Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Francesco Rizzo]

Caro Sun, e cari tutti, ecco la traduzione in inglese del messaggio del 21
febbraio scorso.
Cari saluti.
Francesco

Dear everyone,
on February 8 I sent you a message whose content, without any presumption,
can be useful to resolve the over-epistemo-logical issues that have arisen.
Then I send it again.
Dear Terry extensible to everyone,
It is always a pleasure to read and understand you. The general theory of
information is preceded by a system (or semiotic) of signification and
followed by a system (or semiotic) of communication. Except when there is a
communicative process such as the passage of a Signal (which does not
necessarily mean 'a sign') from a Source, through a Transmitter, along a
Channel, to a Recipient. In a process between machine and machine, the
signal has no 'significant' power. In this case there is no signification
even if we can say that we have information. When the recipient is a human
being (and it is not necessary that the source is also a human being),
there is a process of signification. A system of signification is an
autonomous semiotic construction, independent of any possible act of
communication that actualizes it. On the other hand, every process of
communication between human beings - or between any type of intelligent
apparatus or structure, both mechanical and biological, - presupposes a
system of signification as its own or specific condition. In conclusion, it
is possible to have a semiotic of signification independent of a semiotic
of communication; but it is impossible to establish a semiotic of
communication independent of a semiotic of signification.
I learned a lot from Umberto Eco to whom I dedicated chapter 10. Umberto
Eco and the process of re-interpretation and re-enchantment of economic
science (pp. 175-217) of "Value and evaluations. 'economy of science'
(FrancoAngeli, Milan, 1997). In my own book you can find:
- chapter 15. Economic-estimative semiotics (pp. 327-361) that is part of a
global theory of all signification systems and communication processes;
- subparagraph 5.3.3 The genetic psychology of Jean Piaget and the
neurobiology of Humberto Maturana and Francesco Varela. a new experimental
epistemology of quality and uniqueness (pp. 120-130).
I apologize to everyone if I get tired of you or if once again my writing
in Italian creates some problems. I think the gift you give me is, in terms
of QUALITY and UNITY, much greater than the (for) gift I ask of you. Thank
you.
A warm greeting.
Francesco

2018-02-21 17:17 GMT+01:00 Sungchul Ji :

> Hi Francesco, FISers,
>
>
> Can someone translate your post in English so that everyone can understand
> what you are saying?
>
>
> Sung
>
>
> --
> *From:* Fis  on behalf of Francesco Rizzo <
> 13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, February 21, 2018 6:11 AM
> *To:* y...@pku.edu.cn
> *Cc:* FIS Group
>
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
> Cari Tutti,
> l'8 febbraio Vi ho inviato un messaggio il cui contenuto, senza alcuna
> presunzione, può essere utile per dirimere le questioni
> onto-epistemo-logiche che sono sorte.
> Allora lo trasmetto nuovamente.
> Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
> è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of information
> è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un
> sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un
> processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa
> necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un  Trasmettitore,
> lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina
> il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha
> significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione.
> Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte
> sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di
> significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
> autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
> l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
> tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
> biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
> specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della
> significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è
> impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una
> semiotica della significazione.
> Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto
> Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza
> economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia
> o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso
> libro si trovano:
> - il capitolo 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Francesco Rizzo]

Cari Tutti,
l'8 febbraio Vi ho inviato un messaggio il cui contenuto, senza alcuna
presunzione, può essere utile per dirimere le questioni
onto-epistemo-logiche che sono sorte.
Allora lo trasmetto nuovamente.
Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of information è
preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un
sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un
processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa
necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un  Trasmettitore,
lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina
il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha
significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione.
Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte
sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di
significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della
significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è
impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una
semiotica della significazione.
Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto
Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza
economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia
o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso
libro si trovano:
- il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si
colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di
significazione e i processi di comunicazione;
- il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la
neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova
epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130).
Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio
scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che
mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA',  molto più grande
del (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie.
Un saluto affettuoso.
Francesco


2018-02-21 11:03 GMT+01:00 Xueshan Yan :

> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> In the first half of this month, we have a heated discussion about the
> relationship among Information, Language, and Communication started by
> Sung. I am simply summing up part of the different opinions as follows:
>
>
>
> *Sung: Without a language, no communication would be possible. Encoding,
> decoding, information (flow) are essential for communication*.
>
> Part of the related different opinions:
>
> Terry: (In this way), one must use the term "language" in a highly
> metaphoric sense. Communications take place in the following situations,
> are there languages? Such as scent, music, sexual display of some animals,
> smile, frown, pattern of colors of a flower that attracts bees, dog's bark,
> walk of a depressed person, hiccup after eating. There is a serious problem
> with using language as the model for analyzing other species’ communication
> in hindsight.…… It is an understandable anthropocentric bias.
>
> Javier: *Not every* communication process involves coding/decoding and
> meaning. so they could not be simply paralleled to language. For instance,
> there is no coding/decoding process when I communicate to my dog. It does
> not understand my speaking, and I do not understand its barking. Yet still
> both of us interact. I would not define communication as information
> transfer. There is no information "traveling" from one place to another,
> from sender to receiver. The system itself becomes the medium of
> information production and processing.
>
> Xueshan and Stan: The hierarchy idea is not only suitable for different
> species which communication take places between them, from elementary
> particle(?), molecule(?) to cell, brain(human, other animals), plant(?),
> even other different planets(?). It is also suitable for different
> information carrier. Stan think the carriers can be layered as {language
> {signal {information}}}, Xueshan think they can be layered as {substrate
> {signal {information}}}, here we simply consider sign, signal, symbol,
> token, marker and so forth as the same.
>
> Gordana: It might be possible to develop a general theory of language ……
> with different levels of cognition which communicate and process
> information in order to survive. As in biology there are different kinds of
> organisms there are also different kinds of “languages”. There are small
> languages 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Xueshan Yan]

Dear colleagues,

 

In the first half of this month, we have a heated discussion about the 
relationship among Information, Language, and Communication started by Sung. I 
am simply summing up part of the different opinions as follows:

 

Sung: Without a language, no communication would be possible. Encoding, 
decoding, information (flow) are essential for communication.

