### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Hi Joseph,

> On 31 May 2018, at 17:28, Joseph Brenner  wrote:
>
> Stan,
>
> Good, but things can also run in the opposite direction. How about variety
> (plus more energy) generating more variety, more possibilities and allowing
> new ‘information’ to emerge? Standard logical analysis is inadequate because
> it cannot handle this picture.

Is not a simple counting algorithm, in base greater than 2, generating all
information (in Shannon sense)?

0, 1, 10, 11, 100, 101, 110, 111, 1000, 1001, 1010, 1011, etc.

Of course, this does not generate 01, of 001, but they appear as easy
subsequence like in 101 or 1001. You can also directly generate all finite
sequences.

Then a universal dovetailer, which is a program generating all programs (in
some fixed programming language), and execute them on all input do much more,
as it generates all information, and all ways all machine reacted to such
information, and, assuming mechanism, that generates (in some sense) also their
thoughts and experiences in that process (i.e, the information in the cognitive
first person private sense). This is already less trivial than a counting
algorithm which can be shown to be NOT Turing universal.

But this will never generate any physical realities. On the contrary, as I
explain in my papers, the physical will have to be retrieved through a sum on
all computations (which exists in arithmetic) below my substitution level,
going through my states, and this can be used to show that physics has to be,
fundamentally, a statistics, even a quantum-like statistics on all computations.

So, the arithmetical reality contains the seed of your varieties, I think,
which generates all information(s). Now, to get physics from there, we need to
structure that information space by using the canonical machine theory of
self-reference, by Gödel, Löb, Solovay. That would be too long to describe here
and now, but ask any question, as I do think this is relevant in this list, and
especially in this thread on the nature of information, and, I add, on the
nature of matter.

Bruno

PS Please, take your time to answer, as this was my second post of this week. I
will comment your possible remarks next week.

>
> Joseph
>
> From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
> <mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>] On Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe
> Sent: jeudi, 31 mai 2018 16:21
> To: Burgin, Mark; fis
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis
>
> Mark -- What Shannon referred to as 'entropy' was 'variety'. 'Information'
> per se was achieved by way of a reduction or winnowing of this variety of
> possibilities, leaving 'information' to survive.
>
> STAN
>
> On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:24 PM, Burgin, Mark  <mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>> wrote:
> Dear Loet,
> Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is Shannon's
> measure of information, which is called entropy.
>
> Sincerely,
> Mark
>
>
>
> On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>> Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,
>>
>> The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and
>> res extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that
>> things could have been different is not out there in the world as something
>> seizable such as piece of wood.
>>
>> Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it
>> can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The
>> grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize
>> Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the measurement as information.
>>
>> Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a
>> system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to
>> call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is
>> embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as
>> Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as physical.
>>
>> In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical
>> entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a
>> distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this distribution
>> will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic
>> entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 – .37 = .49 bits of
>> information. One thus can prove that this information is not physical.
>>
>> Best,
>> Loet
>>
>> Loet Leydesdorff
>> Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
>> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>> l..```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear Arturo,

> On 21 May 2018, at 12:49, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
>
> Dear Bruno,
> You state that:
> "When poll are done at congress in cosmology or quantum computing, about half
> of the physicists endorse the non collapse theory, as it is covariant, and
> has no “measurement problem”.
> This means that the main tenet of your account, your "First Principle", is
> not accepted by HALF of the scholars.
> How can you build your huge building on a so much controversial claim?
>
>

That was just a probably useless reply to the remark according to which few
people endorse the non-collapse theory. In science, there is no poll, no vote,
no mainstream, nor any similar form of argument per authority.

My claim for the non)collapse theory is that the collapse theory violate the
Schroedinger equation, or the unitary evolution, and so is mainly a statement
that quantum mechanics does not apply to … and the rest has never been made
clear. There are almost as much collapse theory than there are physicists
rejecting the SWE. Even Bohr, after expelling us that the collapse results from
the perturbation of the act of measuring, admits to Einstein & AL., in his
reply to the EPR paper (which shows that if there is a collapse due to
measurement, it has to be Faster Than Light (FTL), that the collapse is not a
physical phenomenon. Yet, he will later refuse to talk to Everett, and ciricize
his idea of abandoning the collapse.

Now, you can say that I am biased, as I predicted the “many-worlds” much before
I knew about quantum physics, in the form of the many computations which have
been proved to be executed in virtue of very elementary truth. That has been
seen by Gödel partially, and made clear by Church, Kleene and the works which
followed. Today we know that even a simple Diophantine equation does already
the job, and emulate or simulate exactly all computational processes.

Unfortunately, when I will study quantum mechanics, I will take, like many, the
collapse for granted, but I was still sure about the many computations, and I
was still predicting the digital equivalent of a notion of “many-worlds”. It
took me to read the EPR paper to begin to change my mind, but it is only after
the careful study of Everett argument, that I will realise that quantum
mechanics confirms the “many-worlds”, and thus the simplest and obvious, albeit
shocking perhaps, consequence of Mechanism in the philosophy of mind (aka
cognitive science). I predicted also the non-cloning theorem, indeterminacy,
and non-locality, all as a natural phenomenology “lived” by any introspective
universal machine.

> account is a philosophical one,
>
Not at all. I have proven that if Mechanism isn correct, then physics has to be
retrieved in a very precise way, as a mode of knowledge imposed by
incompleteness in the machine or number self-reference theory, and I would have
claim to have refute that form of Mechanism if the facts would have refuted
this. But the facts confirm this, up to now.

So, Mechanism explains, until now, both consciousness and matter appearances,
where physicalism and/or materialism failed, up to now, and indeed it would
require a non-mechanist theory of mind, which usually are nonsense.

It explains consciousness by showing that any universal machine which
introspect itself, and remains sound in that process, is confronted to
something

- True,
- Non doubtable,
- Immediate,
- Non provable,
and
- Non definable.

Which is a good candidate for consciousness.

The theory also provides a role for consciousness, as it shows that such truth
can be used by the machine to transform itself into a more speedy machine
relative to the machine(s) supporting it, or even to simply other machines. The
machine needs to be very cautious, because if it deduces that this is true, it
becomes inconsistent and unsound, so the machine needs some act of faith, or to
remember the question mark when invoking Mechanism. It is a subtle but
important point.

> based on a logical principle, that, although fashinating and intriguing, is
> highly controversial.
>

Mechanism in cognitive science is an old and venerable theory, appearing in
Indian and Greek antic text, renewed by Descartes and Diderot (who called it
“rationalism”).

Note that mechanism in cognitive science refutes mechanism in physics. This is
due to the fact that no universal machine can ever know for sure which machine
she is, nor which computations (in arithmetic) supports us, and that any exact
observable prediction has to be retrieved from a non computable statistics on
all computations. But the propositional physical logic has been shown
decidable, and you can consult my long texts to look at a theorem prover for it
in LISP.

Is the theory of evolution controversial? It used implicitly mechanism, because
non-mechanism would require infinite amount ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Cari Tutti,

ho affrontato la questione dell’accoppiata energia−informazione altre
volte. Ora aggiungo, altrettanto brevi considerazioni in proposito.
L’energia è un modo di essere dell’informazione e l’informazione è un modo
di essere dell’energia.

In apodittica o estrema sintesi:

* *Informazione naturale o termodinamica*: *I* = −*S* = neg−entropia
(energia libera)  dipendente dalla *forma* o distribuzione/diffusione delle
molecole o particelle: *entropia* (energia degradata) è equilibrio o
diffusione omogenea o indifferenziata delle particelle o molecole, perché
il gradiente termico (separazione delle molecole calde e veloci da un lato
e fredde e lente dall’altro) salta: *neg**−**entropia* è dis−equilibrio o
disposizione eterogenea o  differenziata delle particelle o molecole dando

* *Informazione genetica *è: informazione delle informazioni: moneta
biologica che riempie e determina la vita: comunicazione−trasmissione
genomica da cui dipende la *forma* struttural/funzionale o
funzional/strutturale degli organismi umani, animali e vegetali; energia
vitale connessa al codice inscritto nei geni: alla base del passaggio della
ricerca biologica dal metabolismo alla genetica;

* *Informazione matematica*: teoria strutturale delle proprietà statistiche
della fonte implicante studi di ingegneria della trasmissione
dell’informazione relativi a processi che trasmettono unità di informazione
non significanti; secondo Shannon e Weaver  [140] l’informazione è il
valore di equi probabilità che si realizza tra molte possibilità
combinatorie ed è direttamente proporzionale all’*entropia *(misurata in
bit) di un dato sistema ;

* *Informazione semiotico**−**semantica*: teoria strutturale delle
proprietà generative di un s−codice che sottendono processi in cui unità
significanti di informazione sono trasmesse a fini comunicativi; l’s−codice
sovrapposto alla equiprobabilità del sistema lo domina comunicativamente,
riducendone l’informazione matematica, ma rendendo possibile la
comunicazione di significati selezionati, trasmessi e ricevuti.

Se l’informazione può essere definita sia come entropia sia come neg−entropia,
questo discende dal fatto che nel primo caso si tratta di informazione
matematica, nel secondo caso di informazione semiotico−semantica. Allora
come si fa a dire o scrivere che l’informazione non ha niente a che vedere
con l’energia, quando l’energia è una forma di informazione e
l’informazione è una forma di energia?

