Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Joe, However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and what is being modeled as processes. They are not so abstract that one would not be able to measure these mechanisms using information theory. The models can be expected to generate redundancy because they are entertained in the present when restructuring the system, while they indicate possible future states. Bob Ulanowicz pointed me to the mutual information in three dimensions that can indicate redundancy (= negative entropy). Last year, we had a discussion with Klaus Krippendorff about the relation between this redundancy and the probabilistic entropy which is necessarily generated when the redundancy is historically retained (because of the second law). [Redundancy in Systems which Entertain a Model of Themselves: Interaction Information and the Self-Organization of Anticipation, http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/1/63 Entropy 12(1) (2010) 63-79; pdf http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/12/1/63/pdf ] The retention mechanisms of anticipation operating in systems is historical and therefore measurable; the anticipatory mechanisms are not directly measurable because they are not part of the res extensa, but remain res cogitans. However, they can be simulated. The theory and computation of anticipatory systems have provided us with new instruments for doing so (Rosen, 1984; Dubois, 1998). At his time, Husserl (1929) had no instruments beyond the transcendental apperception of this domain of cogitata and therefore he has to refrain from empirical investigation; as he formulated: We must forgo a more precise investigation of the layer of meaning which provides the human world and culture, as such, with a specific meaning and therewith provides this world with specifically “mental” predicates. (Husserl, 1929, at p. 138; my translation). The progression has been made in terms of the analytical modeling (Rosen, Dubois) and the development of means to measure redundancy generation within cultural domains (McGill, Ashby, Ulanowicz, Krippendorff). See for further elaborations: http://www.leydesdorff.net/meaning.2011/index.htm Meaning as a sociological concept: A review of the modeling, mapping, and simulation of the communication of knowledge and meaning, Social Science Information (in press); pdf-version http://www.leydesdorff.net/meaning.2011/meaning.pdf The Communication of Meaning and the Structuration of Expectations: Giddens' http://www.leydesdorff.net/GiddensLuhmann/index.htm structuration theory and Luhmann's self-organization, Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology 61(10) (2010) 2138-2150; pdf-version http://www.leydesdorff.net/GiddensLuhmann/structuration.pdf With best wishes, Loet _ Loet Leydesdorff Professor, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR) Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel. +31-20-525 6598; fax: +31-842239111 mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ http://www.leydesdorff.net/ Visiting Professor, http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html ISTIC, Beijing; Honorary Fellow, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/ SPRU, University of Sussex ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear FIS colleagues, I have some differences about the epistemic stance recently discussed by Karl, Loet (and in part, Joseph, but he looks more as trying to step on the reality, whatever it is). Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. My contention is that the epistemology of information science has to give room for non-human observers, I mean, there is cognition and informational processes (forms of knowledge and intelligence included) in bacteria, living cells in general, non human nervous systems, and in a number of social constructions and institutions (accounting processes, specifically the sciences), even at the level of global human society we are living now in an epoch of planetary observation and actuation (eg, climate change) --not to speak only on politics and economics. The micro-macro info flows and knowledge circulation are fascinating epistemic problems of our time, when collectively considered. I have argued in previous messages that a new info rhetorics looks necessary, so to prepare the room for a new info epistemology. The problem of the agent(s) and the world(s), the abstract observer(s) and the real one(s), the necessary disciplinary involvement (particularly of the neurosciences, the action strike...) all of this looks very difficult to be handled directly. New way of thinking needed. best wishes ---Pedro PS. NEXT WEEK THE NEW DISCUSSION SESSION BY MARK BURGING ON INFO THEORY WILL BE ANNOUNCED. ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Pedro, I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me try to clarify. Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ... On p. 49, he formulated: ... so that the relations of neuronal activity generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And furthermore (at this same page): ... the second-order consensual domain that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a semantic domain. This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the information. However, as Maturana argues later in this paper this semantics is different from that of human super-observers introduced from p. 56 onwards. My interest is in human super-observers. I consider the latter as psychological systems which are able not only to provide meaning to the observations, but also to communicate meaning. The communication of meaning generates a supra-individual super-semantic domain, in which meaning cannot only be provided, but also changed; not in the sense of updated but because of the reflexivity involved. Robert Rosen's notion of anticipatory systems is here important. Dubois (1998) distinguished between incursive and hyper-incursive systems and between weak and strong anticipation. Both psychological observers and interhuman discourses can be considered as