Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? (R.Capurro)

2015-05-19 Thread Loet Leydesdorff
Dear colleagues, 

 

For the measurement of interdisciplinarity, one can use, for example,
Rao-Stirling diversity which is defined as follows (Rao, 1982; Stirling,
2007): 

 

Δ = Σij pi pj dij   (1)

 

where dij is a disparity measure between two classes i and j-the categories
are in the case below journals-and pi is the proportion of elements assigned
to each class i. As the disparity measure, we use the distances on an
aggregated journal-journal citation map (Leydesdorff, Heimeriks,  Rotolo,
in press; Leydesdorff, Rafols,  Chen, 2013). 

 

For example, 23 publications can be retrieved as of today with the search
string au=Marijuan P* at WoS. The journal map is as follows: 

 

cid:image001.gif@01D09216.E78CE210

 

and the Rao-Stirling diversity (interdisciplinarity) of this set is 01282.

 

If I repeat the analysis with the search string au=leydesdorff l*, I
retrieve 270 documents; Rao-Stirling diversity is 0.0805.

 

 

cid:image002.gif@01D09216.E78CE210

 

In other words, Leydesdorff is more prolific than Marijuan in terms of WoS
publications, but Marijuan's portfolio is more interdisciplinary than
Leydesdorff's. 

 

One finds the relevant software at
http://www.leydesdorff.net/portfolio/index.htm 

Reference:

Leydesdorff, L., Heimeriks, G.,  Rotolo, D. (2015 (in press)). Journal
Portfolio Analysis for Countries, Cities, and Organizations: Maps and
Comparisons http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.05676 . Journal of the Association
for Information Science and Technology. 



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Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? (R.Capurro)

2015-05-19 Thread Francesco Rizzo
Cari Tutti,
 secondo l'esordio di questo nuovo tema di discussione e riflessione mi
verrebbe di scrivere: E' l'economia bellezza!. Difatti la mia Nuova
economia è una inter-mediatrice di tutte le scienze perché congiunge
l'astrattezza filosofica e la concretezza empirica con un resiliente
impegno metodologico di tipo popperiano in-centrato su problemi, ipotesi,
teorie, critiche.. Ciò premesso nell'agosto 1997 ho elaborato il capitolo
11 K. R. Popper dal neo-positivismo al post-positivismo o 'razionalismo
critico': la dimensione trina dell'esistenza e del sapere (economico) di
Valore e valutazioni (FrancoAngeli Milano, 1999, pp. 219-242) che
confronta tre modelli nel seguente modo:
a) il mio processo di tras-informazione ha come input o immissioni,
materia, energia e informazione e come output o emissioni  ancora materia,
energia e informazione, ma in uno stato diverso; in estrema sintesi
questa è l'attività o teoria economica basata su un triangolo di tre
surplus;
b) Popper e John C. Eccles formulano (soprattutto il primo) ed esplicitano
(soprattutto il secondo) il Mondo 1 (Oggetti e Stati fisici inorganici,
biologici e fatti dall'uomo; Mondo 2 (Stati di Coscienza: Conoscenza
soggettiva attraverso l'Esperienza di percezione, pensiero, emozioni,
propositi, memorie, sogni immaginazione creativa); Mondo 3 (Conoscenza in
Senso Oggettivo: Testimonianze di imprese intellettuali filosofiche,
teologiche, scientifiche, storiche, letterarie, artistiche, tecnologiche;
Sistemi teoretici: problemi scientifici, argomentazioni, critiche);
c) G. Bugliarello, tecnologo di New York, nel 1991 ha introdotto il
concetto-unità di Bio-So-Ma (comprendente le entità biologiche, sociali e
tecnologiche) in relazione alla materia (società pre-industriale),
all'energia (società industriale) e all'informazione (società
post-industriale).
In questo stesso capitolo 11 ho criticato ( e proposto emendamenti de) i
tre Mondi di Popper così come sono stati esplicitati da Eccles. Tuttavia,
con una larga approssimazione metodologica, questi tre modelli com-provano
l'armonia meravigliosa che governa il mondo, quindi a mio parere, le stesse
eventuali  differenze o diversità non fanno altro che rafforzare una certa
UNITA' di fondo tra tutti i problemi dell'esistenza e tutte le teoria della
conoscenza.
La mia Nuova economia, da circa 50 anni ri-comprende, ri-significa e
re-interpreta la scienza economica tradizionale che ha ha fatto tante
scelte pratiche e teoriche sbagliate da farsi perdonare: compresa la crisi
economico-finanziaria, ecologica ed umana che  ancora imperversa nel mondo
globalizzato.
Chiedo scusa se sono stato più lungo del solito. Un doppio grazie.
Un saluto
Francesco Rizzo


2015-05-19 9:34 GMT+02:00 Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net:

 Dear colleagues,



 For the measurement of interdisciplinarity, one can use, for example,
 Rao-Stirling diversity which is defined as follows (Rao, 1982; Stirling,
 2007):



 Δ = Σij pi pj dij   (1)



 where *dij *is a disparity measure between two classes *i *and *j*—the
 categories are in the case below journals—and *pi *is the proportion of
 elements assigned to each class *i*. As the disparity measure, we use the
 distances on an aggregated journal-journal citation map (Leydesdorff,
 Heimeriks,  Rotolo, in press; Leydesdorff, Rafols,  Chen, 2013).



