Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Dear Terry, First, allow me to respond to your questions on my own account and then further challenge your own. No, information is not for me a stereochemical property, in that I am less concerned about the particulars of the chemistry involved. However, my principal concern is a generalized (flexible and closed) structure that may be formed by different elements in different environments. So it is structure that is primary and not chemistry, that may simply be seen as a means to an end. Your question concerning my definition of knowledge is insightful. Indeed, knowledge embodied by an organism may be false, but this has no impact at all upon the responses that the organism produces in its utilization. The false knowledge may, in fact, benefit the organism. All knowledge, indeed any knowledge, is that which determines subsequent physical actions, be it true or false. Fallibilism is simply part of a method of knowledge refinement. Of course, this model opens up some interesting philosophical questions in that sustained error can now potentially play an important role in evolution. You claim that to understand information requires a theory of dynamical constraints and further these constraints do not have reducible components. You are perhaps inspired by Darwin's constraint of natural selection? These are, for me, posterior determinants. But natural selection is not itself dynamic and nor does it have an existential status that would allow me to say that it has level specific properties. This, again, suggests dualism (sorry). Regards, Steven PS. Let's just say that I posted this to FIS on Monday, and I'll limit myself next week. :-) On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 9:23 PM, Terrence W. DEACON dea...@berkeley.edu wrote: Dear Steven, Sadly Taking the time (and wordiness) required to explain my critique and redefinition of emergence is beyond the scope this venue and your patience, so I can only point to my too lengthy book for that account. Needless to say I do not accept either dualism or identity theory. My claim is that to understand information requires a theory of dynamical constraints, and since constraints don't have reducible components they are level specific relational properties, not identified with intrinsic properties of specific material objects or energetic systems, but not epiphenomenal. Do I understand you to be reducing information to a stereochemical property? And do you reduce knowledge to anything that determines physical actions? Obviously, I must be missing something. I would not be alone in arguing that for something to be information about something, it must be capable of being in error. How can simple physical properties or causal interactions have this property of falliblism? — Terry On 1/30/15, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: Dear Terry, This emergence theory, at least on the face of it, is then surely an advocacy of dualism, since epiphenomenalism is logically indistinguishable from identity theory. So I must ask how you propose to distinguish the two. Information theory is a way of speaking about what happens in the world. As such it is a pragmatic, like many other pragmatics before it, it is a step in the right direction but not, of itself, able or required to meet the explanatory goal. My best definition of information does not standalone: Information is that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause, where knowledge is generalized to include all that determines subsequent action (importantly, it is the immediate that includes all physical actions). It is possible, in my theory, to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical property. Briefly, sense is formed as a shape upon the surface of flexible closed structures (biophysics, with latent receptors and motor functions), characterized by a holomorphic functor, covariant with another shape upon the closed surface, bound as a hyper-functor. The hyper-functor provides a sense/response decision point between the two. IOW, a clear reference is always associated with a response. Regards, Steven On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Terrence W. DEACON dea...@berkeley.edu wrote: Hi Steven, My apologies for wordiness. We all have our weaknesses. I am curious about your claim that a complete theory of information may be impossible. I am not even sure what this would mean — except irresolvable dualism. But as to the issue of whether I advocate an identity theory, I can provide a clear no. Mine is an emergence theory in which it is not possible to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical property. Thanks, Terry On 1/30/15, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: Dear Terry, list. I apologize that I have not had the time to keep up with this discussion. I did try to read Terry's text but found it strangely impenetrable with many more word than were necessary to make a point. This
Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
process. I agree with this definition. Your model, further, is that of a theoretical two-component molecular system called an autogen that is capable of instantiating such, autogenic processes. The properties of the model molecules are stated to be those of real molecules – reciprocal autocatalysis and self-assembly and these processes are further stated to be self-organizing. The model, it is claimed, can analyze the relationships between the information medium properties, the work involved and the properties of the context, the environment or as you put it the system-extrinsic physical conditions. What I see as having been elided here is that in the real systems, but not in the model as described, one has the properties of the molecules that enable them to ‘self’-assemble in the first place. Unless these are taken into account, I claim that the models are incomplete. They require inclusion of the residual constraints (potentialities) at lower levels of molecular structure to avoid the danger of circularity. Further, there seems to be no place in this description of relationships for the non-algorithmic processes, for example qualitative signification (vs. the ‘amount’ of work saved), that are necessarily involved as soon as one leaves the level of abstraction of the model. These are well described on p. 10 as “the