Part of the related different opinions:

Terry: (In this way), one must use the term "language" in a highly metaphoric 
sense. Communications take place in the following situations, are there 
languages? Such as scent, music, sexual display of some animals, smile, frown, 
pattern of colors of a flower that attracts bees, dog's bark, walk of a 
depressed person, hiccup after eating. There is a serious problem with using 
language as the model for analyzing other species’ communication in 
hindsight.…… It is an understandable anthropocentric bias.

Javier: Not every communication process involves coding/decoding and meaning. 
so they could not be simply paralleled to language. For instance, there is no 
coding/decoding process when I communicate to my dog. It does not understand my 
speaking, and I do not understand its barking. Yet still both of us interact. I 
would not define communication as information transfer. There is no information 
"traveling" from one place to another, from sender to receiver. The system 
itself becomes the medium of information production and processing.

Xueshan and Stan: The hierarchy idea is not only suitable for different species 
which communication take places between them, from elementary particle(?), 
molecule(?) to cell, brain(human, other animals), plant(?), even other 
different planets(?). It is also suitable for different information carrier. 
Stan think the carriers can be layered as {language {signal {information}}}, 
Xueshan think they can be layered as {substrate {signal {information}}}, here 
we simply consider sign, signal, symbol, token, marker and so forth as the same.

Gordana: It might be possible to develop a general theory of language …… with 
different levels of cognition which communicate and process information in 
order to survive. As in biology there are different kinds of organisms there 
are also different kinds of “languages”. There are small languages communicated 
in relatively simple ways between simple agents (like cells) and big languages 
used by complex agents like humans.

 

(In all the above discussions, we all omitted the Sung’s deep layer analysis of 
cell language and category theory).

 

Others:

Arturo: I suggest to fully REMOVE from the TRUE scientific adventures the 
terms: "symbol", "signal", "marker", "information".

Howard: Information is anything a receiver can interpret. Information is in the 
eye of the beholder.

Javier: Information and meaning are not the same.

Christophe: I take communications as related to meaning generation.

Mayank: Can we not make conceptual leap from networks, information, 
communication, and language to sound?

Koichiro: Focusing upon languaging comes to shed light on the communication in 
time between whatever parties.

 

Best wishes,

Xueshan

 

From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu] 
Sent: Wednesday, February 14, 2018 11:44 PM
To: y...@pku.edu.cn
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory

Xueshan -- My {language {signal {information}}} is meant apply only to a system 
that has language. That is, my assertion would be that no information can be 
gained in such a system that has not passed through a linguistic filter. The 
idea is that in such a system language dominates everything. Perhaps this has 
not been definitively demonstrated as yet. I suppose it would depend upon, for 
example, whether or not we consider our bodily reaction to, for example, having 
just burned our finger to have been ‘informationally mediated. If not (which 
seems possible to me) then my supposition might be OK. But if we think that 
neuron communications mediate information, then I am wrong. 

 

STAN

 

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 6:31 AM, Xueshan Yan  > wrote:

Dear Javier and Dear Stan,

 

Javier:

1. I very much agree with you as follows:

“I think that only signals can be transmitted, not information. Information can 
only be gained by an observer (a self-referential system) that draws a 
distinction.”

A Chinese scholar Dongsheng Miao’s argument is: There is no information can 
exists without carrier, i.e. No naked can exists.

I think both of you two are expressing a principle of information science.

 

2. According to Linguistics, the relationship between language and 
communication is:

Language is a tool of communication about information.

Of course, this is only limited to the human atmosphere. So I think that all 
(Human) Semiotics ((Human) Linguistics), (Human) Communication Study should be 
the subdisciplines of Human 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Koichiro and colleagues,

The ancient Greeks had several notions of time. The main point for our 
discussion seems to me the distinction between historical time and event 
time. Trajectories, for example, can be formed in historical time by 
series of relations; trajectories are observable. Among other things, 
they can be shaped by languaging.


I agree that language uses another time. It is not a trajectory, but a 
regime. The difference is that a trajectory can be shaped, for example, 
along a life-cycle, whereas a regime is a next-order change like life or 
death. The next-order operation leaves a footprint in historical time; 
however, it is part of an evolutionary dynamics. This dynamics is not 
directly observable, but only available as an informed hypothesis which 
can be tested against the events/non-events in historical time.


Best,
Loet


Loet Leydesdorff

Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net ; 
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Associate Faculty, SPRU, University of 
Sussex;


Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. , 
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, 
Beijing;


Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck , University of London;

http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ=en


-- Original Message --
From: "Koichiro Matsuno" 
To: "Fis," 
Sent: 2/15/2018 5:53:23 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based 
on the cateogry theory



On 8 Feb 2018 at 4:05 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

From a biological perspective, not language itself, but “languaging” 
behavior is considered the system of reference.




On 13 Feb 2018 at 7:01 PM, Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic wrote:

As in biology thre are different kinds of organisms there are also 
different kinds of “languages”.






Folks,



   Focusing upon languaging comes to shed light on the communication in 
time between whatever parties. The issue of time then reminds me of the 
oft-quoted Aristotelian aphorism on the vulgar nature of time. As 
calling attention to the nonexistence of both past and future at the 
present moment of now, Aristotle observed “the present now is not part 
of time at all, for a part measures the whole, and the whole must be 
made up of the parts, but we cannot say that time is made up of ‘nows’ 
(Physics Book 4, 218a)”. Thus, “there is a something pertaining to time 
which is indivisible, and this something is what we mean by the 
‘present’ or ‘now’ (234a)”. One outcome from these observations is 
simply a metaphysical aporia as pointing to that time both does and 
does not exist.




   One common-sense strategy getting out of the metaphysical impasse, 
which Aristotle would also seem to ‘reluctantly’ share, might be to 
view time as a linear succession of the now-points thanks to the 
additional idea of the levelling-off of the now points. This limiting 
procedure may help us to forget about the underlying aporia for the 
time being. But the contrast between languaging and language may revive 
our concern on whether we could dismiss the vulgar nature of time in a 
sweeping manner in a positive sense. So far, language has seemed to be 
quite at home with time as the linear succession of the  now points. 
That is so even in physics as we know it today. However, once the 
aspect of languaging is called up, the temporality of languaging may be 
found to differ from that of language. Languaging is not continuous, 
but distinctively discontinuous in distinguishing between the utterer 
and its potential respondent. Alternation of the role between utterer 
and respondent proceeds discretely temporally. (Bio)semiotician may 
seem to be sensitive to this issue of time.




