (t+1) following time t, is already
a consequence of synchronization among the clocks available to us. A point of
clarification is that synchronization in the making as a necessary condition
for a meaningful integration into whatever context is not sure about whether it
could also proceed upon a linear progression of time. Suppose everybody asks
the nearest neighbor “what time do you have?”. The outcome might be somewhere
in between the two extremes of a successful synchronization in the end among
all of them on one hand and a total mess on the other.

3. Linguistic or theoretical access to synchronization in the making would
be hard to imagine when it is prohibited to refer to time as a comprehensible
analytical tool in advance. This does not however mean the end of the whole
issue. Empirical access to synchronization in the making is totally different.
Cyanobacteria as the first photosynthetic bacteria appeared on Earth could have
been quite successful in synchronizing their circadian clocks among them
without asking the help of our languages.

4. Addressing the theoretical question of what kinds of material means are
employed for the job of synchronization and why, goes far beyond our present
rational comprehension. Although the cyanobacterial circadian clocks employ
three different kinds of protein called KaiA, B and C for the job, we cannot
say for sure at this moment why these particular proteins would come to be
focused upon. This has been an irrevocable empirical fact.

5. Neuronal dynamics is full of synchronization in the making by means of
exchanging an extremely wide variety of chemical messengers, including for
instance acetylcholine, available empirically.

6. Even if we take a pause for a while for addressing the grandiose
why-questions, there may still remain some room for tailoring time for a
comprehensible analytical tool. Time is further qualified in terms of its
tense. There remains a likelihood of addressing how the actual dynamics would
proceed through the interplay between the different tenses, especially between
the present progressive and the present perfect tense.

7. Put it bluntly, information synthesizes the flow of time from scratch.

Cheers,

Koichiro

```

### [Fis] Fw: reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) dualism

```Dear Stan, Dear All,

My justification for pursuing this thread, if our leader agrees, is
that the Foundations of Information Science are not going to be all that
different from the Foundations of Science /tout court/, as seems to be
coming out.

I thus see that radical skepticism about science and fundamental religious
belief have
something in common: an aspect of irresponsibility. The believer says all
is
the will of God, including my tendency to behave badly, so I have no
responsibility to choose differently. The skeptic says that (all) science
is
a human construct, and has erred in the past, so I have no responsibility
to
choose that part of science to which this statement is inapplicable.
However,
if one is unable to learn enough to make that choice, then his skepticism is
unfounded.

My Post-post-modernism is, in my humble opinion, stepping forward again,
in a movement counter to Stan's stepping back :-), but one in which it is
accepted that absolute certainty is an illusion. Since I totally share
Stan's list of political establishments to be unseated (or at least
inhibited), to which I would add organized crime and the shadow elite, my
critique is offered to bring out the need for both approaches, and to hope
that their dual existence is seen as part of a broader dualism at the
basis of science.

The consequence for me is that Information Science must be able to discuss,
as rigorously as possible what it is that people like Assange, and their
opposnents actually do with and to information.

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Robert Ulanowicz u...@umces.edu
To: Stanley N Salthe ssal...@binghamton.edu
Cc: Karl Javorszky karl.javors...@gmail.com; Joseph Brenner
joe.bren...@bluewin.ch; u...@cbl.umces.edu
Sent: Friday, December 10, 2010 1:33 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) dualism

Stan, Karl, Joseph:

Karol Wojtyla described the relationship between science and religion
rather succinctly: Science prunes religion of superstition; religion
warns science against false absolutes.

Stan and legions of others are at work trying to deconstruct religion.
You all obviously don't need my help (although I do at times  appreciate
constructive de-mythologization).

Like Stan, however, I also view science in the postmodern vein as a
construct, and not a very solid one at that -- certainly no where near
the absolute that advocates of scientism claim it is. Just how tenuous
and far from absolute is not very well-appreciated.

That's the side of the dialog that I have been pursuing. I don't see
myself as deconstructing science, however. Far from it. I see my
directions as freeing science from puerile ideology in order to make
significant progress on serious problems via new approaches. Hubris?
Very possibly! But somebody needs to attempt that pathway.