Cari colleghi, Vi chiedo scusa per lo  stile espressivo (oltre che per la
lingua italiana) usato, oltre che per lo  schema assai sintetico che
propongo alla vostra significativa attenzione. Comunque, Vi ringrazio per
la compagnia che mi fate. Il tempo ci martirizza, rendendoci testimoni
della nostra e altrui storia. Un abbraccio affettuoso a tutti.

Francesco.

2018-05-31 17:28 GMT+02:00 Joseph Brenner :

> Stan,
>
>
>
> Good, but things can also run in the opposite direction. How about variety
> (plus more energy) generating more variety, more possibilities and allowing
> new ‘information’ to emerge? Standard logical analysis is inadequate
> because it cannot handle this picture.
>
>
>
> Joseph
>
>
> --
>
> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Stanley
> N Salthe
> *Sent:* jeudi, 31 mai 2018 16:21
> *To:* Burgin, Mark; fis
>
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis
>
>
>
> Mark -- What Shannon referred to as 'entropy' was 'variety'. 'Information'
> per se was achieved by way of a reduction or winnowing of this variety of
> possibilities, leaving 'information' to survive.
>
>
>
> STAN
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:24 PM, Burgin, Mark
> wrote:
>
> Dear Loet,
> Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is
> Shannon's measure of information, which is called entropy.
>
> Sincerely,
> Mark
>
>
> On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>
> Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,
>
>
>
> The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between* res cogitans*
>  and* res extensa* as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case
> that things could have been different is not out there in the world as
> something seizable such as piece of wood.
>
>
>
> Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but
> it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others).
> The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to
> operationalize Descartes'* cogitans* and make it amenable to the
> measurement as information.
>
>
>
> Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by
> a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Stan,

Good, but things can also run in the opposite direction. How about variety
(plus more energy) generating more variety, more possibilities and allowing
new information to emerge? Standard logical analysis is inadequate because
it cannot handle this picture.

Joseph

_

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N
Salthe
Sent: jeudi, 31 mai 2018 16:21
To: Burgin, Mark; fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Mark -- What Shannon referred to as 'entropy' was 'variety'. 'Information'
per se was achieved by way of a reduction or winnowing of this variety of
possibilities, leaving 'information' to survive.

STAN

On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:24 PM, Burgin, Mark
wrote:

Dear Loet,
Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is Shannon's
measure of information, which is called entropy.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and
res extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that
things could have been different is not out there in the world as something
seizable such as piece of wood.

Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it
can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The
grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize
Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the measurement as information.

Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to
call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is
embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as
Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as physical.

In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical
entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a
distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this distribution
will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic
entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86  .37 = .49 bits of
information. One thus can prove that this information is not physical.

Best,

Loet

_

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> l...@leydesdorff.net ;
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/> http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty,  <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/> SPRU, University of
Sussex;

Guest Professor  <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/> Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou;
Visiting Professor,  <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html> ISTIC,
Beijing;

Visiting Fellow,  <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/> Birkbeck, University of London;

citations?user=ych9gNYJ=en

-- Original Message --

From: "Burgin, Mark"

To: "Søren Brier" ; "Krassimir Markov" ;
<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es> "fis@listas.unizar.es"

Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM

Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the
Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is real, or
it cannot be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other
realities, as it was demonstrated in my book Structural Reality, allows
understand information as real but not physical.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:

Dear Mark

Using physical this way it just tends to mean real, but that raises the
problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödels theorem or
mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is subjectivity and
self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a conscious subject with
feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure it. Is it physical then?? I
only see what you write and your behavior. And are the meaning of your
sentences physical? So here we touch phenomenology (the experiential) and
hermeneutics (meaning and interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the
meaning of signs in cognition and communication). We have problems
encompassing these aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the
technical sciences that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of
information science.

Best

Søren

Fra: Fis  <mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>
På vegne af Krassimir Markov
Sendt: 17. maj 2018 11:33
Til: fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark  <mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>

Emne: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagu```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Mark -- What Shannon referred to as 'entropy' was 'variety'. 'Information'
per se was achieved by way of a reduction or winnowing of this variety of
possibilities, leaving 'information' to survive.

STAN

On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:24 PM, Burgin, Mark
wrote:

> Dear Loet,
> Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is
> Shannon's measure of information, which is called entropy.
>
> Sincerely,
> Mark
>
>
>
> On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>
> Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,
>
> The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between* res cogitans*
>  and* res extensa* as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case
> that things could have been different is not out there in the world as
> something seizable such as piece of wood.
>
> Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but
> it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others).
> The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to
> operationalize Descartes'* cogitans* and make it amenable to the
> measurement as information.
>
> Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by
> a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer
> to call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is
> embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as
> Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as physical.
>
> In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical
> entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a
> distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this
> distribution will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the
> probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 – .37 =
> .49 bits of information. One thus can prove that this information is not
> physical.
>
> Best,
> Loet
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
> Sussex;
>
> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;
>
> Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;
>
>
> -- Original Message --
> From: "Burgin, Mark"
> To: "Søren Brier" ; "Krassimir Markov" ;
> "fis@listas.unizar.es"
> Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis
>
> Dear Søren,
> You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the
> Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is real,
> or it cannot be real if it is not physical.
> Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other
> realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural Reality,” allows
> understand information as real but not physical.
>
>Sincerely,
>Mark
>
> On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:
>
> Dear Mark
>
>
>
> Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that raises
> the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s theorem or
> mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is subjectivity and
> self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a conscious subject with
> feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure it. Is it physical then?? I
> only see what you write and your behavior. And are the meaning of your
> sentences physical? So here we touch phenomenology (the experiential) and
> hermeneutics (meaning and interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the
> meaning of signs in cognition and communication). We have problems
> encompassing these aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the
> technical sciences that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of
> information science.
>
>
>
>   Best
>
>   Søren
>
>
>
> *Fra:* Fis   *På
> vegne af *Krassimir Markov
> *Sendt:* 17. maj 2018 11:33
> *Til:* fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark
>
> *Emne:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis
>
>
>
> Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,
>
>
>
> First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to publish
> it in IJ ITA.
>
> It will be nice to continue our common work this way.
>
>
>```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
Dear Loet,
Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is
Shannon's measure of information, which is called entropy.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between/res
cogitans/ and/res extensa/ as two different realities. Our knowledge
in each case that things could have been different is not out there in
the world as something seizable such as piece of wood.

Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable,
but it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among
others). The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable
us to operationalize Descartes'/cogitans/ and make it amenable to the
measurement as information.

Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning
by a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of
us prefer to call only thus-meaningful information real information
because it is embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type
information as Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as
physical.

In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the
physical entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles
have a distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this
distribution will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the
probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 –
.37 = .49 bits of information. One thus can prove that this
information is not physical.

Best,
Loet

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;

Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;

-- Original Message --
From: "Burgin, Mark" <mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>>
To: "Søren Brier" mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>; "Krassimir
Markov" mailto:mar...@foibg.com>>;
"fis@listas.unizar.es" <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>

Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the
Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is
real, or it cannot be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes
other realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural
Reality,” allows understand information as real but not physical.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:

Dear Mark

Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that
raises the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s
theorem or mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is
subjectivity and self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a
conscious subject with feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it,
measure it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write and your
behavior. And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So here we
touch phenomenology (the experiential) and hermeneutics (meaning and
interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the meaning of signs
in cognition and communication). We have problems encompassing these
aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the technical sciences
that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of information science.

Best

Søren

*Fra:*Fis  *På vegne af *Krassimir Markov
*Sendt:* 17. maj 2018 11:33
*Til:* fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark
*Emne:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to
publish it in IJ ITA.

It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on

*Is information physical?*

was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss
and to come to some conclusions.

I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.

For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the
Infos consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”.

Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the
r```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear Soren,
What I try to say is that the Piercean triadic pragmatic semiotics includes
‘meaning’ as generated by the Interpreter but does not tell much about the
nature of that meaning. And this lack makes difficult to adress questions like:
what is the reason of being of a meaning?, what can be its content? its
purpose?, what are its relations with information?, how can it be applied to
animals and humans (and to AAs)?,  is a meaning always meaningful? and for
which entities?, ...
Theses questions should be part, I feel, of a transdiciplinarity semiotic
process philosophy. And I don’t see very well how they can be taken into
account without the availability of a description or modeling of the
Interpreter.
Did I miss something?
Best
Christophe

De : Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk>
Envoyé : vendredi 25 mai 2018 13:13
À : Christophe Menant; fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : RE: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Christoph

I am not sure what you mean. In my understanding the important dynamics in
Peirce’s pragmaticist semiotics is that symbols grow and create habits in a web
of signs in nature as well as in culture viewing the central dynamic process in
the cosmos as well as man  to be of symbolic nature that through evolution and
history develops reasoning in many interlocking dimension.