   Koichiro Matsuno








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Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi Christophe,

I completely agree that there is an important distinction between the 
communication between attached beams and the semantic communication between 
agents.  Like you, I have long been interested in the evolution of biological 
signaling systems.  My dissertation research included explorations of the 
potential meaning attached to courtship displays by a damselfish species.  In 
the decades since I did that work, my view of communication has broadened.  
Semantics is context dependent and is manifested internally by the agents 
(perception), which makes it very hard to study empirically.  The best I could 
do, and I think this may be a general limitation, was to model the hypothetical 
semantic content of a signal, naively predict how the perceiver ‘should’ 
respond to the hypothetically encoded meaning, and judge whether the empirical 
data fit my model of the system.  Note that I did my dissertation research at a 
time when the leading idea was that  all signals were deceptive devices for 
maximizing personal fitness (e.g., Krebs and Davies, 1984).  My observational 
and experimental work on this system led me to think more deeply about the 
evolution of signaling systems, and I proposed the following:


  *   individuals assess all of the information they perceive, some of which 
represents signals expressed by other individuals
  *   far more information about individuals can be useful than the information 
‘packaged’ in a signal
  *   individuals signal to other individuals in unconventional ways, in 
addition to conventional ways (evolved signaling systems)
  *   evolved, codified kinds of signals generally started as one of those 
unconventional kinds of signals that conferred fitness gains for both the 
signaler and the perceiver, on average
  *   such useful signals tend to persist and they have an opportunity for 
adaptive fine-tuning, morphological integration (e.g., a color patch used for 
display), and amplification
  *   I think these become the classical animal signaling systems we are so 
familiar with

So, for me, codified semantic signals are embedded in, and deeply connected to, 
a sea of information about other individuals.  Such signals may be anywhere 
along a spectrum from simple information transfer (similar to the beams) to 
semantically-based language.  Semantics is a fascinating and important target 
of study, but I think limiting our terminology to that domain misleadingly 
suggests that it is more disconnected from less formalized modes of 
communication than it really is.  I also think it suggests that semantic 
communication is more disconnected from the universal physico-chemical laws 
than it really is.  I prefer to think of semantic communication as a subset of 
all communication, and I see value in understanding the information transfer 
between connected beams as sharing some fundamental similarities to semantic 
communication.

Regards,

Guy

On Feb 14, 2018, at 3:05 PM, Christophe Menant 
> wrote:


Yes Guy,
Unconsciously I take communications as related to meaning generation.
But, as you say, we could use the word for the two beams attached to each other 
with bolts and that ‘communicate’ relatively to the strength of the building.
The difference may be in the purpose of the communication, in the constraint 
justifying its being.
The ‘communication’ between the two beams is about maintaining them together, 
satisfying physical laws (that exist everywhere). It comes from the decision of 
the architect who is constrained to get a building that stands up. The 
constraint is with the architect, not with the beams that only obey physical 
laws.
In the case of living entities the constraints are locally present in the 
organisms (‘stay alive’). The constraint is not in the environment of the 
organism. And the constraint addresses more than physico-chemical laws.
If there is meaning generation for constraint satisfaction in the case of 
organisms, it is difficult to talk the same for the two beams.
This introduces the locality of constraints as a key subject in the evolution 
of our universe. It is an event that emerged from the a-biotic universe 
populated with physico-chemical laws valid everywhere.
Another subject interesting to many of us
All the best
Christophe



De : Guy A Hoelzer >
Envoyé : mardi 13 février 2018 18:18
À : Foundations of Information Science Information Science
Cc : Terry Deacon; Christophe Menant
Objet : Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory

Hi All,

I want to pick on Christophe’s post to make a general plea about FIS posting.  
This is not a comment on meaning generation by agents.  Christophe  wrote:

"Keeping in mind that communications exist only because agents need to manage 
meanings for given purposes”.

This seems to imply that we have 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Christophe Menant]

Dear Soren,
Thanks for your comments.
Interpretation and agency are indeed key items. An approach based on internal 
constraint saisfactiont allows to address them together, with autonomy also.
In a few words:
An agent is an entity submitted to internal constraints and capable of actions 
for the satisfaction of the constraints (ex: animals submitted to a ‘stay 
alive’ constraint).
An autonomous agent can satisfy its internal constraints by its own.
Interpretation is meaning generation by an agent when it receives information 
that has a connection with a constraint. The generated meaning is precisely 
that connection. It will be used for the determination of an action that the 
agent will implement to satisfy the constraint.
Normativity and teleology can also be added to the ‘internal constraints’ 
thread.
More details on these subjects at https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCSA-2 where the 
contributions of Peirce and Uexkull are highlighted.
However, the concept of internal constraint is not enough to understand the 
relations between animals and human minds. Philosophy of mind makes available 
several entry points (the hard problem, phenomenal consciousness, qualia, first 
person perspective, transcendental/empiric self, transitive/untransitive 
self-consciousness, .. ).
What is interesting is that these entry points need to consider more or less 
explicitly some aspect of self-consciousness. This is why I look at a possible 
evolutionary nature of self consciousness based on an evolution of meaningful 
representations where meaning generation comes in again (in above ref also).
A lot is to be done on these interesting subjects..
All the Best
Christophe


De : Søren Brier 
Envoyé : mardi 13 février 2018 15:22
À : Christophe Menant; Terrence W. DEACON
Cc : FIS Group
Objet : RE: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory


Dear Christophé



I think you hit on a most interesting problem of how to establish 
interpretation and agency in a philosophical framework that is compatible trans 
disciplinarily from the natural over the social and into the human sciences, 
here especially encompassing phenomenological and hermeneutical descriptions of 
meaningful perception, cognition and communication. The interpreter in Peirce 
is described as a phenomenological triadic process, but I agree with you  that 
the embodiment is not well described in the Peircean framework. Therefore 
biosemiotics are integrating Peircean semiotics with Bateson concept of mind,  
Uexkülls funktionskreis and Maturana’ and Varela’s autopoietic models. Uexküll 
has similarities with the cybernetics that inform autopoiesis theory. Neither 
has a full philosophy  with a phenomenological grounding as Peirce. I do not 
think that cybernetics have a theory of experiential mind, Von Foerster has a 
few reflections on cognition in his establishing of second order cybernetics 
not encompassing the experiential aspect, the quality problem or the problem of 
spontaneity that must be there to establish agency, which are all theory in 
Peirce’s idea of the self as a symbolic process. Uexküll seems to have a 
phenomenological idea of experiential mind in order to establish his Umwelt 
concept, but how that is related to the biologically described body is still 
not clear for me. Uexküll seem to be an anti-evolutionary sort of Platonist. 
The relation between animals and human are not clear to me. I do not think he 
has a full philosophy. So the problem is how we establish an ontological view 
encompassing natural science, evolution and the phenomenology of experiential 
mind’s agency. Process philosophy seems to be a way out and so far only Peirce 
and Whitehead has produced acceptable ones and of those only Peirce has 
produced a semiotics. I wonder in which ontology you establish your concept of 
agency?



Best

   Søren



From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Christophe Menant
Sent: 13. februar 2018 14:20
To: Terrence W. DEACON 
Cc: FIS Group 
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory



Dear Terry and FISers,
It looks indeed reasonable to position the term 'language' as ‘simply referring 
to the necessity of a shared medium of communication’. Keeping in mind that 
communications exist only because agents need to manage meanings for given 
purposes.
And the concept of agent can be an entry point for a ‘general theory of 
information’ as it does not make distinctions.
The Peircean triadic approach is also an available framework (but with, alas, a 
limited development of the Interpreter).
I choose to use agents capable of meaning generation, having some compatibility 
with the Peircean approach and with the Biosemiotics 
Umwelt.(https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCSA-2)

All the best
Christophe

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Guy A Hoelzer]

Hi All,

I want to pick on Christophe’s post to make a general plea about FIS posting.  
This is not a comment on meaning generation by agents.  Christophe  wrote:

"Keeping in mind that communications exist only because agents need to manage 
meanings for given purposes”.

This seems to imply that we have such confidence that this premise is correct 
that it is safe to assume it is true.  However, the word “communication” is 
sometimes used in ways that do not comport with this premise.  For example, it 
can be said that in the building of a structure, two beams that are attached to 
each other with bolts are “communicating” with each other.  This certainly fits 
my notion of communication, although there are no “agents” or “meanings” here.  
Energy (e.g., movement) can be transferred from one beam to the next, which 
represents “communication” to me.  I would personally define communication as 
the transfer of information, and I prefer to define “information” without any 
reference to “meaning”.  If the claim above had been written as a contingency 
(e.g., “If we assume that communications exist…”), then I could embrace the 
rest of Christophe’s post.

I think the effectiveness of our FIS posts is diminished by presuming everybody 
shares our particular perspectives on these concepts.  It leads us to talk past 
each other to a degree; so I hope we can remain open to the correctness or 
utility of alternative perspectives that have been frequently voiced within FIS 
and use contingent language to establish the premises of our FIS posts.

Regards,

Guy


On Feb 13, 2018, at 5:19 AM, Christophe Menant 
> wrote:


Dear Terry and FISers,
It looks indeed reasonable to position the term 'language' as ‘simply referring 
to the necessity of a shared medium of communication’. Keeping in mind that 
communications exist only because agents need to manage meanings for given 
purposes.
And the concept of agent can be an entry point for a ‘general theory of 
information’ as it does not make distinctions.
The Peircean triadic approach is also an available framework (but with, alas, a 
limited development of the Interpreter).
I choose to use agents capable of meaning generation, having some compatibility 
with the Peircean approach and with the Biosemiotics 
Umwelt.(https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCSA-2)

All the best
Christophe
___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Christophe Menant]

Dear Terry and FISers,
It looks indeed reasonable to position the term 'language' as ‘simply referring 
to the necessity of a shared medium of communication’. Keeping in mind that 
communications exist only because agents need to manage meanings for given 
purposes.
And the concept of agent can be an entry point for a ‘general theory of 
information’ as it does not make distinctions.
The Peircean triadic approach is also an available framework (but with, alas, a 
limited development of the Interpreter).
I choose to use agents capable of meaning generation, having some compatibility 
with the Peircean approach and with the Biosemiotics 
Umwelt.(https://philpapers.org/rec/MENCSA-2)

All the best
Christophe







De : Fis  de la part de Terrence W. DEACON 

Envoyé : mardi 13 février 2018 06:33
À : Sungchul Ji
Cc : FIS Group; Jose Javier Blanco Rivero
Objet : Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory

To claim that:

"without a language, no communication would be possible"

one must be using the term "language" in a highly metaphoric sense.

Is scent marking a language?
Music?
Sexual displays, like a peacock's tail?
How about a smile or frown?
Is the pattern of colors of a flower that attracts bees a language?
Was the evolution of language in humans just more of the same, not
something distinct from a dog's bark?
When a person is depressed, their way of walking often communicates
this fact to others; so is this slight modification of posture part of
a language?
If I get the hiccups after eating is this part of a language that
communicates my indigestion?

Is this usage of the term 'language' simply referring to the necessity
of a shared medium of communication? Is it possible to develop a
general theory of information by simply failing to make distinctions?

— Terry




On 2/12/18, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
> Hi FISers,
>
>
> (1) I think language and communication cannot be separated, since without a
> language, no communication would be possible (see Figure 1).
>
>
>
>f
>g
>  Sender --->  Message
> >  Receiver
>   |
>^
>   |
> |
>   |
> |
>
> |_|
>
> h
>
> “Language and communication are both irreducibly triadic; i.e., the three
> nodes and three edges are essential for communication, given a language or
> code understood by both the sender and receiver.”   f =  encoding; g =
> decoding; h = information flow.
>
> Figure 1.  A diagrammatic representation of the irreducibly triadic nature
> of communication and language.
>
>
>
>
> (2) I think it may be justified and useful to distinguish between
> anthropomorphic language metaphor (ALM) and non-athropomorphic language
> metaphor (NLM).  I agree with many of the members of this list that we
> should not apply ALM to biology uncritically, since such an approch to
> biology may lead to  unjustifiable anthropomorphisms.
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus) and the anthropocentric theory of
[https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/07/Alchemische_Vereinigung_aus_dem_Donum_Dei.jpg/1200px-Alchemische_Vereinigung_aus_dem_Donum_Dei.jpg]

Homunculus - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
A homunculus (/ h oʊ ˈ m ʌ ŋ k j ʊ l ə s /; Latin for "little man") is a 
representation of a small human being. Popularized in sixteenth-century alchemy 
and ...