Science makes for strange bedfellows! :)

Peace,
Bob

Quoting Stanley N Salthe ssal...@binghamton.edu:

in my first for the week, Replying to Joseph:

Dealing as I do with hierarchies and thermodynamics, I have come to the
postmodern conclusion that our explicit scientific knowledge is a
logical
construct -- unlike our intuitive 'knowledge' (viz. qualia) of the world
we
are IMMERSED IN.  In these scientifically-based efforts we create a
logical
simulacrum (which I call 'Nature') of The World.  Its basis is logic and
esthetic, but today it also passes through a pragmatic filter imposed by
those who pay for the science.  This latter bias works mostly in choice
of
study objects.  Stepping back from active engagement in the process of
gaining primary knowledge in these ways, I feel that I am these days
engaging in a renewed Natural Philosophy -- an attempt to construct a
scientifically based 'mythology' for moderns, meant as an alternative to
religious myths.  These latter importantly have also engaged, via
rituals,
the qualia we are immersed in.  Inasmuch as Natural Philosophy has no
such
practices associated with it, the primary function of the emerging
Nature is
to challenge the religiously based myths associated with the rituals in
an
attempt to unseat the associated political establishments (Rome, the
Caliphate, the Republican Party, etc.) that enforce them.

On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 7:54 AM, Joseph Brenner
joe.bren...@bluewin.chwrote:

Dear All,

In agreeing with Bob, I would like to point out that his critique is
not
theoretical philosophy. He is calling attention to something
essential
missing in the pictures and models of Stan and Karl, namely, 1) the
life
and blood of the world; 2) that that life and blood follows
different
rules than the entities in the models; 3) those rules are based on real
dualities of equal ontological purport: order and disorder, continuity
and
discontinuity, entropy and negentropy; etc.; and 4) these dualities
play
out in real interactions in biology, cognition```

### [Fis] Fw: INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (by Y.X.Zhong)

```Dear All,

I return to the original definition of this project because I am not satisfied
with its evolution. There are points in Professor Zhong's perspective on
(natural) intelligence that I still would like to call attention to, apart from
the connection between intelligence and information.

1. intelligence as wealth implies something acquired, a posteriori, from
experience, as well as some innate capacity for processing that experience.
There are thus two aspects and their interaction to be taken into account.

2. the secrets of intelligence, human thinking in particular could be sought
in the above.

3. how intelligence is produced by brains. Neurology and cognitive science
have provided fantastic new insights, and even possible semi-quantitative
measures of intelligence as capacity for processing some simple stimuli, but
something is still being missed.

I therefore make this plea for a phenomenological approach, recognizing that
since Petitot and Varela, responsible phenomenology, like responsible dualism,
can be naturalized, that is, made part of science.

A coherent phenomenological approach might for example distinguish between the
operation of intelligence leading to a variety of options vs. a simple
cognitive process ending in a more or less clear-cut thought.

In any case, I have taken to heart comments that suggest that I am trying
somehow to overturn the results, and subvert the use, of the scientific method.
As a physical scientist, I can only conclude that I have badly expressed my
intention, which is to support physical science by pointing out aspects and
implications that may have been missed, due to a reliance on classical logic.

Thus I have a positive reaction to Pedro's concept of trialism, since my
logical approach is ternary, but the connection should be explored in another
thread.

Thanks and best wishes,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: Pedro C. Marijuan
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Friday, November 05, 2010 1:55 PM
Subject: [Fis] INTELLIGENCE  INFORMATION (by Y.X.Zhong)

Intelligence and Information

Yi-Xin-Zhong

Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing100876, China

yxzh...@ieee.org

1. The Study of Intelligence Science

Intelligence has been very well regarded as the most valuable wealth for
mankind, compared with other attributions like constitution and strength, and
the study of intelligence science should therefore be the greatest issue in
modern science and most urgent demand from human society, particularly for the
21st century.

The study of intelligence is consisted of two branches,  i.e., natural
intelligence study and artificial intelligence study. The aim for the former is
to explore the secrets of intelligence, human thinking in particular.
Neurological science and cognitive science are typical disciplines in this
field. The aim for the latter is to create intelligent machines based on the
understanding of the secrets of intelligence. The two branches are closely
related to, and mutually interacted to, each other.

The crucial problem that is still widely open to the study of intelligence is
the great mystery on how it is produced by brains. The major problem that the
study of artificial intelligence confronts is how to effectively reproduce
intelligence on computing machineries.

During the past decades, the studies of both branches have made good progresses
but at the same time faced difficulties and challenges too. For the information
about the progress made in neurology and cognitive science, please see the
reference [1] and for the detailed progress in artificial intelligence, please
refer to the references [2-3].

2. The Problems of Artificial Intelligence

One of the major problems and challenges that the study of artificial
intelligence confronts is that there have been three schools carrying on the
same study with different approaches, namely the structuralism approach (neural
network systems), the functionalism approach (expert systems), and the
behaviorism approach (sensor-motor systems), and they never cooperate with each
other. There has been no unified theory in the field so far. Moreover, none of
the three schools have paid necessary attentions to such issues as
consciousness, emotion and cognition that are extremely fundamental to the
study of intelligence. In the meantime, there is little cooperation with the
study of natural intelligence.

Another big problem existing in the fields of intelligence study, also in other
scientific fields of course, is the methodological issue. Researchers have been
used to the traditional methodology called divide and conquer. They divided
the study of intelligence into different respects (the structural respect, the
functional respect, and the behavioral respect), and carried on the research
within the limits of each respect of intelligence. As a result, each one of
them cannot individually get the global picture of ```

### Re: [Fis] Fw: INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION: A Charicature. Psychology

