-------- Messaggio inoltrato -------- Da: tozziart...@libero.it A: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es Data: giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 03:23PM +02:00 Oggetto: Re[2]: [Fis] [FIS] Is information physical?
>Dear Bruno, >You state: >"IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, >THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. >“physical” becomes a mathematical notion. >...Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of >description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any >change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the >brain/body at that level of description". >The problem of your account is the following: >You say "IF" and "indexical digital mechanism is the HYPOTHESIS". >Therefore, you are talking of an HYPOTHESIS: it is not empirically tested and >it is not empirically testable. You are starting with a sort of postulate: I, >and other people, do not agree with it. The current neuroscience does not >state that our brain/body is (or can be replaced by) a digital machine. >In other words, your "IF" stands for something that possibly does not exist in >our real world. Here your entire building falls down. >-- >Inviato da Libero Mail per Android giovedì, 10 maggio 2018, 02:46PM +02:00 da >Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be : > >>(This mail has been sent previously , but without success. I resend it, with >>minor changes). Problems due to different accounts. It was my first comment >>to Mark Burgin new thread “Is information physical?”. >> >> >>Dear Mark, Dear Colleagues, >> >> >>Apology for not answering the mails in the chronological orders, as my new >>computer classifies them in some mysterious way! >>This is my first post of the week. I might answer comment, if any, at the end >>of the week. >> >> >>>On 25 Apr 2018, at 03:47, Burgin, Mark < mbur...@math.ucla.edu > wrote: >>>Dear Colleagues, >>>I would like to suggest the new topic for discussion >>> Is information physical? >> >>That is an important topic indeed, very close to what I am working on. >> >>My result here is that >> >>IF indexical digital mechanism is correct in the cognitive science, >> >>THEN “physical” has to be defined entirely in arithmetical term, i.e. >>“physical” becomes a mathematical notion. >> >>The proof is constructive. It shows exactly how to derive physics from >>Arithmetic (the reality, not the theory. I use “reality” instead of “model" >>(logician’s term, because physicists use “model" for “theory"). >> >>Indexical digital mechanism is the hypothesis that there is a level of >>description of the brain/body such that I would survive, or “not feel any >>change” if my brain/body is replaced by a digital machine emulating the >>brain/body at that level of description. >> >>Not only information is not physical, but matter, time, space, and all >>physical objects become part of the universal machine phenomenology. Physics >>is reduced to arithmetic, or, equivalently, to any Turing-complete machinery. >>Amazingly Arithmetic (even the tiny semi-computable part of arithmetic) is >>Turing complete (Turing Universal). >> >>The basic idea is that: >> >>1) no universal machine can distinguish if she is executed by an arithmetical >>reality or by a physical reality. And, >> >>2) all universal machines are executed in arithmetic, and they are >>necessarily undetermined on the set of of all its continuations emulated in >>arithmetic. >> >>That reduces physics to a statistics on all computations relative to my >>actual state, and see from some first person points of view (something I can >>describe more precisely in some future post perhaps). >> >>Put in that way, the proof is not constructive, as, if we are machine, we >>cannot know which machine we are. But Gödel’s incompleteness can be used to >>recover this constructively for a simpler machine than us, like Peano >>arithmetic. This way of proceeding enforces the distinction between first and >>third person views (and six others!). >> >>I have derived already many feature of quantum mechanics from this (including >>the possibility of quantum computer) a long time ago. I was about sure this >>would refute Mechanism, until I learned about quantum mechanics, which >>verifies all the most startling predictions of Indexical Mechanism, unless we >>add the controversial wave collapse reduction principle. >> >>The curious “many-worlds” becomes the obvious (in arithmetic) many >>computations (up to some equivalence quotient). The weird indeterminacy >>becomes the simpler amoeba like duplication. The non-cloning of matter >>becomes obvious: as any piece of matter is the result of the first person >>indeterminacy (the first person view of the amoeba undergoing a duplication, >>…) on infinitely many computations. This entails also that neither matter >>appearance nor consciousness are Turing emulable per se, as the whole >>arithmetical reality—which is a highly non computable notion as we know since >>Gödel—plays a key role. Note this makes Digital Physics leaning to >>inconsistency, as it implies indexical computationalism which implies the >>negation of Digital Physics (unless my “body” is