> creatiion.
>
>
> (3) Table 1 below may represent one possible example of NLM.  Although the
> linguistic terms such as letters, words, sentences, etc. are used in this
> table, they  are matrially/ontologically  different from their molecular
> coutner parts; e.g., letters are  different from nucleotides, protein
> domians , etc.,and  words are different from genes, proteins, etc., but
> there are unmistakable common formal features among them.
>
> Table 1.  The formal and material aspects of the cell language (Cellese).
>
> \  Material Aspect
> \(Function)
> \
> \
> \
>  \
> \
> Formal Aspect \
>(Function) \
>   \
>
> DNA Language
> (DNese;
> Information transmission in time)
>
> RNA Language
> (RNese;
> Information transmission in space, from DNA to proteins)
>
> Protein Language
> (Proteinese;
> Energy transduction
> from chemical to mechanical; i.e., conformon production)
>
> Chemical Language
> (Moleculese;
> Source of free 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

Hello Terry, Sung, FIS colleagues

There is a notion of “body language”.

Perhaps it might be possible to develop a general theory of language that can 
take into account bacteria and dogs (according to Nature 
http://www.nature.com/news/dogs-can-tell-when-praise-is-sincere-1.20514) as 
well as plants https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2634130/ & 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2688289/ cognitive agents with 
different levels of cognition which communicate and process information in 
order to survive.

One may build a theory of communication of information by just paying attention 
to what has been sent with respect to the cognitive structures of a sender and 
what has been received with respect to the cognitive structure of a receiver. 
Here cognitive means embodied and should include all sensors, actuators, memory 
and information processing mechanisms. As in biology thre are different kinds 
of organisms there are also different kinds of “languages”. There are small 
languages communicated in relatively simple ways between simple agents (like 
cells) and big languages used by complex agents like humans.

Why not?

Best wishes,
Gordana




On 2018-02-13, 06:33, "Fis on behalf of Terrence W. DEACON" 
 on behalf of 
dea...@berkeley.edu> wrote:

To claim that:

"without a language, no communication would be possible"

one must be using the term "language" in a highly metaphoric sense.

Is scent marking a language?
Music?
Sexual displays, like a peacock's tail?
How about a smile or frown?
Is the pattern of colors of a flower that attracts bees a language?
Was the evolution of language in humans just more of the same, not
something distinct from a dog's bark?
When a person is depressed, their way of walking often communicates
this fact to others; so is this slight modification of posture part of
a language?
If I get the hiccups after eating is this part of a language that
communicates my indigestion?

Is this usage of the term 'language' simply referring to the necessity
of a shared medium of communication? Is it possible to develop a
general theory of information by simply failing to make distinctions?

― Terry




On 2/12/18, Sungchul Ji 
> wrote:
Hi FISers,


(1) I think language and communication cannot be separated, since without a
language, no communication would be possible (see Figure 1).



f
g
  Sender --->  Message
>  Receiver
   |
^
   |
 |
   |
 |

|_|

 h

“Language and communication are both irreducibly triadic; i.e., the three
nodes and three edges are essential for communication, given a language or
code understood by both the sender and receiver.”   f =  encoding; g =
decoding; h = information flow.

Figure 1.  A diagrammatic representation of the irreducibly triadic nature
of communication and language.




(2) I think it may be justified and useful to distinguish between
anthropomorphic language metaphor (ALM) and non-athropomorphic language
metaphor (NLM).  I agree with many of the members of this list that we
should not apply ALM to biology uncritically, since such an approch to
biology may lead to  unjustifiable anthropomorphisms.
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homunculus) and the anthropocentric theory of
creatiion.


(3) Table 1 below may represent one possible example of NLM.  Although the
linguistic terms such as letters, words, sentences, etc. are used in this
table, they  are matrially/ontologically  different from their molecular
coutner parts; e.g., letters are  different from nucleotides, protein
domians , etc.,and  words are different from genes, proteins, etc., but
there are unmistakable common formal features among them.

Table 1.  The formal and material aspects of the cell language (Cellese).

\  Material Aspect
 \(Function)
 \
 \
 \
  \
 \
Formal Aspect \
(Function) \
   \

DNA Language
(DNese;
Information transmission in time)

RNA Language
(RNese;
Information transmission in space, from DNA to proteins)

Protein Language
(Proteinese;
Energy transduction
from chemical to mechanical; i.e., conformon production)

Chemical Language
(Moleculese;
Source of free energy)

Letters*
(To build)

4n nucleotides
n = 1, 2, 3, 4, . . .
Exons (?)



Protein domains

Partial chemical reactions

Words
(To denote)

Genes



Proteins

Full chemical reactions

Sentences

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Xueshan Yan]

Dear Javier and Dear Stan,

 

Javier:

1. I very much agree with you as follows:

“I think that only signals can be transmitted, not information. Information can 
only be gained by an observer (a self-referential system) that draws a 
distinction.”

A Chinese scholar Dongsheng Miao’s argument is: There is no information can 
exists without carrier, i.e. No naked can exists.

I think both of you two are expressing a principle of information science.

 

2. According to Linguistics, the relationship between language and 
communication is:

Language is a tool of communication about information.

Of course, this is only limited to the human atmosphere. So I think that all 
(Human) Semiotics ((Human) Linguistics), (Human) Communication Study should be 
the subdisciplines of Human Informatics.

 

==

Dear Xueshan,

Thanks for sharing your interesting remarks and references. I think no one 
really wants to deny the crucial role the language metaphor has played in the 
thinking of communication and information models. But I believe the crucial 
point is to distinguish between language and communication. Language is for us 
humans the main communication medium, though not the only one. We tend to 
describe other communication media in society and nature by mapping the 
language-like characteristics they have. This has been useful and sucessful so 
far. But pushing the language metaphor too far is showing its analytical 
limits. I think we need to think of a transdisciplinary theory of communication 
media. On the other hand, I agree with you that we need to check the uses of 
the concepts of signal and information. I think that only signals can be 
transmitted, not information. Information can only be gained by an observer (a 
self-referential system) that draws a distinction.  