 For example, 23 publications can be retrieved as of today with the search
 string “au=Marijuan P*” at WoS. The journal map is as follows:



 [image: cid:image001.gif@01D09216.E78CE210]



 and the Rao-Stirling diversity (“interdisciplinarity”) of this set is
 01282.



 If I repeat the analysis with the search string “au=leydesdorff l*”, I
 retrieve 270 documents; Rao-Stirling diversity is 0.0805.





 [image: cid:image002.gif@01D09216.E78CE210]



 In other words, Leydesdorff is more prolific than Marijuan in terms of WoS
 publications, but Marijuan’s portfolio is more interdisciplinary than
 Leydesdorff’s.



 One finds the relevant software at
 http://www.leydesdorff.net/portfolio/index.htm

 Reference:

 Leydesdorff, L., Heimeriks, G.,  Rotolo, D. (2015 (in press)). Journal
 Portfolio Analysis for Countries, Cities, and Organizations: Maps and
 Comparisons http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.05676. *Journal of the
 Association for Information Science and Technology*.

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Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? (R.Capurro)

2015-05-19 Thread PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ


De: Rafael Capurro [raf...@capurro.de]
Enviado el: martes, 19 de mayo de 2015 14:06
Para: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ
Asunto: Re: Fwd: Undelivered Mail Returned to Sender

...then the problem is, how can a 'realist' detach theoretical problems
from the real problems of the real world. Mario Bunge said once that
Popper's 'world 3' is a platonic phantasy and Carl Friedrich von
Weizsäcker told me about Popper'ontology' it is bad ontology. To put
it more crude: if after a catastrophic event all human beings (or beings
capable of understanding what is put in 'world 3') disappear then 'world
3' is meaningless. Or: it makes no sense (to me) to advocate for the
independence of each of the three 'worlds' and to speak of 'worlds' when
talking about 'things' that cannot be be counted _as_ worlds.
best
Rafael

--
Prof.em. Dr. Rafael Capurro
Hochschule der Medien (HdM), Stuttgart, Germany
Capurro Fiek Foundation for Information Ethics 
(http://www.capurro-fiek-foundation.org)
Distinguished Researcher at the African Centre of Excellence for Information 
Ethics (ACEIE), Department of Information Science, University of Pretoria, 
South Africa.
Chair, International Center for Information Ethics (ICIE) (http://icie.zkm.de)
Editor in Chief, International Review of Information Ethics (IRIE) 
(http://www.i-r-i-e.net)
Postal Address: Redtenbacherstr. 9, 76133 Karlsruhe, Germany
E-Mail: raf...@capurro.de
Voice: + 49 - 721 - 98 22 9 - 22 (Fax: -21)
Homepage: www.capurro.de


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Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? (R.Capurro)

2015-05-19 Thread John Collier
Rafael, Joseph, list members,

That is an interesting way of putting it, but I think the answer is yes. C.S. 
Peirce's pragmatacism is aimed at doing exactly that. Mathematical structures 
and other structural models have no implication of reality in the sense that 
reality is contingent, so we need a way to test applications. For Peirce, this 
is against our expectations of reality, which give meaning to the models in 
particular applications (pragmatic maxim).

This goes some way to responding to Joseph, who says:
When John C. talks about references crossing ecology, management and political 
science, what is of interest to me and perhaps others is the 'substance' so to 
speak of the crossing. To make things difficult (rather than easy for a 
change), let us assume that this substance includes, but is not limited to 
common assumptions and common attitudes. (My informational exchanges today are 
more interdisciplinary because I am paying more attention to the way in which 
information is processed in the different disciplines.)

Peirce's maxim goes a long way towards getting at the substance (you don't need 
his categories to apply his pragmatic maxim), and should be sufficient, but I 
would agree that it would be easier if there are shared presuppositions, domain 
specific (or not so domain specific) paradigms in Kuhn's sense. Because we 
can't fully express our presuppositions (Polanyi, Quine, Wittgenstein, Barwise 
and Perry) our ideas can never be made fully clear without their losing 
anything but tautological sense. So common ground is not always easy to find, 
and it requires a fair degree of cooperation and willingness to compromise, 
especially on what seem to be certainties.

Joseph also says:
The task then becomes to express the 'substance' in informational terms. What 
informational terms are possible that are not numbers or ad hoc Peircean 
categories? The first thing I see is that the corresponding logic and category 
theory must be non-standard or it will miss the interactions and overlaps 
between disciplines. The next thing might be to change to a process 
perspective, looking at the way in which the disciplines, considered as 
informational entities, influence one another, and find some formal but 
non-mathematical language for referring to this. Are there any suggestions for 
such a language?

