Re: [Fis] Fw: Clarifying Posting. Speculative Realism

[John Collier]

Stan, Joseph,

I don’t see any general advantage of a process philosophy over a philosophy of 
things, though Every Thing Must Go argues that things are misleading in modern 
physics, and aren’t needed anyway. We argue that in many cases processes work 
better, bu7t we don’ argue solely in favour of processes, either, since they 
have their own problems. Instead we argue for the more inclusive idea of 
structures, which are definitionally relational. They are more accessible than 
things, but don’t rule out entire metaphysics that includes things, qualia and 
much else. Structuralism merely imposes some discipline on the chaos. It does 
not propose oppositions (though many are constructed in its name)
Processes come in subsets, but only as types. This follows fro9m the definition 
of set. Interlinking of processes spatiotemporally produces networks.

Retaining two-valued logic in some cases at least seems me to be an advantage. 
Logic is an apparatus, a tool, and to predefine which tools are to be useful is 
as fallacious on one side as on the other. Especially when the subject matter 
appears to be confused. It becomes much too easy to give in too quickly. In 
particular, applying logic to itself seems to require a two-valued approach to 
avoid degenerating into Babaylonic nihilism (Zi’inovev). The most appropriate 
application of two valued logic is to logic itself. It illuminates logic an a 
way that nothing else is able to.

Two valued logic give birther to a myriad of logics. I am not a big fan of 
pluralism, preferring simplicity if it can be effectrive, but sometimes it is 
the best we can do, given our mental limitations and the inherent complexity of 
some of the things we study (see both Bill Wimsatt’s methods for finite minds 
and Paul Cilliers’ positive postmodernism  here. There is room for, nay need 
for, at least four basic foundational  but complexly inter-related metaphysical 
attitudes going back at least to the Greeks, and found in many other cultures 
as well. (See William Irwin Thomson’s excellent, At the Edge of History and/or 
Cosmography in the Review of Metaphysics starting in the mid-50s.)

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N Salthe
Sent: Sunday, 08 May 2016 4:13 PM
To: Joseph Brenner <joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>; fis <fis@listas.unizar.es>
Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw: Clarifying Posting. Speculative Realism

Joseph -- Regarding:

?As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of 
weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of concepts 
embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include an ontology 
of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the world, a logic of 
non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has reason and value, but 
excludes the possibility of a ground of existence which includes incoherence 
and contradiction.
S: Well, why cannot processes be described by subsetting? As in: {energy 
dissipation {work {building a box}}}
and
{energy dissipation {finds quickest route around an obstruction {fails to win 
the race}}}
STAN

On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 9:32 PM, Joseph Brenner 
<joe.bren...@bluewin.ch<mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>> wrote:
Dear Friends and Colleagues,

The last couple of postings have opened the discussion in a direction their 
authors may not have intended. Bob's felt personal plea for a phenomenological 
approach to biology, and hence to other sciences, and as the foundation of a 
philosophy, begs the question of non-phenomenological approaches which may be 
equally or more valid.

We all agree the mind is capable of phenomenal experience and is not a machine, 
but the (correct) arguments being made seem to me expressions, in various 
styles, of the non-fundamentality of matter and energy. Unless I am wrong, this 
is at least a still open question. Further, Terry's (again correct) statements 
about the importance of the Liar and Goedel paradoxes perhaps overlooks one 
aspect of them: they (the paradoxes) themselves are only relatively simple 
binary cases that can be considered reduced versions of some more fundamental, 
underlying princple governing relationships in the real, physical world. These 
relationships are crucial to an understanding of the non-binary properties of 
information.

A recent book by Tom Sparrow is entitled "The End of Phenomenology". It 
proposes a new science-free doctrine, Speculative Realism, to provide a link 
between phenomena and reality which in my opinion also fails, but may be of 
interest to some of you. I wrote about this doctrine:

As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of 
weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of concepts 
embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include an ontology 

[Fis] Fw: Clarifying Posting. Speculative Realism

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear Friends and Colleagues,

The last couple of postings have opened the discussion in a direction their 
authors may not have intended. Bob's felt personal plea for a 
phenomenological approach to biology, and hence to other sciences, and as 
the foundation of a philosophy, begs the question of non-phenomenological 
approaches which may be equally or more valid.


We all agree the mind is capable of phenomenal experience and is not a 
machine, but the (correct) arguments being made seem to me expressions, in 
various styles, of the non-fundamentality of matter and energy. Unless I am 
wrong, this is at least a still open question. Further, Terry's (again 
correct) statements about the importance of the Liar and Goedel paradoxes 
perhaps overlooks one aspect of them: they (the paradoxes) themselves are 
only relatively simple binary cases that can be considered reduced versions 
of some more fundamental, underlying princple governing relationships in the 
real, physical world. These relationships are crucial to an understanding of 
the non-binary properties of information.


A recent book by Tom Sparrow is entitled "The End of Phenomenology". It 
proposes a new science-free doctrine, Speculative Realism, to provide a link 
between phenomena and reality which in my opinion also fails, but may be of 
interest to some of you. I wrote about this doctrine:


As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of 
weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of 
concepts embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include 
an ontology of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the world, 
a logic of non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has reason and 
value, but excludes the possibility of a ground of existence which includes 
incoherence and contradiction.


All for now, for various reasons,

Best wishes,

Joseph


- Original Message - 
From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz" 

To: "Stanley N Salthe" 
Cc: "fis" 
Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 7:36 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Clarifying Posting



Dear Pedro,

Most of the discussion has centered about phenomenology in the sense of
Husserl. The topic is broader, however, and remains the foundation of the
engineering philosophy that has guided my career.

I have long advocated a phenomenological approach to biology as the only
way forward. I have devoted years to the phenomenological study of
ecosystems trophic exchange networks and have shown how hypothesis
falsification can be possible in abstraction of eliciting causes
.
I have gone so far as to propose an alternative metaphysics to
conventional mechanical/reductionist theory that followed from
phenomenological premises.


So I would submit that phenomenology is alive and well as a practical and
even quantitative tool in science. It's just that, as an engineer, I find
Husserl tough going. :)

Warm regards,
Bob

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