Best,

Javier

==

Stan:

According to Peirce, language is only one of the systematic signs. Here we 
consider sign, signal, symbol as the same thing. So, more precisely in my 
opinion:

{signal {information}},   or   {substrate {signal {information}}}

But not

{language {signal {information}}}

If you remember, in our previous discussions, I much appreciate the 

The hierarchy idea is very important to our study which is initially introduced 
by Pedro, Nikhil and you.

===

Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically, as:

In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in other 
ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus (using the 
compositional hierarchy):

[information [language [signal]]]

Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be understood or 
construed by way of linguistic constructs. 

(Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’, where:

[sign [information [...]]] ) 

Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):

{language {signal {information}}}

Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations, so 
that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information (informing) 
only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations.

STAN

 

Best wishes to all,

Xueshan

===

El feb 10, 2018 5:23 AM, "Xueshan Yan"  > escribió:

Dear Colleagues,

I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana recommended, 
and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination with Sung's 
comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human language, I have 
the following learning feelings to share with everyone:

In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple 
languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and interspecies 
cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various biological 
activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such as AI-2, it is 
a general language that bacteria use for intergenera signaling.

I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the concept 
information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or signaling) 55 times, so 
we have to review the history and application of “information” and “signal” in 
biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to understand the relationship 
between language, signal, and information.

The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be 
traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and 
endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of 
Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in 
Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since then, 
the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[tozziarturo]

Dear Karl, 

your analysis about Wittgenstein does not take into account the second 
Wittgenstein, who repudiated his own idea from the Tractatus. 

I think, in touch with Carnap on other issues, that the use of the terms 
"symbol", "signal", "marker", "information" into scientific sentences does not 
mean anything. Such use gives rise to metaphysical (in its worst meaning) 
pseudosentences, because the propositions containing the terms "symbol", 
"signal", "marker", "information" can neither verified (in the Schlick sense), 
nor confirmed (in the Carnap sense), nor falsified (in the Popper sense), not 
statistically assessed (in the Reichenbach or Shannon sense). 

Therefore, I think, we are talking about pseudopropositions: there is not a way 
to empirically test the propositions containing the useless terms "symbol", 
"signal", "marker", "information".  Therefore, as always, and sorry to be 
boring and bothering, I suggest to fully REMOVE from the TRUE scientific 
adventures  the terms: "symbol", "signal", "marker", "information".   

I'm deeply horrified by such residuals of the ancient Hermes Trismegstus' 
hermetic conceptions in our current scientific vocabulary and practice.  We are 
not dwarves on the shoulders of giants, we are giants on the shoulders of 
dwarves.


> Il 10 febbraio 2018 alle 19.36 Karl Javorszky  ha 
> scritto:
> 
> Using the logical language to understand Nature
> 
>  
> 
> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms 
> “symbol”, “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome 
> development, because understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when 
> creating great works.
> 
> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical 
> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies. 
> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
> 
>  
> 
> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by 
> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he has 
> been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that 
> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on 
> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is opaque; 
> not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway 
> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
> 
> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of 
> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate 
> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is 
> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a 
> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only 
> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true. 
> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an 
> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an 
> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised 
> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding 
> so long.
> 
> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are 
> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his results 
> show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical words, the 
> collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial problem. 
> This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a tool of 
> sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in a 
> semantic fashion.
> 
> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that 
> Wittgenstein suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that 
> real philosophy has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical 
> sentences or otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside 
> philosophy, namely number theory. If every concept can be represented by a 
> number, and valid sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers 
> are satisfied, then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out 
> later for what they stand.
> 
> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The 
> only noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that 
> old dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering 
> layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too 
> high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that 
> one executes by routine.
> 
> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible 
> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to 
> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could 
> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Karl Javorszky]

Using the logical language to understand Nature



The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms
“symbol”, “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome
development, because understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful
when creating great works.

There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.



Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
self-evident and cannot be otherwise.

The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It
is true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be
surprised about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of
the finding so long.

As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical
words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a
combinatorial problem. This is also the reason why he says that his
philosophy is just a tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing
whatsoever noteworthy in a semantic fashion.

One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that
Wittgenstein suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that
real philosophy has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical
sentences or otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside
philosophy, namely number theory. If every concept can be represented by a
number, and valid sentence are those for which the rules that govern
numbers are satisfied, then one can work with the numbers as such and
figure out later for what they stand.

This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The only
noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that old
dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering
layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too
high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that
one executes by routine.

We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible
enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to
order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could
memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority
readiness One into priority readiness Two.

There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the
field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of
reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the
concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a
reorder. Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each other.
Learning is based on the concept of associations. Being an element in the
corpus of a cycle may well be the formal explanation for a property of
being associated with.

Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place,
relation to potential successors, …} {symbol, signal, mass, impact,
chemical valence, predictability, energy level, information content,…} is
of secondary importance. As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is
to make sure *that* we all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same
one. The next task is to make sure that we all perceive the *same picture*.
As the kaleidoscope produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge
that one can be expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we
all observe the same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to
name the facts of perception.

The present problem is not with the inability of the logical language to
process that what we wish to discuss.  The present task is to realise that
one needs a clear idea before one enters the struggle to express it
clearly. The unveiling has been done. Now the interested public is invited
to look at the picture.

Once one has answered 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Stanley N Salthe]

Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically,
as:

In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in other
ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus (using the
compositional hierarchy):

[information [language [signal]]]

Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be
understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs.

(Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’,
where:

[sign [information [...]]] )

Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):

{language {signal {information}}}

Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations,
so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information
(informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations.