strongly anticipatory, that is, they use future states -- discursively and reflexively envisaged -- for the update. Non-human systems do not have this capacity: they learn by adaptation, but not in terms of entertaining and potentially discussing models. Models provide predictions of future states that can be used for updating the persent state of the systems which can entertain these models. Thus, new options are generated. This increases the redundancy; that is, against the arrow of time. Meaning providing already does so, but communication and codification of meaning enhances this process further. Non-human observers (e.g., monkeys) are able to provide meaning and perhaps sometimes to entertain a model, but they are not able to communicate these models. That makes the difference. If models cannot be communicated, they cannot be improved consciously and reflexively. Thus, a non-human may be an observer, but it cannot be a cogito. This makes the psychological system different from the biological. Cogitantes can entertain and discuss models (as cogitata). One of the models, for example, is the one of autopoiesis. Best wishes, Loet Loet Leydesdorff Professor, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ -Original Message- From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 11:29 AM To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear FIS colleagues, I have some differences about the epistemic stance recently discussed by Karl, Loet (and in part, Joseph, but he looks more as trying to step on the reality, whatever it is). Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. My contention is that the epistemology of information science has to give room for non-human observers, I mean, there is cognition and informational processes (forms of knowledge and intelligence included) in bacteria, living cells in general, non human nervous systems, and in a number of social constructions and institutions (accounting processes, specifically the sciences), even at the level of global human society we are living now in an epoch of planetary observation and actuation (eg, climate change) --not to speak only on politics and economics. The micro-macro info flows and knowledge circulation are fascinating epistemic problems of our time, when collectively considered. I have argued in previous messages that a new info rhetorics looks necessary, so to prepare the room for a new info epistemology. The problem of the agent(s) and the world(s), the abstract observer(s) and the real one(s), the necessary disciplinary involvement (particularly of the neurosciences, the action strike...) all of this looks very difficult to be handled directly. New way of thinking needed. best wishes ---Pedro PS. NEXT WEEK THE NEW DISCUSSION SESSION BY MARK BURGING ON INFO THEORY WILL BE ANNOUNCED. ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and OrderingPrinciples
Dear Loet, Pedro and FIS Colleagues, It is very important to take in account the ontological structure of the information subjects in the reality. The hierarchy of the intellectual properties is not investigated in deep till now. Who may say that the human brain is one whole but not a very complicated system of small cells and possibly special kinds of bacteria and other micro organisms ? The phenomena of intelligence could not be investigated separately taking in account only one of its realizations. Let remember the very actual scientific area called Natural Information Technologies. I expect in the future the scientific collegium to recognize special kind of intelligent systems which is seen today - social human-technic systems where the new kind of information subject was established - a society built by connected nodes of human-computer systems. Let remember Nord Africa. I think we made step to the next discussion. It is nice to meet Mark! Friendly regards Krassimir -Original Message- From: Loet Leydesdorff Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 1:14 PM To: 'Pedro C. Marijuan' ; fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and OrderingPrinciples Dear Pedro, I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me try to clarify. Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ... On p. 49, he formulated: ... so that the relations of neuronal activity generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And furthermore (at this same page): ... the second-order consensual domain that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a semantic domain. This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the information. However, as Maturana argues later in this paper this semantics is different from that of human super-observers introduced from p. 56 onwards. My interest is in human super-observers. I consider the latter as psychological systems which are able not only to provide meaning to the observations, but also to communicate meaning. The communication of meaning generates a supra-individual super-semantic domain, in which meaning cannot only be provided, but also changed; not in the sense of updated but because of the reflexivity involved. Robert Rosen's notion of anticipatory systems is here important. Dubois (1998) distinguished between incursive and hyper-incursive systems and between weak and strong anticipation. Both psychological observers and interhuman discourses can be considered as strongly anticipatory, that is, they use future states -- discursively and reflexively envisaged -- for the update. Non-human systems do not have this capacity: they learn by adaptation, but not in terms of entertaining and potentially discussing models. Models provide predictions of future states that can be used for updating the persent state of the systems which can entertain these models. Thus, new options are generated. This increases the redundancy; that is, against the arrow of time. Meaning providing already does so, but communication and codification of meaning enhances this process further. Non-human observers (e.g., monkeys) are able to provide meaning and perhaps sometimes to entertain a model, but they are not able to communicate these models. That makes the difference. If models cannot be communicated, they cannot be improved consciously and reflexively. Thus, a non-human may be an observer, but it cannot be a cogito. This makes the psychological system different from the biological. Cogitantes can entertain and discuss models (as cogitata). One of the models, for example, is the one of autopoiesis. Best wishes, Loet Loet Leydesdorff Professor, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ -Original Message- From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 11:29 AM To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear FIS colleagues, I have some differences about the epistemic stance recently discussed by Karl, Loet (and in part, Joseph, but he looks more as trying to step on the reality, whatever it is). Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. My contention is that the epistemology of information science has to give room for non-human observers, I mean, there is cognition and informational processes (forms of knowledge and intelligence included) in bacteria, living cells in general, non human nervous systems
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Pedro, I do not quite recognize myself in the statement: Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and non-classical, fully participating (and in part constituting) the order and disorder. However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and what is being modeled as processes. I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity and self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken to describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive processes necessary for an understanding of information and meaning. The above notwithstanding, I then have a problem with your, Pedro, formulation of the capabilities of non-human observers. Here, I agree with the principle expressed by Loet that the examples of the entities you mentioned lack the necessary cognitive abilities, although I focus on aspects of them other than model-related. A theory in which NOTHING previous is taken as entirely satisfactory seems more and more necessary . . . Best wishes, Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht Von: l...@leydesdorff.net Datum: 01.04.2011 12:14 An: 'Pedro C. Marijuan'pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es, fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear Pedro, I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me try to clarify. Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ... On p. 49, he formulated: ... so that the relations of neuronal activity generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And furthermore (at this same page): ... the second-order consensual domain that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a semantic domain. This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the information. However, as Maturana argues later in this paper this semantics is different from that of human super-observers introduced from p. 56 onwards. My interest is in human super-observers. I consider the latter as psychological systems which are able not only to provide meaning to the observations, but also to communicate meaning. The communication of meaning generates a supra-individual super-semantic domain, in which meaning cannot only be provided, but also changed; not in the sense of updated but because of the reflexivity involved. Robert Rosen's notion of anticipatory systems is here important. Dubois (1998) distinguished between incursive and hyper-incursive systems and between weak and strong anticipation. Both psychological observers and interhuman discourses can be considered as strongly anticipatory, that is, they use future states -- discursively and reflexively envisaged -- for the update. Non-human systems do not have this capacity: they learn by adaptation, but not in terms of entertaining and potentially discussing models. Models provide predictions of future states that can be used for updating the persent state of the systems which can entertain these models. Thus, new options are generated. This increases the redundancy; that is, against the arrow of time. Meaning providing already does so, but communication and codification of meaning enhances this process further. Non-human observers (e.g., monkeys) are able to provide meaning and perhaps sometimes to entertain a model, but they are not able to communicate these models. That makes the difference. If models cannot be communicated, they cannot be improved consciously and reflexively. Thus, a non-human may be an observer, but it cannot be a cogito. This makes the psychological system different from the biological. Cogitantes can entertain and discuss models (as cogitata). One of the models, for example, is the one of autopoiesis. Best wishes, Loet Loet Leydesdorff Professor, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ -Original Message- From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan Sent: Friday, April 01, 2011 11:29 AM To: fis
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
It seems obvious to me that any property held by a very complex entity (e.g., human being), IF it can be modeled, then that model can be used to generalize that property ANYWHERE we wish to. On these grounds I have been busy working on 'physiosemiosis' using the triadic formulation of semiosis of Charles Peirce. I have proposed that the 'sign' emerges from the context of an interaction between object and system. If context has no effect on the interaction, there is no semiosis. If, on the contrary, context affects the interaction, then we have semiosis, even in a pond. The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human experience, yet even a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very unhappy when her chicks are threatened. STAN On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 3:04 PM, Pridi Siregar pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com wrote: Hi all ! Maybe the term « observer » in Pedro’s « non-human observer » term