Re: [Fis] Let analyse: A TOPOLOGICAL/ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PERCEPTION
Dear Krassimir, first of all, thanks for reading all the paragraphs of our most difficult paper! We are grateful to you! Concerning the BUT (AND ITS NOVEL VARIANTS!) let's recapitulate: Every feature is embedded in a structure. The structure displays n-dimensions. We call this feature: single description. Single descriptions are points, or lines. Single descriptions are perimeters, or areas. Single descriptions are single points. Single descriptions are functions, or vectors, or tensors. Single descriptions are algorithms, or parameters. Single descriptions are spatial patterns, or images. An illumined surface is a single description. Single descriptions are groups, or range of data. Single descriptions are symbols, or signs. Single descriptions are temporal patterns, or movements. Single descriptions are particle trajectories, or paths. Single descriptions are syntactic, or semantic, constructions. Single descriptions are thermodynamic parameters, or signals. A region is single description. Single descriptions are strings. Single descriptions project onto a n+1 structure. Single descriptions stand for two descriptions with matching features on the n+1 structure. I call the two above matching features: matching description. What does it mean? This means that the BUT does not describe just POINTS with matching description, but COUNTLESS other types of matching descriptions! Therefore, it also describes a visual and an auditory inputs, if they come from the same environmental source (e.g., in the case of multisensory integration): this occurs for a MATHEMATICAL concept (not a qualitative, nor inaccurate, nor a metaphysical concept) coming from computational proximity, which is a branch of algebraic topology. -- Inviato da Libero Mail per Android sabato, 26 novembre 2016, 10:12PM +01:00 da Krassimir Markov mar...@foibg.com : >Dear Arturo, Gordana, Joseph, and FIS Colleagues, >The key to our current discussion I found in the newest work of Arturo (I have >read it before last letter of Arturo ): > >A TOPOLOGICAL/ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PERCEPTION >http://biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2016/11/11/086827.full.pdf >or >https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arturo_Tozzi/publication/310006296_A_TOPOLOGICALECOLOGICAL_APPROACH_TO_PERCEPTION/links/5827617808ae254c50832922.pdf?origin=publication_list > >What is important is that there exist a non correct using of the topological >theory (concretely the BUT). > >It is taken as an idea to explain the perception when different stimulus >create the same meaning in the consciousness. >See the example with ambulance of Figure 5a (visual and sound stimulus) which >is connected to the same meaning on Figure 5b (single point). > >But !!! > >BUT explicitly proof that (citation from the Arturo’s paper): > >BUT states that, if a single point on a circumference projects to a higher >spatial dimension, it gives rise to two antipodal points with matching >description on a sphere, and vice versa ( Figure 1A ) (Borsuk, 1933; >Marsaglia, 1972; Matoušek, 2003; Beyer, 2004). This means that the two >antipodal points are assessed at one level of observation in terms of >description, while a single point is assessed at a lower level (Tozzi 2016b), >i.e., point location vs. point description. Points on a sphere are >“antipodal”, provided they are diametrically opposite (Henderson, 1996). >Examples of antipodal points are the poles of a sphere. This means, e.g., >that there exist on the earth surface at least two antipodal points with the >same temperature and pressure . BUT looks like a translucent glass sphere >between a light source and our eyes: we watch two lights on the sphere surface >instead of one. But the two lights are not just images, they are also real >with observable properties, such as intensity and diameter. > >i.e. the antipodal points have the same characteristics !!! > >This is not valid for the sound and vision with the same meaning! > >Nevertheless, Arturo wrote very important conclusion (citation): >Gibson’s work strengthens and brings to the front the primary question of >“what” is perceived , before questions of mechanisms and material >implementation are introduced (Rao et al., 1997). > >Finally, I like the conclusion. My remark is to be more precise when we use >mathematical theoretical results. > >Friendly regards >Krassimir > > > > >From: Joseph Brenner >Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2016 10:05 PM >To: tozziart...@libero.it ; fis >Subject: Re: [Fis] Who may prove that consciousness is an Euclidean n-space??? > >Dear FISers, > >At the risk of attracting the anger of all the mathematicians in the group, I >will agree with Arturo, contra Krassimir. For a non-mathematician like me, a >description of complex dynamic processes such as consciousness and information >can be partly mathematical but need not involve proofs and their reduced logic. > >The question I have is whether the fiel
