Dear Colleagues,
During activity of Infos’ consciousness, reflections are combined and as a
result the new ones may be created and stored in the Infos memory.
Processing of some reflections may cause some activity, too.
In other words, it doesn't matter what kind of Infos is active – the result is
the same!
INFORMATION IS PROCESSING the reflections that has as final result an activity
or new reflections.
Usually, the results of such processing are called “Information”.
Of course, to be active means to be real (material, physical) and to have
energy for processing.
To store reflections, material objects are needed, i.e. “carriers”.
This is the main interconnection between mater, energy, and information.
No Information exist anywhere – only reflections – REAL, PHYSICAL REFLECTIONS!
Reflections in real, physical objects, including living creatures.
Including Brain!
Main difference between living and not living mater is possibility for
processing of reflections.
Of course, many levels of such processing exist.
Maybe, the most complex is the social one.
Maybe, the simplest one is in the cells...
Could the Machine process reflections? Still no answer ...
But the Computer can!
"That's All Folks!"
Friendly greetings
Krassimir
From: Karl Javorszky
Sent: Friday, May 11, 2018 1:20 PM
To: Arturo Tozzi
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?
Dear Arturo,
There were some reports in clinical psychology, about 30 years ago, that relate
to the question whether a machine can pretend to be a therapist. That was the
time as computers could newly be used in an interactive fashion, and the Rogers
techniques were a current discovery.
(Rogers developed a dialogue method where one does not address the contents of
what the patient says, but rather the emotional aspects of the message, assumed
to be at work in the patient.)
They then said, that in some cases it was indistinguishable, whether a human or
a machine provides the answer to a patient's elucidations.
Progress since then has surely made possible to create machines that are
indistinguishable in interaction to humans. Indeed, what is called "expert
systems ", are widely used in many fields. If the interaction is rational,
that is: formally equivalent to a logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, the
difference in: "who arrived at this answer, machinery or a human", becomes
irrelevant.
Artistry, intuition, creativity are presently seen as not possible to translate
into Wittgenstein sentences. Maybe the inner instincts are not yet well
understood. But!: there are some who are busily undermining the current
fundamentals of rational thinking. So there is hope that we shall live to
experience the ultimate disillusionment, namely that humans are a
combinatorial tautology.
Accordingly, may I respectfully express opposing views to what you state: that
machines and humans are of incompatible builds. There are hints that as far as
rational capabilities go, the same principles apply. There is a rest, you say,
which is not of this kind. The counter argument says that irrational processes
do not take place in organisms, therefore what you refer to belongs to the main
process, maybe like waste belongs to the organism's principle. This view draws
a picture of a functional biotope, in which the waste of one kind of organism
is raw material for a different kind.
Karl
<tozziart...@libero.it> schrieb am Do., 10. Mai 2018 15:24:
Dear Bruno,
You state:
"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e.
“physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of
description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any
change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the
brain/body at that level of description".
The problem of your account is the following:
You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS".
Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested and
it is not empirically testable. You are starting with a sort of postulate: I,
and other people, do not agree with it. The current neuroscience does not
state that our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) a digital machine.
In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not exist
in our real world. Here your entire building falls down.
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be:
(This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend it,
with minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my first
comment to Mark Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”.
Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues,
Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my new
computer classifies them in some mysterious way!
This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at the
end of the week.
On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark <mbur...@math.ucla.edu> wrote:
Dear Colleagues,
I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion
Is information physical?
That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on.
My result here is that
IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science,
THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e.
“physical” becomes a mathematical notion.
The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from
Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use “reality” instead of “model"
(logician’s term, because physicists use “model" for “theory").
Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of
description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any
change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the
brain/body at that level of description.
Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all
physical objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology. Physics is
reduced to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any Turing-complete machinery.
Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of arithmetic) is
Turing complete (Turing Universal).
The basic idea is that:
1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an
arithmetical reality or by a physical reality. And,
2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are
necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its continuations emulated in
arithmetic.
That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to my
actual state, and see from some first person points of view (something I can
describe more precisely in some future post perhaps).
Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, we
cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s incompleteness can be used to
recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, like Peano
arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction between first and
third person views (and six others!).
I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this
(including the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago. I was about
sure this would refute Mechanism, until I learned about quantum mechanics,
which verifies all the most startling predictions of Indexical Mechanism,
unless we add the controversial wave collapse reduction principle.
The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many
computations (up to some equivalence quotient). The weird indeterminacy becomes
the simpler amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter becomes obvious:
as any piece of matter is the result of the first person indeterminacy (the
first person view of the amoeba undergoing a duplication, …) on infinitely many
computations. This entails also that neither matter appearance nor
consciousness are Turing emulable per se, as the whole arithmetical
reality—which is a highly non computable notion as we know since Gödel—plays a
key role. Note this makes Digital Physics leaning to inconsistency, as it
implies indexical computationalism which implies the negation of Digital
Physics (unless my “body” is the entire physical universe, which I rather
doubt).
My opinion is presented below:
Why some people erroneously think that information is physical
The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong
belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is only physical
reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, people encounter
something that they call information.
When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information
because with the letter they receive information. The letter is physical, i.e.,
a physical object. As a result, people start thinking that information is
physical. When people receive an e-mail, they comprehend that it is information
because with the e-mail they receive information. The e-mail comes to the
computer in the form of electromagnetic waves, which are physical. As a result,
people start thinking even more that information is physical.
However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical
objects are only carriers or containers of information.
To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to
say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that the
textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way, the
textbook contains information but is not information itself. The same is true
for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical objects because
all of them only contain information but are not information. For instance, as
we know, different letters can contain the same information. Even if we make an
identical copy of a letter or any other text, then the letter and its copy will
be different physical objects (physical things) but they will contain the same
information.
Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge,
data and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on physical
objects (physical bodies) and this action also misleads people who think that
information is physical.
OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how immaterial or non physical
objects can alter the physical realm. It is the usual problem faced by dualist
ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we recover many dualities, but they
belong to the phenomenologies.
One more misleading property of information is that people can measure
it. This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure only
physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous conclusion
that information is physical. However, measuring information is essentially
different than measuring physical quantities, i.e., weight. There are no
“scales” that measure information. Only human intellect can do this.
OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he human one.
Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is always a form of the
“knocking table” argument. They knocks on the table and say “you will not tell
me that this table is unreal”.
I have got so many people giving me that argument, that I have made dreams
in which I made that argument, or even where I was convinced by that argument …
until I wake up.
When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this “dream argument”
illustrates that seeing, measuring, … cannot prove anything ontological. A
subjective experience proves only the phenomenological existence of
consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that although there are plenty of
strong evidences for a material reality, there are no evidences (yet) for a
primitive or primary matter (and that is why, I think, Aristotle assumes it
quasi explicitly, against Plato, and plausibly against Pythagorus).
Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the worlds of ideas is the
world of programs, or information, or even just numbers, since very elementary
arithmetic (PA without induction, + the predecessor axiom) is already Turing
complete (it contains what I have named a Universal Dovetailer: a program which
generates *and* executes all programs).
So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim that if we assume
Mechanism (Indexical computationalism) matter itself is also not *primarily*
physical: it is all in the “head of the universal machine/number” (so to speak).
And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough to find if there
is a discrepancy between the physics that we infer from the observation, and
the physics that we extract from “the head” of the machine. This took me more
than 30 years of work, but the results obtained up to now is that there is no
discrepancies. I have compared the quantum logic imposed by incompleteness
(formally) on the semi-computable (partial recursive, sigma_1) propositions,
with most quantum logics given by physicists, and it fits rather well.
Best regards,
Bruno
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