is what bugs some of you because it seems to imply some “non-human cogitum” that by habit we may want to equate to human thinking. Of course trying to understand the “psychology” of a bacteria may be a bit hard for humans so perhaps the term “observer” should be given a broader meaning and the challenge would be to define the nature/ boundaries/mechanics of this semantic extension/redefinition. The same may hold for defining “language” and “meaning”… But for lack of time I really haven’t followed all the debates and I’m no philosopher. As a business person I am much more practical and I do have one practical concern/question: are we trying to lay down a new theory of living systems or are we going (in some not too distant future) towards devising a computational framework that (even modestly) may go beyond projects such as the VHP?Sorry to be so down to earth but I suppose that in this forum everyone is allowed to express himself/herself… J Pridi *De :* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *De la part de* joe.bren...@bluewin.ch *Envoyé :* vendredi 1 avril 2011 19:38 *À :* l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Pedro C. Marijuan'; fis@listas.unizar.es *Objet :* Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear Pedro, I do not quite recognize myself in the statement: Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and non-classical, fully participating (and in part constituting) the order and disorder. However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and what is being modeled as processes. I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity and self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken to describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive processes necessary for an understanding of information and meaning. The above notwithstanding, I then have a problem with your, Pedro, formulation of the capabilities of non-human observers. Here, I agree with the principle expressed by Loet that the examples of the entities you mentioned lack the necessary cognitive abilities, although I focus on aspects of them other than model-related. A theory in which NOTHING previous is taken as entirely satisfactory seems more and more necessary . . . Best wishes, Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht Von: l...@leydesdorff.net Datum: 01.04.2011 12:14 An: 'Pedro C. Marijuan'pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es, fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear Pedro, I understand that you have some problems with my epistemic stance. Let me try to clarify. Let me go back to Maturana (1978) The Biology of Language ... On p. 49, he formulated: ... so that the relations of neuronal activity generated under consensual behavior become perturbations and components to further consensual behavior, an observer is operationally generated. And furthermore (at this same page): ... the second-order consensual domain that it establishes with other organisms becomes indistinguishable from a semantic domain. This observer (at the biological level) is able to provide meaning to the information
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Stan, Ø The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human experience, yet even a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very unhappy when her chicks are threatened. Being a computer scientist I don't really know enough about qualia, so I checked Wiki and read: Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, the experience of taking a recreational drug, or the redness of an evening sky. I believe that hen and other animals have some sort of qualia, of course not human qualia, but their own, animal qualia. Am I wrong in my believe that animals can feel pain, have headache, feel taste of drink and food, can see colors and can even get drunk (Animals Are Beautiful People, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDknJ6KPLxc ) and that pain, headache etc. that they experience represent their qualia? With best regards, Gordana http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/ From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe Sent: den 1 april 2011 21:39 To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles It seems obvious to me that any property held by a very complex entity (e.g., human being), IF it can be modeled, then that model can be used to generalize that property ANYWHERE we wish to. On these grounds I have been busy working on 'physiosemiosis' using the triadic formulation of semiosis of Charles Peirce. I have proposed that the 'sign' emerges from the context of an interaction between object and system. If context has no effect on the interaction, there is no semiosis. If, on the contrary, context affects the interaction, then we have semiosis, even in a pond. The key is whether the trait involved can be modeled; on these grounds it has not yet been shown that 'qualia' can be generalized beyond the human experience, yet even a child can see, for example, that a mother hen is very unhappy when her chicks are threatened. STAN On Fri, Apr 1, 2011 at 3:04 PM, Pridi Siregar pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.commailto:pridi.sire...@ibiocomputing.com wrote: Hi all ! Maybe the term « observer » in Pedro's « non-human observer » term is what bugs some of you because it seems to imply some non-human cogitum that by habit we may want to equate to human thinking. Of course trying to understand the psychology of a bacteria may be a bit hard for humans so perhaps the term observer should be given a broader meaning and the challenge would be to define the nature/ boundaries/mechanics of this semantic extension/redefinition. The same may hold for defining language and meaning... But for lack of time I really haven't followed all the debates and I'm no philosopher. As a business person I am much more practical and I do have one practical concern/question: are we trying to lay down a new theory of living systems or are we going (in some not too distant future) towards devising a computational framework that (even modestly) may go beyond projects such as the VHP?Sorry to be so down to earth but I suppose that in this forum everyone is allowed to express himself/herself...:) Pridi De : fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] De la part de joe.bren...