Re: [Fis] The world of singularities, beyond language - Discussion on INFORMATION THEORY--Karl

[Rafael Capurro]

well... not exactly. This is the way Hegel (and others) looked at it, 
discarding the 'singulars' or including them into the particulars and so 
creating a dialectics of the universal and the particular. Kierkegaard 
was not at all happy with this. What I am trying to say (quoting Octavio 
Paz) is nothing mystical or singular in the sense that might be part of 
the process of questionning ("falsifying") theories and the like. It is 
surely not against scientific method (fallibilistic or not) and it is 
not mystical (a word used by Wittgenstein as you know). Trees are trees, 
not signs. As simple as this. Best. Rafael
> Dear Rafael&  Gordana,
>
> What we are discussing here is the difference between universals and
> particulars. Universal laws can only be stated in terms of universal
> variables (mass, energy, etc. The "pleroma" of Bateson). The
> particular, the asymmetric, the contingent are all constrained, but
> not determined by the universal laws. The laws are insufficient for
> that purpose. The (mostly unique) contingencies are part of the
> boundary-value problem -- the mostly neglected half of the full
> problem statement. Such contingencies can affect one another (and
> indirectly themselves) via the intermediary of the universal laws,
> sometimes creating what Peirce called "habits". Such habits may have
> been contingent in origin, but take on the form of strong local
> (non-universal) constraints.
>
> Hence, this world that *we* inhabit does not violate universal laws,
> but neither is it completely formed by them. Singularities exist
> everywhere, but most of them are ephemeral. A few get entrained into
> the "habits". It is a predominately historical world wherein the
> "stability" we sense derives from the historical habits.
>
> In recognizing the insufficiency of universal laws, we also must
> acknowledge bounds on our ability to predict. All is not lost, however
> (depending on how one feels about predictability), because we can
> still entertain probabilistic predictions via what Popper called "the
> calculus of conditional probabilities", or information theory (more
> accurately termed "constraint theory").
>
> See also:
>
> The best,
> Bob U.
>
> -
> Robert E. Ulanowicz|  Tel: +1-352-378-7355
> Arthur R. Marshall Laboratory  |  FAX: +1-352-392-3704
> Department of Biology  |  Emeritus, Chesapeake Biol. Lab
> Bartram Hall 110   |  University of Maryland
> University of Florida  |  Email
> Gainesville, FL 32611-8525 USA |  Web
> --
>
>
> Quoting Rafael Capurro:
>
>> Dear Gordana,
>>
>> yes, we build a world, something stable, with names and laws and
>> signs and.. everything looks as nice as before (this uneery
>> experience) but it just looks so... Nothing would change if we would
>> try to get this experience again (!) into the perspective of law and
>> order and making sense and There is no logical (sign, name) path
>> from one experience to the other, just a leap. The world of the
>> observer next morning looks like the usual way of the observer but
>> it has radically changed. Maybe the problem consists in the idea of
>> the 'observer' itself. The uneery experience Octavio Paz is pointing
>> to means a radical questionning of the power of the observer to
>> change everything into signs, names, ... and also of becoming an
>> agent (and not just an observer!) in the world.
>> best
>> Rafael
>>
>>> ØThey are unrepeatable: they will never be again what they are
>>> right now. [...]
>>>
>>> Very true.
>>>
>>> They will never be again exactly the same and what is even more, we
>>> will never be exactly the same. - Panta rhei.
>>>
>>> And yet, there is something in that chaos of the World, of the Ding
>>> an sich which is stable, which makes us able to make sense.
>>>
>>> In front of that dark window from which the World is gradually
>>> fading away beyond recognizability  there is an remarkable Other, a
>>> distinct piece of the World which makes the difference (observation
>>> &  reflection).
>>>
>>> This remarkable observer making an observation of not being able to
>>> make an observation of the vanishing World of appearances, has
>>> memory of the World in her body.
>>>
>>> In the structures of her brain and morphology her body, there is an
>>> expectation against which this wonder rises about the World
>>> disappearing in the evening darkness.
>>>
>>> What establishes (communicable) sense, structures and names, comes
>>> in the morning.
>>>
>>> The very same World will come back next morning and make usual
>>> sense for an observer/agent.
>>>
>>> She will repeat the same pattern of interaction, being reassured
>>> that there is a structure in an ever-changing World.
>>>
>>> Saying ?I have 