complex system of relationships” involving both human and social history. Wu Kun adds their potential states and calls the whole entity the informosome. This was the basis for the comment in my first note that I agreed with the mechanism but not the model(s). My comment about presence being a source of information as well as absence refers to your more complete treatment of information as an absential phenomenon in Incomplete Nature rather than to that in your discussion paper. In the latter, the concepts on p. 3 (inexistent properties) and on p. 10 (information as being about an absent referent) should therefore be discussed in another thread. I therefore look forward very much to a further round of discussion of real systems using the tools you have provided. In this, however, I think there will be agreement between our approaches to the necessary dualism of information, despite the differences in language. My line is to search for the overlap/dynamic interaction between the two sides of the relationship and the chains of intermediating processes (Wu again) involved. Best wishes, Joseph Message d'origine De : dea...@berkeley.edu Date : 30/01/2015 - 12:43 (PST) À : joe.bren...@bluewin.ch Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es Objet : Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture? Thanks to Joseph for this spirited rejoinder, and to Krassimir for reminding us that convergence is perhaps more likely to succeed than any single-minded approach. With Krassimir, I am in agreement. I have probably overstated the priority of my own approach, even if I do believe it to be a best middle ground from which to begin formalization. This is a big challenge and I should celebrate the diversity of approaches more than I have. This is my path, and I have taken this opportunity to make my reasons for pursuing it clear. Like most of us, it is sent as a sort of mating call, in case others might find interesting insights there too. In response to Joseph, I would challenge you to specifically identify my homuncular assumptions, demonstrate where the autogenic model makes them, and deacribe in what ways you think that autogenesis is somehow not physically realizable. I admit to being blind to any of these, but I don't want to just convince you, I want to get it right. However, I am not willing to live with unresolved dualisms. And I don't quite get your comment about dualisms that do exist in nature and how you connect this with my presence/absence perspective. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that I am not satisfied that certain dualisms arising from quantum theories are fundamental, rather than the result of incomplete theory, and your own view which seems to embrace them. In which case we may need to agree to disagree. I am slightly perplexed and don't quite follow your implications regarding the specific proposal made in this piece. The dualisms I am hoping to resolve in this essay orbit around the difference between physicalistic and semiotic uses of the information concept, and about how this implicitly reifies Descartes' res cogitans / res extensa dualism, with reference and significance on the former side of this divide and Shannon information (and related uses in physics) on the latter. You can read my view as arguing that this dualism cannot merely be left as an unanalyzed assumption if we are seeking a complete theory of information. I anticipate that there is much unmentioned detail that remains to be unpacked and debated here. Pursuing some of these details could be very informative, even if it doesn't change entrenched positions. I think
Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Dear Terry, list. I apologize that I have not had the time to keep up with this discussion. I did try to read Terry's text but found it strangely impenetrable with many more word than were necessary to make a point. This is, perhaps, merely a question of style, repeated in the recent books of his that I have purchased but that sit essentially unread although I have tried. To clarify, I have spent more than my share of time reading the work of Charles Peirce, readily acknowledged, although many of you may now recognize my preference for his father's work and its priority. Both quite brilliant men, but Charles suffers, both conceptually and in his readership at the hands of neology. Who among us wants to sit through yet another argument with followers of Charles on the nature of semeiois or a sign? Not I. I have also spent a good deal of my time with the work of Claude Shannon. My discipline of origin is, after all (in French), Informatique. I do this not merely to comprehend Shannon's theory of communication but also to inquirer concerning the role that his mathematization plays in its unfolding. I find, in the end, that the theory applies well to its original intent, telephony engineering (a human activity), but it lacks any true ontology. That is, from my point of view, communication does not exist because there is a lack of continuity. What I may speak of instead is apprehension. This suggests that no complete theory of information is, in fact, conceivable. I confess that I am stunned by Joe's advocacy of necessary duality. But then, it is not entirely clear what he is implying. He could, for example, simply be an advocate of a universal property not widely considered and advocated by myself as the basis of experience or as Benjamin Peirce's universal will or Charles' (weaker) matter as effete mind, all being the universal equal of gravitation and of light and to be found ultimately in the same equations as a force that have an effect upon the world, in this case in the flexible closed structures that form biophysics. A theory based upon such a premise, even though it requires something physically extra today, is clearly not at all dualist. I, naturally enough, am sympathetic to Terry's denial of dualism, but I wonder if Terry merely advocates an identity theory. As I have noted often such a theory is, in fact, a dualism. Regards, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 12:43 PM, Terrence W. DEACON dea...