STAN

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan  wrote:

> Dear Colleagues,
>
> I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana
> recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination
> with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human
> language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:
>
> In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple
> languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and
> interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various
> biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such
> as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera
> signaling.
>
> I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the
> concept *information* 3 times but the concept *signal* (signal or
> signaling) 55 times, so we have to review the history and application of
> “information” and “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for
> us to understand the relationship between language, signal, and information.
>
> The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be
> traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and
> endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of
> Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in 
> *Nature,
> *in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since then,
> the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and biochemistry.
>
> As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to
> its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used
> to employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From
> the tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal
> transduction study of cells is only equivalent to the level of
> telecommunications before 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's
> information theory, the central issue of telecommunications is "signal"
> rather than "information". After that, the central issue of
> telecommunications is "information" rather than "signal".
>
> According to the application history of information concept, nearly all
> the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger,
> signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem
> what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the
> information.
>
>
>
> For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:
>
> 1. Do Plants Think?  (June 5, 2012, *Scientific American*)
>
> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-
> daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931
> e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b）
>
> 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn  (December 3, 2014, *New Scientist*)
>
> (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-
> intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn)
>
> From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Xueshan
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
> *To:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON <
> dea...@berkeley.edu>
> *Cc:* Fis, 
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
> Hi Terry,  and FISers,
>
>
>
> Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that,
> in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill?
>
>
>
> All the best.
>
>
>
> Sung
> --
>
> *From:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
> *To:* Terrence W. DEACON
> *Cc:* Fis,; Sungchul Ji
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
> Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
>
> è sempre un 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Xueshan Yan]

Dear Colleagues,

I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana
recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination
with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human
language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:

In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple
languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and
interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various
biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such
as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera
signaling.

I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the concept
information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or signaling) 55 times,
so we have to review the history and application of “information” and
“signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to understand
the relationship between language, signal, and information.

The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be
traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and
endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of
Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in
Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since
then, the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and
biochemistry.

As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to its
transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used to
employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From the
tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal transduction
study of cells is only equivalent to the level of telecommunications before
1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's information theory, the
central issue of telecommunications is "signal" rather than "information".
After that, the central issue of telecommunications is "information" rather
than "signal".

According to the application history of information concept, nearly all the
essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger, signal
and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem what we
are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the information.

 

For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:

1. Do Plants Think?  (June 5, 2012, Scientific American)

(http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz/
#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f
559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b）

2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn  (December 3, 2014, New Scientist)

(http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants
-can-think-feel-and-learn)

>From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.

 

Best wishes,

Xueshan

 

From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On
Behalf Of Sungchul Ji
Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
To: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON

Cc: Fis, 
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
the cateogry theory

 

Hi Terry,  and FISers,

 

Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that, in
the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill?

 

All the best.

 

Sung

  _  

From: Francesco Rizzo < 
13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
To: Terrence W. DEACON
Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
the cateogry theory 

 

Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, 

è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of information
è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un
sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un processo
comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa
necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un  Trasmettitore,
lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina
il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha
significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione.
Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte
sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di
significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi Terry,  and FISers,


Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that, in 
the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill?


All the best.


Sung


From: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
To: Terrence W. DEACON
Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji
Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory

Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of information è 
preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un sistema 
(o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un processo 
comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa necessariamente 
'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un  Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un 
Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun 
potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha significazione anche se si può 
dire che si ha passaggio di informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere 
umano (e non è necessario che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in 
presenza di un processo di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una 
costruzione semiotica autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di 
comunicazione che l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra 
esseri umani -- o tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia 
meccanico che biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come 
propria o specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica 
della significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è 
impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una 
semiotica della significazione.
Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto Eco e 
il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza economica 
(pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia o l'economia 
della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso libro si trovano:
- il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si colloca 
nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di significazione e i 
processi di comunicazione;
- il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la 
neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova epistemologia 
sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130).
Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio scrivere in 
lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che mi fate è, a 
proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA',  molto più grande del (per)dono che 
Vi chiedo. Grazie.
Un saluto affettuoso.
Francecso


2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON 
>:
Dear FISers,

In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model for 
building a general theory of information.
Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a claim that 
all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it can be causally 
misleading.
I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and 
evolution of the human language capacity.
And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic Species.
Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary biologists) 
have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary thinking.
Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing tendency, I 
think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic thinking as well.
So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I append the 
following excerpt from the book.

"But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for analyzing 
other

species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other form of 
communication as

exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent case. No 
analytic method

could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as long as 
animals have

interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been around at 
least as long as frogs

have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic communication 
was an afterthought,

so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an ancient and 
well-established

mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model against 
which to assess

other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, and a 
quite anomalous

exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with respect to 
the extent they possess or

lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the types of 
hair on different mammals

with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is an 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Francesco Rizzo]

Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of information è
preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e seguita da un
sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si ha un
processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non significa
necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un  Trasmettitore,
lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra macchina e macchina
il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal caso non si ha
significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di informazione.
Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario che la fonte
sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo di
significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della
significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è
impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una
semiotica della significazione.
Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. Umberto
Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della scienza
economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza dell'economia
o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). Nello mio stesso
libro si trovano:
- il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si
colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di
significazione e i processi di comunicazione;
- il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la
neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova
epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130).
Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio
scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che
mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA',  molto più grande
del (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie.
Un saluto affettuoso.
Francecso


2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON :

> Dear FISers,
>
> In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model for
> building a general theory of information.
> Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a claim
> that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it can be
> causally misleading.
> I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and
> evolution of the human language capacity.
> And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic Species.
> Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary
> biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary
> thinking.
> Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing
> tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic
> thinking as well.
> So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I append
> the following excerpt from the book.
>
> "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for
> analyzing other
>
> species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other form
> of communication as
>
> exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent case.
> No analytic method
>
> could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as long
> as animals have
>
> interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been around at
> least as long as frogs
>
> have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic
> communication was an afterthought,
>
> so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an
> ancient and well-established
>
> mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model
> against which to assess
>
> other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, and
> a quite anomalous
>
> exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with respect
> to the extent they possess or
>
> lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the types
> of hair on different mammals
>
> with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is an
> understandable
>
> anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we might
> see more typical wings
>
> and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced
> adaptations—but it does more to
>
> obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so should
> be analyzed as an
>
> exception to a more general rule, not vice versa."
>
>
> Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms.
>
> This is 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Terrence W. DEACON]

Dear FISers,

In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model for
building a general theory of information.
Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a claim
that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it can be
causally misleading.
I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and
evolution of the human language capacity.
And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic Species.
Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary biologists)
have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary thinking.
Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing
tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic
thinking as well.
So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I append
the following excerpt from the book.

