Re: [Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

[Karl Javorszky]

Dear Friends,



we keep talking in different systems of references. Nevertheless, there are
points about which some clarification is helpful, to connect the
translucent picture of numbers to the movies you see. Let us talk some
absolute numbers, in the hope of clarifying the background.



Dai wrote a few days ago:

“ … To my mind the note which is heard is far richer than the note on the
score. The difference includes everything that goes into the interpretation
of a piece of music. I am not arguing that numbers could not describe this
difference, but claiming that hugely more numbers would be required to
adequately describe it. … “

Now Stanley brings up following perspective:

“  … But my point was simply that the observer cannot be 'objective', but
always brings in many constraints to any observation, which might have been
made from yet another perspective, of which we cannot imagine the number or
qualities of. … “



Both injections deal with the numeric extents that are available to
perceive or express a state of the world. Assuming that the neurology works
ideally, the perception or expression of the state of the world is not
influencing anything: as many different states of the world are there, as
many can be flawlessly perceived and expressed.

The question that has to be addressed is, then, how many different states
of the world there are. We know that about a limited number of things only
a limited number of nonredundant sentences can be said (otherwise one would
start repeating oneself). These sentences are only meaningful, if they
convey something that could be otherwise (there is nothing to say about a
standalone tautology, like there is nothing to say about Kant’s
thing-as-such). So, the assumption is that the sentence details the place
of the element, relative to which and what kind and how any symbols the
element carries, which make that element commutative to some other
elements, and commutative-cum-sequential to some specific elements, which
are presently relevant. In this context, there is always something to
remark on and make idle predictions about the future.

Nevertheless, about a limited number of things only a limited number of
different sentences can be said, be these sentences stating something about
a sequential position of elements, relative to the patterns of distribution
of commutative symbols, or be they of the kind that they detail the
patterns of distribution of commutative symbols, relative to the sequential
positions that the elements have; in both cases one hits an upper
limit of *rien
ne va plus*, all that can be said, has been said.

The monoideismus this person labours with is connected to the two upper
limits not agreeing with each other. One should indeed refer to
www.oeis.org/A242615 to see the numeric relations pictured.



For the present discussion it does well to mention, that we deal here with
different cases of probabilities the numbers of which are in the order of
magnitude of 3.6E+94 and 1.3E+95. These are really big numbers. There is,
by Jupiter!, sufficient number of alternatives for a sound’s timbre,
enchantment, finest innuendo, etc.

It is not easy to raise hell by running around and holding up placates that
say: “There is an intricate inexactitude in our counting system! We count
incorrectly to the tune of 3.4E-94%!” There are many, to whom other
problems appear more urgent.

Among the corollaries of the steps to put this inexactitude in clean cloths
is, that there exists a maximal number of aspects (perspectives,
viewpoints) that can be used while describing all possible states of the
world. Commutative statements appear to be independent of each other. We
might have counted a case under *{(k elements carry symbol w, among these,
j elements carry also symbol q), (r elements carry symbol t, among these, k
elements also carry symbol z), … etc} *as we met it at any of its partial
descriptions, therefore classifications that come *later*, repeat
redundancies (which may be the method to force registry in the memory).
There is always a *first* describing aspect that segments the cases. The
*second* aspect deals with cases that are already categorised in some ways.
The *last *aspect finds the last cases that were indistinguishable
previously and assigns identifying symbols to them. Any subsequent searches
would turn up only such cases that have already been entered in the
databases. This is a query language, but also in that language only a
limited number of sentences can be said of a collection that is limited in
numbers.



Yes, we indeed can very well imagine the number and the qualities of
categorising perspectives, at least in idealised cases. There is an inner
granularity to the logical world, things are not spread uniformly in space.
Things congregate by very simple rules, at least on the numeric level.



