Re: [Fis] Steps to a theory of reference significance
Thanks for the response Jeremy. I appreciate the rigor of your piratic comments (perhaps at fis we are more relaxed concocting the arguments; rather than a tightly-knit discussion group, fis is more like a caravan of very heterogenous knowledge traders)... Anyhow, concerning the plausibility of approaching the prokaryotic, it is an attempt that my mini-group has developed in several works (not very successfully attracting the attention of peers; but, helas, that's quite another matter!), see: On prokaryotic Intelligence... (Marijuan et al., BioSystems 99,2,94-103, 2010) which is perhaps the best exemplar. Also del Moral et al. in Kyberneteshttp://juliette.lsi.us.es/Bibliography.aspx?query=%22Kybernetes%22, 43(6):846-864, 2014, and several others focused in Mycobacterium tuberculosis. Even at the very elementary level we have worked, there seems to be ample room for advancing in information-related directions. Perfectly congruent with the main theme of this discussion too (reference significance). Beyond the single cell level, there are several information-thresholds of communication-thresholds in biological evolution that need to be understood better. Once crossed, complexity runaways take place ... (also in our societies). I think the story would make better sense if the intertwining of self-production flows and communication flows is contemplated differently, entering the idea of absence too (at least, I have also attempted!). Although minimally, we should be able to contribute to the social-informational arena of our times. See for instance the great works on social physics by Alex Pentland (shouldn't it be social information science?). But in order to do that, we should take care that the microphysical advances in the foundations of information can escalate with some parsimony... These comments have become pretty tangential --but often at fis we draw this sort of free wheeling tangents! best ---Pedro De: Jeremy Sherman [mindreadersdiction...@gmail.com] Enviado el: viernes, 09 de enero de 2015 0:39 Para: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ Cc: fis Asunto: Re: [Fis] Steps to a theory of reference significance Hi Pedro, Jeremy Sherman here, a long-time pirate. Pleased to meet you. You say: I am also critical with the autogenesis model systems--wouldn't it be far clearer approaching a (relatively) simple prokaryotic cell and discuss upon its intertwining of the communication and self-production arrangements? The way a bacterium sees the world, and reorganizes its living, could be a very useful analysis. I think it leads to a slightly different outcome regarding reference/significance, and meaning/value/fitness. Terry and the Pirates have a long standing rule: One cannot employ as explanation that which hasn't yet been explained. Failing to hold this standard opens researchers up to merely taxonomical work, positing forces, properties and capacities defined solely by their consequences, in effect mistaking questions as answers. Hence, our focus on exploring reference at its earliest possible emergence, and explaining exactly how that emergence occurs, since emergence is also a question, not an answer, an explanandum not an explanan. Somewhat related, I recently came across this: Epistemological particularism is the belief that one can know something without knowing how one knows that thing.[1]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epistemological_particularism#cite_note-1 By this understanding, one's knowledge is justified before one knows how such belief could be justified. Taking this as a philosophical approach, one would ask the question What do we know? before asking How do we know? The term appears in Roderick Chisholmhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roderick_Chisholm's The Problem of the Criterionhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_the_Criterion, and in the work of his student, Ernest Sosahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernest_Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge). Particularism is contrasted with Methodismhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methodism_(philosophy), which answers the latter question before the former. Since the question What do we know implies that we know, particularism is considered fundamentally anti-skeptical, and was ridiculed by Kanthttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant in theProlegomenahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prolegomena. We Pirates do what we can to stay on the epistemological methodist side of things. Even the simplest prokaryotic cell is extraordinarily complex. We don't want to run before we can walk. The briskest runners-before-walkers are those who want to go straight from physics to human consciousness, a leap that we think makes the endeavor thoroughly intractable. Best, Jeremy On Thu, Jan 8, 2015 at 4:48 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.esmailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote: Dear Terry and colleagues, Thanks
[Fis] Steps to a theory of reference significance
_*Steps to a theory of reference significance in information *_*FIS discussion paper by Terrence W. Deacon (2015)* This is the link to download the whole paper: https://www.dropbox.com/s/v5o8pwx3ggmmmnb/FIS%20Deacon%20on%20information%20v2.pdf?dl=0 /The mere fact that the same mathematical expression - Σ pi log pi occurs both in statistical mechanics and in information theory does not in itself establish any connection between these fields. This can be done only by finding new viewpoints from which thermodynamic entropy and information-theory entropy appear as the same concept. /(Jaynes 1957, p. 621) /What I have tried to do is to turn information theory upside down to make what the engineers call 'redundancy' [coding syntax ] but I call 'pattern' into the primary phenomenon. . . . “/ (Gregory Bateson, letter to John Lilly on his dolphin research, 10/05/1968) *Introduction* In common use and in its etymology the term ‘information’ has always been associated with concepts of reference and significance—that is to say it is about something for some use. But following the landmark paper by Claude Shannon in 1948 (and later developments by Wiener, Kolmogorov, and others) the technical use of the term became almost entirely restricted to refer to signal properties of a communication medium irrespective of reference or use. In the introduction to this seminal report, Shannon points out that although communications often have meaning, “These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem” which is to provide a precise engineering tool to assess the computational and physical demands of the transmission, storage, and encryption of communications in all forms. The theory provided a way to precisely measure these properties as well as to determine limits on compression, encryption, and error correction. By a sort of metonymic shorthand this quantity (measured in bits) came to be considered synonymous with the meaning of ‘information’ (both in the technical literature and in colloquial use in the IT world) but at the cost of inconsistency with its most distinctive defining attributes. This definition was, however, consistent with a tacit metaphysical principle assumed in the contemporary natural sciences: the assertion that only material and energetic properties can be assigned causal power and that appeals to teleological explanations are illegitimate. This methodological framework recognizes that teleological explanations merely assign a locus of cause but fail to provide any mechanism, and so they effectively mark a point where explanation ceases. But this stance does not also entail a denial of the reality of teleological forms of causality nor does it require that they can be entirely reduced to intrinsic material and energetic properties. Reference and significance are both implicitly teleological concepts in the sense that they require an interpretive context (i.e. a point of view) and are not intrinsic to any specific physical substrate (e.g. in the way that mass and charge are). By abstracting the technical definition of information away from these extrinsic properties Shannon provided a concept of information that could be used to measure a formal property that is inherent in all physical phenomena: their organization. Because of its minimalism, this conception of information became a precise and widely applicable analytic tool that has fueled advances in many fields, from fundamental physics to genetics to computation. But this strength has also has undermined its usefulness in fields distinguished by the need to explain the non-intrinsic properties associated with information. This has limited its value for organismal biology where function is fundamental, for the cognitive sciences where representation is a central issue, and for the social sciences where normative assessment seem unavoidable. So this technical redefinition of information has been both a virtue and a limitation. The central goal of this essay is to demonstrate that the previously set aside (and presumed nonphysical) properties of reference and significance (i.e. normativity) can be re-incorporated into a rigorous formal analysis of information that is suitable for use in both the physical (e.g. quantum theory, cosmology, computation theory) and semiotic sciences (e.g. biology, cognitive science, economics). This analysis will build on Shannon’s formalization of information, but will extend it to explicitly model its link to the statistical and thermodynamic properties of its physical context and to the physical work of interpreting it. It is argued that an accurate analysis of the non-intrinsic attributes that distinguish information from mere physical differences is not only feasible, but necessary to account for its distinctive form of causal efficacy. Initial qualitative and conceptual steps toward this augmentation of information theory