Best

Søren

From: Christophe Menant <christophe.men...@hotmail.fr>
Sent: 25. maj 2018 09:08
To: Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk>; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: RE: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Soren,
You are right to recall that a transdisciplinary theory of cognition and
communication has to include meaning. But I’m not sure that the Peircean
approach is enough for that.
The triad (Object, Sign, Interpretant) positions the Interpretant as being the
meaning of the Sign created by the Interpreter. But Peirce does not tell much
about a possible content of the Interpreter. He does not tell what is for him a
process of meaning generation. And this, I feel,  should bring us to be
cautious about using Peirce in subjects dealing with meaning generation.
Best
Christophe

De : Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>> de
la part de Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk<mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>
Envoyé : jeudi 24 mai 2018 17:44
À : Loet Leydesdorff; Burgin, Mark; Krassimir Markov;
fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark, Loet and others

My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality is
bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements can be
useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at transdisciplinary
theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then we have to include
meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural science do not have
experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations. We can try to develop a
logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where Mark stays in the structural
dimension and Loet wants to  enter res cogitans by probability measures, ,
maybe because a  philosophical framework that does not allow meaning to be
real. But Peirce keeps working with the metaphysical stipulations until he
reaches a framework that can integrate experience, meaning and logic in one
theory, namely his triadic pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it
because I think it is unique, but many researcher do not want to use it,
because its change in metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all
though most of us agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern
scientific ontology of irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other
than Peirce has developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary
semiotic process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution,
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development of
human consciousness?

Best

Søren

From: l...@leydesdorff.net<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>
<leydesdo...@gmail.com<mailto:leydesdo...@gmail.com>> On Behalf Of Loet
Leydesdorff
Sent: 24. maj 2018 07:45
To: Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>>; Søren
Brier <sbr@cbs.dk<mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>; Krassimir Markov
<mar...@foibg.com<mailto:mar...@foibg.com>>;
fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and res
extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear Christoph

I am not sure what you mean. In my understanding the important dynamics in
Peirce's pragmaticist semiotics is that symbols grow and create habits in a web
of signs in nature as well as in culture viewing the central dynamic process in
the cosmos as well as man  to be of symbolic nature that through evolution and
history develops reasoning in many interlocking dimension.

Best
Søren

From: Christophe Menant <christophe.men...@hotmail.fr>
Sent: 25. maj 2018 09:08
To: Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk>; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: RE: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Soren,
You are right to recall that a transdisciplinary theory of cognition and
communication has to include meaning. But I'm not sure that the Peircean
approach is enough for that.
The triad (Object, Sign, Interpretant) positions the Interpretant as being the
meaning of the Sign created by the Interpreter. But Peirce does not tell much
about a possible content of the Interpreter. He does not tell what is for him a
process of meaning generation. And this, I feel,  should bring us to be
cautious about using Peirce in subjects dealing with meaning generation.
Best
Christophe

De : Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>> de
la part de Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk<mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>
Envoyé : jeudi 24 mai 2018 17:44
À : Loet Leydesdorff; Burgin, Mark; Krassimir Markov;
fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark, Loet and others

My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality is
bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements can be
useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at transdisciplinary
theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then we have to include
meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural science do not have
experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations. We can try to develop a
logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where Mark stays in the structural
dimension and Loet wants to  enter res cogitans by probability measures, ,
maybe because a  philosophical framework that does not allow meaning to be
real. But Peirce keeps working with the metaphysical stipulations until he
reaches a framework that can integrate experience, meaning and logic in one
theory, namely his triadic pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it
because I think it is unique, but many researcher do not want to use it,
because its change in metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all
though most of us agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern
scientific ontology of irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other
than Peirce has developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary
semiotic process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution,
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development of
human consciousness?

Best

Søren

From: l...@leydesdorff.net<mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>
<leydesdo...@gmail.com<mailto:leydesdo...@gmail.com>> On Behalf Of Loet
Leydesdorff
Sent: 24. maj 2018 07:45
To: Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>>; Søren
Brier <sbr@cbs.dk<mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>; Krassimir Markov
<mar...@foibg.com<mailto:mar...@foibg.com>>;
fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and res
extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that things
could have been different is not out there in the world as something seizable
such as piece of wood.

Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it
can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The
grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize
Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the measurement as information.

Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to
call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is embedded.
One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as Bateson-type
information. The latter can be debated as physical.

In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical
entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a distribution
of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, th```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear Søren

I have been interested in Peirce for a long time, but while I've found it
an interesting explanatory framework, I've tended to not find it as
practically useful as other (cybernetic) ways of thinking. I'm puzzled by
this: I think the problem might have something to do with the difference
between "logic" and "explanation", or to be more precise, the different
between a process explanation and a process logic.

Logic is not explanation. It provides a way of generating expectations.
>From a logic, we are able to construct a view on "What might happen". From
that, we can make observations about "What might have happened, but did
not" (which is what Ashby considered to the science of the cybernetician).

Peirce's work is split with regard to logic. Clearly, the existential
graphs are logic (similar to Spencer-Brown and (thanks to Lou for this)
Lewis Carroll). But the semiotic triad? It's an attempt to explain, isn't
it? And in the hands of media studies, it becomes dogmatic (this is an
index, this is an interpretant, etc). How can one use it to make
predictions and test them? And is it really non-foundationalist? It looks
rather like Naturphilosophie, I would suggest...

Cybernetic models, on the other hand, do (I think) articulate a process
logic. It's in McCulloch's "Logic of nervous nets", Ashby's Law, Beer's
VSM, Bateson's Double bind, Howard's Paradoxes of Rationality, and
Shannon's information. And there are deeper formal logics which capture
this - like Lupasco/Brenner, and (maybe) Spencer-Brown. Some of these have
been practically useful - notably, Shannon, Beer, Bateson and Howard - and
Ashby sits behind all of it. And even in generating explanations, I think
Beer's logic of cybernetic transduction is a much better fit to cell-cell
transduction, than Peirce (for example).

There's so much that's tantalising in Peirce (like the quaternions which
hang in the background of his whole family, and which could well be where
he got his triadic obsession from), but it's not clear to me that it all
joins up quite as successfully as you suggest.

Unless I'm missing something...

Best wishes,

Mark

On 24 May 2018 16:47, "Søren Brier" <sbr@cbs.dk> wrote:

Dear Mark, Loet and others

My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality
is bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements
can be useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at
transdisciplinary theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then
we have to include meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural
science do not have experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations.
We can try to develop a logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where
Mark stays in the structural dimension and Loet wants to  enter res
cogitans by probability measures, , maybe because a  philosophical
framework that does not allow meaning to be real. But Peirce keeps working
with the metaphysical stipulations until he reaches a framework that can
integrate experience, meaning and logic in one theory, namely his triadic
pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it because I think it is unique,
but many researcher do not want to use it, because its change in
metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all though most of us
agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern scientific ontology of
irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other than Peirce has
developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary semiotic
process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution,
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development
of human consciousness?

Best

Søren

*From:* l...@leydesdorff.net <leydesdo...@gmail.com> *On Behalf Of *Loet
Leydesdorff
*Sent:* 24. maj 2018 07:45
*To:* Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>; Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk>;
Krassimir Markov <mar...@foibg.com>; fis@listas.unizar.es
*Subject:* Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between* res cogitans* and*
res extensa* as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that
things could have been different is not out there in the world as something
seizable such as piece of wood.

Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but
it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others).
The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to
operationalize Descartes'* cogitans* and make it amenable to the
measurement as information.

Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer
t```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear Soren,
You are right to recall that a transdisciplinary theory of cognition and
communication has to include meaning. But I’m not sure that the Peircean
approach is enough for that.
The triad (Object, Sign, Interpretant) positions the Interpretant as being the
meaning of the Sign created by the Interpreter. But Peirce does not tell much
about a possible content of the Interpreter. He does not tell what is for him a
process of meaning generation. And this, I feel,  should bring us to be
cautious about using Peirce in subjects dealing with meaning generation.
Best
Christophe

De : Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> de la part de Søren Brier
<sbr@cbs.dk>
Envoyé : jeudi 24 mai 2018 17:44
À : Loet Leydesdorff; Burgin, Mark; Krassimir Markov; fis@listas.unizar.es
Objet : Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark, Loet and others

My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality is
bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements can be
useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at transdisciplinary
theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then we have to include
meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural science do not have
experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations. We can try to develop a
logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where Mark stays in the structural
dimension and Loet wants to  enter res cogitans by probability measures, ,
maybe because a  philosophical framework that does not allow meaning to be
real. But Peirce keeps working with the metaphysical stipulations until he
reaches a framework that can integrate experience, meaning and logic in one
theory, namely his triadic pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it
because I think it is unique, but many researcher do not want to use it,
because its change in metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all
though most of us agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern
scientific ontology of irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other
than Peirce has developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary
semiotic process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution,
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development of
human consciousness?

Best

Søren

From: l...@leydesdorff.net <leydesdo...@gmail.com> On Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: 24. maj 2018 07:45
To: Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>; Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk>;
Krassimir Markov <mar...@foibg.com>; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and res
extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that things
could have been different is not out there in the world as something seizable
such as piece of wood.

Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it
can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The
grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize
Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the measurement as information.

Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to
call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is embedded.
One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as Bateson-type
information. The latter can be debated as physical.