The main points again: we compare the maximal number of DNAs with the
maximal diversity of organisms. We find that the upper limits do not 

Re: [Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bruno -- That is an interesting, creative move!  But my point was simply
that the observer cannot be 'objective', but always
brings in many constraints to any observation, which might have been made
from yet another perspective, of which we cannot
imagine the number or qualities of.

STAN

On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 11:41 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> Dear Stan,
>
>
> On 20 Mar 2018, at 20:22, Stanley N Salthe  wrote:
>
> Bruno -- In this context I like to point out the constraints on our
> abilities of perception.  First, we are physical.
>
>
> That is a strong metaphysical assumption. See my paper for showing this is
> not compatible with the Digital Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive
> science, which is my working hypothesis.
>
> Perception is a relative indexical relation between a (digital) machine
> (number, combinators, pattern of game of life, whatever) and other
> plausible, from its perspective, universal or not entities (infinitely many
> below the substitution level, making both matter and consciousness not
> Turing emulable (in the Mechanist perspective).
>
> There are evidences for a physical reality, but I am not sure there are
> evidence for a primary physical reality. The use of math in physics is well
> explained if the physical appears to be a mathematical reality seen from
> internal creature represented, relatively incarnated or implemented in that
> mathematical reality.
>
> I can prove, if you agree with very elementary arithmetic, the existence
> of the computations and the machine running them. I cannot prove the
> existence of a physical universe, but if Mechanism is true, the physical
> universe appearance can and must be explained by a statistics on all
> computations (seen in a first person way). That makes mechanism testable
> and indeed, thanks to Quantum Mechanics (without collapse) it fits very
> well up to now.
>
>
>
>
>
> Thus:
>
> {physical {material {biological {animal {mammal {primate {human
> {socialized {with accumulated personal history }
>
>
>
> Ok, but you will need “magical” (non Turing emulable, nor Recoverable)
> ability in your matter to select some computation.
>
> You invoke the God “Matter", but if it plays a role, I am no more sure I
> can say yes to …the doctor and survive qua computation.
>
> Mechanism and Materialism, which are often used together, can be shown
> incompatible (it is basically my PhD thesis, and it is summed up in most of
> my papers).
>
> So it is more like
>
> {arithmetical{dream-like{biological{conscious{physical{{animal {mammal
> {primate {human {socialized {with accumulated personal history }
>
>
>
>
> Hence, actuality is for us non-existent.
>
>
> ?
> Is not actuality existent *for us*, phenomenologically, and non-existent
> Ontologically, I guess you mean.  I am not sure I understand well.
>
>
> We live in a constructed reality.
>
>
> The whole physicalness is indeed the arithmetic seen from the internal
> arithmetical beings, but the person attached to them are not arithmetical
> not even analytical (not even third person describable in any way).
>
> I am aware that what I say contradicts 1500 years of (Aristotelian)
> theology, but then it was enforced by 1500 years of argument per authority,
> sometimes violent.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> STAN
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> Hi Dai, Hi Carl, Hi colleagues,
>>
>> > On 19 Mar 2018, at 16:22, Dai Griffiths 
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:
>> >
>> > >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between
>> “reality” and “data”
>> >
>> > That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that
>> which we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we
>> cannot perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.
>>
>> If not the whole of mathematics.
>>
>> To be provocative, I would me more like thinking that the data are an
>> observer tiny distorted part of reality, especially that we can never
>> distinguishes possibly genuine data with hallucinations and dreams.
>>
>> In the computationalist theory, a data is the input to some
>> machine/number program, the execution is the arithmetical semantic of some
>> universal number getting the machine and the data has its input.
>>
>> Now a data can be anything, and can be interpreted, and handled, quite
>> differently, if at all, by different universal, or not, programs. I
>> identify the person by its set of beliefs, and the first person by its
>> subset of true beliefs. Incompleteness makes this working well.
>>
>>
>> >
>> > > just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between
>> the note printed on the partiture,
>> > > and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between
>> the description of the position
>> > > in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces 

Re: [Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

[Bruno Marchal]

Dear Stan,


> On 20 Mar 2018, at 20:22, Stanley N Salthe  wrote:
> 
> Bruno -- In this context I like to point out the constraints on our abilities 
> of perception.  First, we are physical.