"But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for
analyzing other

species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other form
of communication as

exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent case.
No analytic method

could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as long as
animals have

interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been around at
least as long as frogs

have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic
communication was an afterthought,

so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an ancient
and well-established

mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model
against which to assess

other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, and a
quite anomalous

exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with respect
to the extent they possess or

lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the types of
hair on different mammals

with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is an
understandable

anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we might see
more typical wings

and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced
adaptations—but it does more to

obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so should
be analyzed as an

exception to a more general rule, not vice versa."


Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms.

This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a vast
nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure.

So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more fundamental
precursors.

And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw insight
from this more familiar realm.

I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that assumes
what it endeavors to explain.


Regards to all, Terry



On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero <
javierwe...@gmail.com> wrote:

> In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, though I am
> still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I am afraid
> that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of it I will
> lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it comes:
>
> I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts in
> which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many
> contexts on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of
> the distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D.
> Baecker and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group
> that what information is depends on the system we are talking about. But
> the concept of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has
> many sources and types of information.
> So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a set of
> loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a
> temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements.
> Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by
> RNA to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate
> cell. We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a
> specific kind of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or
> a set of linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or
> discourse.
> The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as information.
> Or even better, each type of medium produces information of its own kind.
> According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. It can
> only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference that a
> medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A
> medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can
> couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic
> manner, 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Jose Javier Blanco Rivero]

In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, though I am
still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I am afraid
that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of it I will
lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it comes:

I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts in which
the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many contexts on
which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of the
distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. Baecker
and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group that
what information is depends on the system we are talking about. But  the
concept of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has many
sources and types of information.
So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a set of
loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a
temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements.
Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by
RNA to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate
cell. We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a
specific kind of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or
a set of linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or
discourse.
The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as information.
Or even better, each type of medium produces information of its own kind.
According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. It can
only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference that a
medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A
medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can
couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic
manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions.
And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into information.
For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to
print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let us
say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking
cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social
practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the introduction
of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message
orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not the
same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to
face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if the
other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and
what that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is
being sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special
place, so he planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable
configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You
shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone in
her room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And  imagination
makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral
communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and
send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by
adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what
he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social
sciences because that is my research field, although I have the intuition
that it could also work for natural sciences.

Best,

JJ
El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji"  escribió:

> Hi  FISers,
>
>
> On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote:
>
>
> " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our discussions and
> recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways to many
> different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate the
> framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological,
> linguistic, etc.
> . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction introduced
> by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though it too is in
> my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be misleading
> when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less linguistic
> (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the division: i.e.
> into intrinsic, referential, and normative analyses/properties of
> information."
>
> I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic metaphor
> in defining "information".  Although the linguistic metaphor has its
> limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique
> advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of
> functions (see the last column in 

Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic]

In agreement with Sung I see the value of “language metaphor" that can be 
applied to physical objects when they are used for communication.
Description of “chemical language” used by bacteria can be found e.g. here 
http://genesdev.cshlp.org/content/15/12/1468.full.pdfStephan and number of 
other articles by Bonnie Bassler or Eschel Ben-Jacob on quorum sensing, or in a 
popular talk here http://wagner.edu/newsroom/founders-day-2012-1/

This idea of information processing performed by natural systems is parallell 
to natural computing – cell computing, bacterial cognition, DNA computing, 
membrane computing, etc.

Best wishes,
Gordana


From: Fis > 
on behalf of Sungchul Ji 
>
Date: Wednesday, 7 February 2018 at 14:46
To: FIS FIS >
Subject: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the 
cateogry theory


Hi  FISers,


On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote:


" So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our discussions and 
recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways to many different 
contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate the framing, whether 
physical, formal, biological, phenomenological, linguistic, etc.

. . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction introduced by 
Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though it too is in my 
opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be misleading when 
applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less linguistic (and nested 
in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the division: i.e. into intrinsic, 
referential, and normative analyses/properties of information."

I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic metaphor in 
defining "information".  Although the linguistic metaphor has its limitations 
(as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique advantage as well, for 
example, its well-established categories of functions (see the last column in 
Table 1.)

The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied theories of 
information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging to the same 
category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically represented as 
the 3-node closed network in the first column ofTable 1.

Table 1.  The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) as 
manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell language theory, and 
linguistics.

Category Theory

   fg
   A -> B --> C
|   ^
||
|__|
   h

ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation)

Deacon’s theory of information

Shannon’s
Theory of
information

Peirce’s theory of signs

Cell language theory

Human language
(Function)

A

Intrinsic information

Source

Object

Nucleotides*/
Amion acids

Letters
(Building blocks)

B

Referential information

Message

Sign

Proteins

Words
(Denotation)

C

Normative information

Receiver

Interpretant

Metabolomes
(Totality of cell metabolism)

Systems of words
(Decision making & Reasoning)

f

?

Encoding

Sign production

Physical laws

Second articulation

g

?

Decoding

Sign interpretation

Evoutionary selection

First and Third articulation

h

?

Information flow

Information flow

Inheritance

Grounding/
Habit

Scale   Micro-Macro?Macro   Macro   Micro   Macro


*There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides.  According to 
the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n genetic alphabets, each 
consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn consisting of n nucleotides.  
In this view, the classical genetic alphabet is just one example of the n 
alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1.  When n = 3, for example, we have the 
so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet with 4^3 = 64 letters each consisting of 3 
nucleotides, resulting in the familiar codon table.  Thus, the 64 genetic 
codons are not words as widely thought (including myself until recently) but 
letters!  It then follows that proteins are words and  metabolic pathways are 
sentences.  Finally, the transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as 
"hyperstructures" by V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by me 
more recently) correspond to texts essential to represent 
arguement/reasoning/computing.  What is most exciting is the recent discovery 
in my lab at Rutgers that the so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of mRNA levels 
in living cells can identify function-dependent "hypermetabolic pathways" 
underlying breast cancer before and after drug treatment (manuscript under 
review).

Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome.

Sung

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