[Fis] Gyuri's Post . . .

2017-01-19 Thread Marcus Abundis
Gyuri , thanks for your informative post (which Otto seems to agree wth?),

The essence of what I now understand (I think) is that the amounts of mass
involved in LHC  experiments is so small that there is little-to-no chance
of gravitational force (collapse) exceeding nuclear forces, such that
atomic electron shells would spontaneously collapse.
(Is it not the strong nuclear force the maintains electron shells, or is it
electron momentum that allows those shells to persist?)

It would seem to me that the mathematical formulas and values involved here
would be fairly well known (are they not?) such that a reasonable
'calculation of risk' is easily determined(?).

The experiments at LHC don't even involve full atoms, do they? I thought it
was merely proton smashing that they were doing. If it is just protons they
are using, the argument for any type of spontaneous bh collapse seems to
become even more removed, due to even smaller amounts of involved mass.

If I am misguided in any of my thoughts, I would appreciate being corrected
. . . as I said, I am here to learn. Thanks!

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[Fis] Toward a Calculus of Redundancy

2017-01-19 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi Loet,

The notion of a calculus of redundancy has much appeal, so I was looking
more closely at the linked paper you posted. Still, I am not sure I follow
what is presented (help?) . . .

> Whereas the generation of Shannon-type information is coupled to the
second law of thermodynamics <
• The first line in the abstract seems to make an unexamined
claim/assertion. The linking of Shannon entropy and thermodynamic entropy
does not seem to me to be a foregone matter. Deacon's work examines this
aspect (in his own way) and at least offers a type of "entropic analysis"
as a way to join these two facets. Further, I have argued (privately) with
Terry that a purely thermodynamic view cannot possibly reconcile to a true
physics based model  (he may agree). This severely limits the usefulness of
a thermodynamic "starting point." As such, later in that first sentence
when you mention 'maximum entropy' I am unclear what entropy *exactly* you
are speaking of?

> The dynamics of discursive knowledge production thus infuse . . . <
• The second sentence then suggests the first assertion allows one to
'discursively' progress from one subject to another(?), where I cannot even
see a discursive link between one object role and another (per my note

I am unsure if I am completely misreading what is presented, so  I thought
I should at least ask, and hopefully be corrected. This 'rough start' of
mine prevents me from proceeding much deeper into the paper. Thanks!

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[Fis] Curiouser and Curiouser . . .

2017-01-11 Thread Marcus Abundis
Yes, Happy New Year to all! . . . But, I confess to some confusion.

● On seeing the offered New Years session, I wondered 'Why? Hasn't this
issue long been overtaken by events?' Still I was happy to follow along and
see if I might learn something new . . . but it seems my initial intuition
was correct(?) I am still looking for more specific comments to be offered
by Prof. Rossler.

● And then there is matter of 'old business' that is still being discussed!?
John Collier's note left me wondering what his latest version of his own
model looked like (John: could you please send me a recent draft, that I
might study it more closely?)
I know of Terry's work already and feel I know if fairly well, although I
look forward to hearing more recent developments.
I have my own offering on this front (re June-July FIS session) which can
be found at
Both Terry and John have influenced my own thinking on this matter (I
easily confess).

● Re Alex H's post . . . I have some general sympathy for the view he
offered, but I thought this was the type histrionic commentary that was not
going to be tolerated any more? It would be nice to see firm critical
thinking as the lingua franca here . . .

● I echo Terry's interest in Loet's note on a calculus of redundancy, and
hope to hear more.

● I am happy to follow any direction this New Year's session ultimately
follows . . . but I also confess to holding more innate interest in
continuing the exploration of 'the essence of information' vein initiated
late December. In my now-almost-two-years with FIS, this one topic
continually re-surfaces whenever the 'named session topic' seems to loose
steam. It is for that recurrent reason that I thought to make my own
offering last June-July, but we know how that went . . .

I look forward to further guidance, and to contributing when and where I
can . . .

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[Fis] The Meaning of Meaning (or Information) . . .

2016-11-15 Thread Marcus Abundis
A talk was recently posted where Searle and Floridi broach this matter, but
from a foundational vista and framed in a context of artificial
intelligence. For those who have not seen it:

My own few exchanges with Searle on this issue, and on biological
naturalism, eventually resulted in this summary "map" of the issues:
This seems germane given the groups recent interest in intelligence.

Also, overlaid on this map is a cursory view of the model I offered in the
June-July FIS session. How might this map (or such a map) be improved to
afford a comprehensive view of information in *all* of its intended and
necessary "meanings"? Such "synthetic thinking" seems needed to resolve a
BASIS for beginning one's analysis, rather than holding fast to one's more
historic views. I touched on this earlier in raising the matter of
"cultural legacy" for this group. The shared aim, rather, I would think,
would be to avoid more "disappointing and bizarre" presentations of
information, meaning, and intelligence – and find some actual progress.

For example, any "pre-scientific" label seems like a disingenuous
dismissal. All one need do is pick some "point in time" and then use a
current view to dismiss something as "pre-xyz" – where in fact, all species
have long been involved in a de facto "science of survival".

And then there is the matter of looking PAST agent based models, and
directly addressing the physical. I think the referenced map attempts to
incorporate all notions within one system of thought.

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[Fis] Is quantum information the basis of spacetime?

2016-11-12 Thread Marcus Abundis
Further to John's original note . . .
and then to Pedro's further note
> It would neatly apply to the living but also to the physical <

This is, of course, a recurring issue for FIS – the matter of meaning . . .
or even, what is "information?"
When it comes to defining "meaning" (or information) I have found it
infinitely more useful to think of things in terms of pure "functional
significance" rather than agents, as some (many?) seem disposed to do in
this group.
I too, used to be part of "that camp," but plainly no longer. Close
examination "showed me the light."

When considering things in terms of "functional significance" one must
confront the need to address "meaning" in terms of both the living and the
physical . . . and their necessarily entangled nature. Failing to "make
that connection" simply leaves one with an explanatory gap. And then, once
connected, a further link to "space-time" is also easily located . . .

Further, it is profoundly odd/confusing/puzzling how this matter of
meaning, which is plainly a key issue for FIS continues to "float around."
But then, when the group is offered a serious(?) opportunity to engage with
the topic it seemed to draw very little legitimate energy or dialogue?! I
am happy to let that moment pass, but I do remain *curious* about WHY this
is the case for FIS – and invite private communications that offer insight.
Also, for those with genuine interest, the admittedly weak supporting
papers that went with that now-past session re meaning have been updated,
and are available on request.

Re Mark's note . . . I agree Floridi's view of an informational world is
highly speculative, and I would even say overblown, simply in an effort to
claim some novel ground? But then I also think I agree with Mark for
different reasons.

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[Fis] Apology

2016-08-08 Thread Marcus Abundis
Dear FIS members,

Further to Krassimir's post of 23 July, I offer the FIS steering
committee and FIS members my apologies for the strong language used in my
closing notes on 15 July. Also, I apologize for my delay in responding to
Krassimir's note as I had not seen his post (I was no longer receiving FIS

Thank you for your attention.
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[Fis] Closing Notes (A Priori Modeling)

2016-07-15 Thread Marcus Abundis
Dear Pedro,

Thank you for your surprisingly shameless and preemptive session closing.
This spares you a need to explain “freewheeling speculation” and to convey
actual intellectual content. I hoped for a better show of your intellectual
bravura, or perhaps, that was it?

Still, failure to incite my FIS colleagues to a worthy study of a “theory
of meaning” is *my* responsibility. Thus, I see Pedro’s post as inviting me
to make my closing notes. I now head toward into we may *actually* call
freewheeling speculation.

