Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

2018-04-28 Thread Loet Leydesdorff

Dear colleagues,

Not only logic, but also language is not directly and one-to-one coupled 
to physics. The hidden positivism of claiming priority for physics by 
some of us, is at odds with the linguistic turn in the philosophy of 
science. Furthermore, the issue is not directly related to the 
definition of information as probablistic entropy or otherwise.


I agree with most of what Lou Kauffman said, but:

We come to investigate both reason and physicality through each other 
and our ability to sense and feel.
Sensing and feeling and measurement are our terms for those places 
where concept and the physical arise together in our perception.
The emphasis in the above remains on the individual sensing and feeling, 
mediated by measurement. However, scientific observation is not such 
immediate feeling, but careful and discursively constructed 
articulations of expectations which are tested against observations. The 
cocon of language (a la Maturana) is opened at specific places which are 
carefully reasoned. The feelings do enter only after having been 
articulated into observational reports. The latter contain knowledge 
claims which are validated discursively. No escape! The observations 
enable us to improve the codification in the specialist language 
(jargon).


Physics is part of this edifice of science. It has no privileged access 
to reality, but constructs its own reality. Nobody senses the particles 
at CERN. The observational reports are readings from an instrument which 
have to be discussed before one can interpret.


If any science can claim priority, it is communication studies. The 
specialist languages are shaped in processes of communication. How does 
this work? Can it be improved?


Best,
Loet




5. Beyond those places where significant related pairs of opposites 
that cannot be separated (complementarities) occur there is our (in at 
least my tradition)

personal reality of unity — whereof nothing can be said.
6. We cannot sever philosophy and logic and reason from science, AND 
for science we must open to the largest possible access to precision 
and understanding.

Best,
Lou


On Apr 27, 2018, at 4:38 AM, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:

Dear Bruno,
You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of 
anything physical".
I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more 
untestable, metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.


Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and quantifiable, 
otherwise we are doing philosophy and logic, not science!  Even if 
information is (as many FISers suggest) at least in part not physical, 
we NEED to focus just on the testable part, i.e., the physical one.  
And, even if physics does not exist, as Bruno states, at least it 
gives me something quantifiable and useful for my pragmatic purposes.
Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally 
untestable, but very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific 
standpoint?
If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is 
fashinating, but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.


--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android

venerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal 
marc...@ulb.ac.be:



Hi Lou, Colleagues,



On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman  wrote:

Dear Krassimir and Mark,
Let us not forget the intermediate question:
How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the 
problem of assigning existence to that which is relational.


The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. 
Does the number 2 exist without any couples?
The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { 
}, {{}} } in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that
a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 
correspondence with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we 
do not have to
assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — 
to take two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating 
intellectual move, but
I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two 
in such a way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems 
and outside of the physical
except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism 
and linked with the apparent physical.


And let us not forget the other question.
What is "the physical”?
What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing 
(and generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation 
is an extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, 
however

attractive or repelling it may seem.



Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in 
metaphysics, and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle 
and even more by its followers.


What can be shown, is 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

2018-04-27 Thread Louis H Kauffman
Dear Folks,
I suspect I am past quota for the week. Apologies for that.
1. Work in logic and mathematics is scientific even if mathematicians and 
logicians sometimes deny being scientists.
2. Exact work is logical work coupled with precise and repeatable methods of 
measurement.
3. The point about mathematics and logic is that it is independent of the 
substrate on which it is apparently performed. 
This is what I mean by statements such as “all computations exist independently 
of the existence of anything physical”.
You may say, yes, but computations or reasonings cannot occur without some 
substrate!
I almost agree, but point out to you that since you use reasoning, concept and 
observation to conjecture and verify the properties of substrates 
(physical or even conceptual) there is a circularity here.
4. We come to know substrates such as physicality through reason and 
measurement.
We come to know reason and measurement through the support of our physical and 
biological substrates.
We come to investigate both reason and physicality through each other and our 
ability to sense and feel.
Sensing and feeling and measurement are our terms for those places where 
concept and the physical arise together in our perception.
5. Beyond those places where significant related pairs of opposites that cannot 
be separated (complementarities) occur there is our (in at least my tradition)
personal reality of unity — whereof nothing can be said. 
6. We cannot sever philosophy and logic and reason from science, AND for 
science we must open to the largest possible access to precision and 
understanding.
Best,
Lou