In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical
entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a distribution
of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this distribution will change in
the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic entropy is .7 log2
(.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 – .37 = .49 bits of information. One thus can
prove that this information is not physical.

Best,

Loet

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/> University of Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ.<http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, Hangzhou;
Visiting Professor, ISTIC, <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html> Beijing;

Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck<http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;

-- Original Message --

From: "Burgin, Mark" &l```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear Mark, Loet and others

My point was that all the aspects I mention are part of a reality that is
bigger than what we can grasp under the realm of physical science. Reality is
bigger than physicalism. Quantitative forms of information measurements can be
useful in many ways, but they are not sufficient for at transdisciplinary
theory of cognition and communication. As Loet write then we have to include
meaning. In what framework can we do that? The natural science do not have
experience and meaning in their conceptual foundations. We can try to develop a
logical approach like Mark and Peirce do. Where Mark stays in the structural
dimension and Loet wants to  enter res cogitans by probability measures, ,
maybe because a  philosophical framework that does not allow meaning to be
real. But Peirce keeps working with the metaphysical stipulations until he
reaches a framework that can integrate experience, meaning and logic in one
theory, namely his triadic pragmaticist semiotics. I am fascinated by it
because I think it is unique, but many researcher do not want to use it,
because its change in metaphysics in developing out of Descartes dualism, all
though most of us agrees that it is too limited to work in the modern
scientific ontology of irreversible time, that Prigogine developed. Who other
than Peirce has developed on non-dualist non-foundationalist transdisciplinary
semiotic process philosophy integrating animal (biosemiotics), human evolution,
history and language development in a consistent theory of the development of
human consciousness?

Best
Søren

From: l...@leydesdorff.net <leydesdo...@gmail.com> On Behalf Of Loet Leydesdorff
Sent: 24. maj 2018 07:45
To: Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>; Søren Brier <sbr@cbs.dk>;
Krassimir Markov <mar...@foibg.com>; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re[2]: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans and res
extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case that things
could have been different is not out there in the world as something seizable
such as piece of wood.

Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but it
can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others). The
grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to operationalize
Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the measurement as information.

Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by a
system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer to
call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is embedded.
One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as Bateson-type
information. The latter can be debated as physical.

In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical
entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a distribution
of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this distribution will change in
the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the probabilistic entropy is .7 log2
(.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 – .37 = .49 bits of information. One thus can
prove that this information is not physical.

Best,
Loet

Loet Leydesdorff
Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/> University of Sussex;
Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ.<http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, Hangzhou;
Visiting Professor, ISTIC, <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html> Beijing;
Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck<http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;

-- Original Message --
From: "Burgin, Mark" <mbur...@math.ucla.edu<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>>
To: "Søren Brier" <sbr@cbs.dk<mailto:sbr@cbs.dk>>; "Krassimir Markov"
<mar...@foibg.com<mailto:mar...@foibg.com>>;
"fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>"
<fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the Physical
World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is real, or it cannot
be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other
realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural Reality,” allows
understand information as real but not physical.

Sincerely,
Mark
On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier w```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
Thanks Lou, you are surely right to point out the object-nature of concepts.

>There is no escape from sooner or later realizing that 2 exists only
in the mind or in the Mind.

Indeed. Our minds are full of such concepts. It seems that one of the
important activities of the mind is to generate 'things' from the
processes that impinge upon us. This makes living our lives much simpler
(we don't need to set about curating the collection of all couples).

>Mind as eigenform never happens except at the limit where
self-reference occurs.

I found it useful to read your paper on that is to be found at
eigenforms http://homepages.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/Eigen.pdf.

Best

Dai

On 24/05/18 05:08, Louis H Kauffman wrote:

Dai,
I start down a road toward attempting to understand information by
first understanding number and form.

|
||
|||

|
…

Is a number a thing?
Is 2 a thing?
Cannot say that this 2, this || “is” two. Rather it partakes in being
a couple.
2 is relational. We say that there are 2 signs in the word “is"
because a standard couple can be matched to the i and the s.

There is a potential process behind the concept 2.
2 is a concept, but you cannot point to any existent “thing” and say
“that is 2”.

You can only say there are 2 of them here, indicating relationship.
So process can also be subordinate to the existence of a something if
that something is a concept.

Numbers exist.
Numbers are concepts.
Numbers are related to processes of matching and comparing.
But numbers are not these processes only.
No thing is so real as the number 2.
Numbers are at the base of what we mean by information.
Do you want the actual couples to somehow allow 2 to emerge in the
proliferation of many many couples?

Russel said: “2 is the collection of all couples.”
Are you convinced that the collection of all possible couples captures
the concept of 2?

I doubt it unless you take collection to be a verb.
There is no escape from sooner or later realizing that 2 exists only
in the mind or in the Mind.
Mind as eigenform never happens except at the limit where
self-reference occurs.

I am the observed link between myself and observing myself (HVF).
Lou

On May 17, 2018, at 6:44 AM, Dai Griffiths > wrote:

What is a 'thing'?

Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that  only processes exist,
and that for human convenience in living in the world we put
conceptual membranes around some parts of those processes and call
them 'things'. From this point of view we do not have two aspects
(things and predictions about those things), but simply the
monitoring of processes, and theorising about what we find. This does
not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. mechanisms might be a
special kind of process).

Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully
reformulated as "Is information a thing?".

Dai

On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:

Dear FISers,

I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I
got an idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes
two kind of philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to
the existence of things) and predicative (what can we say and know
about things). Against Quine materialism I came across the idea that
ontological problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting
problem. The fact is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All
we have as scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think
of Science as a communicative social system differentiated from its
environment by means of a code -I think Loet would agree with me in
this point). As a system (I mean not the social system, but the set
of statements taken as a unity) they all are incomplete. There are
many ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown (in this point I
confess I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I
think I have many points of agreement with him but also of
disagreement -but honestly I currently lack the knowledge to
undertake a thorough discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of
the most coherent ways to deal with it. But this means we have to
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the
a set of statements that represent what we know about information.
The problem is that although we can have the intuition that
information is real, physical as has been said, it cannot be proved.
An external reference like "reality ", if we look carefully, acts as
regulatory function within the system. I remember that in the
"Science of the Society", Luhmann devised the concept of consistency
proofs (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an sich, is
inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be

Best,

JJ

El may ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,

The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between res cogitans
and res extensa as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case
that things could have been different is not out there in the world as
something seizable such as piece of wood.

Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable,
but it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among
others). The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us
to operationalize Descartes' cogitans and make it amenable to the
measurement as information.

Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning
by a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us
prefer to call only thus-meaningful information real information because
it is embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type
information as Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as
physical.

In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the
physical entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles
have a distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this
distribution will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the
probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 – .37
= .49 bits of information. One thus can prove that this information is
not physical.

Best,
Loet

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;

Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;

-- Original Message --
From: "Burgin, Mark" <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>
To: "Søren Brier" <sbr@cbs.dk>; "Krassimir Markov"
<mar...@foibg.com>; "fis@listas.unizar.es" <fis@listas.unizar.es>

Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the
Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is
real, or it cannot be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other
realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural Reality,”
allows understand information as real but not physical.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:

Dear Mark

Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that
raises the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s
theorem or mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is
subjectivity and self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a
conscious subject with feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure
it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write and your behavior.
And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So here we touch
phenomenology (the experiential) and hermeneutics (meaning and
interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the meaning of signs in
cognition and communication). We have problems encompassing these
aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the technical sciences
that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of information
science.

Best

Søren

Fra: Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>
<mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>På vegne af Krassimir Markov

Sendt: 17. maj 2018 11:33
Til:fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>
<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>

Emne: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to
publish it in IJ ITA.

It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on

Is information physical?

was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and
to come to some conclusions.

I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.

For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the Infos
consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”.

Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the
relationships “between” and/or “in” real (physical) entities as ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dai,
I start down a road toward attempting to understand information by first
understanding number and form.
|
||
|||

|
…

Is a number a thing?
Is 2 a thing?
Cannot say that this 2, this || “is” two. Rather it partakes in being a couple.
2 is relational. We say that there are 2 signs in the word “is" because a
standard couple can be matched to the i and the s.
There is a potential process behind the concept 2.
2 is a concept, but you cannot point to any existent “thing” and say “that is
2”.
You can only say there are 2 of them here, indicating relationship.
So process can also be subordinate to the existence of a something if that
something is a concept.
Numbers exist.
Numbers are concepts.
Numbers are related to processes of matching and comparing.
But numbers are not these processes only.
No thing is so real as the number 2.
Numbers are at the base of what we mean by information.
Do you want the actual couples to somehow allow 2 to emerge in the
proliferation of many many couples?
Russel said: “2 is the collection of all couples.”
Are you convinced that the collection of all possible couples captures the
concept of 2?
I doubt it unless you take collection to be a verb.
There is no escape from sooner or later realizing that 2 exists only in the
mind or in the Mind.
Mind as eigenform never happens except at the limit where self-reference occurs.
I am the observed link between myself and observing myself (HVF).
Lou