In my 13 July post, I note four items in Josephson’s talk. First is a
dual-material aspect. A dual aspect is so plain to me in developing my
model that I easily assert: models without a clearly named/unified
dual-material aspect must be ignored. They cannot answer Chalmers’s Hard
Problem or a data/symbol grounding problem – this is a “no brainer.” Life
is too short to spend time with lesser views. But I do not go as far as
Hector’s 29 June post:
> Shannon entropy should not even be mentioned any longer in serious <
> discussions about information, we moved on a long time ago (unfortunately
> not even many physicists have done) <

This assertion is equally naive. Gains from Shannon’s quantitative model
cannot be lost. The question is NOW more of how do we extend Shannon’s view
to *qualitative* roles? (Jerry’s undefined “punctuation”?) Still, to
Hector’s point, the 1920’s Cultural Legacy Shannon (1949) left us
(“disappointing and bizarre”) must be reduced to ash! The use of
“information” in any Shannon context must be replaced with “data.” Again,
life is too short to waste *more* time debating the issue – any striving to
impishly aggrandize one’s work by further fomenting false (disappointing
and bizarre) informational views must be TORCHED! We occupy the 21st
century, and only “forward thinking” will offer new gains (insert tired
Einstein quote). Josephson, even if crudely stated, correctly sees the
matter as a “theory of meaning” will define the 21st century! Anyone
failing to see this is too myopic to ponder “meaning,” unequal to the
challenge, or an intellectual coward . . . where we define ourselves by our

But JUST a *dual aspect* helps little as it has no generative value. It
does not *even* reach to the level of a Hegelian dialectic, it cannot
explain evolution. And, if a “model of meaning” cannot improve dialectic
adaptivity it is surely meaningless! My model thus entails a
dualistic-triune view for *minimal* creative/evolutionary roles. Again,
“modeled meaning” that fails to frame creativity or evolution in *some* way
must be ignored. It is DOA (dead on arrival) with no explanatory power. I
have seen enough false leads here that I have no more patience or interest.

Josephson’s third point “that a new way of thinking is needed” should be
plain to any thoughtful individual (tired Einstein quote). But “new
thinking” that is not to be “new age” requires firm organizing principles,
rather than airy posturing. As noted before, “exclaiming a problem” does
not “answer the problem.” The hard truth is many poseurs, of all stripe,
reactively seek some “glimmer of glory,” while actually muddying the
critical thinking needed to realize a project; witness Brenner’s
long-defeated (dating to Hegel) and oft-repeated LIR plea. This concerns a
crass Cultural Legacy – Max Planck, asked about later acceptance of his
theory, is quoted to say “the theory was not accepted, its critics merely
died.” This is reframed as “Science advances one funeral at a time.“ All
Cultural Legacies creep to their death by dint of true mortality. But
without a true supportive/creative “womb,” acute gains then come only if we
seek fertile ground elsewhere . . . otherwise, we must resign humanity to
merely finding an inevitable evolutionary terminus.

Josephson’s third point that “a theory of meaning will likely displace
quantum mechanics (QM), as QM displaced Newtonian mechanics” is an
intriguing and difficult claim. I prefer a more watchful position, even if
I too see the potential. It is this disruptive role that *may* define the
21st century. Still, I have two reactions here. Foremost of what keeps me
from “jumping in” is that I am unsure of my own dualistic-triune view, as
it feels unfinished. There are many-but-limited ways to show a
dualistic-triune organizing principle. This speaks to basic “connections
and topology” that Josephson also notes, although he offers no model. Can
that topology be shown within an UTI? I am unsure, but many indicators
suggest the answer is “Yes!” Finding that answer lies at the heart of what
I see as a likely research project. My “start” at this research is entailed
in paper #4 – I hoped to see some worthy collaborators here, but none seem
evident? Per Michel – Alas!

The second part of my “watchful view” is whether a theory of meaning can
transcend quantum mechanics. I have looked closely (not exhaustively) at
quantum mechanics and quantum computing, and I feel easier about this

Re: [Fis] Reply to John & Jerry (7 July Posts)

2016-07-14 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi Jerry,

For some reason your latest post does not seem to appear on the FIS
list – but still, I shall reply. In my note to your 7July post I said I was
unsure if you were confusing the earlier Biomathics session and the current
A Priori Modeling session – as they are two very different projects. From
your latest comments I now see you have clearly confused the two sessions.

My earlier note to you on "a priori," as in:
"A priori justification is a type of epistemic justification that is, in
some sense, independent of experience."
was intended to gently point out that your "relative to other uses" comment
was confusing *a priori* with "ontology," where in the later case several
ontological classes can be named:
You then go on to repeatedly insist that:
> either a conceptual or intuitive knowledge of interpretation of signs and
associated symbol systems. <
is needed for effective modeling.
• You may notice that notions of conceptual, intuitive, interpretive, and
symbols all imply some type of experiential role (i.e., not *a priori* per
SEP). Still, this is not to deny the true utility of ontological modeling –
your view here is just misplaced relative to the current session.

You also state that you "do not see a foundational significance" in the
use of Shannon, Bateson, or Darwinian based models, oddly juxtaposed to
"Metaphysics is no substitute for foundations of science. Semiotics is
critical for transcending disciplinary boundaries." There seems to be an
oddly unexamined contradiction in this assertion.

So to paraphrase your note:
"I fear that you totally misread the origins and meanings of *this
The most helpful thing you might do for the *current session* is to read
the introductory text and reorient your comments.

I too offer you my "Best wishes for your continued personal and
professional growth."



On Wed, Jul 13, 2016 at 5:00 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Marcus, List:
> Comments inserted.  And comment on your concluding comment.
> On Jul 9, 2016, at 7:59 AM, Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com> wrote:
> JERRY (re 7 July post):
> Thanks for this note . . .
> > I find the term “a priori” to be rather mis-leading <
> > *relative to other usages*. < [emphasis added]
> • Your reservation is reasonable – in fact this can be said of any attempt
> at *any* “ontological modeling.”
> I strongly disagree. Ontological modeling can be powerful, compelling and
> useful. However, it requires either a conceptual or intuitive knowledge of
> interpretation of signs and associated symbol systems.
> >“a priori” does not encompass the deep practical problems<
> • Assuredly true! I can go further and say this is a typical (chronic?)
> risk in using analytic philosophy (e.g., thought experiments); I target a
> middle ground of pragmatism.
> I strongly disagree.
> I repeat:
> However, it requires either a conceptual or intuitive knowledge of
> interpretation of signs and associated symbol systems.
> > one may say your artificial terminology *only concerns* <
> > the punctuation of Shannon-informed sentences.<  [emphasis added]
> • If I understand you correctly (nice phrasing!), I would say *builds
> upon* rather than “only concerns.”
> I strongly disagree.
> Your notation is completely constrained to the indexing aspect of
> information.
> That is the nature of Boolean algebra.
> As noted in other posts, I use Shannon, Bateson, Darwin (accepted
> universal aspects?) as structural fundaments. So, of course, Shannon is
> there, but not to the exclusion to other “meaningful” aspects.
> I do not see a foundational significance to these statements.
> > align with certain of Pedro’s views . . . except the <
> > dynamics are more perplex than he implies.<
> • I too agree, especially the later. Pedro seems to hold a view that he
> and I disagree, but I have difficulty seeing much to oppose. MAYBE our
> disagreement is in whether one preferences a biological view over a
> physical view (per note to John above). In some respects, this also seems
> to be Loet’s argument with Pedro(?). My sense is that a *bio-physical
> account* is needed – which I think aligns with Steven Ericsson-Zenith’s
> thoughts, and which I think Terry Deacon targets as well.
> Metaphysics is no substitute for foundations of science. Semiotics is
> critical for transcending disciplinary boundaries.
> > a comment about the “Integral Biomathics” hypothesis. In<
> > my opinion, it is

[Fis] Cultural Legacy Redux (Freewheeling Speculation)

2016-07-12 Thread Marcus Abundis
Greetings to all,

This A Priori Modeling session began Thursday, 16 June, and today marks
four weeks. As “session leader” some meta-comments seem needed. In gauging
our progress, a sense akin to that in Terry Deacon’s 30 Jan 2015 post comes
to mind:
> . . . I haven't felt that the specific components of <
> this proposal have been addressed in this thread. <
• Likewise, I feel frustrated with the session and I am unsure of how to
address the issue. Still, I feel the best service I can offer FIS is to say
“something” – even if I risk sounding patronizing, pedantic, or [insert
your favorite pejorative].