That is a strong metaphysical assumption. See my paper for showing this is not 
compatible with the Digital Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive science, 
which is my working hypothesis. 

Perception is a relative indexical relation between a (digital) machine 
(number, combinators, pattern of game of life, whatever) and other plausible, 
from its perspective, universal or not entities (infinitely many below the 
substitution level, making both matter and consciousness not Turing emulable 
(in the Mechanist perspective).

There are evidences for a physical reality, but I am not sure there are 
evidence for a primary physical reality. The use of math in physics is well 
explained if the physical appears to be a mathematical reality seen from 
internal creature represented, relatively incarnated or implemented in that 
mathematical reality.

I can prove, if you agree with very elementary arithmetic, the existence of the 
computations and the machine running them. I cannot prove the existence of a 
physical universe, but if Mechanism is true, the physical universe appearance 
can and must be explained by a statistics on all computations (seen in a first 
person way). That makes mechanism testable and indeed, thanks to Quantum 
Mechanics (without collapse) it fits very well up to now.





> Thus:
> 
> {physical {material {biological {animal {mammal {primate {human {socialized 
> {with accumulated personal history }


Ok, but you will need “magical” (non Turing emulable, nor Recoverable) ability 
in your matter to select some computation. 

You invoke the God “Matter", but if it plays a role, I am no more sure I can 
say yes to …the doctor and survive qua computation.

Mechanism and Materialism, which are often used together, can be shown 
incompatible (it is basically my PhD thesis, and it is summed up in most of my 
papers).

So it is more like

{arithmetical{dream-like{biological{conscious{physical{{animal {mammal {primate 
{human {socialized {with accumulated personal history }



> 
> Hence, actuality is for us non-existent.

? 
Is not actuality existent *for us*, phenomenologically, and non-existent 
Ontologically, I guess you mean.  I am not sure I understand well.


> We live in a constructed reality.

The whole physicalness is indeed the arithmetic seen from the internal 
arithmetical beings, but the person attached to them are not arithmetical not 
even analytical (not even third person describable in any way).

I am aware that what I say contradicts 1500 years of (Aristotelian) theology, 
but then it was enforced by 1500 years of argument per authority, sometimes 
violent.

Best, 

Bruno





> 
> STAN
> 
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> Hi Dai, Hi Carl, Hi colleagues,
> 
> > On 19 Mar 2018, at 16:22, Dai Griffiths  > > wrote:
> >
> > On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:
> >
> > >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between 
> > >“reality” and “data”
> >
> > That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that 
> > which we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we 
> > cannot perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.
> 
> If not the whole of mathematics.
> 
> To be provocative, I would me more like thinking that the data are an 
> observer tiny distorted part of reality, especially that we can never 
> distinguishes possibly genuine data with hallucinations and dreams.
> 
> In the computationalist theory, a data is the input to some machine/number 
> program, the execution is the arithmetical semantic of some universal number 
> getting the machine and the data has its input.
> 
> Now a data can be anything, and can be interpreted, and handled, quite 
> differently, if at all, by different universal, or not, programs. I identify 
> the person by its set of beliefs, and the first person by its subset of true 
> beliefs. Incompleteness makes this working well.
> 
> 
> >
> > > just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between the 
> > > note printed on the partiture,
> > > and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between the 
> > > description of the position
> > > in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his 
> > > hands.
> >
> > I do not think that these are the same case.
> 
> I think that equating reality and data would lead to solipsism (which is 
> phenomenologically correct but ontologically incorrect).
> 
> Also, is there a reality?
> 
> And what could it be?
> 
> We can’t answer, but we can do hypothesis/theory, and with mechanism the 
> physical reality becomes a 

Re: [Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Dai, Hi Carl, Hi colleagues, 

> On 19 Mar 2018, at 16:22, Dai Griffiths  wrote:
> 
> On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:
> 
> >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between “reality” 
> >and “data”
> 
> That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that which 
> we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we cannot 
> perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.