[Fis] Let analyse: A TOPOLOGICAL/ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PERCEPTION
Dear Arturo, Gordana, Joseph, and FIS Colleagues, The key to our current discussion I found in the newest work of Arturo (I have read it before last letter of Arturo ): A TOPOLOGICAL/ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PERCEPTION http://biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2016/11/11/086827.full.pdf or https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arturo_Tozzi/publication/310006296_A_TOPOLOGICALECOLOGICAL_APPROACH_TO_PERCEPTION/links/5827617808ae254c50832922.pdf?origin=publication_list What is important is that there exist a non correct using of the topological theory (concretely the BUT). It is taken as an idea to explain the perception when different stimulus create the same meaning in the consciousness. See the example with ambulance of Figure 5a (visual and sound stimulus) which is connected to the same meaning on Figure 5b (single point). But !!! BUT explicitly proof that (citation from the Arturo’s paper): BUT states that, if a single point on a circumference projects to a higher spatial dimension, it gives rise to two antipodal points with matching description on a sphere, and vice versa (Figure 1A) (Borsuk, 1933; Marsaglia, 1972; Matoušek, 2003; Beyer, 2004). This means that the two antipodal points are assessed at one level of observation in terms of description, while a single point is assessed at a lower level (Tozzi 2016b), i.e., point location vs. point description. Points on a sphere are “antipodal”, provided they are diametrically opposite (Henderson, 1996). Examples of antipodal points are the poles of a sphere. This means, e.g., that there exist on the earth surface at least two antipodal points with the same temperature and pressure. BUT looks like a translucent glass sphere between a light source and our eyes: we watch two lights on the sphere surface instead of one. But the two lights are not just images, they are also real with observable properties, such as intensity and diameter. i.e. the antipodal points have the same characteristics !!! This is not valid for the sound and vision with the same meaning! Nevertheless, Arturo wrote very important conclusion (citation): Gibson’s work strengthens and brings to the front the primary question of “what” is perceived, before questions of mechanisms and material implementation are introduced (Rao et al., 1997). Finally, I like the conclusion. My remark is to be more precise when we use mathematical theoretical results. Friendly regards Krassimir From: Joseph Brenner Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2016 10:05 PM To: tozziart...@libero.it ; fis Subject: Re: [Fis] Who may prove that consciousness is an Euclidean n-space??? Dear FISers, At the risk of attracting the anger of all the mathematicians in the group, I will agree with Arturo, contra Krassimir. For a non-mathematician like me, a description of complex dynamic processes such as consciousness and information can be partly mathematical but need not involve proofs and their reduced logic. The question I have is whether the field description is itself necessary and sufficient and if incomplete, what is missing. Perhaps it is my intuition that consciousness is both continuous and discontinuous, and so is its opposite, unconsciousness, which still involves high-level nervous functions. In my picture, antipodal points are of little relevance compared to the non-Euclidean multi-dimensionality of this dynamic opposition, moving between identity and diversity, presence and absence, clarity and vagueness, symmetry and dissymetry, within the same high overall energy level. In any case, perhaps we can agree that everything that is moving here is information! Thank you and best wishes, Joseph - Original Message - From: tozziart...@libero.it To: fis Sent: Saturday, November 26, 2016 7:06 PM Subject: Re: [Fis] Who may prove that consciousness is an Euclidean n-space ??? Dear Krassimir, Thanks a lot for your question, now the discussion will become hotter! First of all, we never stated that consciousness lies either on a n-sphere or on an Euclidean n-space. Indeed, in our framework, consciousness IS the continuous function. Such function stands for a gauge field that restores the brain symmetries, broken by sensations. Concerning brain and gauge fields, see my PLOS biology paper: http://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.1002400 When consciousness lacks, the inter-dimensional projections are broken, and the nervous higher functions temporarily disappear. Concerning the question about which are the manifolds where brain functions lie, it does not matter whether they are spheres, or circles, or concave, or flat structures: we demonstrated that the BUT is valid not just for convex manifolds, but for all the kinds of manifolds. See our: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jnr.23720/abstract?userIsAuthenticated=false&deniedAccessCustomisedMessage= Therefore, even if