I think that nonstandard here requires at least that noncomputability is 
allowed. I have written ab out this in my discussion of an informational view 
of causal connection (or transfer of causation - a version of Russell's 'at-at' 
approach) in Information, causation and 
computationhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/CollierJohn%20formatted.pdf 
(2012. Information and 
Computation:http://astore.amazon.co.uk/books-books-21/detail/9814295477 
Essays on Scientific and Philosophical Understanding of Foundations of 
Information and Computation, Ed by Gordana Dodig Crnkovic and Mark Burgin, 
World Scientific). It probably requires more as well, depending on what we mean 
by 'nonstandard'. I think of nonstandard analysis as an example, but perhaps 
Joseph has more in mind, or something different.

Cheers,
John


From: Rafael Capurro [mailto:raf...@capurro.de]
Sent: May 19, 2015 3:15 AM
To: John Collier; Joseph Brenner; PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ; 
fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? 
(R.Capurro)

then the problem is, how can a 'realist' detach theoretical problems from the 
real problems of the real world.
Rafael
An earlier version was blocked due to the large set of earlier messages. 
Usually I delete them if they are not relevant. I have done that this time.

Cheers,
John

Dear fis list,
List,

Popper is famous for his Three Worlds model, in which ideas sit out there in 
their own world (the others are material and mental, roughly). The problems 
approach, I think, is directed at this world. However I think that systems 
theorists should agree at least that there are general problems that involve 
many different disciplines (Rosen calls them sometime metaphors, but he means 
mathematical or structural Formalisms that have wide generality). By solving 
some of these general problems we can facilitate the generation of solutions to 
more specific problems, both theoretical and practical. That is what systems 
theory is about.

Popper considered himself a realist, but thought that the object of theory 
(problem solutions) was verisimilitude. Exactly what that means is still a 
matter of debate.

I agree with Joseph about the usefulness of the bibliometric work. I found it 
interesting, working in ecology right now, that despite many ecologists 
accepting that there is a socio-ecological system that requires study to solve 
ecological problems, that there were few if any references crossing ecology and 
management and political science. That reflects my reading in the fields.

John



From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es

Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? (R.Capurro)

2015-05-18 Thread John Collier
An earlier version was blocked due to the large set of earlier messages. 
Usually I delete them if they are not relevant. I have done that this time.

Cheers,
John

Dear fis list,
List,

Popper is famous for his Three Worlds model, in which ideas sit out there in 
their own world (the others are material and mental, roughly). The problems 
approach, I think, is directed at this world. However I think that systems 
theorists should agree at least that there are general problems that involve 
many different disciplines (Rosen calls them sometime metaphors, but he means 
mathematical or structural Formalisms that have wide generality). By solving 
some of these general problems we can facilitate the generation of solutions to 
more specific problems, both theoretical and practical. That is what systems 
theory is about.

Popper considered himself a realist, but thought that the object of theory 
(problem solutions) was verisimilitude. Exactly what that means is still a 
matter of debate.

I agree with Joseph about the usefulness of the bibliometric work. I found it 
interesting, working in ecology right now, that despite many ecologists 
accepting that there is a socio-ecological system that requires study to solve 
ecological problems, that there were few if any references crossing ecology and 
management and political science. That reflects my reading in the fields.

John



From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Joseph Brenner
Sent: May 17, 2015 11:14 AM
To: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ; fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? 
(R.Capurro)

Dear All,

I agree with Rafael that there is an anti-realist flavor to Popper's concept of 
problems. However, it indicates to me an intiution that there is something 
important going on between disciplines. This is a dynamic aspect which I feel 
is not captured by diagrams such as Loet's :-) in which the connections between 
disciplines are represented by sets of lines.

I would not be so hard as Dino on bibliometrics as such, but I think that once 
classifications and maps have been established, it is important to talk about 
where to go next.

Best wishes,

Joseph
- Original Message -
From: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZmailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
To: fis@listas.unizar.esmailto:fis@listas.unizar.es
Sent: Sunday, May 17, 2015 1:17 PM
Subject: [Fis] RV: THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? 
(R.Capurro)



De: Rafael Capurro [raf...@capurro.de]
Enviado el: sábado, 16 de mayo de 2015 9:34
Para: PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ
Asunto: Re: [Fis] THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL?
Karl Popper once suggested (Conjectures and Refutations, p. 67) that we should 
not think in terms or subject matter(s) or disciplines but in terms of 
problems. Problems do not arise within a fixed definition of a discipline 
(essentialism) but within a tradition where a theory is being discussed. In 
this sense, theories are in some sense disciplines or can be conceived as 
loose clusters of  theories. But Popper speaks about a world of problems in 
themselves which is a kind of Platonism not only because it separates such 
problems in themselves from their connection to the world _as_ perceived (ie. 
interpreted) by humans, but also because it creates a knowledge hierarchy  by 
giving theoretical knowledge a higher status than practical knowledge. Thirty 
years ago (sic) I wrote some thoughts on this issue. See: 
http://www.capurro.de/trita.htm

Rafael

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