@berkeley.edu wrote: Thanks to Joseph for this spirited rejoinder, and to Krassimir for reminding us that convergence is perhaps more likely to succeed than any single-minded approach. With Krassimir, I am in agreement. I have probably overstated the priority of my own approach, even if I do believe it to be a best middle ground from which to begin formalization. This is a big challenge and I should celebrate the diversity of approaches more than I have. This is my path, and I have taken this opportunity to make my reasons for pursuing it clear. Like most of us, it is sent as a sort of mating call, in case others might find interesting insights there too. In response to Joseph, I would challenge you to specifically identify my homuncular assumptions, demonstrate where the autogenic model makes them, and deacribe in what ways you think that autogenesis is somehow not physically realizable. I admit to being blind to any of these, but I don't want to just convince you, I want to get it right. However, I am not willing to live with unresolved dualisms. And I don't quite get your comment about dualisms that do exist in nature and how you connect this with my presence/absence perspective. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that I am not satisfied that certain dualisms arising from quantum theories are fundamental, rather than the result of incomplete theory, and your own view which seems to embrace them. In which case we may need to agree to disagree. I am slightly perplexed and don't quite follow your implications regarding the specific proposal made in this piece. The dualisms I am hoping to resolve in this essay orbit around the difference between physicalistic and semiotic uses of the information concept, and about how this implicitly reifies Descartes' res cogitans / res extensa dualism, with reference and significance on the former side of this divide and Shannon information (and related uses in physics) on the latter. You can read my view as arguing that this dualism cannot merely be left as an unanalyzed assumption if we are seeking a complete theory of information. I anticipate that there is much unmentioned detail that remains to be unpacked and debated here. Pursuing some of these details could be very informative, even if it doesn't change entrenched positions. I think that it is interesting that so many responses have betrayed a sort of thinly
[Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Dear Pedro, Dear FISers, Terrence Deacon has made a passionate plea for the proper consideration of his approach to information science that his contribution merits. But this consideration is only possible if he is willing to accept that some of his positions may be contaminated with assumptions in a way that he correctly criticizes in others. As a specific example, we can all easily understand and agree that the incorporation of ‘homunculi’, that is, unproven mechanisms, as explanatory, should be avoided. In my view, however, Terry has a small army of homunculi at work (sic!) who insure that his processes of self-organization, self-reconstitution and ‘spontaneous’ self-assembly can take place! The finality of using his simulated autogenic systems is “a rigorous physical foundation upon which” future complex theories of information may be based. If, as I contend, Terry’s approach has failed to take into account the fundamentally dualistic physical properties of real systems, it is hard to see how it could do so. In his reply to Loet, regarding cognitive processes, Terry writes: “As I have said a number of times, my goal is not to deal with all aspects of the information concept, and certainly not at the level of human thought. I merely propose to dissolve the implicit dualism in our current concepts at the most basic level, so that for example it will be possible to develop a scientifically grounded theory of molecular biosemiotics.” No-one can argue with his first sentence, but the second has the implication that dualism at the most basic level in concepts should be absent when it is present in reality. Again, we can all reject the straw-man of mind-body dualism. But the dualisms that do exist in nature must be reflected in concepts or the latter are outside nature and outside science. The pair presence-absence is one of these that I have offered, so far without comment, as one of these. As a substitute for what is referred to as ‘the implicit dualism in our current concepts’, Terry seems to offer a repeated reliance on the Peircean categories as having explanatory power. I have discussed, accessibly, why these categories amount to epistemic classifications, a position that is in fact confirmed by a member of Terry’s group. Ontological approaches, which if looked at closely differ from the ones Terry correctly criticizes, are given a back of the hand dismissal that suggests that the writers may not be familiar enough with them to make the distinction. A point of agreement between Terry and me is that a concept of quantum information should not be mixed with one of thermodynamic information. This does not mean, however, that the some of the dual aspects of quantum entities are not relevant for thermodynamic processes, including the properties, production and transfer of information. Terry is absolutely correct to question the so-called ‘it-from-bit’ theory of information in its simplest form. Again, however, alternatives are available at the heart of which is exactly the ‘overlap’ between physics and information that Pedro calls for, e.g., those of Luhn and myself. I think Krassimir has a good point in concluding that we have a problem of civilization and that all our efforts, scientific and philosophical, should be made with the common good at the center of our preoccupations. This is the theme of the Vienna Summit 2015. Information offers the ground on which standard physical and biological as well as social and psychological reality can meet. It is from the most complex, interactive, recursive aspects of these realities as well as from the simplest that we must learn. Thank you. Best wishes, Joseph Message d'origine De : dea...@berkeley.edu Date : 30/01/2015 - 09:31 (PST) À : lo...@physics.utoronto.ca Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es Objet : Re: [Fis] Concluding the Lecture? Thanks to Pedro and Bob for these last few comments. Indeed, like Darwin in 1859 we are still just beginning to formulate one long argument that will need to be progressively refined in the decades to come. The question is where best to begin the task of synthesizing. I too find the metaphor of searching for lost keys quite apropos, but I would beg your indulgence while I add an elaboration to this metaphor that sheds light on the perspective I have offered. Yes, we must at first search close to the light, even though there we will only find vague hints. But, importantly, as we cover more and more territory we will discover that the light progressively brightens. So long as we keep searching and don't walk out into the dark too quickly, skipping over important territory in between, the entire territory will become more and more thoroughly illuminated, searchable, and familiar to us. I believe that the light is brightest in the domain where we can see a clear relation between the two quite different concepts of entropy and the relationship of both to the concept
Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Thanks to Joseph for this spirited rejoinder, and to Krassimir for reminding us that convergence is perhaps more likely to succeed than any single-minded approach. With Krassimir, I am in agreement. I have probably overstated the priority of my own approach, even if I do believe it to be a best middle ground from which to begin formalization. This is a big challenge and I should celebrate the diversity of approaches more than I have. This is my path, and I have taken this opportunity to make my reasons for pursuing it clear. Like most of us, it is sent as a sort of mating call, in case others might find interesting insights there too. In response to Joseph, I would challenge you to specifically identify my homuncular assumptions, demonstrate where the autogenic model makes them, and deacribe in what ways you think that autogenesis is somehow not physically realizable. I admit to being blind to any of these, but I don't want to just convince you, I want to get it right. However, I am not willing to live with unresolved dualisms. And I don't quite get your comment about dualisms that do exist in nature and how you connect this with my presence/absence perspective. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that I am not satisfied that certain dualisms arising from quantum theories are fundamental, rather than the result of incomplete theory, and your own view which seems to embrace them. In which case we may need to agree to disagree. I am slightly perplexed and don't quite follow your implications regarding the specific proposal made in this piece. The dualisms I am hoping to resolve in this essay orbit around the difference between physicalistic and semiotic uses of the information concept, and about how this implicitly reifies Descartes' res cogitans / res extensa dualism, with reference and significance on the former side of this divide and Shannon information (and related uses in physics) on the latter. You can read my view as arguing that this dualism cannot merely be left as an unanalyzed assumption if we are seeking a complete theory of information. I anticipate that there is much unmentioned detail that remains to be unpacked and debated here. Pursuing some of these details could be very informative, even if it doesn't change entrenched positions. I think that it is interesting that so many responses have betrayed a sort of thinly veiled irritation and anger. To me it suggest that we are close to a nerve—i.e. some critical issues that are of central importance. Thanks, Terry On 1/30/15, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch joe.bren...@bluewin.ch wrote: Dear Pedro, Dear FISers, Terrence Deacon has made a passionate plea for the proper consideration of his approach to information science that his contribution merits. But this consideration is only possible if he is willing to accept that some of his positions may be contaminated with assumptions in a way that he correctly criticizes in others. As a specific example, we can all easily understand and agree that the incorporation of ‘homunculi’, that is, unproven mechanisms, as explanatory, should be avoided. In my view, however, Terry has a small army of homunculi at work (sic!) who insure that his processes of self-organization, self-reconstitution and ‘spontaneous’ self-assembly can take place! The finality of using his simulated autogenic systems is “a rigorous physical foundation upon which” future complex theories of information may be based. If, as I contend, Terry’s approach has failed to take into account the fundamentally dualistic physical properties of real systems, it is hard to see how it could do so. In his reply to Loet, regarding cognitive processes, Terry writes: “As I have said a number of times, my goal is not to deal with all aspects of the information concept, and certainly not at the level of human thought. I merely propose to dissolve the implicit dualism in our current concepts at the most basic level, so that for example it will be possible to develop a scientifically grounded theory of molecular biosemiotics.” No-one can argue with his first sentence, but the second has the implication that dualism at the most basic level in concepts should be absent when it is present in reality. Again, we can all reject the straw-man of mind-body dualism. But the dualisms that do exist in nature must be reflected in concepts or the latter are outside nature and outside science. The pair presence-absence is one of these that I have offered, so far without comment, as one of these. As a substitute for what is referred to as ‘the implicit dualism in our current concepts’, Terry seems to offer a repeated reliance on the Peircean categories as having explanatory power. I have discussed, accessibly, why these categories amount to epistemic classifications, a position that is in fact confirmed by a member of Terry’s group. Ontological approaches, which if looked at closely differ from the ones Terry correctly
Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Hi Steven, My apologies for wordiness. We all have our weaknesses. I am curious about your claim that a complete theory of information may be impossible. I am not even sure what this would mean — except irresolvable dualism. But as to the issue of whether I advocate an identity theory, I can provide a clear no. Mine is an emergence theory in which it is not possible to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical property. Thanks, Terry On 1/30/15, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: Dear Terry, list. I apologize that I have not had the time to keep up with this discussion. I did try to read Terry's text but found it strangely impenetrable with many more word than were necessary to make a point. This is, perhaps, merely a question of style, repeated in the recent books of his that I have purchased but that sit essentially unread although I have tried. To clarify, I have spent more than my share of time reading the work of Charles Peirce, readily acknowledged, although many of you may now recognize my preference for his father's work and its priority. Both quite brilliant men, but Charles suffers, both conceptually and in his readership at the hands of neology. Who among us wants to sit through yet another argument with followers of Charles on the nature of semeiois or a sign? Not I. I have also spent a good deal of my time with the work of Claude Shannon. My discipline of origin is, after all (in French), Informatique. I do this not merely to comprehend Shannon's theory of communication but also to inquirer concerning the role that his mathematization plays in its unfolding. I find, in the end, that the theory applies well to its original intent, telephony engineering (a human activity), but it lacks any true ontology. That is, from my point of view, communication does not exist because there is a lack of continuity. What I may speak of instead is apprehension. This suggests that no complete theory of information is, in fact, conceivable. I confess that I am stunned by Joe's advocacy of necessary duality. But then, it is not entirely clear what he is implying. He could, for example, simply be an advocate of a universal property not widely considered and advocated by myself as the basis of experience or as Benjamin Peirce's universal will or Charles' (weaker) matter as effete mind, all being the universal equal of gravitation and of light and to be found ultimately in the same equations as a force that have an effect upon the world, in this case in the flexible closed structures that form biophysics. A theory based upon such a premise, even though it requires something physically extra today, is clearly not at all dualist. I, naturally enough, am sympathetic to Terry's denial of dualism, but I wonder if Terry merely advocates an identity theory. As I have noted often such a theory is, in fact, a dualism. Regards, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 12:43 PM, Terrence W. DEACON dea...@berkeley.edu wrote: Thanks to Joseph for this spirited rejoinder, and to Krassimir for reminding us that convergence is perhaps more likely to succeed than any single-minded approach. With Krassimir, I am in agreement. I have probably overstated the priority of my own approach, even if I do believe it to be a best middle ground from which to begin formalization. This is a big challenge and I should celebrate the diversity of approaches more than I have. This is my path, and I have taken this opportunity to make my reasons for pursuing it clear. Like most of us, it is sent as a sort of mating call, in case others might find interesting insights there too. In response to Joseph, I would challenge you to specifically identify my homuncular assumptions, demonstrate where the autogenic model makes them, and deacribe in what ways you think that autogenesis is somehow not physically realizable. I admit to being blind to any of these, but I don't want to just convince you, I want to get it right. However, I am not willing to live with unresolved dualisms. And I don't quite get your comment about dualisms that do exist in nature and how you connect this with my presence/absence perspective. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that I am not satisfied that certain dualisms arising from quantum theories are fundamental, rather than the result of incomplete theory, and your own view which seems to embrace them. In which case we may need to agree to disagree. I am slightly perplexed and don't quite follow your implications regarding the specific proposal made in this piece. The dualisms I am hoping to resolve in this essay orbit around the difference between physicalistic and semiotic uses of the information concept, and about how this implicitly reifies Descartes' res cogitans / res extensa dualism, with reference and significance on the
Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Dear Steven, Sadly Taking the time (and wordiness) required to explain my critique and redefinition of emergence is beyond the scope this venue and your patience, so I can only point to my too lengthy book for that account. Needless to say I do not accept either dualism or identity theory. My claim is that to understand information requires a theory of dynamical constraints, and since constraints don't have reducible components they are level specific relational properties, not identified with intrinsic properties of specific material objects or energetic systems, but not epiphenomenal. Do I understand you to be reducing information to a stereochemical property? And do you reduce knowledge to anything that determines physical actions? Obviously, I must be missing something. I would not be alone in arguing that for something to be information about something, it must be capable of being in error. How can simple physical properties or causal interactions have this property of falliblism? — Terry On 1/30/15, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: Dear Terry, This emergence theory, at least on the face of it, is then surely an advocacy of dualism, since epiphenomenalism is logically indistinguishable from identity theory. So I must ask how you propose to distinguish the two. Information theory is a way of speaking about what happens in the world. As such it is a pragmatic, like many other pragmatics before it, it is a step in the right direction but not, of itself, able or required to meet the explanatory goal. My best definition of information does not standalone: Information is that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause, where knowledge is generalized to include all that determines subsequent action (importantly, it is the immediate that includes all physical actions). It is possible, in my theory, to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical property. Briefly, sense is formed as a shape upon the surface of flexible closed structures (biophysics, with latent receptors and motor functions), characterized by a holomorphic functor, covariant with another shape upon the closed surface, bound as a hyper-functor. The hyper-functor provides a sense/response decision point between the two. IOW, a clear reference is always associated with a response. Regards, Steven On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Terrence W. DEACON dea...