Re: [Fis] The world of singularities, beyond language - Discussion on INFORMATION THEORY--Karl

[Robert Ulanowicz]

Dear Rafael & Gordana,

What we are discussing here is the difference between universals and  
particulars. Universal laws can only be stated in terms of universal  
variables (mass, energy, etc. The "pleroma" of Bateson). The  
particular, the asymmetric, the contingent are all constrained, but  
not determined by the universal laws. The laws are insufficient for  
that purpose. The (mostly unique) contingencies are part of the  
boundary-value problem -- the mostly neglected half of the full  
problem statement. Such contingencies can affect one another (and  
indirectly themselves) via the intermediary of the universal laws,  
sometimes creating what Peirce called "habits". Such habits may have  
been contingent in origin, but take on the form of strong local  
(non-universal) constraints.

Hence, this world that *we* inhabit does not violate universal laws,  
but neither is it completely formed by them. Singularities exist  
everywhere, but most of them are ephemeral. A few get entrained into  
the "habits". It is a predominately historical world wherein the  
"stability" we sense derives from the historical habits.

In recognizing the insufficiency of universal laws, we also must  
acknowledge bounds on our ability to predict. All is not lost, however  
(depending on how one feels about predictability), because we can  
still entertain probabilistic predictions via what Popper called "the  
calculus of conditional probabilities", or information theory (more  
accurately termed "constraint theory").

See also: 

The best,
Bob U.

-
Robert E. Ulanowicz|  Tel: +1-352-378-7355
Arthur R. Marshall Laboratory  |  FAX: +1-352-392-3704
Department of Biology  |  Emeritus, Chesapeake Biol. Lab
Bartram Hall 110   |  University of Maryland
University of Florida  |  Email 
Gainesville, FL 32611-8525 USA |  Web 
--


Quoting Rafael Capurro :

> Dear Gordana,
>
> yes, we build a world, something stable, with names and laws and  
> signs and.. everything looks as nice as before (this uneery  
> experience) but it just looks so... Nothing would change if we would  
> try to get this experience again (!) into the perspective of law and  
> order and making sense and There is no logical (sign, name) path  
> from one experience to the other, just a leap. The world of the  
> observer next morning looks like the usual way of the observer but  
> it has radically changed. Maybe the problem consists in the idea of  
> the 'observer' itself. The uneery experience Octavio Paz is pointing  
> to means a radical questionning of the power of the observer to  
> change everything into signs, names, ... and also of becoming an  
> agent (and not just an observer!) in the world.
> best
> Rafael
>
>> ØThey are unrepeatable: they will never be again what they are  
>> right now. [...]
>>
>> Very true.
>>
>> They will never be again exactly the same and what is even more, we  
>> will never be exactly the same. - Panta rhei.
>>
>> And yet, there is something in that chaos of the World, of the Ding  
>> an sich which is stable, which makes us able to make sense.
>>
>> In front of that dark window from which the World is gradually  
>> fading away beyond recognizability  there is an remarkable Other, a  
>> distinct piece of the World which makes the difference (observation  
>> & reflection).
>>
>> This remarkable observer making an observation of not being able to  
>> make an observation of the vanishing World of appearances, has  
>> memory of the World in her body.
>>
>> In the structures of her brain and morphology her body, there is an  
>> expectation against which this wonder rises about the World  
>> disappearing in the evening darkness.
>>
>> What establishes (communicable) sense, structures and names, comes  
>> in the morning.
>>
>> The very same World will come back next morning and make usual  
>> sense for an observer/agent.
>>
>> She will repeat the same pattern of interaction, being reassured  
>> that there is a structure in an ever-changing World.
>>
>> Saying ?I have no name for this experience? presupposes knowing  
>> about ?the name? and ?an experience?, both being a part of a  
>> structured world of human/agents millennia long experience with  
>> this World disappearing and appearing again, changing, yet keeping  
>> basic structures time and time again.
>>
>> That is why we understand pre-Socratic philosophers/thinkers/poets,  
>> why we understand beautiful Octavio Paz "El mono gramático" and why  
>> we are able to make any sense at all, including the sense that it  
>> is not possible to make (usual) sense.
>>
>> With best wishes,
>>
>> Gordana
>>
>> *From:*fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es  
>> [mailto:fis-boun...@