> On Apr 27, 2018, at 4:38 AM, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
> 
> Dear Bruno, 
> You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of 
> anything physical".
> I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more untestable, 
> metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.  
> 
> Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and quantifiable, 
> otherwise we are doing philosophy and logic, not science!  Even if 
> information is (as many FISers suggest) at least in part not physical, we 
> NEED to focus just on the testable part, i.e., the physical one.  And, even 
> if physics does not exist, as Bruno states, at least it gives me something 
> quantifiable and useful for my pragmatic purposes.
> Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally untestable, 
> but very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific standpoint?
> If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is 
> fashinating, but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.  
> 
> --
> Inviato da Libero Mail per Android
> 
> venerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be 
> :
> 
> Hi Lou, Colleagues,
> 
> 
>> On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman > > wrote:
>> 
>> Dear Krassimir and Mark,
>> Let us not forget the intermediate question:
>> How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
>> This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of 
>> assigning existence to that which is relational.
>> 
>> The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does 
>> the number 2 exist without any couples?
>> The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}} 
>> } in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that 
>> a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence 
>> with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to 
>> assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take 
>> two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual 
>> move, but
>> I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in such 
>> a way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of 
>> the physical
>> except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked 
>> with the apparent physical.
>> 
>> And let us not forget the other question.
>> What is "the physical”?
>> What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and 
>> generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
>> To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an 
>> extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
>> attractive or repelling it may seem.
> 
> 
> Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in metaphysics, 
> and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle and even more by its 
> followers. 
> 
> What can be shown, is that if we assume Digital Mechanism in the cognitive 
> science, then the physical cannot be ontological, and physics has to be 
> reduced to the psychology, or better the theology of the digital machine. My 
> contribution shows this testable, and the physical observations, up to now,  
> favour 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

2018-04-27 Thread tozziarturo

Dear Bruno, 
You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of anything 
physical".
I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more untestable, 
metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.  
Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and quantifiable, 
otherwise we are doing philosophy and logic, not science!  Even if information 
is (as many FISers suggest) at least in part not physical, we NEED to focus 
just on the testable part, i.e., the physical one.  And, even if physics does 
not exist, as Bruno states, at least it gives me something quantifiable and 
useful for my pragmatic purposes.
Even if information is something subjective in my mind (totally untestable, but 
very popular claim) who cares, by a scientific standpoint?
If I say that Julius Caesar was killed by an alien, the theory is fashinating, 
but useless, unless I provide proofs or testable clues.  
--
Inviato da Libero Mail per Android venerdì, 27 aprile 2018, 10:10AM +02:00 da 
Bruno Marchal  marc...@ulb.ac.be :