@bluewin.chmailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch Envoyé : vendredi 1 avril 2011 19:38 À : l...@leydesdorff.netmailto:l...@leydesdorff.net; 'Pedro C. Marijuan'; fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es Objet : Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles Dear Pedro, I do not quite recognize myself in the statement: Basically, their informational subject looks like the abstract, disembodied, non-situated, classical observer, equipped in a Cartesian austerity --and outside, just the Order or maybe the Disorder. I thought my implicit observer was very much real, embodied and non-classical, fully participating (and in part constituting) the order and disorder. However, I rather tend to agree with you that Loet's, Rosen's and Dubois' models of communication, anticipation, etc. are somewhat too abstract. The models, as I think Loet may agree, are created for analysis, and do not define the physical, dynamic relation between the models, the creation of models and what is being modeled as processes. I have never understood why Maturana had to say that observers are operationally generated when it seems obvious that they exist, albeit at different levels of complexity and (and here we agree) capability of recursiveness. As I have said previously, autopoiesis, like spontaneity and self-organization are concepts that are very useful, but cannot be taken to describe, as fully as I anyway would like, the dynamics of the cognitive processes necessary for an understanding
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Karl, Dear Loet, Thank you both for your postings and the perspectives they provide. They leave me with just two questions, and I am glad Karl does not want to close the discussion so that I may ask for your and other views on them. 1. Does Loet's reply to Karl regarding frameworks for observation of actual states vs. frameworks for expectations imply that such frameworks are completely mutually exclusive? 2. Regarding information (copying from Karl), the two views in summary are: By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. Are both these views, however, purely epistemological or do they have an ontological content? Both depend (today, of course, not historically) on the reality of the axiomatic idea of order and/some ideal case. On first reading, it would appear that Karl would accept some ontological content, perhaps partly, since he writes: The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles. This statement, however, if I understand it, would exclude the possibility of a new general, if not ultimate, ordering principle for reality being discovered, that would not be an order per se. Here, I would agree with Loet, that the paradigm of epistemology has indeed changed, but what else?! I look forward to hearing from you. Best wishes, Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com Datum: 27.03.2011 11:41 An: Pedro C. Marijuanpcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es Kopie: fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam Dear James, thank you for the widening of this discussion. Order and Information Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the relation between information and order bring us back to some deep problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages. The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs. the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of the world as the descriptions of the things themselves? In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs. the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus). The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each deviate from the ideal-typical case. The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. So it is the same extent and collection which both see, but the names are different as is different the approach of calculating it. A reorder creates different ties, therefore a different information content. The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles. Our generation has credible news about societies which are ordered in a completely different fashion and yet are not struck down. We have experienced too many ideal orders to believe that any such exists. Karl 2011/3/24, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es: Dear all, Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for the list and to everyone else for indulging me. As a historian, I have learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned out to be very complicated indeed
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
Dear Joe and colleagues, 1. Does Loet's reply to Karl regarding frameworks for observation of actual states vs. frameworks for expectations imply that such frameworks are completely mutually exclusive? Of course, not: the expectations are informed by previous observations and further observations can change our expectations. More precisely: observational reports are needed to make the discourse (entertaining expectations) progressive. 