I'm really grateful for Maxine's summary here. To those who query the value of phenomenology, I find myself reflecting on what Alain Badiou and a number of others (e.g. Burrell and Morgan's "Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis") have argued in there being (at least) three main trends in Western thought in the 20th century: Analytical philosophy/functionalism, phenomenology and existentialism, and Marxism.
Each 'paradigm' (to borrow Burrell and Morgan's word) represents an important perspective, and each harbours totalising ambitions seeing itself in contradistinction to the others. Most thinking about "information" is analytical and functionalist in orientation: obviously with Shannon, but even the most ecological and "second-order" of cybernetic approaches cannot escape functionalism. From functionalism, there will always be a tendency to criticise phenomenology as in some way as "woolly" or Marxist critique as "blah blah sociology". Phenomenologists of all kinds will rightly point out that functionalism cannot explain everything. Many of them, like Husserl, have intimate familiarity with analytical and functionalist arguments. As Husserl saw, mathematical abstractions rest on foundations in the human soul to which it is blind. Whether or not Husserl was successful in articulating a way to uncover the structures of consciousness is beside the point: it was, and continues to be, a profoundly important question to which functionalism has no answer. And then there's politics. Because from academic jousting matches in online fora, to open access to academic papers, to the pathologies of our universities who are meant to support debates but who now operate like businesses, to catastrophic disparities in life chances in the world, and inequalities of wealth, the social context demands action as much as it does reflection. If "information" as a topic is to have any value then it cannot restrict itself to functionalism and analysis alone. It has to address all three perspectives (and maybe more). I don't know if this is possible. But I see that the value of encountering phenomenology as we have done is to highlight the deficiencies of a single-paradigm viewpoint. best wishes, Mark On 29 February 2016 at 23:01, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone <m...@uoregon.edu> wrote: > To FIS Colleagues, > > There are common threads running through communications from Mark, Loet, > Jerry, and Marcus that I would like to address. I thank them for their > concerns and the issues they raise. I thank Plamen too for his response, > specifically for upholding the value of phenomenology, though disagreeing > with him in his giving prominence to Merleau-Ponty as a phenomenologist. I > would like to comment on that point of disagreement first. > > (1): I just wrote an invited essay on Merleau-Ponty for an Oxford book on > Phenomenology and Psychopathology. I noted first off that > "Merleau-Ponty’s writings in psychopathology were both exceptional and > non-exceptional. They were exceptional in bringing scientific research into > phenomenology. Husserl had written from time to time on the abnormal—for > example, in Ideas II, Husserl considers what transpires when a particular > sense organ no longer functions normally while others continue to do so > (Husserl 1989, pp. 71ff.)—but he did not delve into the > psychopathological. Heidegger too might be cited: the ‘they’ might be > viewed as metaphysically abnormal, the ‘they’ being those who repress > recognition of their own mortality, who see death as happening only to > others, and whom Heidegger deems ‘inauthentic’. Merleau-Ponty, in contrast, > delved into contemporary studies of psychopathology, in particular, the > extensive studies of Kurt Goldstein and Adhémar Gelb. He also based his own > psychopathological analyses to a large extent on the writings of Sigmund > Freud even as he diverged from them. Thus one might say that he devoted > himself assiduously to available contemporary literature in the then > burgeoning fields of neuropsychiatry and psychoanalysis." > > More of Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, and Psychopathology perhaps at > another time. For a later time too, perhaps, Merleau-Ponty’s affiliating > himself with biologist Jakob von Uexküll, undoubtedly because von Uexküll’s > conjunction of animal and world in “functional tones” connected with > Merelau-Ponty’s own conjunction of seer/seen and touching/touched, and > possibly also because Merleau-Ponty’s disavowal of Darwin’s “origin of > species” i.e., Darwin’s theory of natural selection, straightaway agreed > with von Uexküll’s disavowal of Darwin’s “origin of species.” > > What is of preeminent note here is that Merleau-Ponty never engaged in the > actual practice of phenomenology. He thereby threw away the backbone of > phenomenology, namely, its methodology. Phenomenological methodology is the > topic warranting serious address here in our discussion. I’ve mentioned it > in earlier responses but would like to do so here in fuller detail. > > (2): A Clarification of