I watched the video of Brian Josephson’s talk (Plamen, thank you for
sharing this). Four things from that talk struck me: 1) the dual-aspect he
argues for [as I also do in this session], 2) I paraphrase – “a theory of
meaning will likely displace quantum mechanics (QM), just as QM displaced
Newtonian mechanics,” 3) the need for a fundamentally new way of viewing
the world, and 4) seemingly *HUGE* gaps in his thinking on the subject. I
then compare those points with a “freewheeling speculation” label given to
the current session by the FIS moderator . . . and my mind again turns to
Cultural Legacy (re prior post).

Normally, I react to “freewheeling assaults” with humor or resigned
stoicism. But, in watching Josephson’s talk (point #2) I am reminded that I
should not let the comment pass – as the importance of what is at risk is
too great! First, humanity’s MAIN ADAPTIVE ROLE is “information,” if
someone questions that fact I invite you to post your view and I will
happily “reply.” Second, *absurdly ambitious* projects as the one now
before us, *DEMAND* strong “intellectual blood sport.” Only if done *here*
(in relative “safety”) can a model walk onto the world stage. This “honing”
requires a group setting – and I am not shy about this intellectual
reality, I hunger for it. But then, the level of constructive engagement
here has been acutely lacking.

So, the matter remains . . . is FIS culture equal to the challenge? Is
this lofty aim part of FIS’s legacy? I am unsure – but if I take my work
seriously I must find out. Without needing to defame FIS, IS4IS, or?, I
only need to find a firm forum for building/vetting an actual “theory of

Superficially, a “theory of meaning” seems to fall within FIS’s
purview. Initial prompts-and-pokes from António and Annette (in June) set
us off in a good direction, along with some ensuing simple clarifying
posts. Emanuel then gives us his “bizarre judgement.” Shortly after, I am
treated to a simplistic retelling of *my own view* (twice?) as oddly
arguing against the view I offer? – a rather Kafkaesque experience. This
then ripens into “freewheeling speculation, badly [in need] of
Schrodinger's disclaimer”. All this occurs in the face of available
material, given near the session’s beginning, and that directly addresses
the contested issues.

   Such assaults without intellectual content, while entertaining in
themselves, can be dismissed, but when they are given by senior members
(privately, I have had a few) of FIS or IS4IS, this speaks strongly to “A
Culture.” I have no need to change this culture, but in the conduct of
*this session* I sadly find it necessary to “name that culture.” To be
clear, this does not typify ALL senior members, but I have seen enough now
that I feel compelled to remark on its unhelpful presence.

As such, for the remainder of the session (however long Pedro decides
it should last), I ask that posting members be careful to include some
actual intellectual content with their next insult (i.e., SPECIFIC comments
on the offered model). In the end, if I am simply able to locate one or two
happy, like minded, and qualified individuals with whom I might work, I
will have achieved all that I need.

Thank you for your understanding.

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[Fis] Notes on Pedro's 8 July Post

2016-07-10 Thread Marcus Abundis
Dear Pedro,
Thank you for the added Mechanics info., I will study the archives to
see what else I find.

> strictly remaining within Shannon's and anthropocentric <
> discourse boundaries there is no way out. <
• Still in “raging agreement” – thus my S-B-D (Shannon, Bateson, Darwin)
model. I think few people here disagree with your view (except: Søren’s
Cybersemiotic Star?, and?).

> machine communication is [not] going to advance the <
> generalization either (but who knows? . . . my personal <
> bet is for reconsidering evolutionary origins . . . <
• A reason to for Darwin+ surely? I agree somewhat with this view. I don’t
*claim* a computable UTI is possible – I only think we can do better than
we have, to date. I admit to “cautious optimism” but I also see much work
would remain! Realizing a research project (after this session) toward that
“much work” is my central aim.

> attending to the infrastructure of our cellular [and] <
> bacterial origins . . we share parts [in our] curiosity.<
• This seems an oddly vague reply to a direct question in my 7 July post:
“DO YOU SEE ‘Shannon, Bateson, and Darwin’ as true ‘information
universals’? If YES, we agree – if NOT, please explain how they ARE NOT.”
I belabor the point as it marks a key issue. If we agree on S-B-D on top of
your “three basic points about that: universals, species-specificity, and
essential cores” (also detailed in the introductory text) this *might* mark

In your note to Loet . . .
> That "biology as a science itself is communication" is a<
> strange argument. <
• I admit to confusion. At times I see this as the view you argue for –
prior “expertise” – in your posts (also “contra UTI”). I have difficulty in
exactly grasping both your and Loet’s views. Maybe it has to do with
differences in your intended meaning for “communication” and “information”
here? Or, maybe my a priori (narrow) focus makes the posts seem unclear (to
me) . . .

>Rather than closing doors, establishing multidisciplinary<
> teams and directions is the new [FIS?] mantra.<
• What strikes me here is that multidisciplinary roles are *de regueur*
(typical) in business but de novo to academia.  So, as Michel notes, “I
fully agree!” But “with what” as an organizing principle? Given your
earlier biological notes, this does seem “new.” So, if this is the “new
direction” it should be interesting for you to opine on the merit of an
S-B-D (multidisciplinary) view. I remain eager to hear your S-B-D thoughts
(re organizing principles).

In your note to Jerry . . .
> It is a pity so few biophysical approaches [emphasize] <
> the problems of molecular recognition and complexity. <
• Again, as Michel notes “I fully agree!” For purposes of *this* session, I
only assert that complexity exceeds an “a priori aim.” Still, I think that
the import *here* is we ALSO seem to agree on a bio-physical necessity, no?
– new? This seems to imply that you also *now* consider plausible UTIs?!
Your note “on molecular recognition” I think also extends (i.e.,
information continuum) into quantum mechanics, quantum puddles, etc. – also
stressing a bio-physical view.

> difficult establishing appropriate ontologies on the <
> enormous functional complexity that emerges.<
• A complexity I assert that can only be tamed by a well-reasoned a priori
(ontological) model.

In your note to Francesco . . .
> the universals scheme proposed around bacteria is a <
> mere initial draft --it will get worst! Actually it <
> crystallized in the first days of these discussions, <
> [around] limits of mechanical-Shannonian communication <
• Exciting!? Interesting!? I look forward to seeing/hearing more!

As always, my sincere thanks for sharing your intriguing thoughts!

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[Fis] Reply to John & Jerry (7 July Posts)

2016-07-09 Thread Marcus Abundis
JOHN (re 7 July post):
• Your abruptness is understandable. I have seen your “battle to take a
view of information [as including] physical properties that has a dynamics
of its own.” First, I opposed this “minority view”(?), so I was an
opponent. But after investing time (stirred by your posts!) to better grasp
subtleties in modeling quantum information, and more, I saw an acute gap in
my thinking. I *now* see it as an important issue to “nail down.” The
extent of my thinking now is covered in paper #2. Also, I sense your view
remains a minority view within FIS, so frustration is expected. Still, even
if we disagree on how to address the matter, I hope you now see that you
are not a ”lone voice” here!

> My belief is that a unified approach to information is <
> possible that ties together the various ways it has been<
> used in science.<
• At the least we can do better than we have done so far!

>In the black hole case, the issue is boundary dynamics.<
• Yes, a sense of boundary dynamics tracks Terry Deacon’s (and others?)
view of constraint. My view differs some in that I emphasize “operative
levels” and “referent locales” – which I see as a useful of *further
analyzing* boundary dynamics/constraints, ACROSS domains. I see other
points in your post, some of which I agree and others I may quibble over,
but nothing material – so, issues for another day.

> Laws governing energy just aren’t sufficient to analyze <
> some basic physical processes, <
• Amen brother! This, is a much bigger topic and could last years in
discussion. So, as Feynman did, I will just “point that out” and quickly
run in the other direction!
(Pedro: I do likewise with the origin of Life).

> I don’t think that information has meaning [in] itself.<
• I would be interested in your thoughts after paper #2.

JERRY (re 7 July post):

Thanks for this note . . .
> I find the term “a priori” to be rather mis-leading <
> *relative to other usages*. < [emphasis added]
• Your reservation is reasonable – in fact this can be said of any attempt
at *any* “ontological modeling.” But, I am unsure of how much of this post
is meant for *me* versus the Biomathics folks. For my part, I use a priori
in a very narrow way (initial: “what comes before information” – focused on
“meaning”) so I cannot address “relative to other uses,” as I intend no
other uses. I try to cover this issue early in the introductory text by
differentiating analytic philosophy and phenomenology (okay, too briefly

>“a priori” does not encompass the deep practical problems<
• Assuredly true! I can go further and say this is a typical (chronic?)
risk in using analytic philosophy (e.g., thought experiments); I target a
middle ground of pragmatism.