If not the whole of mathematics.

To be provocative, I would me more like thinking that the data are an observer 
tiny distorted part of reality, especially that we can never distinguishes 
possibly genuine data with hallucinations and dreams.

In the computationalist theory, a data is the input to some machine/number 
program, the execution is the arithmetical semantic of some universal number 
getting the machine and the data has its input. 

Now a data can be anything, and can be interpreted, and handled, quite 
differently, if at all, by different universal, or not, programs. I identify 
the person by its set of beliefs, and the first person by its subset of true 
beliefs. Incompleteness makes this working well.


> 
> > just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between the 
> > note printed on the partiture,
> > and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between the 
> > description of the position
> > in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his hands.
> 
> I do not think that these are the same case.

I think that equating reality and data would lead to solipsism (which is 
phenomenologically correct but ontologically incorrect).

Also, is there a reality?

And what could it be?

We can’t answer, but we can do hypothesis/theory, and with mechanism the 
physical reality becomes a phenomenological mode of self-reference of the 
universal (in the sense of Post, Church, Kleene, Turing, …) machine/number.

The biological evolution explains the biological origin of the humans, but to 
avoid the behaviourist error of avoiding consciousness, eventually, we get a 
“physical evolution”, where the physical laws somehow percolate from the dreams 
of all universal numbers. The key is that from the universal machines' first 
person perspectives it is “executed” by infinitely many universal numbers below 
their computationalist substitution level. A fact that I saw a long time before 
this is confirmed by Everett quantum mechanics (which is the old one minus the 
collapse of the wave packet postulate).

Data are indexicals, defined relatively to the universal machine/number which 
interpret it, correctly, or incorrectly, relatively to its most probable 
computations (among an infinity of them).

With mechanism the big picture is very simple, arithmetic and its enumerable, 
but non mechanically enumerable set of universal numbers. But the first person 
phenomenology is “uncertain” on non enumerable computations, making them 
“living” on the border of the uncomputable.

Related to this is that the original doubt of the greek 
theologians/metaphysicians was between "is reality what we see” or is reality 
something else from which what we see is the shadow, the border, the symptom, 
...


> 
> The description of the configuration of a chess game is lossless. I could 
> note down the distribution of the pieces, take them off the board, mix them 
> up and put them back again, and the game would not be changed for the 
> players. The physical chess set and the physical context are also largely 
> irrelevant. Players could leave one room, have a relaxed coffee or aquavit, 
> go back into another room with a duplicate of the game with different pieces 
> on another board, and continue with little disturbance.
> 
> But sheet music is not a lossless representation of a performance. From the 
> starting point of the sheet music, the performer has to decide on volumes, 
> intonation and timing, and in some cases also ornament and variations. These 
> issues arouse deep passions and ferocious debate! Nor would we be happy to 
> buy a recording of a symphony in which different orchestras played different 
> movements in different concert halls (although it might be interesting to 
> hear).


I might agree with Karl, but as expressing a first person phenomenology. With 
mechanism that keeps enumerability, but loss “recursive enumerability. Even the 
simple Gödel-Löbian self-observing universal system/number/machine is 
confronted to the uncomputable main part of the (arithmetical) Truth by just 
this introspection. The senses comes from the multi-relations in between 
different universal machine.

Best Regards,

Bruno





> 
> Dai
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Re: [Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

[Karl Javorszky]

Dear Dai,



thank you for your thoughtful comments on diversity, particularities and
generalities. In my case, setting “reality” equivalent to “data” is one
more little effort on my part to make all things appear enumerable. As you
graciously concede, this is an acceptable perspective.