Phenomenology, Specifically in Terms of > Methodology. > > Bracketing is only the beginning! Making the familiar strange is only the > first step! The “plunge” into a bona fide phenomenological investigation” > that I mentioned in my ‘response to Salthe’s response’ is essential to > getting at the foundational meaning and nature of any phenomenon. In short, > in turning “to the things themselves,” we distinguish noesis and noema: > consciousness and the object as meant. > > The following remarks concerning phenomenological methodology appear in > the opening of an article that will appear in an edited book on > phenomenology and aesthetic experience: > > "Phenomenological methodology in its original Husserlian formulation was > in the service of uncovering sense-making, that is, in the service of > uncovering the faculties and processes—the perceptual-cognitive > structures-- by which we come to know the world. How indeed do we come to > know the world? How does perception lead to knowledge? Husserlian > phenomenology is anchored in a strict and rigorous methodology that > requires practice and patience. It is a discipline in the dual sense of > being both a schooled practice and a branch of knowledge. Phenomenology is > thus not something one turns to and does on a lazy Sunday afternoon nor > some general term to be used indiscriminately, as in articles on bodily > awareness or attention that take the body as a ready-made adult body that > already knows the world, in particular, an already learned body that has > learned how to move itself.” > > In my original FIS response, I wrote, “we begin by bracketing’ all > assumptions and beliefs, and, in Husserl's words, turn ‘to the things > themselves’." I should have said “.. . AND THEN, in Husserl’s words, turn > ‘to the things themselves’.” In short, making the familiar strange is only > the first step. The “plunge” into a bona fide phenomenological > investigation” that I mentioned in my ‘response to Salthe’s response’ is > essential. It is requisite to understanding the nature, structure, origin, > and meaning of any phenomenon. > > A fundamental and sterling example of the plunge and what it uncovers is > evident in Husserl’s meticulously detailed study of meaning. Meaning is > constituted on the basis of horizons, of sedimentations, of active and > passive syntheses, of internal time consciousness, and more. Each of these > aspects of meaning warrants study. I might note in this context that though > no specific book was devoted to horizons or to sedimentations, for example, > Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis runs over 600 > pages. > > (3): In this context of bona fide phenomenological analysis, I would like > to ask the following question: > > Might a phenomenological analysis of information be possible? > > Is information like a sensation, for example? Is it “news” and in that > sense “spatially pointillist and temporally punctual” as I have described a > sensation? What is the actual experience of information? As a further > example: If neural networks are taken as information networks, do those > informational networks constitute informational repertoires and do those > informational repertoires correlate with what in lived-through, > experiential terms we call habits? > > What is wanted in a phenomenological analysis of information is not a > definition of information but a full-blown uncovering of the nature, > structure, origin, and meaning of information. Would a phenomenological > analysis of information prove as insightful and complex as Husserl’s > phenomenological analysis of meaning? > > I add the following: I confess that I am not a subscriber to naturalizing > phenomenology, but I am a subscriber to finding and detailing > complementarities between the sciences and phenomenology, precisely as I > described in my FIS article. > > (4): In the actual practice of phenomenology, one comes to what I have > termed “the challenge of languaging experience”-- see last chapter titled > same in The Corporeal Turn: An Interdisciplinary Reader. I quote from that > chapter: > > "The idea that language names things and that its function is to name > things gives precedence to stable items in the world, not to dynamic events > experienced in a directly felt sense by sentient living bodies. Given this > idea, language rightly preserves it function by adhering to things that are > reified or reifiable and that consequently stay in place, and that moreover > continue to stay in place or remain the integral ‘things’ they are even as > they move, as waves rolling or wind blowing. > > I quote a variety of people in documenting the challenge: infant > psychiatrist and clinical psychologist Daniel Stern, Jean Piaget and Bärbel > Inhelder, Leonardo da Vinci, Shakespeare, Aristotelian scholar Arthur Peck, > Carl Jung. I cite others too, including Husserl and paleoanthropologist > André Leroi-Gourhan, in the context of showing how the challenge of > languaging experience is clearly illuminated, even crystallized, in > experience itself. Though I did not quote him in the chapter, an > observation of Husserl is telling. In attempting to pinpoint the > metaphysical reality of “flux” in The Phenomenology of Inner Time > Consciousness, Husserl states, “In the lived experience of actuality we > have the primal source-point and a continuity of moments of reverberation > [Nachhallmomenten]. For all this names are lacking” (p. 100). > > With reference to (3) above: How would one language the nature, structure, > origin, and meaning of information—or in briefer terms, how would one > language the experience of information? Obvious perhaps is that whatever > the scientific concept of information might be, that concept is generated > in experience and that experience warrants study and illumination. > > I might add in this context that philosopher Dan Lloyd won an award from > the fMRI Institute in New Hampshire several years back for the most > innovative use of fMRI data. Lloyd used it in conjunction with Husserl’s > analysis of inner time consciousness. > > (5): The following comments are in relation to Schutz’s statement quoted > by Loet and commented upon by Loet. > The quote from Schutz: “ As long as man is born from woman, > intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the foundation for all > other categories of human existence.” Loet’s comment: “Schutz wishes to > bring the body back into the reflection, whereas Husserl’s position is more > abstract.” > > I would add two comments: > > 1. Man is born from woman = intersubjectivity. What of woman born > from woman? What about simply birth, specifically avian and mammalian birth > = intersubjectivity insofar as the newborn is parent-dependent, commonly > female-dependent, but in some instances shared, i.e., female/male-dependent? > > 2. Re Husserl’s position being “more abstract” in relation to the > body: Herewith simply one of a multitude of possible examples one finds in > Husserl: “The Body is, as Body, filled with the soul through and through. > Each movement of the Body is full of soul, the coming and going, the > standing and sitting, the walking and dancing, etc. Likewise, so is every > human performance, every human production” (Ideas II, p. 252). > > With respect specifically to a “we-relationship,” see, for example, > Cartesian Meditations, p. 124: > > "What I actually see is not a sign and not a mere analogue, a depiction in > any natural sense of the word; on the contrary, it is someone else. And > what is grasped with actual originariness in this seeing—namely that > corporeality over there, or rather only one aspect of its surface—is the > Other’s body itself. . . . According to the sense-constitution involved in > perceiving someone else, what is grasped originaliter is the body of a > psyche essentially inaccessible to me originaliter, and the two are > comprised in the unity of one psychophysical reality.” > > The unity of the reality that Husserl describes is a matter of pairing, a > phenomenon he describes earlier. > > Of note also is the following in the Fifth Meditation in Cartesian > Meditations, p. 154: > > Thus the investigations concerning the transcendental constitution of a > world, which we have roughly indicated in these meditations, are precisely > the beginning of a radical clarification of the sense and origin (or of the > sense in the consequence of the origin) of the concepts: world, Nature, > space, time, psychophysical being, man psyche, animate organism, social > community, culture, and so forth. > > Husserl’s concern was precisely with how the world, the world that > definitively includes Others, thus bodies and we-relationships, is > constituted, thus how we come to the concepts, judgements, and meanings we > do. His habit of beginning over and over from the beginning testifies to a > relentless spirit of investigation and at the same time to a discerning > critical perspective and to an awareness of the vastness of his basic > concern: how we put the world together, how consciousness and object as > meant, how soul and body, how I and other, and so on, and so on, constitute > in each instance a distinctive psychophysical reality warranting exacting > study grounded in a rigorous and exacting phenomenological methodology. > That methodology, as pointed out in my FIS paper, is not different from > scientific methodology in terms of verification. As I noted in that paper, > findings in both areas may be “amended, elaborated, questioned on specific > grounds, and so on. Just as in science one replicates by following the > exact method, so in phenomenology.” I also added a caveat: “one cannot > replicate, amend, elaborate, question, and so on, what one has not oneself > ventured to examine following the same strict methodology.” > > Cheers, > Maxine > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > -- Dr. Mark William Johnson Institute of Learning and Teaching Faculty of Health and Life Sciences University of Liverpool Visiting Professor Far Eastern Federal University, Russia Phone: 07786 064505 Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com
_______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