> one may say your artificial terminology *only concerns* <
> the punctuation of Shannon-informed sentences.<  [emphasis added]
• If I understand you correctly (nice phrasing!), I would say *builds upon*
rather than “only concerns.” As noted in other posts, I use Shannon,
Bateson, Darwin (accepted universal aspects?) as structural fundaments. So,
of course, Shannon is there, but not to the exclusion to other “meaningful”

> align with certain of Pedro’s views . . . except the <
> dynamics are more perplex than he implies.<
• I too agree, especially the later. Pedro seems to hold a view that he and
I disagree, but I have difficulty seeing much to oppose. MAYBE our
disagreement is in whether one preferences a biological view over a
physical view (per note to John above). In some respects, this also seems
to be Loet’s argument with Pedro(?). My sense is that a *bio-physical
account* is needed – which I think aligns with Steven Ericsson-Zenith’s
thoughts, and which I think Terry Deacon targets as well.

> a comment about the “Integral Biomathics” hypothesis. In<
> my opinion, it is deeply flawed . . .ignore the role of <
>electric fields in creating, from sub-atomic physics . . <
> The physical “a priori” is missing <
• I agree, the session was frustrating for me especially as my few mild
inquiries, attempting to explore this, were met with defeating silence
(insert sad face). Also, here you point to an “energetic aspect” that John
also notes (above) and which is especially problematic.

> . . . the failure to envision logical paths between the <
> inanimate and the animate. <
• So you ALSO look for a bio-physical account!? (insert happy face)

Sincere thanks to you, John and Jerry, for your thoughts.


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[Fis] Reply to Loet & Pedro (A Priori Modeling)

2016-07-07 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi Loet,
Thank you for your Fri Jul 1 post:
> to define information as “a difference which makes a <
> difference”. . both differences have to be specified.<
> Differences(1) can make a difference(2) for a system of <
> reference (receiver). <
• This is surely correct! This also aligns with what the video presents –
that “differences themselves must be differentiated” (also Bateson), framed
via metadata (data about data). But the video enlarges this view by naming
four minimal needed differences (delta O [object], delta S [subject], delta
Q [expansion],and delta x [reduction]) to infer a universal (evolving)
model of information. But then I am struck by your post’s last line:

>The idea that one can reconcile two analytical different <
> concept in a “universal” theory is mistaken.<
• I am unsure of what you mean here. Do you assert that an UTI is *per se*
impossible? Or do you mean *at least* two distinct analytic concepts must
be presented beside each other, in a complementary manner? The “impossible
view” I disagree with, and I claim this is a psychological problem in how
one frames their model (type theory is the answer). A “two concept” view I
agree with, which I show as natural material duality (dual aspect: delta O
& delta S) . . . but then one must go further to accommodate evolution –
hence, four minimal modeled differences.

• Again, I wonder *just how much* we agree and disagree – of course, as you
say, there is no “cosmic commandment” saying that we must agree. Still, I
hope to understand the details of any specific differences (pun wholly
intended) that do arise.

Dear Pedro,
Your 29 June post notes an old session on Mechanics. I examined the
archives (http://fis-mail.sciforum.net) for such a session and all I found
was four brief entries that begin with:
> Re: mechanics vs. info Erdi Peter (Tue 23 Feb 1999) <
• Those entries did not offer much detail. Did you have another session in
mind? Also, you close your last post:

> sorry if this was a disruption, but your discussion <
> invites [one] to transgress the boundaries. <
• To an extent, this is true. But I also note, and briefly typify, this
“difficulty” (e.g., order vs. disorder) in the introductory text. Further,
a “UTI impossible” view noted in my reply to Loet seems plausible only when
emphasizing “higher-order” roles. Thus, I stress an *a priori* model –
which emphasizes a more-simplified view.

• I say a bit more – a priori views demand something “well informed”
individuals may find hard. A “beginners mind” is needed (from meditation),
or an “intellectual innocence,” even if we never truly “forget what we
know.” A *humble* view denies the detailed expertise most of us are trained
in. “Expertise” also hinders true trans-disciplinary views. This is all
part of the Cultural Legacy that we inherit and that I pointed to in my
earlier post re Shannon’s usage of “information.” I will say a bit more on
this in another post.

Regardless, Loet and Pedro, I sincerely thank you both for your thoughts.

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[Fis] Black Hole Notes (reply to John & Krassimir)

2016-07-04 Thread Marcus Abundis
John – thank you for the intriguing article on the back hole information
paradox. But I was surprised you saw Krassimir's note as insulting that at
"the same time he/she has no [idea] what is 'information'”. This caused me
to take a closer look at the article, which seemed to affirm Krassimis's

The reported progress relies on "information-preserving massless particles
known as 'soft hair', which they say should surround black holes." This
sounds fairly speculative, and it is called "research"?

Then "Hawking's colleague Andrew Strominger
 of Harvard
University explains . . . 'People find it very hard to accept that in the
quantum world, momentum and position are not absolute quantities,' he says.
'But that *pales into insignificance* compared with what we would have to
accept were Hawking's contention true. We would have to accept that there
are no laws of physics."' [emphasis added]
This implies some radically new view of physics (or whatever we might call
it) is needed to frame the matter . . . but now they are merely positing
"soft hair" and various "hairdos"?

A noted figure suggests the "idea to be 'worth pursuing', but points out
that it can only account for a part of the information that enters a black
hole. " And . . . what idea is not worth pursuing?

An yet another figure says the "authors fail to spell out exactly how the
information in the hair becomes encoded into the Hawking radiation." I
imagine even some of the study's authors might agree with Krassimir's

In a priori modeling (the focus of this session) I carefully name *at
least* three types of meaning (paper #2) – the only three of which I am
CERTAIN. Still, your article and other explorations into QM imply
the possibility of other types of *meaningful information*. But such ideas
have not been researched, or posited by me, I only see them as vague
possibilities. Perhaps *you* would care to comment on *meaningful
information* in those contexts. I would find that interesting.

As for Krassimir's comment . . . I thought it was very mild compared to
what might have been said about this admittedly interesting news.

Again, thank you for sharing the article.

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[Fis] Reply 2 to Michel (A Priori Modeling)

2016-06-29 Thread Marcus Abundis
In an offline exchange, Michel asks some questions (on my reply to
Annette), summarized below.
> Your "material variation" seems identical to "spatial <
> structure" which is classically used in informational <
> ecology. Why not ? <
• “Why not?“ what? I am unsure of what you are asking. In general material
variation and spatial structure are similar, but the latter (as far as I
know) is used only in urban planning and ecology. That some similar
concepts exist here is unsurprising.

> Could you explain more what is dis-functioning? <
• I focus on an informational continuum, so a simple answer is not
possible. For example, “driving a car“ *might* exemplify functioning, but
“driving a car OFF a cliff“ might typify dis-functioning OR functioning –
depending on whether the driver *intended* to die (via suicide). OR,
“driving a car OFF a cliff“ due to tie-rod (steering) failure might
exemplify dis-function, OR if the tie-rod failed after 800,000 km (max
intended life 300,000 km) might be highly functional. This question can
only be considered within a specified *intensional* context.

> "meaningful" is it a scientific materialistic concept or<
> a philosophical one ? <
• Again, as I focus on an informational continuum a simple answer is not
possible. I detail three (minimum) types of meaning in paper #2, so you can
answer this question for yourself – or you can ask questions specific to
that paper.

> "pro temp" is it equivalent to temporal ? If yes, this <
> merits a long discussion about [ecological?] stability, <
• The type of stability you seem to emphasize is NOT what I study. I focus
on a priori informational aspects, please keep this in mind as you develop
your questions. I do not dismiss your interests, but I cannot make useful
comments on your topic.