the entire physical >>universe, which I rather doubt). >>>My opinion is presented below: >>> >>> >>> Why some people erroneously think that information is physical >>> >>> The main reason to think that information is physical is the strong >>>belief of many people, especially, scientists that there is only physical >>>reality, which is studied by science. At the same time, people encounter >>>something that they call information. >>> When people receive a letter, they comprehend that it is information >>>because with the letter they receive information. The letter is physical, >>>i.e., a physical object. As a result, people start thinking that information >>>is physical. When people receive an e-mail, they comprehend that it is >>>information because with the e-mail they receive information. The e-mail >>>comes to the computer in the form of electromagnetic waves, which are >>>physical. As a result, people start thinking even more that information is >>>physical. >>> However, letters, electromagnetic waves and actually all physical >>>objects are only carriers or containers of information. >>> To understand this better, let us consider a textbook. Is possible to >>>say that this book is knowledge? Any reasonable person will tell that the >>>textbook contains knowledge but is not knowledge itself. In the same way, >>>the textbook contains information but is not information itself. The same is >>>true for letters, e-mails, electromagnetic waves and other physical objects >>>because all of them only contain information but are not information. For >>>instance, as we know, different letters can contain the same information. >>>Even if we make an identical copy of a letter or any other text, then the >>>letter and its copy will be different physical objects (physical things) but >>>they will contain the same information. >>> Information belongs to a different (non-physical) world of knowledge, >>>data and similar essences. In spite of this, information can act on physical >>>objects (physical bodies) and this action also misleads people who think >>>that information is physical. >> >>OK. The reason is that we can hardly imagine how immaterial or non physical >>objects can alter the physical realm. It is the usual problem faced by >>dualist ontologies. With Indexical computationalism we recover many >>dualities, but they belong to the phenomenologies. >> >> >> >>> One more misleading property of information is that people can measure >>>it. This brings an erroneous assumption that it is possible to measure only >>>physical essences. Naturally, this brings people to the erroneous conclusion >>>that information is physical. However, measuring information is essentially >>>different than measuring physical quantities, i.e., weight. There are no >>>“scales” that measure information. Only human intellect can do this. >> >>OK. I think all intellect can do that, not just he human one. >> >>Now, the reason why people believe in the physical is always a form of the >>“knocking table” argument. They knocks on the table and say “you will not >>tell me that this table is unreal”. >> >>I have got so many people giving me that argument, that I have made dreams in >>which I made that argument, or even where I was convinced by that argument … >>until I wake up. >> >>When we do metaphysics with the scientific method, this “dream argument” >>illustrates that seeing, measuring, … cannot prove anything ontological. A >>subjective experience proves only the phenomenological existence of >>consciousness, and nothing more. It shows that although there are plenty of >>strong evidences for a material reality, there are no evidences (yet) for a >>primitive or primary matter (and that is why, I think, Aristotle assumes it >>quasi explicitly, against Plato, and plausibly against Pythagorus). >> >>Mechanism forces a coming back to Plato, where the worlds of ideas is the >>world of programs, or information, or even just numbers, since very >>elementary arithmetic (PA without induction, + the predecessor axiom) is >>already Turing complete (it contains what I have named a Universal >>Dovetailer: a program which generates *and* executes all programs). >> >>So I agree with you: information is not physical. I claim that if we assume >>Mechanism (Indexical computationalism) matter itself is also not *primarily* >>physical: it is all in the “head of the universal machine/number” (so to >>speak). >> >>And this provides a test for primary matter: it is enough to find if there is >>a discrepancy between the physics that we infer from the observation, and the >>physics that we extract from “the head” of the machine. This took me more >>than 30 years of work, but the results obtained up to now is that there is no >>discrepancies. I have compared the quantum logic imposed by incompleteness >>(formally) on the semi-computable (partial recursive, sigma_1) propositions, >>with most quantum logics given by physicists, and it fits rather well. >> >>Best regards, >> >>Bruno >>_______________________________________________ >>Fis mailing list >>Fis@listas.unizar.es >>http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
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