Hi Lou, Colleagues,
> On 25 Apr 2018, at 16:55, Louis H Kauffman wrote:
> Dear Krassimir and Mark,
> Let us not forget the intermediate question:
> How is information independent of the choice of carrier?
> This is the fruitful question in my opinion, and it avoids the
> On 25 Apr 2018, at 19:51, Alex Hankey wrote:
> Extract from Louis Kauffman:
> Two is a concept and it is outside of formal systems and outside of the
> except in that we who have that concept are linked with formalism and linked
> with the apparent
You claim: "all computations exists independently of the existence of anything
I never heard, apart probably from Berkeley and Tegmark, a more untestable,
metaphyisical, a-scientific, unquantifiable claim.
Dear FISers, we NEED to deal with something testable and
This is a literary level exposition of a view, of the category of
Confessiones. The confidence of a philosopher, like that of a poet, that
his words can be understood, even though they are of a subjective,
individual perspective, is well rewarded if indeed the worldview can be
I suspect I am past quota for the week. Apologies for that.
1. Work in logic and mathematics is scientific even if mathematicians and
logicians sometimes deny being scientists.
2. Exact work is logical work coupled with precise and repeatable methods of
3. The point
Thank you for this concise statement. It very closely matches my own
perspective. I would only add the notion that meaningfulness or
meaninglessness is not an inherent property of information. It is entirely
contingent upon the affect, or the absence of affect, of encountered
Dear Lou and All,
Mark Burgin deserves credit for having started a discussion in which
contrasting points of view are clearly delineated, and where some new
convergences can appear. Karl critiques my views as philosophy, but says that
numbers support them. Arturo critiques Bruno's view of
Let us not forget that the talk about substrate can be misleading if it is
not taken into account that communication itself produces a "double bind"
(Bateson and Watzlawick)or "double closure " (von Foerster), that is, for
every statement made it allows a set of suppositions to lay