> This problem is exactly "emergence" (and not emergency)<
> in its scientific signification, . . .<
• I am unsure why you mention emergency here as I only ever explore
emergence (detailed mostly in paper #4).

Michele also asks a question on my reply to Stan and Bob.
> Could you explain what you mean by rather paradoxical? <
• I merely emphasize that information and uncertainty are “bizarre
partners“ in terms of statistical entropy. Two types of entropic roles are
implied here, but of opposite characters. Type theory is needed to resolve
this supposed paradox.

Thank you for your questions.

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[Fis] _ Reply to Loet (A Priori Modeling)

2016-06-27 Thread Marcus Abundis
Dear Loet,

I hoped to reply to your posts sooner as of all the voices on FIS I
often sense a general kinship with your views. But I also confess I have
difficulty in precisely grasping your views – the reason for my delay.

>[while Shannon’s] concept of information (uncertainty) <
> is counter-intuitive. It enables us among other things <
> to distinguish between "information" and "meaningful <
> information". <
• Easily agreed; *how* to distinguish a presumed meaning (or
meaningless-ness) then becomes the remaining issue.

> Providing . . . meaning presumes the specification <
> of a system of reference; for example, an observer.<
• It is telling for me (in viewing our differences and likenesses) that you
suggest an observer. My “system of relating“ accommodates but does not
require an observer (okay – observer, defined how?), as shown immediately

>Different[ly] . . . expected information is dimensionless<
> ("a priori"). <
• I suggest the act of “expectation“ already infers minimal dimensions –
for example, who/what/how is doing the expecting? Thus, in my view, this is
not truly a priori. A “readiness“ or a compelling functional need innate to
any “system of relating“ has bearing. For example, a single Oxygen atom has
a compelling/innate need to react with other elements, just as any agent is
compelled to react to “nutrients.“ Both imply dimensional expectations, no?
(obviously – of different orders/types).

> In my opinion, a "real theory of meaning" should enable <
> us to specify/measure meaning as redundancy / reduction <
> of uncertainty given . . . I took this further in . . . <
> The Self-Organization of Meaning and the Reflexive . . .<
• My weak grasp of the concepts in this paper leads me to think you are
actually modeling the “processing of meaning,“ related-to-but-distinct-from
“generating meaning“ that I target. I also vaguely recall(?) in an offline
exchange I asked you if you saw this paper as presenting a “theory of
meaning“ and you answered “No.“

• In your later response to Pedro, I found your citation matrix a
interesting example of your thinking, but still too “high-order“ for my
reductive-but-meaningful aim. Your matrix (for me) presents an essential
complexity of high-order views, but in itself it is too simple to detail
*how* a citation is *meaningfully used.* Still, an intriguing concept that
might be meaningfully expanded? Perhaps there are more useful details in
the additional papers you list, which I have not had a chance to explore.

• Your last post then reinforces my sense you are actually exploring the
processing of meaning, rather than the generation of meaning. Diverse
“systems of relating“ you name seem to be “on point“ and
> can be considered as a semantic domain (Maturana,1978)<
But I find this unsatisfying as exactly *what(s)* is being related, and
exactly *how* it is being related, does not seem to be covered. It is in
precisely naming those “whats“ and “hows“ that true a priori models become
possible. For example, a *system of relating* between “a hominid and a
rock“ affords certain types of meaning, equally a *system of relating*
between “the same rock and an ant“ affords wholly different types of
meaning – all in regards to an identical (autonomous) rock.
> the same information is delineated differently and <
> considered from a different perspective <
arguing for essential subjectivity? This seems to point to my use of delta
O and delta S in the video.

• I am unsure if we are in: radical agreement, radical disagreement, or if
we just name subtle differences. . . but I thought I should at least
attempt a reply to your posts and see what ensues.
> In my opinion, the task is to specify mechanisms which <
> generate redundancy <
This leads me to believe we essentially agree but focus on different levels
of operation and complexity. Any thoughts you have to share are appreciated.


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[Fis] Reply to Emanuel (A Prioro Modeling)

2016-06-26 Thread Marcus Abundis
Dear Emanuel – thank you for your opinions and judgements.

> The video . . . looks great <
• Given what follows, I am unsure of how to view this note.
> I asked you to provide me with a printed version . . . <
• I had no request and I offered nobody anything beside the introductory
text and its attachments. Thus, I am unsure of what you are referring to.
>. . . it turns out that all [your?] efforts were in vein <
>. . . I also did not understand nothing (sic). <
• I am sorry to hear this, if you understood nothing.

> From this mass of unknown . . . and bizarre notions:<
>"universal meaning", "aesthetic entropy","generative <
>informatics", "entropic mimicry", "behavioral entropy" <
> and so on . . . I will try to comment only on - the <
> "theory of meaning".<
> Therefore, with your permission . . . <
• If I understand you correctly, you *do not* grasp any of the concepts in
the material. Instead of asking questions to improve your grasp, you now
wish to share your opinions and judgements?

>. . . you mention the Shannon-Weaver (1949) "theory of <
> meaning" as a basic key component of your attempts <
• If I say such a thing this is an error (please specify so I can make
corrections). There is no theory of meaning; in my introductory I refer to
a “meaningful void“ as the central problem I wish to address.
• In your ensuing notes on Shannon (1948) and Shannon & Weaver (1949), the
points you wish to make seem unclear. It is plain (I think) to most readers
that no claim is made in any of Shannon’s/Weaver’s papers about a “theory
of meaning.“

> [Shannon] calls the child by his real name - <
> semantics! That is the name of his choice! Essentially <
> semantic information is the name of the issue that is <
> at the heart of all our current [session] . . . <
• Do you ascribe a different role to “meaning“ versus “semantics“? My
dictionary defines semantics as: “relating to meaning in language or logic.“

> 1952, Bar-Hillel and Carnap have . . . "Semantic <
> Information" that [has] since become the dominant theme <
> of the ongoing scientific discourse. <
• On your further comments re Bar-Hillel & Carnap, or Shannon (1956), I
think it is generally seen that a failed attempt at “meaning“ was made; I
agree. If you instead wish to dismiss my use of “meaning“ rather than
“semantics,“ I see this idea as lacking intellectual content (per above).

> The same as Terrence Deacon (whom you quote in support <
> of your claims) . . . <
I make no such claim, I have no idea of Terry’s view of my work. My *guess*
is that he would see it as a competing model and he would speak against it,
if at all.

> Shannon (1956) warned against such a misuse of his <
> information theory “. . . a few exciting words like <
> information,entropy, redundancy, do not solve all our <
> problems". These are Shannon’s words. But who cares? <
• Well, I care! A thoughtful view of Shannon’s words here leads one to
think there are other *important* problems still needing solutions. He does
not expressly frame those problems for us, beyond what Weaver (1949) does.
We are now in the 21st century and those undefined problems demand
“something new“ – which I hope to offer, and you cannot grasp? Such is life
– I try my best . . .

And then I find this surprising bit of news
> that the Sun is rising [in] the East.<
With recent Brexit voting, I see the sun has finally set on a once great
empire. But your news here, that the sun continues to rise in the east lets
me rest easy . . . for now.

Thank you for sharing your thoughts.

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[Fis] _ Reply to Annette (A Priori Modeling)

2016-06-22 Thread Marcus Abundis
In an online exchange, Annette raises a few points and questions that I
summarize below.
> Please give me your basic definition of entropy <
My short answer is that I define entropy as "material variation" of any
type, as clarified in paper #2 and detailed starting on page 5 (actually
named on page 6). This definition is admittedly generic/vague, for a few
  a) many "types of meaning" (or entropy, if you wish) must be framed and
then joined. I name three minimum types of meaning/entropy in paper #2.
This multitude requires that a generic term first be named if an UTI is to
be developed (point 1 in the introductory text).
  b) noise is itself informational in a Darwinian role as “demise.” I
believe this departs from most informational notions, where noise is seen
as the opposite of information. This view also accommodates an inverse,
where one eventually “makes sense” of nominally chaotic events.
As such, I name an existential ground Generic Entropy, and the “tendency to
symmetric dispersal,” within that ground, “material entropy.” And so,
“material variation” (of any type) is meant to capture the entirety of
those entropic roles. Lastly, I find the notion of “pure symmetry” a useful
scientific fiction, but still a fiction in the context of true empiric
models (point 8 in the introductory text).