2. Regarding information (copying from Karl), the two views in summary are: By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. I would prefer to use a plural for “ideas of order”: paradigms, theoretical frameworks, etc. As argued before, the “sunt” is problematic because this order does not “exist” (in the res extensa), but can be entertained (as cogitate in the res cogitans). The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. The information content is always expected information content of a distribution. Are both these views, however, purely epistemological or do they have an ontological content? It seems to me that my perspective leads to a chaology instead of a cosmology. “Out there” is only noise; order emerges from our reflections and exchanges as cogitantes. Both depend (today, of course, not historically) on the reality of the axiomatic idea of order and/some ideal case. On first reading, it would appear that Karl would accept some ontological content, perhaps partly, since he writes: The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles. These ordering principles are not “given” by God in his Creation (albeit in the substance of Natura naturans or natura naturata), but are constructed by us in scholarly discourses. This statement, however, if I understand it, would exclude the possibility of a new general, if not ultimate, ordering principle for reality being discovered, that would not be an order per se. Here, I would agree with Loet, that the paradigm of epistemology has indeed changed, but what else?! “Reality” can be considered as broken in res extensa and res cogitans. Alternative expectations are also possible, but have to assume a “veracitas Dei” or harmonia prestabilita. When one gives this perspective up, chaology can be expected to prevail. Best wishes, Loet I look forward to hearing from you. Best wishes, Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com Datum: 27.03.2011 11:41 An: Pedro C. Marijuanpcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es Kopie: fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam Dear James, thank you for the widening of this discussion. Order and Information Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the relation between information and order bring us back to some deep problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages. The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs. the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of the world as the descriptions of the things themselves? In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs. the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus). The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each deviate from the ideal-typical case. The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam. Orders and Ordering Principles
is always *expected* information content of a distribution. Are both these views, however, purely epistemological or do they have an ontological content? It seems to me that my perspective leads to a chaology instead of a cosmology. “Out there” is only noise; order emerges from our reflections and exchanges as cogitantes. Both depend (today, of course, not historically) on the reality of the axiomatic idea of order and/some ideal case. On first reading, it would appear that Karl would accept some ontological content, perhaps partly, since he writes: The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles. These ordering principles are not “given” by God in his Creation (albeit in the substance of Natura naturans or natura naturata), but are constructed by us in scholarly discourses. This statement, however, if I understand it, would exclude the possibility of a new general, if not ultimate, ordering principle for reality being discovered, that would not be an order per se. Here, I would agree with Loet, that the paradigm of epistemology has indeed changed, but what else?! “Reality” can be considered as broken in res extensa and res cogitans. Alternative expectations are also possible, but have to assume a “veracitas Dei” or harmonia prestabilita. When one gives this perspective up, chaology can be expected to prevail. Best wishes, Loet I look forward to hearing from you. Best wishes, Joseph Ursprüngliche Nachricht Von: karl.javors...@gmail.com Datum: 27.03.2011 11:41 An: Pedro C. Marijuanpcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es Kopie: fis@listas.unizar.es Betreff: Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam Dear James, thank you for the widening of this discussion. Order and Information Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the relation between information and order bring us back to some deep problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages. The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs. the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of the world as the descriptions of the things themselves? In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs. the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus). The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each deviate from the ideal-typical case. The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. So it is the same extent and collection which both see, but the names are different as is different the approach of calculating it. A reorder creates different ties, therefore a different information content. The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles. Our generation has credible news about societies which are ordered in a completely different fashion and yet are not struck down. We have experienced too many ideal orders to believe that any such exists. Karl 2011/3/24, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es: Dear all, Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for the list and to everyone else for indulging me. As a historian, I have learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned out to be very complicated indeed. The purpose of history, I think, is to explain the past. It is not just a collection of facts (one damn thing after another) or even attempting to find out
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam
Dear James, thank you for the widening of this discussion. Order and Information Let us not close this session on the historical perspective of the modern concept of Science yet. Loet’s thoughtful remarks about the relation between information and order bring us back to some deep problems they were addressing in the Middle Ages. The discussion about the relative importance of the universalia vs. the re (also known as Occam’s) can be restated in today’s terms as follows: is the idea behind the thing more useful as a description of the world as the descriptions of the things themselves? In Loet’s view, there exists a framework within which we can observe how the actual states of the things are. Therefore, in this approach there is no need for a separate concept of order; as each possible alternative is a priori known, it is the information content that gives a description of the world. By information, this approach means the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical case, in which an order exists. (universalia sunt ante rem) The opposing view explains information by means of the axiomatic idea of order. The system is in the same fashion closed, and every possible alternative is equally known a priori. The difference in viewpoints lies in the focusing on the properties of the ideal-typical case vs. the actual types of cases. (universalia sunt post rebus). The numbers offer a nice satisfying explanation. As we order the things, we encounter ties. (A sort on 136 additions will bring forth cases which are indistinguishable with respect to one aspect.) The members of a tie can represent the universalia. (“All additions where a+b=12” is e.g. a universalium) The actual cases will – almost – each deviate from the ideal-typical case. The information content is then the deviation of the actual cases from the ideal-typical state, as Loet defines, and concurrently an implication of which order prevails, as the opposing view suggests. So it is the same extent and collection which both see, but the names are different as is different the approach of calculating it. A reorder creates different ties, therefore a different information content. The difference between the Middle Ages and today is, in my view, that they had no possibility to face the idea that there is no ultimate ordering principle behind the many obviously existing ordering principles. Our generation has credible news about societies which are ordered in a completely different fashion and yet are not struck down. We have experienced too many ideal orders to believe that any such exists. Karl 2011/3/24, Pedro C. Marijuan pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es: Dear all, Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for the list and to everyone else for indulging me. As a historian, I have learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned out to be very complicated indeed. The purpose of history, I think, is to explain the past. It is not just a collection of facts (one damn thing after another) or even attempting to find out what really happened (although it does help if we can do this). Historians want to ask why? and how? as well as what? Among historians of science, there are two camps. The larger one examines science as a cultural artefact within a particular historical milieu. It seeks to answer questions like why did people believe what they believed?, why did they practice science in the way they did? and what did they hope science could achieve? Historians in this camp tend to be specialists in a particular area. They want to see the world through the eyes of their historical agents. Questions about whether a particular scientific theory is true or corresponds to objective reality are not very relevant. What matters is the way people in the past saw things. We need to understand them. A second, smaller camp of historians of science where I have pitched my own tent want to know what caused modern science. They recognise the enormous utility of scientific discovery and seek to explain how mankind came by this wonderful tool. In other words, they seek a theory of the historical origins of science. For this camp, questions about truth are of paramount importance because we are trying to look back in time to find the beginnings of processes that ultimately lead to a particular end. That end is a scientific practice that produces true theories, or at least theories that correspond to an objective reality. This quest for the origins of modern science is difficult, not to mention rather pointless, if you contest the claim that modern science can give rise to a true description of the objective world. So, when I presented my claim that we should look in the Middle Ages for these origins, it seems I had ignored a number of prior questions. Indeed, the whole concept of science as producing true information was rapidly thrown into question. I
[Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam
Dear all, Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for the list and to everyone else for indulging me. As a historian, I have learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned out to be very complicated indeed. The purpose of history, I think, is to explain the past. It is not just a collection of facts (one damn thing after another) or even attempting to find out what really happened (although it does help if we can do this). Historians want to ask why? and how? as well as what? Among historians of science, there are two camps. The larger one examines science as a cultural artefact within a particular historical milieu. It seeks to answer questions like why did people believe what they believed?, why did they practice science in the way they did? and what did they hope science could achieve? Historians in this camp tend to be specialists in a particular area. They want to see the world through the eyes of their historical agents. Questions about whether a particular scientific theory is true or corresponds to objective reality are not very relevant. What matters is the way people in the past saw things. We need to understand them. A second, smaller camp of historians of science where I have pitched my own tent want to know what caused modern science. They recognise the enormous utility of scientific discovery and seek to explain how mankind came by this wonderful tool. In other words, they seek a theory of the historical origins of science. For this camp, questions about truth are of paramount importance because we are trying to look back in time to find the beginnings of processes that ultimately lead to a particular end. That end is a scientific practice that produces true theories, or at least theories that correspond to an objective reality. This quest for the origins of