```Dear Loet,

You have opened up what may be an important box, and we need to see if it is
Pandora's or Sophia's! Does not your note imply the following questions:

1. Intelligence is a well-defined subject of studies in psychology, but is it a
well-defined subject?
2. If intelligence is a well-defined subject of studies, should not this be
part of the solution, rather than the problem?
3. Are we to conclude that all we non-psychologists can know is that, with due
respect to your wife, psychologists know better what intelligence is? Is
there a process view of intelligence in psychology?
4. Since we have more or less agreed that consciousness, information and
knowledge are all critical to the understanding of intelligence, do we conclude
that psychologists also have appropriate, adequately complex notions of these
that we can learn from or contribute to?
5. Thus, are you saying that if we are using an inappropriate paradigm for
studying intelligence, psychology is the appropriate one?
6. If so, that is, if psychology is the most appropriate paradigm, what support
does it have or require from other disciplines that are relative to point 4
above, especially information?

Shall we see where this track might lead?

Best wishes,

Joseph

- Original Message -
From: Loet Leydesdorff
To: 'Joseph Brenner' ; 'fis'
Sent: Sunday, November 21, 2010 10:39 PM
Subject: RE: [Fis] Fw: INTELLIGENCE  INFORMATION: A Charicature

Dear Joseph,

It seems to me that part of the problem is that “intelligence” is a
well-defined subject of studies within psychology. (I happen to be married with
a psychologist.)

Perhaps, this is an example of scholars discussing a subject using an
inappropriate paradigm. J

Best wishes,

Loet

--

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR),
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of Joseph Brenner
Sent: Sunday, November 21, 2010 9:36 PM
To: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: INTELLIGENCE  INFORMATION: A Charicature

Dear Colleagues,

I have just gone back over the discussion of Intelligence and Information to
try to extract the major new thoughts and my conclusion is one of frustration.
The introduction of the other thread of the fis digest confused me further,
since I could not follow its intention or objective. I have thus charicatured
the situation as follows:

1. Intelligence has something to do with information, but it is not clear
which constitutes the other.

2. It might be possible to measure intelligence, but no-one knows how, or
whether it is necessary or desirable.

3. Some lower level biological structures could be considered as displaying
intelligence, but the term adds little to the observation of their behavior.

4. Similarly, human beings appear to have multiple capacities that can be
characterized as intelligences, but again the term has no explanatory power
over and above the biological or cognitive capacities themselves.

Perhaps the first conclusion from the above is that all approaches that tend
to reify intelligence, to make it a thing rather than a pattern or process
should be thrown out at once. We would then agree that intelligence is
polysemic, and try to explain how the conceptions differ. For example, a basic
question to be answered before looking for the mechanism for the growth of
intelligence is if and how intelligence or intelligences change, increase or
decrease. Another: what is the relation of intelligence to the process of
acquiring knowledge (rather than to knowledge itself) and then, how is this to
be differentiated from learning?

If someone can produce a real synthesis of the discussion that would
completely deconstruct the above I would be the first to applaud it.

Sincerely,

Joseph

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### Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 543, Issue 19

```Dear Pedro,

I beg your indulgence (3rd note) to make one point: Pedro wrote: I
understand Joseph lamentations, but do not share them, as logical
clarification of an intrinsically evolutionary phenomenon --without any
major discontinuity-- as intelligence is (at least in my view), becomes too
big or too daring an undertaking.

Such a logical clarification would be undertaken only by a classical
logician, not by me, and it would not clarify anything. I am sorry if my
caricature implied this. If anything, my logic supports populational
thinking and a doctrine of limitation.

Thank you and best wishes,

Joseph

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