> So the different entropies you are using in your video point to different
options to organize <
> elements in a way that they generate recognizable (and therefore to a
degree similar) <
> information out of those elements? <
Here, *options* and *recognizable* are the key terms. As you note, I am
using a different (novel?) notion of “entropy,” beyond even the novel way
in which Shannon did, and thus (hopefully) extend Shannon's view. The most
reductive aspect here is “the element” (i.e., a “fulcrum,“ a “load,” a
“bit,” etc. [re paper #4]). Then, inter-RELATED *element sets,* depending
on their order (innate functioning or dis-functioning), convey a specific
role (signal or noise). It is this RELATING of singular elements (there are
many *options*) that conveys specific meaning/functioning/logic/order. This
meaningful relating can equally convey *recognizable* “types of order” or
“types disorder” (e.g., many “types of screws” exist, each with unique
functional advantages and disadvantages, or uses and mis-uses – a machine
screw works poorly in wood). Finally, a “recognizably deformed screw” (a
use-less *option*) must also be accounted for within this continuum. This
notion of related data echoes the idea already noted in the exchange with

> So I see it that you confirm to Shannon´s interpretation of entropy as
actually being information <
Well, in essence we may agree, but I would call this an unfortunate choice
of words. “Information," I think, has come to mean so many things to so
many people that it is *nearly* a useless term. Even though I use this term
myself, I try to minimize its use. I would say that I agree with Shannon’s
view of signal entropy as a *type* of information – and then extend that
concept using type theory, to include “meaningful” roles. Only when taken
as a whole does “information” exist, within my framing.

Also, the notion of stability (as necessary for meaning) you emphasize I
find helpful but also limiting. I tend to think of  *everything* as pro tem
except for perhaps the Standard Model and the Periodic Table (addressed in
paper #2; Lee Smolin may disagree?). Within type theory the central
question becomes “At what point/level(s) does material variation
(“entropy”) break down or fail?”, and how and why does it fail? For me,
this is a more useful way of viewing things – using stability is too much
like The Denial of Death (Ernest Becker). This requires us to look beyond
thermodynamics for answers. I believe thermodynamics is historically
stressed as it is the closest we have to a “hard science” that we might
ascribe to “information” (outside of Shannon, of course). We could easily
spend hours discussing this I think . . . . but we are essentially on the
same page.

Lastly, thanks for sending me Shu-Kun Lin’s paper (The Nature of the
Chemical Process. 1. Symmetry Evolution – Revised Information Theory,
Similarity Principle and Ugly Symmetry). It looks to have some useful
“pokes,” and I will hungrily dig into it when I have a chance.

Thanks for your questions.

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[Fis] Dropbox: Supplemental Files (A Priori Modeling)

2016-06-21 Thread Marcus Abundis
Please use the Dropbox links below to access the supplemental files.

paper #2

paper #3

paper #4

Apparently Issuu.com recently changed their web reader and downloading
files is not as easy as before . . .


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[Fis] Supplemental Papers (A Priori Modeling)

2016-06-20 Thread Marcus Abundis
At least one of you has reported problems with downloading the
supplemental papers (#2, #3, #4). Please email me if you also have this
problem. I will then email the papers directly to you, if you wish.

Thank you.
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[Fis] Reply to António (A Priori Modeling)

2016-06-18 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi António – thank you for your questions. I paraphrase your questions
below and respond in the order as given:

*• “How does a map constitute metadata?”*
You immediately strike the key issue.
Metadata is often known as “data ABOUT data.”
We might simplify this to “ABOUT-ness.”
Or, we might expand this to:
“*descriptors* ABOUT a *described*,” or “a MAP *about* a TERRAIN” to covey
targeted meaning.
This answers the "map as metadata" question.

But this example might be expanded further (as you suggest) to:
“a LEGEND, *about* a MAP, *about* a TERRAIN.”
But a map’s legend has “certain order” (why we know it is a legend). So we
now have:
“an ORDER, *about* a LEGEND, *about* a MAP, *about* a TERRAIN.”
You then mention the ALPHABET (ordered letters) used to create that legend
. . .

I hope you see the infinite regress I develop here, where all terms cover
ABOUT-ness – each is a type of metadata – except for the TERRAIN itself.
To answer your question, we must explore TYPES of DATA, and their
relationships (type theory). But then, we have still not begun to detail
the most important thing, the TERRAIN itself (why a map exists, das Ding an
sich). And, we have not named the *many* types of maps (tectonic,
geological, biological, hydrological, topological, etc.) possible for this

In this infinite regress, we may attempt “truthful” exchanges ABOUT the
TERRAIN, but with no real grasp of the other person’s meaning . . . *unless*
we are clear on the types of data being discussed. For this reason, I use a
third analytic track (beyond simplify or expand) to *deconstruct*
(universalize) metadata in a priori terms, hoping to minimize confusion.

I am careful in my answer here as it covers a basic concept (oft taken for
granted, or forgotten?), that can lead quickly to complex confusion. One
must be bloody-minded in viewing this matter of "type," or confusion
quickly erupts. This is why I mention Deacon’s notion of “keeping our
levels straight” in my opening comments.

*• “How does delta z describe Darwinian fitness?” *
I am not sure if I understand your question. Delta Z, by itself, does NOT
describe fitness or a cost function. Delta Z merely describes “the ground”
prior to the emergence of Darwinian agents/agency. Thus, at *this level of
analysis* fitness is not relevant or even evident. You then ask . . .
*• “Should we interpret ‘meaning’ as quantifiable?”*
Yes, if we see survival as meaningful and quantifiable. For “higher-order”
functioning, parametric quantification is a complex matter. Here, going
further leads to a discussion of “types of meaning” and matters explored in
the paper (resource #2) “Is the Internet, etc Conscious” – an advanced
topic (a bit early to go into this?). You add . . .
*• “Why a Darwinian process and not another?”*
Because Darwinism is one or our most successful scientific models, and
offers a good starting point. I am aware of the problems with Darwinism
(again in the paper just noted), but this simple “scientific base” (even
with its problems) supports a “scientific effort” in modeling information.
I am interested to hear alternative foundations you find more interesting
or useful.

*• “What do you mean by ‘role’ and ‘model’ . . . one relating to function?
. . . isn’t 'model of the world' more useful?”*
This is another “map or terrain” question. Yes, the ROLE/terrain relates to
functioning (a “thing” that is DIRECTLY meaningful – survival/demise), and
MODEL/map refers to “other things” (diverse informational facets, many map
types). Both are useful, but in very different ways. I believe DIRECT
effective functioning is *most* useful (survival role), and INDIRECT models
of that utility are “very interesting” – if you take my meaning. If I ever
seem to confuse “role” and “model” (map or terrain) in my material, this is
an error – please tell me so that I can make the correction.

*• “How do you justify continuous “direct versus indirect” roles in the
informational reduction of entropy?”*
This is a big question, and actually invokes the entire body my work.
Still, I hope the infinite regress I name above (continuum), and the notes
just above (direct versus indirect, terrain versus map) offer insight on
how this question is already answered. If not, please let me know and I
will make a better effort.

Also, your note on “entropy gap” is well framed. In fact, THIS is THE KEY
MATTER! Shannon signal entropy must somehow tie to “material entropy”
(tendency to symmetric material dispersal). I label this “Shannon’s Gap” or
“a meaningful void.” I cannot say more here as I am unsure of what exactly
*you* mean by entropy gap. Still, one might see how an “informational
continuum” might conceptually close/fill that gap.

*• “Examples of the various entropy types you discuss would be helpful.” *
I am unsure how to respond as most of the video (to my mind) details just
such examples. The call for more examples here echoes your opening comments
– I am sympathetic.

Yes, the video is 

[Fis] "A Priori" Modeling of Information

2016-06-16 Thread Marcus Abundis
Thank you Pedro, and of course, thank you very much for your enduring
efforts in moderating this site . . .