@berkeley.edu wrote: Hi Steven, My apologies for wordiness. We all have our weaknesses. I am curious about your claim that a complete theory of information may be impossible. I am not even sure what this would mean — except irresolvable dualism. But as to the issue of whether I advocate an identity theory, I can provide a clear no. Mine is an emergence theory in which it is not possible to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical property. Thanks, Terry On 1/30/15, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: Dear Terry, list. I apologize that I have not had the time to keep up with this discussion. I did try to read Terry's text but found it strangely impenetrable with many more word than were necessary to make a point. This is, perhaps, merely a question of style, repeated in the recent books of his that I have purchased but that sit essentially unread although I have tried. To clarify, I have spent more than my share of time reading the work of Charles Peirce, readily acknowledged, although many of you may now recognize my preference for his father's work and its priority. Both quite brilliant men, but Charles suffers, both conceptually and in his readership at the hands of neology. Who among us wants to sit through yet another argument with followers of Charles on the nature of semeiois or a sign? Not I. I have also spent a good deal of my time with the work of Claude Shannon. My discipline of origin is, after all (in French), Informatique. I do this not merely to comprehend Shannon's theory of communication but also to inquirer concerning the role that his mathematization plays in its unfolding. I find, in the end, that the theory applies well to its original intent, telephony engineering (a human activity), but it lacks any true ontology. That is, from my point of view, communication does not exist because there is a lack of continuity. What I may speak of instead is apprehension. This suggests that no complete theory of information is, in fact, conceivable. I confess that I am stunned by Joe's advocacy of necessary duality. But then, it is not entirely clear what he is implying. He could, for example, simply be an advocate of a universal property not widely considered and advocated by myself as the basis of experience or as Benjamin Peirce's universal will or Charles' (weaker) matter as effete mind, all being the universal equal of gravitation and of light and to be found ultimately in the same equations as a force that have an effect
Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Terry, In your discussion paper, you state that an interpretive process can only be adequately defined with respect to a process that is organized to maintain itself by repairing and reconstituting its essential form and dispositions - a teleodynamic process. I agree with this definition. Your model, further, is that of a theoretical two-component molecular system called an autogen that is capable of instantiating such, autogenic processes. The properties of the model molecules are stated to be those of real molecules – reciprocal autocatalysis and self-assembly and these processes are further stated to be self-organizing. The model, it is claimed, can analyze the relationships between the information medium properties, the work involved and the properties of the context, the environment or as you put it the system-extrinsic physical conditions. What I see as having been elided here is that in the real systems, but not in the model as described, one has the properties of the molecules that enable them to ‘self’-assemble in the first place. Unless these are taken into account, I claim that the models are incomplete. They require inclusion of the residual constraints (potentialities) at lower levels of molecular structure to avoid the danger of circularity. Further, there seems to be no place in this description of relationships for the non-algorithmic processes, for example qualitative signification (vs. the ‘amount’ of work saved), that are necessarily involved as soon as one leaves the level of abstraction of the model. These are well described on p. 10 as “the complex system of relationships” involving both human and social history. Wu Kun adds their potential states and calls the whole entity the informosome. This was the basis for the comment in my first note that I agreed with the mechanism but not the model(s). My comment about presence being a source of information as well as absence refers to your more complete treatment of information as an absential phenomenon in Incomplete Nature rather than to that in your discussion paper. In the latter, the concepts on p. 3 (inexistent properties) and on p. 10 (information as being about an absent referent) should therefore be discussed in another thread.I therefore look forward very much to a further round of discussion of real systems using the tools you have provided. In this, however, I think there will be agreement between our approaches to the necessary dualism of information, despite the differences in language. My line is to search for the overlap/dynamic interaction between the two sides of the relationship and the chains of intermediating processes (Wu again) involved. Best wishes, Joseph Message d'origine De : dea...@berkeley.edu Date : 30/01/2015 - 12:43 (PST) À : joe.bren...