For the musician, it is irrelevant, whether he sees the note *a* on a score
or hears it: it is the same data element in the inventory of his mental
contents. Similarly, for the chess champion it is irrelevant, whether he
has gained knowledge of the problem position by seeing it on the table,
reading it from a protocol or having heard it narrated to him. The main
point is, that the *modality *of the perception is of no relevance for the
idealised content – the denotation – of the idea. Me always talking about
the identifiable element, of course I prefer to say that the genesis – the
connotations – of an element are relevant only to that extent as they do
not hinder the communality of the object.

We discuss the pen-ultimate steps of Kant peeling away the particularities
of the object, where you warn, that too much of standardisation annihilates
important properties of the mental objects. How interesting then, that
common consensus reigns, that the world is best depicted by *one *kind of
basic element, that faceless *i *of N, that does not even have its own
place, and much less fights for it.

The model being persistently presented to you deals with positions of 136
individuals. These get constantly reorganised, and are almost always under
way to positions that appear to be more towards optimal, or towards which
circumstances force the individual to migrate. In this theatre, there are
sufficient role conflicts that entertain the participants: what kind of
pileup comes up again, how can one annihilate the maximum number of
alternatives, which position is the most restrictive for its successors,
and so forth. What I am involved with is an exercise in accounting. No
sounds, no chess, no reality, only data.

We investigate the properties of data. How much reality is behind the
results, will remain to be seen. How much reality has been behind the rows
of green peas of Padre Mendel, behind his tables and behind the information
theory of genetics? Have Mendel’s Laws existed while Mendel tried to
explain them to his contemporaries? No, they were Mendel’s Obsession,
Mendel’s Brainbug, anything but Mendel’s Laws.

The counting system that hopefully, peu a peu, evolves in your mind is made
up of a few dozen individual elements, the basic shape of which has around
a dozen different variants.  External influences cause that the inner order
of the collection is in a continuous, dynamic process. There are rules to
these inner processes. These rules are demonstrated in the tables relating
to *a+b=c *being subjected to sorting and ordering.

Our comprehension works by assigning the correct denotation to the
perceived connotation. Then, it is an informational theoretical process,
and a data processing challenge, namely: indexing, searching, filtering,
classifying, categorising and identifying data elements. There are rules of
doing so. The rules are given by how the natural numbers actually are. If
in the context of whatever complex question we discuss, *a+b=c *holds, then
the constituents of the picture of the denotation of the question will
agree to the numeric facts that are registered in the tables regarding the
behaviour of elements during reorganisations.

Thank you for the opportunity of offering you my viewpoints.


Karl

2018-03-19 16:22 GMT+01:00 Dai Griffiths :

> On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:
>
> >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between
> “reality” and “data”
>
> That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that
> which we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we
> cannot perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.
>
> > just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between the
> note printed on the partiture,
> > and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between
> the description of the position
> > in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his
> hands.
>
> I do not think that these are the same case.
>
> The description of the configuration of a chess game is lossless. I could
> note down the distribution of the pieces, take them off the board, mix them
> up and put them back again, and the game would not be changed for the
> players. The physical chess set and the physical context are also largely
> irrelevant. Players could leave one room, have a relaxed coffee or aquavit,
> go back into another room with a duplicate of the game with different
> pieces on another board, and continue with little disturbance.
>
> But sheet music is not a lossless representation of a performance. From
> the starting point of the sheet music, the 

Re: [Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

[Dai Griffiths]

On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:

>To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between 
“reality” and “data”


That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that 
which we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that 
we cannot perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black 
holes.


> just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish between 
the note printed on the partiture,
> and the acoustic sound, or for Chess champions to distinguish between 
the description of the position
> in the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his 
hands.


I do not think that these are the same case.

The description of the configuration of a chess game is lossless. I 
could note down the distribution of the pieces, take them off the board, 
mix them up and put them back again, and the game would not be changed 
for the players. The physical chess set and the physical context are 
also largely irrelevant. Players could leave one room, have a relaxed 
coffee or aquavit, go back into another room with a duplicate of the 
game with different pieces on another board, and continue with little 
disturbance.