Greetings to all,

This session covers the *a priori* modeling of information. It targets a
“meaningful void” named by Shannon and Weaver (1949). As such, it seeks to
frame a “theory of meaning” and a “unified theory of information” (UTI),
two thorny issues. *A priori* models can help as they often focus on
organizing principles. Also, a winning view should offer benefits that
equal or surpass gains seen from Shannon’s (1948) earlier work. For
example, firm notions of meaning and universality are key to founding a
*meaningful* AI, and to addressing hurdles in quantum mechanics/computing
and in material science (Aspuru-Guzik, 2015).

An *a priori* effort starts with “what comes *before* information,” using
analytic philosophy to frame core concepts, but it ends in a phenomenology
of useful information – two often opposed views. The session thus entails
divergent levels of analysis that may stir confusion. For example, disorder
at one level implies a type of order at a different level (type theory,
Bateson’s “differences themselves must be differentiated”), but framed by
one system of thought. Thus, to help guide this session and to initiate
group dialogue, a cursory model is offered. With the foregoing cautionary
notes in mind, I invite you to join this FIS session: together we will see
what unfolds. . . . .

The full version of this introductory text (1,600 words) is attached as a
PDF, or can be downloaded at:

The central goal of this session is – from an "a priori" perspective – to
name specific structural fundaments, and attempt some progress on modeling:
 1. An UTI that reconciles/synthesizes the works of Shannon (entropy),
Bateson (differences/distinctions), and Darwinian selection (e.g., Are
these the correct starting points and how do we proceed?)
2. How "meaning" can be framed in a *fundamental* manner that makes sense
within the diverse informational roles we now confront (minimizing
"higher-order" debate, re Deacon's [from IS4IS] "keeping our levels

I look forward to hearing your thoughts . . .


Description: Adobe PDF document
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[Fis] Origin?

2016-02-21 Thread Marcus Abundis
Dear Stanley & Loet,
Gentlemen, when you speak of "origin" I am unsure of what *exactly* you
have in mind. Is it the "origin of the capacity for movement" that you
think about? The origin of life, itself, along with all its causal roles?
> Then, many of the living do not ‘move’. . . Plants move slowly by growth.
How could a phenomenologist view this at all?<
I think studying *differential movement* could fall within
phenomenology, but explaining the *origination* of autonomous movement,
would not. Also, it seems (to me) a bit unreasonable to think such an
origination (origin of life) narrative would be addressed in this group. Or
do I mistake your meaning, or the group's ultimate aim? Thanks!

I am unclear from your extended abstract on what exactly you aim to
accomplish in the study you present. Also, are we to read the
"Phenomenology and Life Sciences" piece as well? I read its abstract and
its mention of "coordinated dynamics" seemed to say "yes!" but I am unsure.
The emphasis you seem to offer in "Phenomenology and Evolutionary
Biology" I find interesting. Also, your mention of "static" and "genetic"
aspects along with movement. To my mind this points to kinematics, statics,
and dynamics in a more directly mechanical sense – but which you now wish
to tie to evolutionary biology? Is that correct? I find that an interesting
line of thought.
Also, I like Pedro's notion of a connection between dance and mate
selection. Dance then being a display behavior demonstrating an
advantageous capacity for navigating the evolutionary landscape.
Still, I find what you present a bit "too raw" and I am not exactly
sure how I should view the material. For example jumping form
dance/movement to teeth leaves me with a big gap in joining the two. I get
the sense that you aim to close "a gap" but I am not clear on how exactly
you do so. "Where did the notion of a tool come from?" This is an important
question, but how is it precisely answered or addressed? Do you attribute
the entire genesis of "six simple machines" all to teeth?
Lastly, I too work in this area and I am just now finishing (very rough
draft) a piece that looks at this issue. I agree that it is an overlooked
area of study. I am happy to share what I have wth you, if you might find
it of interest.
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[Fis] _ Re: Closing Lecture

2016-02-03 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi Bob (U),

Reading your (Tue Feb 2 21:18:25) note.
> minority opinion among the FIS group . . .
> believe that information possesses both epistemic and ontic features<
I find myself wondering if there is a specific reason you believe this is a
"minority opinion" rather than the exchanges reflecting people struggling
with an interesting problem from various perspectives?

Have I missed something fundamental to this group?
For me, Otto's (Tue Feb 2 13:06) note that:
> seems what is crucially needed is a theory that brings together . . .<
captures the essence of the matter, but that we (FIS?) have yet to surmount.

Loet's note (Mon Jan 18 07:58:42) in reply to my own dualistic struggles on
"Meaning versus Functional Significance" got me to scratching my head . . .
> In my opinion, such an approach is fully consistent with Shannon’s H. > S
= k(B) * H > The Boltzmann constant provides the dimensionality
(Joule/Kelvin) so that S is thermodynamic
> entropy. H is a mathematical formula. It can be used to measure your
“functional significances”,
> cannot it?
And, of course he is correct in saying this . . . it is hard to think
that does not entail some manner of (entropic) functional significance. But
teasing apart the differences is something rather different. So the naive
dualistic notion I was proposing did nothing to improve things (really).

As I reflect on this (and Howard's "communications") further I think the
point Terry Deacon raised in his IS4IS talk on "levels of analysis" and the
importance of keeping divisions clear points me toward home. I recall how
Type Theory (naming levels of analysis) was used to resolve similar logical
paradoxes, akin to the dualistic debate seen here. As I said, this all
points to an interesting problem . . .
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[Fis] Toyabe 2010 [ Information converted to energy ] / Van den > Broeck 2010 Thermodynamics of Information / Cartlidge 2010 Information > converted to energy

2016-01-17 Thread Marcus Abundis
>From Terry's post on Mon Jan 18 00:27
> . . . relation between potential (micro)states of the system (signal,
> medium) under consideration and a constrained variant state . . .

Seeing this note, and then closely rereading the OP – I have a hard time
not “hearing echoes“ of coherence & decoherence and quantum mechanical
processes . . . although that is plainly not the point of the experiment.
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[Fis] Pecking Order . . .

2016-01-14 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi Howard,
> the pecking order, in fact, can be traced  back to hierarchies within
atoms 380,000 years after
> the big bang and to the  hierarchies within galaxies and solar systems
400 million years after
> the big  bang.

An assertion like this requires more explanation I think . . . I am still
hopefully waiting for your reply to my earlier (related) inquiry on your
notion the pecking order and meme.

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[Fis] January Lecture--Information and the Forces of History

2016-01-09 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi Pedro,

Thank you for your well crafted (typical Pedro) synthesizing statement,
it was a pleasure to read. Thanks also for the reminders of J. Diamonds
work. It has been ages since I read it, but it was certainly a treasure
(hmm, now where I put my copy . . . )

Your note:
> Bob has drafted the universal drama, where the elements of the two
different scenarios AP & LP mix<
I am not sure I have seen the draft referenced here, or if I missed it in
an earlier post – details?
In acquainting myself with the IS4IS community I recall seeing some
references to your AP, but in my quick survey I never came across anything
of depth. I assumed such work existed, but I did not stumble upon it. Can
you point me to a particular piece that you feel gives a good
representation? Your posts have rekindled my curiosity.
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[Fis] Forces of History

2016-01-04 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi Howard,

> Social groups compete. They battle for pecking order position in a
hierarchy of groups.<
Your chicken example seemed to be talking about behavior WITHIN groups,
where this (above) note seems to consider behavior BETWEEN groups – please
clarify? You see them as the same?

>From your brief essay it seems you imply that pecking order/status is
driven purely by memes. But then how do memes drive chicken behavior? If
memes are not involved, what is truly driving the pecking order, and how
does that then apply ACROSS systems/groups?

Your reference to conflicts around Islam include noting about differences
between Shia and Sunni sects . . . although the conflicts can easily apply
to establishing a type of pecking order.
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[Fis] Analysis & Fundamentalism . . .

2015-11-04 Thread Marcus Abundis
Moises – thanks much for this analysis. Yes, tagging by the author would be
preferred, and even better if tagging was part of the posting process (but
not available with the software used).

Hi Mark,

 In the spirit of discussing the discussion (not sure how far we want to
push this) . . .
Re ". . . Fundamentalism is an ever present risk for all academics."
I have the impression that (within this group) you are not entirely alone
in the concerns(?) you voice. And to be sure there are risks in
attempting what you discuss.