@bluewin.ch Cc : fis@listas.unizar.es Objet : Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture? Thanks to Joseph for this spirited rejoinder, and to Krassimir for reminding us that convergence is perhaps more likely to succeed than any single-minded approach. With Krassimir, I am in agreement. I have probably overstated the priority of my own approach, even if I do believe it to be a best middle ground from which to begin formalization. This is a big challenge and I should celebrate the diversity of approaches more than I have. This is my path, and I have taken this opportunity to make my reasons for pursuing it clear. Like most of us, it is sent as a sort of mating call, in case others might find interesting insights there too. In response to Joseph, I would challenge you to specifically identify my homuncular assumptions, demonstrate where the autogenic model makes them, and deacribe in what ways you think that autogenesis is somehow not physically realizable. I admit to being blind to any of these, but I don't want to just convince you, I want to get it right. However, I am not willing to live with unresolved dualisms. And I don't quite get your comment about dualisms that do exist in nature and how you connect this with my presence/absence perspective. Perhaps this has to do with the fact that I am not satisfied that certain dualisms arising from quantum theories are fundamental, rather than the result of incomplete theory, and your own view which seems to embrace them. In which case we may need to agree to disagree. I am slightly perplexed and don't quite follow your implications regarding the specific proposal made in this piece. The dualisms I am hoping to resolve in this essay orbit around the difference between physicalistic and semiotic uses of the information concept, and about how this implicitly reifies Descartes' res cogitans / res extensa dualism, with reference and significance on the former side of this divide and Shannon information (and related uses in physics) on the latter. You can read my view as arguing that this dualism cannot merely be left as an unanalyzed assumption if we
Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Dear Terry, This emergence theory, at least on the face of it, is then surely an advocacy of dualism, since epiphenomenalism is logically indistinguishable from identity theory. So I must ask how you propose to distinguish the two. Information theory is a way of speaking about what happens in the world. As such it is a pragmatic, like many other pragmatics before it, it is a step in the right direction but not, of itself, able or required to meet the explanatory goal. My best definition of information does not standalone: Information is that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause, where knowledge is generalized to include all that determines subsequent action (importantly, it is the immediate that includes all physical actions). It is possible, in my theory, to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical property. Briefly, sense is formed as a shape upon the surface of flexible closed structures (biophysics, with latent receptors and motor functions), characterized by a holomorphic functor, covariant with another shape upon the closed surface, bound as a hyper-functor. The hyper-functor provides a sense/response decision point between the two. IOW, a clear reference is always associated with a response. Regards, Steven On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Terrence W. DEACON dea...@berkeley.edu wrote: Hi Steven, My apologies for wordiness. We all have our weaknesses. I am curious about your claim that a complete theory of information may be impossible. I am not even sure what this would mean — except irresolvable dualism. But as to the issue of whether I advocate an identity theory, I can provide a clear no. Mine is an emergence theory in which it is not possible to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical property. Thanks, Terry On 1/30/15, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: Dear Terry, list. I apologize that I have not had the time to keep up with this discussion. I did try to read Terry's text but found it strangely impenetrable with many more word than were necessary to make a point. This is, perhaps, merely a question of style, repeated in the recent books of his that I have purchased but that sit essentially unread although I have tried. To clarify, I have spent more than my share of time reading the work of Charles Peirce, readily acknowledged, although many of you may now recognize my preference for his father's work and its priority. Both quite brilliant men, but Charles suffers, both conceptually and in his readership at the hands of neology. Who among us wants to sit through yet another argument with followers of Charles on the nature of semeiois or a sign? Not I. I have also spent a good deal of my time with the work of Claude Shannon. My discipline of origin is, after all (in French), Informatique. I do this not merely to comprehend Shannon's theory of communication but also to inquirer concerning the role that his mathematization plays in its unfolding. I find, in the end, that the theory applies well to its original intent, telephony engineering (a human activity), but it lacks any true ontology. That is, from my point of view, communication does not exist because there is a lack of continuity. What I may speak of instead is apprehension. This suggests that no complete theory of information is, in fact, conceivable. I confess that I am stunned by Joe's advocacy of necessary duality. But then, it is not entirely clear what he is implying. He could, for example, simply be an advocate of a universal property not widely considered and advocated by myself as the basis of experience or as Benjamin Peirce's universal will or Charles' (weaker) matter as effete mind, all being the universal equal of gravitation and of light and to be found ultimately in the same equations as a force that have an effect upon the world, in this case in the flexible closed structures that form biophysics. A theory based upon such a premise, even though it requires something physically extra today, is clearly not at all dualist. I, naturally enough, am sympathetic to Terry's denial of dualism, but I wonder if Terry merely advocates an identity theory. As I have noted often such a theory is, in fact, a dualism. Regards, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 12:43 PM, Terrence W. DEACON dea...@berkeley.edu wrote: Thanks to Joseph for this spirited rejoinder, and to Krassimir for reminding us that convergence is perhaps more likely to succeed than any single-minded approach. With Krassimir, I am in agreement. I have probably overstated the priority of my own approach, even if I do believe it to be a best middle ground from which to begin formalization. This is a big challenge and I should celebrate the diversity of approaches more than I
Re: [Fis] Fwd: Re: Concluding the Lecture?