>Hi Lou, Colleagues,
>
>
>>On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman < kauff...@uic.edu > wrote:
>>Dear Krassimir and Mark,
>>Let us not forget the intermediate question:
>>How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
>>This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of 
>>assigning existence to that which is relational.
>>
>>The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does the 
>>number 2 exist without any couples?
>>The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}} } 
>>in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that 
>>a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence 
>>with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to 
>>assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take 
>>two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual move, 
>>but
>>I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in such a 
>>way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of the 
>>physical
>>except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked 
>>with the apparent physical.
>>
>>And let us not forget the other question.
>>What is "the physical”?
>>What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and 
>>generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
>>To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an 
>>extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
>>attractive or repelling it may seem.
>
>
>Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in metaphysics, 
>and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle and even more by its 
>followers. 
>
>What can be shown, is that if we assume Digital Mechanism in the cognitive 
>science, then the physical cannot be ontological, and physics has to be 
>reduced to the psychology, or better the theology of the digital machine. My 
>contribution shows this testable, and the physical observations, up to now,  
>favour the non existence of primary matter (as amazing and counter-intuive 
>this could seem).
>
>What many people seem to miss is that the notion of universal machine and the 
>notion of computations (Turing, Post, Church, Kleene) are purely arithmetical 
>notion. Anyone who is able to believe that (3^3) + (4^3) + (5^3) = (6^3) is 
>necessarily either true or false even without verifying which it is, should be 
>able to understand that all computations exists independently of the existence 
>of anything physical, and then a reasoning can show that it is easier to 
>explain the illusion of an otological matter to complex number relation, than 
>to explain the numbers in term of complex relation between primary matter. In 
>fact it is impossible, and the notion of primary matter adds unnecessary 
>insuperable difficulties in the “mind-body” problem.
>
>Now, Landauer, and others, have given some evidence that some notion of 
>information is physical (like quantum information). That does not contradict 
>the idea that information is not physical. The illusion of physical 
>appearances is real, obeys laws, and physics is eventually reduced into an 
>internal statistics on all computations in arithmetic, and that can explain 
>some special form of physical information (and indeed the quantum one is 
>already explained in some testable way).
>
>The origin of information comes from the fact that aTuring machine cannot 
>distinguish the physical reality from the arithmetical reality (which emulates 
>all computations) except by observation. The machines are distributed in 
>infinitely many exemplars in arithmetic, and that defines a sort of indexical 
>differentiating consciousness flux, leading to (collective) sharable deep 
>dreams which we call the physical.
>
>Now, all this is long to explain, and I’m afraid this can look 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

2018-04-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Lou, Colleagues,


> On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman  wrote:
> 
> Dear Krassimir and Mark,
> Let us not forget the intermediate question:
> How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
> This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of 
> assigning existence to that which is relational.
> 
> The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does the 
> number 2 exist without any couples?
> The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}} } 
> in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that 
> a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence 
> with the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to 
> assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take 
> two to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual move, 
> but
> I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in such a 
> way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of the 
> physical
> except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked 
> with the apparent physical.
> 
> And let us not forget the other question.
> What is "the physical”?
> What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and 
> generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
> To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an 
> extra assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
> attractive or repelling it may seem.


Indeed, the existence of a physical ontology is an hypothesis in metaphysics, 
and not in physics. It was brought mainly by Aristotle and even more by its 
followers. 

What can be shown, is that if we assume Digital Mechanism in the cognitive 
science, then the physical cannot be ontological, and physics has to be reduced 
to the psychology, or better the theology of the digital machine. My 
contribution shows this testable, and the physical observations, up to now,  
favour the non existence of primary matter (as amazing and counter-intuive this 
could seem).

What many people seem to miss is that the notion of universal machine and the 
notion of computations (Turing, Post, Church, Kleene) are purely arithmetical 
notion. Anyone who is able to believe that (3^3) + (4^3) + (5^3) = (6^3) is 
necessarily either true or false even without verifying which it is, should be 
able to understand that all computations exists independently of the existence 
of anything physical, and then a reasoning can show that it is easier to 
explain the illusion of an otological matter to complex number relation, than 
to explain the numbers in term of complex relation between primary matter. In 
fact it is impossible, and the notion of primary matter adds unnecessary 
insuperable difficulties in the “mind-body” problem.

Now, Landauer, and others, have given some evidence that some notion of 
information is physical (like quantum information). That does not contradict 
the idea that information is not physical. The illusion of physical appearances 
is real, obeys laws, and physics is eventually reduced into an internal 
statistics on all computations in arithmetic, and that can explain some special 
form of physical information (and indeed the quantum one is already explained 
in some testable way).

