Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues, First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to publish it in IJ ITA. It will be nice to continue our common work this way. At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on Is information physical? was more-less chaotic – we
Dear Arturo, > On 14 May 2018, at 12:25, tozziart...@libero.it wrote: > > Daer Bruno, > > first of all, sorry for the previous private communication, but for a > mistake, I did not add the FIS list in the CC. > > > > Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic, > I agree it is faith, but it
Dear Mark Using 'physical' this way it just tends to mean 'real', but that raises the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel's theorem or mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is subjectivity and self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a conscious subject
Dear FISers, I recently came across an old interview to W. van Orman Quine and I got an idea -maybe not very original per se. Quine distinguishes two kind of philosophical problems: ontological (those referred to the existence of things) and predicative (what can we say and know about things).
What is a 'thing'? Perhaps it is more reasonable to think that only processes exist, and that for human convenience in living in the world we put conceptual membranes around some parts of those processes and call them 'things'. From this point of view we do not have two aspects (things and
Perhaps, it is helpful to compare with the question whether the centimeter is physical. The meter is calibrated on a physical measure, but the centimeter is just a measure. We can provide it with a physical referent: "This is a centimeter". Information is perhaps even more complex: a
Dear Bruno, as far as you wrote and I understood, your Mechanistic framework requires the tenet that quantum wave collapse does not exist. In order to prove that, you invoke the authority of Everett. I want to provide a simple, very rough explanation (excuse me!), for the FISers unaware of
I completely agree, Arturo! And Everett’s many world’s interpretation have been criticised, I would say, killed, since long, for example by Healy and Stein, both in NOUS XVIII, 1984. The problem is conceptual; what does Everett mean by a world? Referring to your simple example below, one might