modern science is difficult, not to mention rather pointless, if you contest the claim that modern science can give rise to a true description of the objective world. So, when I presented my claim that we should look in the Middle Ages for these origins, it seems I had ignored a number of prior questions. Indeed, the whole concept of science as producing true information was rapidly thrown into question. I hope other members of the list have found some of the issues thrown out of this discussion of interest. Thank you all for your patience. Best wishes James /The Genesis of Science: How the Christian Middle Ages Launched the Scientific Revolution http://www.amazon.com/Genesis-Science-Christian-Scientific-Revolution/dp/1596981555/bedeslibrary /by James Hannam is available now. Shortlisted for the Royal Society Science Book Prize Well-researched and hugely enjoyable. */New Scientist/* A spirited jaunt through centuries of scientific development... captures the wonder of the medieval world: its inspirational curiosity and its engaging strangeness. */Sunday Times/* This book contains much valuable material summarised with commendable no-nonsense clarity... James Hannam has done a fine job of knocking down an old caricature. */Sunday Telegraph/* --- ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam
Dear James and colleagues, I have a few comments to the discussion colophon. First, it seems difficult to explain something which has already happened. For example, one cannot test statistically whether what happened could also have been expected. In the tradition, one distinguished more carefully between explanatory (nomothetic) sciences and hermeneutic understanding. Thus, you may wish to adapt the metaphors. The quest for an explanation of the emergence of modernity in terms of a single cause seems not productive to me. Marx, for example, considered new forms of book-keeping as crucial, Weber attributed this revolution to the Protestant ethics, and others have pointed to the effects of the printing press. What most of these writers agree upon is that there is a phase transition between the early 15th and late 16th century. An additional degree of freedom was developed in the systems of interhuman coordination. We have an intuition (e.g., based on artificial life) that a hypercycle can emerge if a number of uncertainties operate at the same time. At the minimum one would need three, but perhaps even more. Why three? Because only a system with three sources of variance operating selectively upon one another can generate redundancy (perhaps, measurable as a negative value of the mutual information in three dimensions). In discussing the Triple Helix of university-industry-government relations we have called this hypercycle an overlay with as an additional communication routine is added to the system and then changes the systems dynamics of all underlying routines. For example, age-long traditions were inverted into different institutional spheres such as autonomous sciences, liberal capitalism, civil liberties, etc. Niklas Luhmann has called this the functional differentiation of society. In my opinion, what was functionally differentiated were the codes of communication; for example, between science and religion. Some of this can perhaps be traced back to the struggle of the Investiture which broke the hegemony of a single order, and left agents with room to make up their own mind. Initially as an imitatio Christi -- that is, no longer prescribed by Rome, but as an individual task, but then generalized to other domains. During the Roman empire and early Christianity, this interpretation of the Gospel was not yet possible because of the worldy constraints, but once the system (cosmology) began to tear apart, further erosion could not be prevented. I am not offering this as an explanation, but as a reading of history. I am doubtful about those messages which claim more objectivity to their statements than such an informed reading. As Whitehead noted: a science which does not forget its past, is doomed. Probably, a kind of Scylla and Charybdis between which one has to travel reflexively. Best wishes, Loet _ Loet Leydesdorff Professor, University of Amsterdam Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111 mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ http://www.leydesdorff.net/ From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Pedro C. Marijuan Sent: Thursday, March 24, 2011 12:02 PM To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: [Fis] Discussion colophon--James Hannam Dear all, Thank you very much to Pedro for asking me to suggest a discussion for the list and to everyone else for indulging me. As a historian, I have learnt that questions I naively thought were quite simple have turned out to be very complicated indeed. The purpose of history, I think, is to explain the past. It is not just a collection of facts (one damn thing after another) or even attempting to find out what really happened (although it does help if we can do this). Historians want to ask why? and how? as well as what? Among historians of science, there are two camps. The larger one examines science as a cultural artefact within a particular historical milieu. It seeks to answer questions like why did people believe what they believed?, why did they practice science in the way they did? and what did they hope science could achieve? Historians in this camp tend to be specialists in a particular area. They want to see the world through the eyes of their historical agents. Questions about whether a particular scientific theory is true or corresponds to objective reality are not very relevant. What matters is the way people in the past saw things. We need to understand them. A second, smaller camp of historians of science where I have pitched my own tent want to know what caused modern science. They recognise the enormous utility of scientific discovery and seek to explain how mankind came by this wonderful tool. In other words, they seek a theory of the historical origins of science. For this camp, questions about