The origin of information comes from the fact that aTuring machine cannot 
distinguish the physical reality from the arithmetical reality (which emulates 
all computations) except by observation. The machines are distributed in 
infinitely many exemplars in arithmetic, and that defines a sort of indexical 
differentiating consciousness flux, leading to (collective) sharable deep 
dreams which we call the physical.

Now, all this is long to explain, and I’m afraid this can look too much 
provocative, if I do not add the proofs and much more explanations. People can 
consult my papers, but needs to study a bit of mathematical logic.

Physicalism/materialism is a long lasting habit of thought, and, as I have 
experienced my whole life, some materialist defend the dogma with more 
integrism and violence than some (pseudo)-religious radicals in history. 

Once we assume mechanism, all we need to assume to get both mind and matter is 
*any* universal machine or machinery, and then the usual platonic 
epistemological definitions can be used (but they can also be motivated through 
some thought experience). 
For the universal machinery, I use (very) elementary arithmetic, because 
everyone is familiar with them, and can accept that “17 is prime” is true 
independently of them, which would not be the case with ((K K) K) = K in 
combinators theory (generally not known). But we can derive arithmetic, and the 
physical dreams from just very small theories, like

((K x) y) = x
(((S x) y) z) = ((x z) (y z))

(Axioms of the SK-combinators: that is Turing 

Re: [Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

2018-04-25 Thread Louis H Kauffman
Dear Krassimir and Mark,
Let us not forget the intermediate question:
How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the problem of 
assigning existence to that which is relational.

The same problem exists for numbers and other mathematical entities. Does the 
number 2 exist without any couples?
The mathematical answer is to construct a standard couple (e.g. { { }, {{}} } 
in set theory or two marks || in formalism) and say that 
a collection has cardinality two if it can be placed in 1-1 correspondence with 
the standard couple. In this way of speaking we do not have to 
assign an existence to two as a noun. The Russelian alternative  — to take two 
to be the collection of all couples — is a fascinating intellectual move, but
I prefer to avoid it by not having to speak of the existence of two in such a 
way. Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of the 
physical
except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked 
with the apparent physical.

And let us not forget the other question.
What is "the physical”?
What we take to be physical arises as a relation between our sensing (and 
generalized sensing) and our ability to form concepts.
To imagine that the “physical” exists independent of that relation is an extra 
assumption that is not necessary for scientific work, however
attractive or repelling it may seem.
Best,
Lou Kauffman
P.S. With this letter, I reach my quota for the week and will remain silent 
until next Monday.
If anyone wants a private email conversation, I shall be happy to carry on in 
that fashion.


> On Apr 25, 2018, at 2:20 AM, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
> 
> Dear Mark and Colleagues,
> 
>  
> Very nice “simple question”:  “Is information physical?”
> 
> I agree that “letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical 
> objects are only carriers of information”.
> 
> The brain is carrier of information, too. 
> 
>  
> Now, I think, what we need to clear is another “simple question” closely 
> interrelated to yours:
> 
>  
> Does the information exist without the carrier?
> 
>  
> In other words, can the color, speed, weigh, temperature, time, etc., exist 
> without objects which these characteristics belong to and may be measured by 
> other objects. 
> 
> To understand more clearly, let see the case of “time”.
> 
> Does the time really exist?
> 
> Does the time exist without real regular processes which we may reflect and 
> compare?
> 
> The time is falling drops of water, the movement of the pendulum, etc.
> 
> One may say, the time is information about all these processes.
> 
> OK! But, if these processes do not exist, will we have “time”?
> 
>  
> I think, we have a question in two interrelated explanations: 
> 
> - Is information physical?
> 
> - Does the information exist without the carrier?
> 
>  
> Friendly greetings
> 
> Krassimir
> 
>
> From: Burgin, Mark 
> the movement of the pendulum
> 
> falling drops of water
> 
> Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 4:47 AM
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es 
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical?
>  
> Dear Colleagues,
> I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion
>   Is information physical?
> My opinion is presented below:
> 
>Why some people erroneously think that information is physical
>
>The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong belief 
> of many people, especially, scientists that there is only physical reality, 
> which is studied by science. At the same time, people encounter something 
> that they call information.
>When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information 
> because with the letter they receive information. The letter is physical, 
> i.e., a physical object. As a result, people start thinking that information 
> is physical. When people receive an e-mail, they comprehend that it is 
> information because with the e-mail they receive information. The e-mail 
> comes to the computer in the form of electromagnetic waves, which are 
> physical. As a result, people start thinking even more that information is 
> physical.
>However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical objects 
> are only carriers or containers of information.
>To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to say 
> that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that the 
> textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way, the 
> textbook contains information but is not information itself. The same is true 
> for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical objects 
> because all of them only contain information but are not information. For 
> instance, as we know, different letters can contain the same information. 
> Even if we make an identical copy 

