Re: [Fis] : Reality of Information World?!!!
Dear Stanley, The point is that information is triadic in the current system of axioms. In other system of axioms matter, time or space may be triadic, as they will be defined through axioms and primary concepts. - Original Message - From: Stanley N. Salthe [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: fis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Monday, July 17, 2006 11:52 PM Subject: Re: [Fis] : Reality of Information World?!!! Responding to Igor -- I don't see how information can be a fundamental category along with space, time, matter -- because it is a triadic concept, requiring a system of interpretance that considers certain configurations of matter in space and/or time to be significant. So, a complixated configuration of objects could have different significance (contain different information) for many different systems of interpretance. Replying to Andrei -- who said: Or can such a \proof\ only be established by a social convention - consensus? In this case a matter of consesual belief. And how do we then proceed from this very point? This is a problem. Yes, modern science works in such a way. But there is reality which is independent of consesual belief. Soon or later this reality will go into teh contradiction with a social agreement. But as we have seen it could take hundreds and even thousands of years. What is bearing here is the Duhem-Quine principle, which states that: in order to test any scientific theory it is necessary to set up an experimental framework, which will inolve other ancillary theories and conjectures. If a test seems to falsify the tested theory, we can always question these ancillary theories and conectures instead of the theory we were testing. In this way no theory ever needs to become falsified. STAN Dear colleagues, As usual, I am bolting sporadically into the discussion with my humble comments. It looks like we are a bit imprisoned in the terminology here. Please allow me to exercise my formal Marxist education. The world out there does not know the word matter. Matter is a primary philosophical concept, our axiome that we introduce to deal (to model) the real world. The concepts of field, particle are derivatives of this axiom, and space and time are also axioms. Therefore if we go down to the basics, (deviating from the applied science which deals with matter casually), we should always keep in mind that we may change the axioms if necessary. The world will not change, only its description. One of the ways to do so is to introduce information as a primary category, which therefore needs no explanation or proof. The information incorporates both material and ideal (never exists without the material carrier on one hand, but is not limited to the carrier's physical properties). Then fields, particles and such like become the derivatives of the information concept. If we think a bit, any interaction is in fact exchange of information. Yours, Igor - Original Message - From: Arne Kjellman [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: fis fis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2006 1:57 PM Subject: Re: [Fis] : Reality of Information World?!!! Dear John and Andrei As usual you hit the head of the nail - but I think there is something missing: Andrei said: Fields are not less real than particles. John said: I am really advocating an information world, in which reality can be understood as (am inclined to say are) information structures. On this account, our internal information space and the rest of the world are of the same basic kind, You are dicussing the possibility to classify fields and information as REAL - and existing on an equal level as of REALITY - as opposed to something else...experience I guess. Does this means you both both think it is consistently possible to classifying phenomena of science into the dichomoty REAL/UNREAL (or eventually MATERIAL/UNMATERIAL)? I mean do you think is it possible to come to such a distinction of phenomena on grounds of an obsevation science?? In in this case on what criteria could such a distinction possibly be uphold? Do you expect a possible experimental proof? Like the way physicists strive for an experiemental proof of Bell's inequality for instance? Or can such a proof only be established by a social convention - consensus? In this case a matter of consesual belief. And how do we then proceed from this very point? The SOA's line of arguing is that real/unreal distinction can only be grounded on social convention - i.e., a definition that is generally accepted but cannot be (ap)proved in a science based on experimental evidence. (The realist's dilemma is an attempt to show that human's capacity of perception is the cause that make this outcome a necessity.) However a decision in consensus can only be achieved in the case each individual participating in this act of consesual decision has made up his mind, ie made a private decision in the matter under consideration. This is why science has to take off form
Re: [Fis] : Reality of Information World?!!!
Responding to Igor -- I don't see how information can be a fundamental category along with space, time, matter -- because it is a triadic concept, requiring a system of interpretance that considers certain configurations of matter in space and/or time to be significant. So, a complixated configuration of objects could have different significance (contain different information) for many different systems of interpretance. Replying to Andrei -- who said: Or can such a \proof\ only be established by a social convention - consensus? In this case a matter of consesual belief. And how do we then proceed from this very point? This is a problem. Yes, modern science works in such a way. But there is reality which is independent of consesual belief. Soon or later this reality will go into teh contradiction with a social agreement. But as we have seen it could take hundreds and even thousands of years. What is bearing here is the Duhem-Quine principle, which states that: in order to test any scientific theory it is necessary to set up an experimental framework, which will inolve other ancillary theories and conjectures. If a test seems to falsify the tested theory, we can always question these ancillary theories and conectures instead of the theory we were testing. In this way no theory ever needs to become falsified. STAN Dear colleagues, As usual, I am bolting sporadically into the discussion with my humble comments. It looks like we are a bit imprisoned in the terminology here. Please allow me to exercise my formal Marxist education. The world out there does not know the word matter. Matter is a primary philosophical concept, our axiome that we introduce to deal (to model) the real world. The concepts of field, particle are derivatives of this axiom, and space and time are also axioms. Therefore if we go down to the basics, (deviating from the applied science which deals with matter casually), we should always keep in mind that we may change the axioms if necessary. The world will not change, only its description. One of the ways to do so is to introduce information as a primary category, which therefore needs no explanation or proof. The information incorporates both material and ideal (never exists without the material carrier on one hand, but is not limited to the carrier's physical properties). Then fields, particles and such like become the derivatives of the information concept. If we think a bit, any interaction is in fact exchange of information. Yours, Igor - Original Message - From: Arne Kjellman [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: fis fis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Thursday, July 13, 2006 1:57 PM Subject: Re: [Fis] : Reality of Information World?!!! Dear John and Andrei As usual you hit the head of the nail - but I think there is something missing: Andrei said: Fields are not less real than particles. John said: I am really advocating an information world, in which reality can be understood as (am inclined to say are) information structures. On this account, our internal information space and the rest of the world are of the same basic kind, You are dicussing the possibility to classify fields and information as REAL - and existing on an equal level as of REALITY - as opposed to something else...experience I guess. Does this means you both both think it is consistently possible to classifying phenomena of science into the dichomoty REAL/UNREAL (or eventually MATERIAL/UNMATERIAL)? I mean do you think is it possible to come to such a distinction of phenomena on grounds of an obsevation science?? In in this case on what criteria could such a distinction possibly be uphold? Do you expect a possible experimental proof? Like the way physicists strive for an experiemental proof of Bell's inequality for instance? Or can such a proof only be established by a social convention - consensus? In this case a matter of consesual belief. And how do we then proceed from this very point? The SOA's line of arguing is that real/unreal distinction can only be grounded on social convention - i.e., a definition that is generally accepted but cannot be (ap)proved in a science based on experimental evidence. (The realist's dilemma is an attempt to show that human's capacity of perception is the cause that make this outcome a necessity.) However a decision in consensus can only be achieved in the case each individual participating in this act of consesual decision has made up his mind, ie made a private decision in the matter under consideration. This is why science has to take off form the individual subject's point of view - the subject-oriented approach (SOA) - and accordingly make a strict use of the first person's view. I sincerely wait for an answer in these crucial questions Arne - Original Message - From: Andrei Khrennikov [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: fis@listas.unizar.es Sent: Wednesday, July 12, 2006 10:53 PM Subject: [Fis] Question to John Collier