Cari Tutti, non vi frastornate. Il pensiero pensante non lo ferma nessuno. Una legge dell'informazione per tutto il sapere e l'intera esistenza è possibile e inevitabile, al di là di ogni specificazione. Inform-azione significa sempre e in tutti i settori del sapere, dare o prendere forma, diversamente quantificabile, con o senza significazione immediata. Questo ho cercato di dire scrivendo nella lingua che conosco. Ma ho l'impressione che, per ragioni diverse, il mio pensiero non sia passato. La Nuova economia che propongo da circa 45 anni è una scienza della mediazione, anzi una scienza delle scienze o al servizio delle scienze, seguendo la strada aperta da Ernst Mach.Grazie lo stesso e buon lavoro a tutti. Francesco Rizzo 2015-01-31 4:50 GMT+01:00 Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us: Dear Terry, This emergence theory, at least on the face of it, is then surely an advocacy of dualism, since epiphenomenalism is logically indistinguishable from identity theory. So I must ask how you propose to distinguish the two. Information theory is a way of speaking about what happens in the world. As such it is a pragmatic, like many other pragmatics before it, it is a step in the right direction but not, of itself, able or required to meet the explanatory goal. My best definition of information does not standalone: Information is that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause, where knowledge is generalized to include all that determines subsequent action (importantly, it is the immediate that includes all physical actions). It is possible, in my theory, to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical property. Briefly, sense is formed as a shape upon the surface of flexible closed structures (biophysics, with latent receptors and motor functions), characterized by a holomorphic functor, covariant with another shape upon the closed surface, bound as a hyper-functor. The hyper-functor provides a sense/response decision point between the two. IOW, a clear reference is always associated with a response. Regards, Steven On Fri, Jan 30, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Terrence W. DEACON dea...@berkeley.edu wrote: Hi Steven, My apologies for wordiness. We all have our weaknesses. I am curious about your claim that a complete theory of information may be impossible. I am not even sure what this would mean — except irresolvable dualism. But as to the issue of whether I advocate an identity theory, I can provide a clear no. Mine is an emergence theory in which it is not possible to reduce reference to an intrinsic physical property. Thanks, Terry On 1/30/15, Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us wrote: Dear Terry, list. I apologize that I have not had the time to keep up with this discussion. I did try to read Terry's text but found it strangely impenetrable with many more word than were necessary to make a point. This is, perhaps, merely a question of style, repeated in the recent books of his that I have purchased but that sit essentially unread although I have tried. To clarify, I have spent more than my share of time reading the work of Charles Peirce, readily acknowledged, although many of you may now recognize my preference for his father's work and its priority. Both quite brilliant men, but Charles suffers, both conceptually and in his readership at the hands of neology. Who among us wants to sit through yet another argument with followers of Charles on the nature of semeiois or a sign? Not I. I have also spent a good deal of my time with the work of Claude Shannon. My discipline of origin is, after all (in French), Informatique. I do this not merely to comprehend Shannon's theory of communication but also to inquirer concerning the role that his mathematization plays in its unfolding. I find, in the end, that the theory applies well to its original intent, telephony engineering (a human activity), but it lacks any true ontology. That is, from my point of view, communication does not exist because there is a lack of continuity. What I may speak of instead is apprehension. This suggests that no complete theory of information is, in fact, conceivable. I confess that I am stunned by Joe's advocacy of necessary duality. But then, it is not entirely clear what he is implying. He could, for example, simply be an advocate of a universal property not widely considered and advocated by myself as the basis of experience or as Benjamin Peirce's universal will or Charles' (weaker) matter as effete mind, all being the universal equal of gravitation and of light and to be found ultimately in the same equations as a force that have an effect upon the world, in this case in the flexible closed structures that form biophysics. A theory based upon such a premise, even though it requires something physically extra today, is clearly not at all dualist. I, naturally enough, am sympathetic to Terry's denial
