Re: [Fis] Fwd: _ Re: _ Gödel discussion

2016-05-06 Thread Francesco Rizzo 
Cari Tutti, Alex, Lou,
mi permetto di far notare che bisogna distinguere o non confondere:
macchine, meccanismi e meccanicamente. Dire che non siamo macchine  è una
cosa ovvia, ma sostenere che gli uomini non devono ragionare meccanicamente
non è per niente ovvio. Non Vi pare?
Grazie.
Francesco

2016-05-06 7:21 GMT+02:00 Alex Hankey :

> By the way, the argument below
> was sent to me by Lou Kauffman.
>
> On 4 May 2016 at 20:11, Alex Hankey  wrote:
>
>> Dear Fis Colleagues,
>>
>> I received this comment on Lucas's argument that seems to me short and
>> sweet,
>> so I am posting it for our general edification.
>>
>> Best wishes,
>>
>> Alex
>>
>> -- Forwarded message --
>>
>> “Proving” that we are not machines is somewhat quixotic from my point of
>> view, in that it should be obvious that we are not machines!
>>
>> But so many people imagine that we could be nothing more than mechanisms
>> that the Lucas-Godelian argument is helpful.
>>
>> But let us look at this argument. We start by assuming that I am a
>> consistent Turing machine (CTM) (consistency being needed to apply Godel’s
>> Theorem.)
>>
>> If I am a CTM, then I can be completely specified by at text T which I
>> put out on the table here in front of me.
>>
>> And I then apply the Godel argument to T, producing a Theorem G that T
>> cannot prove, but that I can prove.
>>
>> But I am identical with T. SO this is a contradiction.
>> We have contradicted that I am a CTM.
>> Therefore I am not a CTM.
>>
>> I cannot be a Consistent Turing Machine.
>> If I am consistent then I am not a Turing machine.
>> Otherwise I might be an inconsistent Turing machine.
>>
>> The argument shows that I must be consistent in order to conclude that I
>> am not a Turing machine.
>>
>> I believe that I am consistent.
>> I conclude that I am not a consistent Turing machine.
>> And being consistent, I am not an inconsistent Turing machine.
>>
>> Therefore, I am not a Turing machine.
>>
>> (P.S. Another champion of the Lucas viewpoint is Roger Penrose in his
>> books
>> “The Emperor’s New Mind” and “Shadows of the Mind”.)
>>
>> --
>> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
>> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
>> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
>> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
>> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
>> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
>> 
>>
>> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences,
>> Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
>> 
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
> 
>
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences,
> Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
> 
>
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> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
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>
>
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[Fis] Fwd: _ Re: _ Gödel discussion

2016-05-05 Thread Alex Hankey 
By the way, the argument below
was sent to me by Lou Kauffman.

On 4 May 2016 at 20:11, Alex Hankey  wrote:

> Dear Fis Colleagues,
>
> I received this comment on Lucas's argument that seems to me short and
> sweet,
> so I am posting it for our general edification.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Alex
>
> -- Forwarded message --
>
> “Proving” that we are not machines is somewhat quixotic from my point of
> view, in that it should be obvious that we are not machines!
>
> But so many people imagine that we could be nothing more than mechanisms
> that the Lucas-Godelian argument is helpful.
>
> But let us look at this argument. We start by assuming that I am a
> consistent Turing machine (CTM) (consistency being needed to apply Godel’s
> Theorem.)
>
> If I am a CTM, then I can be completely specified by at text T which I put
> out on the table here in front of me.
>
> And I then apply the Godel argument to T, producing a Theorem G that T
> cannot prove, but that I can prove.
>
> But I am identical with T. SO this is a contradiction.
> We have contradicted that I am a CTM.
> Therefore I am not a CTM.
>
> I cannot be a Consistent Turing Machine.
> If I am consistent then I am not a Turing machine.
> Otherwise I might be an inconsistent Turing machine.
>
> The argument shows that I must be consistent in order to conclude that I
> am not a Turing machine.
>
> I believe that I am consistent.
> I conclude that I am not a consistent Turing machine.
> And being consistent, I am not an inconsistent Turing machine.
>
> Therefore, I am not a Turing machine.
>
> (P.S. Another champion of the Lucas viewpoint is Roger Penrose in his
> books
> “The Emperor’s New Mind” and “Shadows of the Mind”.)
>
> --
> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
> 
>
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences,
> Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
> 
>



-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy

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[Fis] Fwd: _ Re: _ Gödel discussion

2016-05-04 Thread Alex Hankey 
Dear Fis Colleagues,

I received this comment on Lucas's argument that seems to me short and
sweet,
so I am posting it for our general edification.

Best wishes,

Alex

-- Forwarded message --

“Proving” that we are not machines is somewhat quixotic from my point of
view, in that it should be obvious that we are not machines!

But so many people imagine that we could be nothing more than mechanisms
that the Lucas-Godelian argument is helpful.

But let us look at this argument. We start by assuming that I am a
consistent Turing machine (CTM) (consistency being needed to apply Godel’s
Theorem.)

If I am a CTM, then I can be completely specified by at text T which I put
out on the table here in front of me.

And I then apply the Godel argument to T, producing a Theorem G that T
cannot prove, but that I can prove.

But I am identical with T. SO this is a contradiction.
We have contradicted that I am a CTM.
Therefore I am not a CTM.

I cannot be a Consistent Turing Machine.
If I am consistent then I am not a Turing machine.
Otherwise I might be an inconsistent Turing machine.

The argument shows that I must be consistent in order to conclude that I am
not a Turing machine.

I believe that I am consistent.
I conclude that I am not a consistent Turing machine.
And being consistent, I am not an inconsistent Turing machine.

Therefore, I am not a Turing machine.

(P.S. Another champion of the Lucas viewpoint is Roger Penrose in his books
“The Emperor’s New Mind” and “Shadows of the Mind”.)

-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy

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