> On May 17, 2018, at 6:44 AM, Dai Griffiths  wrote:
>
> What is a 'thing'?
> Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that  only processes exist, and that
> for human convenience in living in the world we put conceptual membranes
> around some parts of those processes and call them 'things'. From this point
> of view we do not have two aspects (things and predictions about those
> things), but simply the monitoring of processes, and theorising about what we
> find. This does not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. mechanisms might
> be a special kind of process).
> Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully reformulated
> as "Is information a thing?".
> Dai
>
>
> On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:
>> Dear FISers,
>>
>> I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got an
>> idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two kind of
>> philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the existence of
>> things) and predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against
>> Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological problems are
>> undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem. The fact is that we cannot
>> leave the predicative realm. All we have as scientists is scientifical
>> statements (therefore I think of Science as a communicative social system
>> differentiated from its environment by means of a code -I think Loet would
>> agree with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the social system, but
>> the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are incomplete. There are
>> many ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown (in this point I confess
>> I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I think I have many
>> points of agreement with him but also of disagreement -but honestly I
>> currently lack the knowledge to undertake a thorough discussion).
>> Self-reference, I think, is one of the most coherent ways to deal with it.
>> But this means we have to learn to deal with paradoxes.
>> Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the
>> constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that paradox in a set of
>> statements that represent what we know about information. The problem is
>> that although we can have the intuition that information is real, physical
>> as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external reference like "reality
>> ", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory function within the system. I
>> remember that in the "Science of the Society", Luhmann devised the concept
>> of consistency proofs (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an
>> sich, is inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> JJ
>>
>> El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark" > > escribió:
>>Dear FISers,
>>It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and
>> creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. Many
>> interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I
>> would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our
>> intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.
>>
>>To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is information
>> physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that here physical means
>> the nature of ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis - Can it be Improved?

```
Dear Jerry, Joseph and all FISers,
The title of my contribution is Logical Analysis but not Formal Logical
Analysis. It means that I did not use any formal logic but thoroughly
applied simple mundane logic, which is frequently used in everyday life.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/18/2018 8:45 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

Mark, List:

I find your analysis to be curious from the perspective of scientific
information theories - that is, the nature of scientific beliefs that
are used to do science pragmatically - in physics, engr., chemistry,
biology and medicine. The practice of scientific information uses
well-established symbol systems, abstractions that relate meaning of
experience to symbolic meaning in the mind.  Mental images (indices,
icons, symbols, diagrams, etc,) are systematically manipulated within
the particular framework of the scientific problem at hand, the focus
of the inquiry.

The internal representation of the situation under investigation is
only a private interpretation of the external objects. It is created
by the various sense organs, for example the critical roles of the
senses of touch, smell, hearing, etc are essential to the natural
sciences.

So, who can define the meaning of the (mathematical?) varieties of
“our model of the world”?
How will such a “model” (path?, category?,)  relate the static to the
dynamic that we experience in our daily inquiries?

Let me skip directly to the categorizational logic:
Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which
comprises three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the
world of structures, we have seven options assuming that information
exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
- information is physical, structural and mental

Philosophically, how does this logic differ from the Vienna Circle
logic of “Unity of Science” of the 1930’s?

Can you expand the premises to include the processing of informational
flows in the natural sciences?

It seems to me that the meaning to be associated with this
categorization is obscured by the usage of the term, structural.

For examples:
Physical information can be considered structured.
Mathematical equations are often considered as structures.
Mental processes are dependent on anatomical structures.
Is time structured?

Where does this categorization take account of the mathematical
representations of molecular biology, genetics, biological dynamics,
human diseases, all of which depend on the handedness of biochemical
isomers and Penrose twistors?

Within this categorization, how are the processes of communication
represented?

Or, is communication not a component of the purposes for developing
the categorization?

My personal philosophy is that categorizations are always for a goal,
purpose, objective, intent, etc.  Thus, many many philosophers have
proposed categorical theories.

It appears that this proposed categorization of information could be
improved by addressing the symbol systems used in the biological and
other sciences. That is, addressing the forms of abstraction that
relate representation to (in-) forms of physical structures.

Cheers

Jerry

On May 16, 2018, at 9:20 PM, Burgin, Mark > wrote:

Dear FISers,
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent
and creative individuals participated expressing different points of
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem
based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.

To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that
here physical means the nature of information and not its substance,
or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical,
chemical biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier of
information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar
to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are
only forms or number representations and not numbers themselves.

If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers
assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate
in our discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for
example, Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).

Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option,
namely, to admit that information is physical because only physical
things exist.
```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
Dear Søren,
You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the
Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is
real, or it cannot be real if it is not physical.
Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other
realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural Reality,”
allows understand information as real but not physical.

Sincerely,
Mark

On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:

Dear Mark

Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that
raises the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s
theorem or mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is
subjectivity and self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a
conscious subject with feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure
it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write and your behavior.
And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So here we touch
phenomenology (the experiential) and hermeneutics (meaning and
interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the meaning of signs in
cognition and communication). We have problems encompassing these
aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the technical sciences
that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of information science.

Best

Søren

*Fra:*Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> *På vegne af *Krassimir Markov
*Sendt:* 17. maj 2018 11:33
*Til:* fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>
*Emne:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to
publish it in IJ ITA.

It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on

*Is information physical?*

was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and
to come to some conclusions.

I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.

For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the Infos
consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”.

Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the
relationships “between” and/or “in” real (physical) entities as well
as “between” and/or “in” mental (physical) entities.

I.e. “physical” include “mental” include “structural”.

Finally, IF  “information is physical, structural and mental” THEN
simply the  “information is physical”!

Friendly greetings

Krassimir

*From:*Burgin, Mark <mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>

*Sent:*Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM

*To:*fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>

*Subject:*Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear FISers,
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent
and creative individuals participated expressing different points of
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem
based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.

To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that
here physical means the nature of information and not its substance,
or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical,
chemical biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier of
information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar to
the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are only
forms or number representations and not numbers themselves.

If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers
assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate
in our discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for
example, Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).

Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option,
namely, to admit that information is physical because only physical
things exist.
If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical,
we have three options assuming that information exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises
three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of
structures, we have seven options assuming that information exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
-```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
Dear Bruno,
You state that:
"When poll are done at congress in cosmology or quantum computing, about half
of the physicists endorse the non collapse theory, as it is covariant, and has
no “measurement problem”.
This means that the main tenet of your account, your "First Principle", is not
accepted by HALF of the scholars.
How can you build your huge building on a so much controversial claim?
account is a philosophical one, based on a logical principle, that, although
fashinating and intriguing, is highly controversial.  The results in common
with the scientific knowledge are just coincidental, I believe.  On the other
side, Robert Grosseteste talks about the big bang in 1228, based on simple
logical accounts, and Eraclitus talks about the vacuum.  Just coincidences.
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android lunedì, 21 maggio 2018, 00:16PM +02:00 da
Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :

>Dear Arturo,
>
>This is already my second post of this week, so you might answer to my two
>posts, and I will comment your possible answer (if necessary) next week. Thank
>you.
>
>
>>On 20 May 2018, at 19:30,  tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
>>Dear Bruno,
>>You talk about "some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the
>>arithmetical reality)".
>>This way of reasoning throws us into the realm of the philosophy of
>>mathematics, in which you clearly pursue a neo-platonism in the traces of
>>Tegmark, Godel, Husserl, Tiles, against Carnap, Hilbert, Stuart Mill,
>>Poincare', Brouwer, Lakoff & Nunez, Dehaene, Maddy, Field, Lakatos,
>>Benacerraf.
>>
>
>Well, actually it is Tegmark which follows my lead, as he sent me his first
>draft of the “mathematical universe”, and took my suggestion into account when
>adding computationalism, but he missed the 1P/3p distinction, so my older
>studies remains more consistent. Actually, he cite my papers in the draft, but
>I guess was not able to maintain it for publication. Many told me that there
>is some resistance, not to my ideas, but personal or political (I don’t know
>as I have never met such opponents).
>But I have been influenced by Benacerraf and also Judson Webb, etc. (and of
>course Gödel, Hilbert, etc.).
>
>Yet my approach is different. I start from the computationalist hypothesis,
>and everything I say is derived from it, first informally (the universal
>dovetailer argument) and formally (in the more mathematical part).
>
>
>>Your idea is interesting and intriguing,  related as it is to the philosophy
>>of mathematics.
>It can be related to philosophy of mathematics, but that is a work which
>remains to be done.
>
>>However, your idea has nothing to do with the concepts of scientific method
>>and of testable hypothesis.
>That is not correct. I prove that if Mechanism is true, the physical reality
>is “in the head of the universal Turing machine”.
>That makes Mechanism testable, by comparing the physics which is in the head
>of the machine with the physics that we infer from observation. When I was
>young I concluded that Mechanism is refuted, but I was naive and ignorant of
>quantum mechanics, which eventually confirmed all the weirdness that I got
>from mechanism, like indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning, the possibility
>of many “parallel” computations/worlds and the possibility to extract a
>material sort of information (confirmed by the notion of quantum information).
>A lot of works remains to be done, but until now, mechanism is confirmed by
>nature, when physicalism + mechanism is refuted by nature. Physicalism + non
>mechanism is still an option, though, but is it really plausible? I don’t
>know. As a scientist, I do not defend any options. I just show mechanism
>testable and confirmed up to now.
>
>
>
>
>>
>
>The complete contrary. I avoid doing philosophy. That is especially important
>when tacking some philosophical questions (at least classify as such by
>Aristotelians) and show them testable experimentally.
>
>
>>I feel myself closer to the scientific method than to the logic underlying
>>the philosophy, therefore I prefer to spend my time in reading scientific
>>papers.
>
>Then study well my papers, because there is no statements which are not
>testable. The whole goal of my work was to show that metaphysics and theology,
>in the frame of some hypothesis, become amenable to the scientific method.I
>literally predicted quantum mechanics from pure arithmetic + mechanism a long
>time ago. Then my thesis shows that all universal machine finds this when
>looking inward (in the sense of Gödel’s self-reference).
>
>
>>Possibly innovative, always deeply grounded in an experimental context.
>>
>
>I am with you on this. It is the whole point of my research. Too show that
>thanks to Gödel’s and Turing’s discovery, and some works, we can test today if
>Aristotle ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear Arturo,

This is already my second post of this week, so you might answer to my two
posts, and I will comment your possible answer (if necessary) next week. Thank
you.

> On 20 May 2018, at 19:30, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
>
> Dear Bruno,
> You talk about "some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the
> arithmetical reality)".
> This way of reasoning throws us into the realm of the philosophy of
> mathematics, in which you clearly pursue a neo-platonism in the traces of
> Tegmark, Godel, Husserl, Tiles, against Carnap, Hilbert, Stuart Mill,
> Poincare', Brouwer, Lakoff & Nunez, Dehaene, Maddy, Field, Lakatos,
> Benacerraf.
>
>

Well, actually it is Tegmark which follows my lead, as he sent me his first
draft of the “mathematical universe”, and took my suggestion into account when
adding computationalism, but he missed the 1P/3p distinction, so my older
studies remains more consistent. Actually, he cite my papers in the draft, but
I guess was not able to maintain it for publication. Many told me that there is
some resistance, not to my ideas, but personal or political (I don’t know as I
have never met such opponents).
But I have been influenced by Benacerraf and also Judson Webb, etc. (and of
course Gödel, Hilbert, etc.).

Yet my approach is different. I start from the computationalist hypothesis, and
everything I say is derived from it, first informally (the universal dovetailer
argument) and formally (in the more mathematical part).

> Your idea is interesting and intriguing,  related as it is to the philosophy
> of mathematics.
>
It can be related to philosophy of mathematics, but that is a work which
remains to be done.

> However, your idea has nothing to do with the concepts of scientific method
> and of testable hypothesis.
>
That is not correct. I prove that if Mechanism is true, the physical reality is
“in the head of the universal Turing machine”.
That makes Mechanism testable, by comparing the physics which is in the head of
the machine with the physics that we infer from observation. When I was young I
concluded that Mechanism is refuted, but I was naive and ignorant of quantum
mechanics, which eventually confirmed all the weirdness that I got from
mechanism, like indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning, the possibility of
many “parallel” computations/worlds and the possibility to extract a material
sort of information (confirmed by the notion of quantum information). A lot of
works remains to be done, but until now, mechanism is confirmed by nature, when
physicalism + mechanism is refuted by nature. Physicalism + non mechanism is
still an option, though, but is it really plausible? I don’t know. As a
scientist, I do not defend any options. I just show mechanism testable and
confirmed up to now.

>
>

The complete contrary. I avoid doing philosophy. That is especially important
when tacking some philosophical questions (at least classify as such by
Aristotelians) and show them testable experimentally.

> I feel myself closer to the scientific method than to the logic underlying
> the philosophy, therefore I prefer to spend my time in reading scientific
> papers.
>

Then study well my papers, because there is no statements which are not
testable. The whole goal of my work was to show that metaphysics and theology,
in the frame of some hypothesis, become amenable to the scientific method.I
literally predicted quantum mechanics from pure arithmetic + mechanism a long
time ago. Then my thesis shows that all universal machine finds this when
looking inward (in the sense of Gödel’s self-reference).

> Possibly innovative, always deeply grounded in an experimental context.
>
>

I am with you on this. It is the whole point of my research. Too show that
thanks to Gödel’s and Turing’s discovery, and some works, we can test today if
Aristotle Primary Matter hypothesis is confirmed by Nature. But the results is
that Plato is confirmed, and Aristotle is debunked. We can say that we have
looked closely at Nature, and that it confirms the immaterialism of Mechanism.
Nature exists phenomenologically, as we recover its logic and laws from
arithmetic when we assume computationalism. But assuming some primary matter
re-introduce the mind-body problem. As there has never been any evidence for
primary matter found yet, better to not add it.

Bruno

> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
>
> domenica, 20 maggio 2018, 07:06PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
> :
>
> Hi Dai Griffith, Hi Colleagues,
>
>
>> On 17 May 2018, at 13:44, Dai Griffiths > > wrote:
>>
>> What is a 'thing'?
>>
>
> I assume Digital Mechanism all along. I don’t know if it is true, but if true
> it provides a clear (and tastable) answer.
>
> For the staring basic primitive ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
Dear Bruno,
You talk about "some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also in the
arithmetical reality)".
This way of reasoning throws us into the realm of the philosophy of
mathematics, in which you clearly pursue a neo-platonism in the traces of
Tegmark, Godel, Husserl, Tiles, against Carnap, Hilbert, Stuart Mill,
Poincare', Brouwer, Lakoff & Nunez, Dehaene, Maddy, Field, Lakatos, Benacerraf.

Your idea is interesting and intriguing,  related as it is to the philosophy of
mathematics.  However, your idea has nothing to do with the concepts of
scientific method and of testable hypothesis.  You are talking about
I feel myself closer to the scientific method than to the logic underlying the
philosophy, therefore I prefer to spend my time in reading scientific papers.
Possibly innovative, always deeply grounded in an experimental context.
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android domenica, 20 maggio 2018, 07:06PM +02:00 da
Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :

>Hi Dai Griffith, Hi Colleagues,
>
>
>>On 17 May 2018, at 13:44, Dai Griffiths < dai.griffith...@gmail.com > wrote:
>>What is a 'thing'?
>
>I assume Digital Mechanism all along. I don’t know if it is true, but if true
>it provides a clear (and tastable) answer.
>
>For the staring basic primitive “ontological”, you can stat from any universal
>complete theory or system.
>To fix the things, I start often from the combinators SK, or, as people are
>more familiar with them, from numbers, with addition and multiplication. That
>determines the set of all computations, and our first person experience
>differentiates on them. Indeed, incompleteness forces the self-referentially
>correct machines/numbers to get many different modes of selves, the believer,
>the knower, the observer, the feeler, etc.
>
>A thing like a chair becomes a sort of map of our (indexical, relative)
>neighbourhood of consistent continuations.
>
>I am aware it is counter-intuitive, and quite non materialist, but it explains
>many features of physics, and of consciousness (which is defined as immediate
>undoubtable unjustifiable truth). It provides a “natural role” for
>consciousness like a self-seppeding up relatively to the universal numbers.
>
>
>
>
>>Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that  only processes
>>  exist, and that for human convenience in living in the world we
>>  put conceptual membranes around some parts of those processes and
>>  call them 'things'. From this point of view we do not have two
>>  aspects (things and predictions about those things), but simply
>>  the monitoring of processes, and theorising about what we find.
>>  This does not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. mechanisms
>>  might be a special kind of process).
>>Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully
>>  reformulated as "Is information a thing?”.
>
>It is certainly a type of thing. With mechanism, we can exploit the abyssal
>difference between the arithmetical reality and the arithmetical theory seen
>from inside by the universal machines. The physics (and theology) is not
>dependent of the choice of the starting ontology, as any universal entity
>emulates the infinitely many interactions between all of them (I predicted the
>non cloning theorem of matter from this well before QM “confirms” it.
>The interesting thing is not in the things, but indeed in the relations
>between, and even more in what the universal relations/things can believe,
>know, observe among all things/relations.
>
>Information can be measured, but it can also interpreted, and that is what the
>universal machine like to do the most.
>See my papers for why mechanism associate a notion of person to a vast variety
>of machines, and also to some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also
>in the arithmetical reality (not to be confused with its computable part).
>
>Bruno
>
>
>
>
>>Dai
>>
>>
>>On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco
>>  Rivero wrote:
>>>Dear FISers,
>>>I recently came across an old interview to W. van
>>>Orman Quine and I got an idea -maybe  not very original per se.
>>>Quine distinguishes two kind of philosophical problems:
>>>ontological (those referred to the existence of things) and
>>>predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against
>>>Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological
>>>problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem.
>>>The fact is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All we
>>>have as scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think
>>>of Science as a communicative social system differentiated from
>>>its environment by means of a code -I think Loet would agree
>>>with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the social
>>>system, but the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are
>>>```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Hi Dai Griffith, Hi Colleagues,

> On 17 May 2018, at 13:44, Dai Griffiths  wrote:
>
> What is a 'thing'?
>

I assume Digital Mechanism all along. I don’t know if it is true, but if true
it provides a clear (and tastable) answer.