But then, as this group/list is titled Foundations of Information Science .
. . I find myself wondering what exactly is to be accomplished here. I have
raised this same question before (using other words) and have risked rebuke
from some corners.

I have no will to actually "direct" the nature of the discussion here. BUT
I am interested in contributing in a workman-like way, and moving things
towards some clarifying point. And if such clarity is not the aim, then
what is it?

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[Fis] It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM

2015-06-29 Thread Marcus Abundis
Following John's, Loet's, and Terry's posts . . .

I don't think anyone would or could reasonably debate the contribution of
Shannon's framing. Even though (per Shanon-Weaver) it is an unsatisfying
notion they present, there is/was a bit of brilliance in that work. STILL,
they too saw that they did not go far enough . . . (framing multiple Levels
of information).

Further to Bateson's difference Bateson also saw that his own concept did
not go far enough in that he stated differences themselves must be
differentiated. But neither does he add any useful details. Instead he
seemed to go in the direction of parables and Freudian psychology as the
only reasonable means (Esalen epistemology lecture) of tracking and
reporting on complex informational roles. Which is to say I think he
recognized the issue, but felt defeated by the challenge (near end of
life?). This also, perhaps, explains his fondness for explaining concepts
in terms of conversations with my daughter as a type of reported parable.

On top of this I have noticed Søren Brier's comment that to whom or to
what it makes a difference is not remarked on by Bateson. And I would add
that to what end it makes a difference is not noted – all of which, I
think, ultimately points in the direction of Terry's notion of work.

From John Collier's post: Fri Jun 26 20:59:47 CEST 2015
 I believe that information in itself must be interpreted, and is not,
therefore intrinsically meaningful

I would agree with this as a basic comment, but then In the good old days
how is it not DATA that scientists would be, in fact, gathering and
interpreting? Why is there this need to displace the notion of data (as a
specific type of uninterpreted information) with a more generic usage of
information? Do we really need to add a meaningless qualifier (pun
wholly intended) in front of every usage of information meant to denote

On Brenner's faint perfume of reductionism . . .
Not exactly sure how to take this – it sounds dismissive, is this
meant to suggest
that reductionism is, per se, bad and to be avoided? Is it all to be an
unexplainable mystery? As I understand Terry's view (and my own) it is
essentially reductionistic,  but I would also say that I don't think it
strives to be naively reductionistic.

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[Fis] It from Bit redux . . .

2015-06-14 Thread Marcus Abundis
From Loet's post:
During the recent conference in Vienna, I was amazed how many of our
colleagues wish to ground information in physics.
I would say that I was disappointed . . .

For me this exchange on It from Bit is problematic as its seems to simply
revisit the same problem introduced with Shannon's use of the term
“information“ in his Mathematical Theory of Communication – but dressed
with a slightly different face. I had this same problem with “lack of
precise thinking“ (or terminology?) in the It from Bit video from last
month. This endless(?) debate around an old issue of “meaningful
information“ versus “meaningless information“ (aka DATA awaiting MEANINGFUL
interpretation) I find unhelpful in addressing FOUNDATIONAL issues. If we
cannot keep our terms straight I am not sure how progress is made.

Yes, of course physics has a place in the conversation, but the needless
blurring of basic terms does not, I think, advance the project. If a basic
nomenclature and/or taxonomy cannot be agreed and then abided in these
conversations, it leaves me wondering how I might contribute. I am new to
this group, but this seems like it should have been dealt with from the
start in agreeing the FIS group goals.

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Re: [Fis] It From Bit video

2015-05-28 Thread Marcus Abundis
While the interviews on the video are interesting, in general, I also find
them a bit annoying. I never hear information actually described in a
specific way. They could as easily be discussing raw data as far as I can
tell. For example, when is meaning associated with information (or data)
and how does that meaning arise, who/what is ascribing meaning, etc..? The
interview could have gone much further, and did not seem particularly well
thought out in advance. Without a clear sense of how information is being
used here, subsequent thoughts would seem to be equally unclear or confused
(to my mind).
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[Fis] What are information and science?

2015-05-23 Thread Marcus Abundis
Dear Colleagues,

Re Pedro's point and other related postings . . .

 I would never bet for a new info-reductionism, or explanatory monism,
science is an elegant Babel construction always condemned --or enjoying--
the plurality of disciplinary languages and views.

I echo the questions around communication and information at different
levels, and BETWEEN different systems/levels – this further takes me back
to a point I raised at the end of Deacon's last (second) session, but that
was not really addressed. This has to do with the nature of emergent things
BETWEEN systems (or levels of analysis). This proved (in his sessions) to
be a rather chronic issue in trying to grasp/convey Deacon's modeling – or
now, even in modeling an effective FIS(?). The Deacon session didn't really
seem to land anywhere (re Pedro's condemned/enjoyed Babel) . . . and
here we are again, no?

So I am now left to wonder if we are to accept the futility of
modeling emergent things (which seems to be a critical deeper issue), that
might otherwise offer a bridge between systems/levels, or if that
imagined/impossible(?) new info-reductionism, or explanatory monism is to
be actively attempted and explored here? As a new member, I simply wish to
know what might be reasonably tolerated.

Thanks to all for your earlier thoughts!

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[Fis] What are information and science?

2015-05-20 Thread Marcus Abundis
Greetings to all,

As I read these comments I have a hard time finding an effective
anchor upon which to add notes. I see informational processes as
essentially being proto-scientific – how is any science not an
informational process? First, I think this places me in the camp of
Peirce's view. Second, I am unsure of how to regard the focus on
higher-order interdisciplinary discussions when a much more essential
view of lower-order roles (i.e., What are science and information?) has not
been first established.

From my naive view I find myself wondering how informational
process is not the ONE overarching discipline from which all other
disciplines are born (is this too psychological of a framework?). As
such, I argue for one great discipline . . . and thus wouldn't try to frame
my view in terms of science, mostly because I am unclear on how the term
science is being formally used here. Thoughts?

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[Fis] New Year Lecture – The Correct Level of Analysis?

2015-04-27 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi Terry – and “first-time greetings“ to FIS colleagues,

First, Terry, thank you for your continued effort with this contentious
topic. It is truly necessary and worthwhile “heavy lifting.“

Second, in reading all prior postings I am drawn to your 30 Jan. note:

 . . . I haven't felt that the specific components of this proposal have
been addressed in this thread. 

I find myself wondering if this is still the case, in the current thread.
This also prompts me to wonder WHY is this “informational topic“ so
doggedly contentious? Your January essay and your April preamble both
emphasize a need for “reductive“ study of the topic, but which does not
seem to truly arise here. This drives me to ask, indeed: “What is the
correct level of analysis?“, and what is the level of analysis exhibited.
To be clear, I support the reductive vista you seem to endorse.

My impression is that there is little focus on the MOST reductive issues,
and there is a bit of reasonable “jumping around“ as people reach for
exemplars to explain/explore/connect their own view of things. But I also
think a problem is buried in “jumping explanatory levels“ due to the nature
of “emergent things.“ The unavoidable (co-incident?) inclusion of emergent
elements (homunculi?), due to jumping explanatory levels seems likely to
introduce logical gaps, that can leave people confused and argumentative.
In some ways, your teleodynamic model may even encourage jumping around,
simply due to its ambitious nature. Thus, I wonder if that ambitiousness
hinders the model’s accessibility. Thoughts? (Yes, some ambitiousness is,
generally speaking, required).

Third, I am a bit confused (or just unclear) on your assertion of a
“non-dual model.“(?) I suspect you must recognize some “dual material
aspect,“ at least, as part of Shannon’s model (noise  signal), and your
January essay seems to aim to explore a “dual aspect“ vis-a-vis Boltzmann
and Shannon – yes, they are connected, but there are also clear
distinctions to be made too, no?

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[Fis] New Year Lecture - redux

2015-04-19 Thread Marcus Abundis
Hi Pedro,

In this reprise of Deacon's(?) talk, I assume the discussion will
orient around the same paper Terry made available to the group earlier. If
a new version of that paper is to be considered, please let me know. I am
new to the FIS group and presently busy going over last January's notes in
order to get unto speed. Thanks!

Marcus Abundis
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