But sheet music is not a lossless representation of a performance. From 
the starting point of the sheet music, the performer has to decide on 
volumes, intonation and timing, and in some cases also ornament and 
variations. These issues arouse deep passions and ferocious debate! Nor 
would we be happy to buy a recording of a symphony in which different 
orchestras played different movements in different concert halls 
(although it might be interesting to hear).


Dai
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[Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

[Karl Javorszky]

Music : Noise = Meaning : Data





Dear Friends,



if one likes contemporary music, one is being well cared for in Vienna,
specifically during the November festival “wien modern”. The concert cycle
“klangforum wien” also introduces creative approaches to what is the state
of the art in creating acoustic data, which some will experience as music,
while for some the performance is partly outside of the boundary of what is
music. This year’s motto “grenzwert” (“limits”) is, once more, a head-on
confrontation with rules, traditions and conventions regarding the highly
subjective delineation between writing music and finding music generated by
the interplay among physics and neurology.



There is a science in religion, like there is music in some contemporary
concertos. It may not be easy to find, and for some orthodox critics,
science is something different to the transcendent aspects that have been
raised in FIS these last few weeks; just like many orthodox critics would
deny the inclusibility of some compositions under the term “music”, while
for people familiar with the style, the goal of the composer is evident:
work on the boundaries separating unrelated instances of noise from a
coherent musical phrase. Style of Cherubini they write not, the closure of
the phrase is not an over-determined, long foretold, affaire; yet – as they
have repeatedly demonstrated – there is a difference between a composition
and a sequence of random noises.



Similarly, in our discussions here, about what is information, we can come
up with ever newer delineations between incomprehensible and predictable.
We can point out Väinämöinen, who can sing into existence a copper boat,
touching on the principle of standing waves, or the Monkey King: Sun
Wukong, who creates clones of himself by blowing on hair from his fur,
being an ancestor to Sheep Dolly.



A more conservative approach would be to restrict ourselves to that, to
which all can agree being mainstream science of information. We do not need
yet to explore the limits of what is (or: what can be
understood/experienced as) information. There is enough to learn within the
confines of classical reasoning. We are not done yet with the Harmonielehre
of how data contain information. Why don’t we pick up Joseph’s low-key
observation: (colour emphasis added)

 “ … The problem of the entire concept of "data-driven" research can be
illustrated by referring to almost any recent copy of *SCIENCE*, which I am
sure you all do from time to time. There are articles in my original field,
chemistry, which describe incredibly complex multiply-sequenced reactions
which were unimaginable when I was in university. They cannot be followed
or their products exploited without the latest concepts in data handling.
But there is a usually a little phrase "in fine print" to the effect that
the system works "provided the reactions *lend themselves to sequencing*".
As long as there is possibility of studying the chemistry of some molecular
systems, literally, as individuals, it will be hypotheses about their
reality that drive the research, not the data. … “



To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between “reality”
and “data”; just like there is no necessity for musicians to distinguish
between the note printed on the partiture, and the acoustic sound, or for
Chess champions to distinguish between the description of the position in
the protocol of the game and the actual pieces one can hold in his hands.



To summarise:



If we understand science to be something that All can talk about, then we
better keep referring to such facts, the existence of which is a common
knowledge: these facts are usually called “data”;



One can and will learn a lot from investigating relations among data. As
facts have educated us to the fact, that information transmission in the
course of genetics happens by the property of data *to be sequenced*, we
should better look into *variants of being sequenced*;



There is sufficient music and noise emanating from differing *sequences*
one and the same collection can have, so presently there appears to be no
need to involve such concepts that may or may not constitute information.
Let us stick to such arrangements of data that do contain information, like
the DNA. No need yet to ask Supranatural Beings for their help with
figuring out, how to transform the collection of pupils from being lined up
on their first name into being lined up on their last name. We can solve
this problem, taking into account the impressive academic achievements we
cumulatively possess.



Karl
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