[Fis] Is information physical? OR Does the information exist without the carrier?

2018-04-25 Thread Krassimir Markov
Dear Mark and Colleagues,



Very nice “simple question”:  “Is information physical?”

I agree that “letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical objects 
are only carriers of information”.

The brain is carrier of information, too. 



Now, I think, what we need to clear is another “simple question” closely 
interrelated to yours:



Does the information exist without the carrier?



In other words, can the color, speed, weigh, temperature, time, etc., exist 
without objects which these characteristics belong to and may be measured by 
other objects. 

To understand more clearly, let see the case of “time”.

Does the time really exist?

Does the time exist without real regular processes which we may reflect and 
compare?

The time is falling drops of water, the movement of the pendulum, etc.

One may say, the time is information about all these processes.

OK! But, if these processes do not exist, will we have “time”?



I think, we have a question in two interrelated explanations: 

- Is information physical?

- Does the information exist without the carrier?



Friendly greetings

Krassimir

From: Burgin, Mark 
the movement of the pendulum

falling drops of water

Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2018 4:47 AM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es 
Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical?

Dear Colleagues,

I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion

  Is information physical?


My opinion is presented below:



   Why some people erroneously think that information is physical

   

   The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong belief 
of many people, especially, scientists that there is only physical reality, 
which is studied by science. At the same time, people encounter something that 
they call information.

   When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information because 
with the letter they receive information. The letter is physical, i.e., a 
physical object. As a result, people start thinking that information is 
physical. When people receive an e-mail, they comprehend that it is information 
because with the e-mail they receive information. The e-mail comes to the 
computer in the form of electromagnetic waves, which are physical. As a result, 
people start thinking even more that information is physical.

   However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical objects 
are only carriers or containers of information.

   To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to say 
that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that the textbook 
contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way, the textbook 
contains information but is not information itself. The same is true for 
letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical objects because all 
of them only contain information but are not information. For instance, as we 
know, different letters can contain the same information. Even if we make an 
identical copy of a letter or any other text, then the letter and its copy will 
be different physical objects (physical things) but they will contain the same 
information.

   Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge, data 
and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on physical objects 
(physical bodies) and this action also misleads people who think that 
information is physical.

   One more misleading property of information is that people can measure it. 
This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure only 
physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous conclusion 
that information is physical. However, measuring information is essentially 
different than measuring physical quantities, i.e., weight. There are no 
“scales” that measure information. Only human intellect can do this.

   It is possible to find more explanations that information is not physical in 
the general theory of information. 

Sincerely,
Mark Burgin



On 4/24/2018 10:46 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

  Dear FIS Colleagues,

  A very interesting discussion theme has been proposed by Mark Burgin --he 
will post at his early convenience. 
  Thanks are due to Alberto for his "dataism" piece. Quite probably we will 
need to revisit that theme, as it is gaining increasing momentum in present 
"information societies", in science as well as in everyday life...
  Thanks also to Sung for his interesting viewpoint and references.

  Best wishes to all,
  --Pedro 


 
-
Pedro C. Marijuán
Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
- 
   Libre de virus. www.avast.com  


   

___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis