Dear Friends,
In this note, I would like to both thank Hans for our interim dialogue, from
which I have learned a good deal and share it with the rest of you. This ‘Best
Of’ covers the for me most important aspects of the differences between the
QBist anti-realist and the Logic in Reality (LIR) realist positions. It is
necessary to accept, of course, that both have something to say. Group A points
refer to theories of physics; Group B to their implications for information and
other cognitive issues.
A.
1. General. Anti-Realism vs. Realism
Anti-realists state basically that because we cannot have direct
knowledge of quantum entities and we cannot know what exists, although they
acknowledge the mind-independent external world. Realists state that the direct
knowledge we have of experience and of both quantum and non-quantum properties
enables us to know a great deal about what exists. LIR realists (assuming there
is more than one of them) state that one of those real properties that has not
been sufficiently taken into account is that of the dynamic interactions
between opposing elements at the chemical, biological, cognitive and social
levels of reality.
2. Standard and Non-Standard Probabilities
The Bayesian probabilities on which QBism is based are standard
ones which include 0 and 1. According to Hans, the authors he cites ‘strain’ to
include the limit of ‘1’ as a ‘fact’. Hans’ objections to changing to the LIR
view that for complex phenomena, the abstract limits of 0 and 1 should be
excluded is primarily that “we have been so thoroughly brainwashed that we
parse the world around us in terms of absolute certainties, i.e. of
probabilities 0 and1." This is exactly the doctrine that Logic in Reality
offers a chance to counter! LIR is a non-truth-functional logic of uncertainty,
of inconsistency that goes beyond the linguistic limitations of paraconsistent
logic.
Fuchs, Mermin and Shack said that the QBist position, that quantum states are
personal judgments of an agent, is an inevitable consequence of the subjective
view of probability. On the other hand, given its ability to remove the
longstanding paradoxes and absurdities that have plagued quantum foundations
for almost a century, one could invert the argument and maintain that QBism
provides a powerful validation of the personalist view of probability.
Actually, I also could 'invert my argument' and say that Logic in Reality and
its view of antagonism or opposition in nature provides a powerful validation
of the role of non-standard probabilities.
3. Specific Questions of Physics
Hans makes two points of physics which I believe are not
universally accepted. I would hope readers would comment on them:
- an electron is a mathematical point;
- the gravitational field exists in three dimensions only.
4. Electron Spin.
Further to the above, Hans and I agree that we are not talking
about ‘spinning’ like a top, but a duality of properties. As Lars-Göran puts it
“spin is a relational property, a relation between the particle and an external
magnetic field” and this relational property is a dualistic attribute of
reality, starting with the hydrogen atom that has the consequences we know for
the formation of molecules, etc. The difference between Hans and me is the
relative importance that I give to this property and to relational properties
in general (cf. the article by Laudisa and Rovelli in the Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, 2002)
5. Reality and Unobservables. The Quantum Field
It is of course true (the ‘Doubting Thomas’ argument) that no
direct experience of quantum fields is possible. We exist at another level of
reality. Thus my statement that my dynamic logic of and in reality is grounded
in quantum mechanics is misleading to the extent that it appears to require
that quantum particles have 'reality' and display non-locality. I don't need
that for LIR as such, but I believe that cross-theoretical reference to
unobservables allows us to talk meaningfully about properties and their causal
consequences (cf. Cao, T. Y. 1997. Conceptual Developments of 20th Century
Field Theories).
B.
1. Subject-Object Interactions
According to Hans, "the interaction between subject and object is a central
concept in QBism. It creates brand-new "facts" that did not pre-exist the
interaction. Thus we humans participate in tiny ways in the ongoing creation of
the world."
But the subject-object interaction is not new or exclusive to QBism. It is a
central concept in Logic in Reality! Something new can and does emerge from it,
so I agree with Hans on that. Where we disagree (for the time being?) is that I
do not consider the cognitive changes (new beliefs) resulting from the
interaction as different in kind from the elements involved in the interaction.
Further, the interaction follows the LIR principle of dynamic opposition that
states as one element of a complex process is primarily actualized, the other
is potentialized, alternately and reciprocally, without either ever going to
the limits of 0 or 1, and we can see this happening at macroscopic levels of
reality.
2. Social Constructivism
Stan Salthe deserves our heartfelt thanks for raising this social
issue, and I can agree with Hans’ rejection of it for QBism. But he appears
less categorical with regard to the Social Sciences. This is not good.
Anti-scientific attitudes anywhere lead to the catastrophes Hans refers to. In
fact this is the ‘worst’ thing about QBism, namely, that it implicitly gives
aid and support to a kind of anti-social anti-realism. Stan's comments on
epiphenomena are perfectly valid in the LIR process ontology.
3. Encoding of Experience
Hans writes that the QBism interpretation of quantum mechanics is a
very complex, abstract encoding of the experiences of generations of scientists
interacting with atomic systems. It disenfranchises a physicist from knowing
what an electron spin, for example, really is. Thing-ness resides in the real
external world that we both experience. But he no longer believes that he can
understand anything essential about it. All one can do is gather experiences
and to encode them in various abstract models in one’s mind (QM).
For me, as soon as the word ‘encoding’ is used, ‘abstract’ becomes
redundant. The issue is not that QBism as such, but that it appears to exclude
alternative ways of understanding essential non-abstract aspects of the world
in more human, and not just ‘personalist’ terms. There are some ways in which I
know my friend, to use Hans' example, better than a spoon.
Thanks and best wishes,
Joseph
----- Original Message -----
From: Stanley N Salthe
To: fis
Sent: Wednesday, January 08, 2014 4:55 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Social constructivism
In my last posting for the week, I Reply to Hans --
QBism does not change any of the impressive successes of quantum mechanics. It
simply says that quantum mechanics is a very complex, abstract encoding of the
experiences of generations of scientists interacting with atomic systems.
S: These generations of “scientists” are a subsystem of society as a whole.
They influence each other via language and other social constructions,
including theories and machines. Through them, it is society that observes the
micro activities occurring with the experimental machinery. ‘Proof’? -- each
individual could be replaced by another using the same social tools (including
education).
It disenfranchises a physicist from knowing what an electron spin, for example,
REALLY is, while celebrating her ability to predict correctly, albeit
probabilistically, what to expect in the next experiment. She and her
predecessors have created an abstract model, and validated it by appeal to
experiments, without appeal to any of the other considerations listed above
S: So QM, via QBism, is meaningless! Is this an achievement? -- to render
meaningless the activities within the socially-constructed machinery guided by
the socially-constructed theories?
In conversation with Joseph Brenner and others I have used the rainbow as a
metaphor. The rainbow is a phenomenon that everyone experiences slightly
differently, but that we all agree on.
S: I would say that it is a biologically-constructed epiphenomenon.
The scientific model that "explains" it is very complicated and highly
abstract. Is the rainbow "real"? It certainly does not exist when nobody is
looking. It is, in the end, a personal experience. For me the experience is
enhanced considerably by my understanding of the scientific model of it,
because it allows me to look for and discover details I had never noticed, but
I would not presume to say I know what YOUR experience of it is. Maybe you are
thinking of Iris or Noah, and feeling awe or curiosity, and remarking on its
(apparently) immense size and variable brightness.
S: But it’s physical interpretation, from the QBist perspective, is of no
interest as such.
QBism suggests that we look at the world as consisting of rainbows -- an
ensemble of complex phenomena about which we know some things, but whose
essences we cannot capture. The QBist says: I don't know what the world is.
All I know is what I experience in my interactions with the world, as they are
illuminated and modified by what I have learned from other people,
past and present, who have had similar experiences and encoded them in the
succinct language of mathematics.
S: That is, our experiences are socially conditioned biological constructs. In
this view physics becomes the theoretical basis for constructing the QM
machinery, which will display an epiphenomenon.
STAN
Hans
On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 6:52 PM, Hans von Baeyer <henrikrit...@gmail.com> wrote:
Stan asks: Would we be justified in viewing QBism the latest venture of
[social] constructivism?
WOW, I sure hope not! While it is true that there are fads in science, and
that the direction of research is influenced to some degree by the society that
funds it and consumes its fruits, I think that the underlying methodology
distinguishes socially constructed models of reality from scientific ones.
Social constructions use arguments that play no role in any account of the
scientific method as it applies to the Natural Sciences (as opposed to the
Social Sciences).
Some examples: Deutsche Physik referred to the ethnicity of scientists,
Lysenkoism adduced ideological goals; Creationism appeals to scripture;
Feminist Science Studies consider the gender of scientists.
QBism does not change any of the impressive successes of quantum mechanics.
It simply says that quantum mechanics is a very complex, abstract encoding of
the experiences of generations of scientists interacting with atomic systems.
It disenfranchises a physicist from knowing what an electron spin, for example,
REALLY is, while celebrating her ability to predict correctly, albeit
probabilistically, what to expect in the next experiment. She and her
predecessors have created an abstract model, and validated it by appeal to
experiments, without appeal to any of the other considerations listed above.
In conversation with Joseph Brenner and others I have used the rainbow as a
metaphor. The rainbow is a phenomenon that everyone experiences slightly
differently, but that we all agree on. The scientific model that "explains" it
is very complicated and highly abstract. Is the rainbow "real"? It certainly
does not exist when nobody is looking. It is, in the end, a personal
experience. For me the experience is enhanced considerably by my understanding
of the scientific model of it, because it allows me to look for and discover
details I had never noticed, but I would not presume to say I know what YOUR
experience of it is. Maybe you are thinking of Iris or Noah, and feeling awe
or curiosity, and remarking on its (apparently) immense size and variable
brightness.
QBism suggests that we look at the world as consisting of rainbows -- an
ensemble of complex phenomena about which we know some things, but whose
essences we cannot capture. The QBist says: I don't know what the world is.
All I know is what I experience in my interactions with the world, as they are
illuminated and modified by what I have learned from other people, past and
present, who have had similar experiences and encoded them in the succinct
language of mathematics.
Hans
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