For the staring basic primitive “ontological”, you can stat from any universal
complete theory or system.
To fix the things, I start often from the combinators SK, or, as people are
more familiar with them, from numbers, with addition and multiplication. That
determines the set of all computations, and our first person experience
differentiates on them. Indeed, incompleteness forces the self-referentially
correct machines/numbers to get many different modes of selves, the believer,
the knower, the observer, the feeler, etc.

A thing like a chair becomes a sort of map of our (indexical, relative)
neighbourhood of consistent continuations.

I am aware it is counter-intuitive, and quite non materialist, but it explains
many features of physics, and of consciousness (which is defined as immediate
undoubtable unjustifiable truth). It provides a “natural role” for
consciousness like a self-seppeding up relatively to the universal numbers.

> Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that  only processes exist, and that
> for human convenience in living in the world we put conceptual membranes
> around some parts of those processes and call them 'things'. From this point
> of view we do not have two aspects (things and predictions about those
> things), but simply the monitoring of processes, and theorising about what we
> find. This does not preclude a taxonomy of processes (e.g. mechanisms might
> be a special kind of process).
> Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully reformulated
> as "Is information a thing?”.
>

It is certainly a type of thing. With mechanism, we can exploit the abyssal
difference between the arithmetical reality and the arithmetical theory seen
from inside by the universal machines. The physics (and theology) is not
dependent of the choice of the starting ontology, as any universal entity
emulates the infinitely many interactions between all of them (I predicted the
non cloning theorem of matter from this well before QM “confirms” it.
The interesting thing is not in the things, but indeed in the relations
between, and even more in what the universal relations/things can believe,
know, observe among all things/relations.

Information can be measured, but it can also interpreted, and that is what the
universal machine like to do the most.
See my papers for why mechanism associate a notion of person to a vast variety
of machines, and also to some non mechanical super-entities (which exist also
in the arithmetical reality (not to be confused with its computable part).

Bruno

> Dai
>
>
> On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:
>> Dear FISers,
>>
>> I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got an
>> idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two kind of
>> philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the existence of
>> things) and predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against
>> Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological problems are
>> undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem. The fact is that we cannot
>> leave the predicative realm. All we have as scientists is scientifical
>> statements (therefore I think of Science as a communicative social system
>> differentiated from its environment by means of a code -I think Loet would
>> agree with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the social system, but
>> the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are incomplete. There are
>> many ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown (in this point I confess
>> I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I think I have many
>> points of agreement with him but also of disagreement -but honestly I
>> currently lack the knowledge to undertake a thorough discussion).
>> Self-reference, I think, is one of the most coherent ways to deal with it.
>> But this means we have to learn to deal with paradoxes.
>> Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the
>> constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that paradox in a set of
>> statements that represent what we know about information. The problem is
>> that although we can have the intuition that information is real, physical
>> as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external reference like "reality
>> ", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory function within the system. I
>> remember that in the "Science of the Society", Luhmann devised the concept
>> of consistency proofs (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an
>> sich, is inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be
>>
>> ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Perhaps, it is helpful to compare with the question whether the
centimeter is physical. The meter is calibrated on a physical measure,
but the centimeter is just a measure. We can provide it with a physical
referent: "This is a centimeter".

Information is perhaps even more complex: a distribution can be expected
to contain information. Is an expectation physical? a distribution?

I tend to disagree with Mark by cutting the world into physical / mental
/ structural, unless the structural includes our codified conventions
such as what is "a centimeter"? We can entertain the concept mentally,
but therefore it is not yet mental. It is codified at an
above-individual level as a structure in language. Is language physical?
I doubt it: language carriers (human beings) are.

Best,
Loet

Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
Sussex;

Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;

Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of London;

-- Original Message --
From: "Jose Javier Blanco Rivero" <javierwe...@gmail.com>
To: "Burgin, Mark" <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>
Cc: "Fis," <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Sent: 5/17/2018 12:47:04 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear FISers,

I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got
an idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two kind
of philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the existence
of things) and predicative (what can we say and know about things).
Against Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological
problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem. The fact
is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All we have as
scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think of Science as
a communicative social system differentiated from its environment by
means of a code -I think Loet would agree with me in this point). As a
system (I mean not the social system, but the set of statements taken
as a unity) they all are incomplete. There are many ways to deal with
it, as logicians have shown (in this point I confess I would need to
examine carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I think I have many points of
agreement with him but also of disagreement -but honestly I currently
lack the knowledge to undertake a thorough discussion). Self-reference,
I think, is one of the most coherent ways to deal with it. But this
means we have to learn to deal with paradoxes.
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the
set of statements that represent what we know about information. The
problem is that although we can have the intuition that information is
real, physical as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external
reference like "reality ", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory
function within the system. I remember that in the "Science of the
Society", Luhmann devised the concept of consistency proofs
(Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an sich, is
inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be

Best,

JJ

El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark" <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>
escribió:

Dear FISers,
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent
and creative individuals participated expressing different points of
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem
based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.

To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that
here physical means the nature of information and not its substance,
or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical,
chemical biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier of
information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar to
the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are only
forms or number representations and not numbers themselves.

If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at
first, to answer the question “Does information exis```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
What is a 'thing'?

Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that  only processes exist, and
that for human convenience in living in the world we put conceptual
membranes around some parts of those processes and call them 'things'.
From this point of view we do not have two aspects (things and
predictions about those things), but simply the monitoring of processes,
and theorising about what we find. This does not preclude a taxonomy of
processes (e.g. mechanisms might be a special kind of process).

Perhaps our "Is information physical" problem could be usefully
reformulated as "Is information a thing?".

Dai

On 17/05/18 11:47, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero wrote:

Dear FISers,

I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I
got an idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two
kind of philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the
existence of things) and predicative (what can we say and know about
things). Against Quine materialism I came across the idea that
ontological problems are undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting
problem. The fact is that we cannot leave the predicative realm. All
we have as scientists is scientifical statements (therefore I think of
Science as a communicative social system differentiated from its
environment by means of a code -I think Loet would agree with me in
this point). As a system (I mean not the social system, but the set of
statements taken as a unity) they all are incomplete. There are many
ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown (in this point I confess
I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's ideas. I think I have
many points of agreement with him but also of disagreement -but
honestly I currently lack the knowledge to undertake a thorough
discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of the most coherent ways
to deal with it. But this means we have to learn to deal with paradoxes.
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the
set of statements that represent what we know about information. The
problem is that although we can have the intuition that information is
real, physical as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external
reference like "reality ", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory
function within the system. I remember that in the "Science of the
Society", Luhmann devised the concept of consistency proofs
(Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an sich, is
inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be

Best,

JJ

El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark" > escribió:

Dear FISers,
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly
intelligent and creative individuals participated expressing
different points of view. Many interesting ideas were suggested.
As a conclusion to this discussion, I would like to suggest a
logical analysis of the problem based on our intrinsic and often
tacit assumptions.

To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note
that here physical means the nature of information and not its
substance, or more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which
can be physical, chemical biological or quantum. By the way,
expression “quantum information” is only the way of expressing
that the carrier of information belongs to the quantum level of
nature. This is similar to the expressions “mixed numbers” or
“decimal numbers”, which are only forms or number representations
and not numbers themselves.

If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All
FISers assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not
participate in our discussions. However, some people think
differently (cf., for example, Furner, J. (2004) Information
studies without information).

Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option,
namely, to admit that information is physical because only
physical things exist.
If we assume that there are two worlds - information is
physical, we have three options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which
comprises three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and
the world of structures, we have seven options assuming that
information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear FISers,

I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got an
idea -maybe  not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two kind of
philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the existence of
things) and predicative (what can we say and know about things). Against
Quine materialism I came across the idea that ontological problems are
undecidable -I think of Turing's Halting problem. The fact is that we
cannot leave the predicative realm. All we have as scientists is
scientifical statements (therefore I think of Science as a communicative
social system differentiated from its environment by means of a code -I
think Loet would agree with me in this point). As a system (I mean not the
social system, but the set of statements taken as a unity) they all are
incomplete. There are many ways to deal with it, as logicians have shown
(in this point I confess I would need to examine carefully B. Marchal's
ideas. I think I have many points of agreement with him but also of
disagreement -but honestly I currently lack the knowledge to undertake a
thorough discussion). Self-reference, I think, is one of the most coherent
ways to deal with it. But this means we have to learn to deal with
Accordingly, as information theorist we would need to identify the
constitutive paradox of information and next unfold that paradox in a set
of statements that represent what we know about information. The problem is
that although we can have the intuition that information is real, physical
as has been said, it cannot be proved. An external reference like "reality
", if we look carefully, acts as regulatory function within the system. I
remember that in the "Science of the Society", Luhmann devised the concept
of consistency proofs (Konsistenzprüfung).But reality as such, the Ding an
sich, is inaccessible. In conclusion, Quine would say that we should not be

Best,

JJ
El may 16, 2018 11:24 PM, "Burgin, Mark"  escribió:

>Dear FISers,
>It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and
> creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. Many
> interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I
> would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our
> intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.
>
>To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is information
> physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that here physical
> means the nature of information and not its substance, or more exactly, the
> substance of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical biological or
> quantum. By the way, expression “quantum information” is only the way of
> expressing that the carrier of information belongs to the quantum level of
> nature. This is similar to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal
> numbers”, which are only forms or number representations and not numbers
> themselves.
>
>   If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at first,
> to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers assume that
> information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in our
> discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for example,
> Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).
>
>Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, namely,
> to admit that information is physical because only physical things exist.
>If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we
> have three options assuming that information exists:
> - information is physical
> - information is mental
> - information is both physical and mental
>
> Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises
> three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of
> structures, we have seven options assuming that information exists:
> - information is physical
> - information is mental
> - information is structural
> - information is both physical and mental
> - information is both physical and structural
> - information is both structural and mental
> - information is physical, structural and mental
>
>  The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to
> avoid unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information
> (in a general sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the physical
> world, it is called *energy*, in the mental world, it is called *mental
> energy*, and in the world of structures, it is called *information* (in
> the strict sense). This conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of
> Mark Johnson that information is both physical and not physical only the
> general theory of information makes this idea more exact and testable.
>In addition, being in the world of structures, information in the
> strict sense is represented in two other worlds by its representations and
> carriers. ```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear Mark

Using 'physical' this way it just tends to mean 'real', but that raises the
problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel's theorem or mathematics
and logic in general (the world of form)? Is subjectivity and self-awareness,
qualia? I do believe you are a conscious subject with feelings, but I cannot
feel it, see it, measure it. Is it physical then?? I only see what you write
and your behavior. And are the meaning of your sentences physical? So here we
touch phenomenology (the experiential) and hermeneutics (meaning and
interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the meaning of signs in cognition
and communication). We have problems encompassing these aspects in the natural,
the quantitative and the technical sciences that makes up the foundation of
most conceptions of information science.

Best
Søren

Fra: Fis <fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> På vegne af Krassimir Markov
Sendt: 17. maj 2018 11:33
Til: fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu>
Emne: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to publish it in
IJ ITA.
It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on
Is information physical?
was more-less chaotic - we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and to come
to some conclusions.

I think now, the Mark's letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.

For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the Infos
consciousness. I.e. "physical" include "mental".

Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the
relationships "between" and/or "in" real (physical) entities as well as
"between" and/or "in" mental (physical) entities.

I.e. "physical" include "mental" include "structural".

Finally, IF  "information is physical, structural and mental" THEN simply the
"information is physical"!

Friendly greetings
Krassimir

From: Burgin, Mark<mailto:mbur...@math.ucla.edu>
Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es<mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear FISers,
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and
creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. Many
interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I would
like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our intrinsic and
often tacit assumptions.

To great extent, our possibility to answer the question "Is information
physical? " depends on our model of the world. Note that here physical means
the nature of information and not its substance, or more exactly, the substance
of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical biological or quantum. By the
way, expression "quantum information" is only the way of expressing that the
carrier of information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar
to the expressions "mixed numbers" or "decimal numbers", which are only forms
or number representations and not numbers themselves.

If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at first, to
answer the question "Does information exist? " All FISers assume that
information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in our discussions.
However, some people think differently (cf., for example, Furner, J. (2004)
Information studies without information).

Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, namely, to
admit that information is physical because only physical things exist.
If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we have
three options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises three
worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of structures, we
have seven options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
- information is physical, structural and mental

The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to avoid
unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information (in a
general sense) exists in all three worlds but ... in the physical world, it is
called energy, in the mental world, it is called mental```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,

First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to publish it in
IJ ITA.
It will be nice to continue our common work this way.

At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on
Is information physical?
was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and to come
to some conclusions.

I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.

What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.

For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.

Mental means physical reflections and physical processes in the Infos
consciousness. I.e. “physical” include “mental”.

Structure (as I understand this concept) is mental reflection of the
relationships “between” and/or “in” real (physical) entities as well as
“between” and/or “in” mental (physical) entities.

I.e. “physical” include “mental” include “structural”.

Finally, IF  “information is physical, structural and mental” THEN simply the
“information is physical”!

Friendly greetings
Krassimir

From: Burgin, Mark
Sent: Thursday, May 17, 2018 5:20 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

Dear FISers,
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent and
creative individuals participated expressing different points of view. Many
interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this discussion, I would
like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem based on our intrinsic and
often tacit assumptions.

To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is information
physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that here physical means
the nature of information and not its substance, or more exactly, the substance
of its carrier, which can be physical, chemical biological or quantum. By the
way, expression “quantum information” is only the way of expressing that the
carrier of information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar
to the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are only forms
or number representations and not numbers themselves.

If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at first, to
answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers assume that
information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in our discussions.
However, some people think differently (cf., for example, Furner, J. (2004)
Information studies without information).

Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option, namely, to
admit that information is physical because only physical things exist.
If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we have
three options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises three
worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of structures, we
have seven options assuming that information exists:
- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
- information is physical, structural and mental

The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to avoid
unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information (in a
general sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the physical world, it is
called energy, in the mental world, it is called mental energy, and in the
world of structures, it is called information (in the strict sense). This
conclusion well correlates with the suggestion of Mark Johnson that information
is both physical and not physical only the general theory of information makes
this idea more exact and testable.
In addition, being in the world of structures, information in the strict
sense is represented in two other worlds by its representations and carriers.
Note that any representation of information is its carrier but not each carrier
of information is its representation. For instance, an envelope with a letter
is a carrier of information in this letter but it is not its representation.
Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of information by the name
energy - physical energy, mental energy and structural energy.

Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested in this discussion, may be
Krassimir will continue his excellent initiative combining the most interesting
contributions into a paper with the title
Is
information physical?
and publish it in his esteemed Journal.

Sincerely,
Mark Burgin

On 5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:

Dear Arturo,

There were some reports in clinical psychology```

### Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

```
Dear FISers,
It was an interesting discussion, in which many highly intelligent
and creative individuals participated expressing different points of
view. Many interesting ideas were suggested. As a conclusion to this
discussion, I would like to suggest a logical analysis of the problem
based on our intrinsic and often tacit assumptions.

To great extent, our possibility to answer the question “Is
information physical? “ depends on our model of the world. Note that
here physical means the nature of information and not its substance, or
more exactly, the substance of its carrier, which can be physical,
chemical biological or quantum. By the way, expression “quantum
information” is only the way of expressing that the carrier of
information belongs to the quantum level of nature. This is similar to
the expressions “mixed numbers” or “decimal numbers”, which are only
forms or number representations and not numbers themselves.

If we assume that there is only the physical world, we have, at
first, to answer the question “Does information exist? “ All FISers
assume that information exists. Otherwise, they would not participate in
our discussions. However, some people think differently (cf., for
example, Furner, J. (2004) Information studies without information).

Now assuming that information exists, we have only one option,
namely, to admit that information is physical because only physical
things exist.
If we assume that there are two worlds - information is physical, we
have three options assuming that information exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is both physical and mental

Finally, coming to the Existential Triad of the World, which comprises
three worlds - the physical world, the mental world and the world of
structures, we have seven options assuming that information exists:

- information is physical
- information is mental
- information is structural
- information is both physical and mental
- information is both physical and structural
- information is both structural and mental
- information is physical, structural and mental

The solution suggested by the general theory of information tries to
avoid unnecessary multiplication of essences suggesting that information
(in a general sense) exists in all three worlds but … in the physical
world, it is called *energy*, in the mental world, it is called *mental
energy*, and in the world of structures, it is called *information* (in
the strict sense). This conclusion well correlates with the suggestion
of Mark Johnson that information is both physical and not physical only
the general theory of information makes this idea more exact and testable.
In addition, being in the world of structures, information in the
strict sense is represented in two other worlds by its representations
and carriers. Note that any representation of information is its carrier
but not each carrier of information is its representation. For instance,
an envelope with a letter is a carrier of information in this letter but
it is not its representation.
Besides, it is possible to call all three faces of information by
the name energy - physical energy, mental energy and structural energy.

Finally, as many interesting ideas were suggested in this
discussion, may be Krassimir will continue his excellent initiative
combining the most interesting contributions into a paper with the title

*Is information physical?*
and publish it in his esteemed Journal.

Sincerely,
Mark Burgin

On 5/11/2018 3:20 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:

Dear Arturo,

There were some reports in clinical psychology, about 30 years ago,
that relate to the question whether a machine can pretend to be a
therapist. That was the time as computers could newly be used in an
interactive fashion, and the Rogers techniques were a current discovery.
(Rogers developed a dialogue method where one does not address the
contents of what the patient says, but rather the emotional aspects of
the message, assumed to be at work in the patient.)

They then said, that in some cases it was indistinguishable, whether a
human or a machine provides the answer to a patient's elucidations.

Progress since then has surely made possible to create machines that
are indistinguishable in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called
"expert systems ", are widely used in many fields. If the interaction
is rational,  that is: formally equivalent to a logical discussion
modi Wittgenstein, the difference in: "who arrived at this answer,
machinery or a human", becomes irrelevant.

Artistry, intuition, creativity are presently seen as not possible to
translate into Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are
not yet well understood. But!: there are some who are busily
undermining the current fundamentals of rational thinking. So there is
hope that we shall live to experience the ultimate disillusionment,
namely ```