Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Robert E. Ulanowicz]

Dear Ken & Pedro,

Unfortunately, I have not read Friston's thesis. In his abstract he
writes, "Furthermore, if we look closely at what is optimized, the same
quantity keeps emerging, namely value (expected reward, expected utility)
or its complement, surprise (prediction error, expected cost). This is the
quantity that is optimized under the free-energy principle..."

When one is dealing with complementary values, optimization usually infers
some balance. Is this what Friston means? If so, that is quite similar to
the balance between mutually-exclusive attributes that we observe when we
apply Shannon-like calculus to ecosystem trophic exchange networks. (See
Fig 7 on p1890 in <http://people.biology.ufl.edu/ulan/pubs/Dual.pdf>.)
Very interesting!

Bob U.

> Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11, 127-138 (February 2010) | doi
> :10.1038/nrn2787
> http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v11/n2/full/nrn2787.html
>
> :)  Ken
>
> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 8:19 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:
>>
>> Dear Loet, Steven, and colleagues,
>>
>> During last ten years or so, with particular success in most recent
>> years,
>> Karl Friston has developed his free energy optimization principle, based
>> on
>> Shannon's information theory and optimal control theory as well as on
>> the
>> Bayesian brain hypothesis. I think this is the most advanced work
>> towards a
>> unified brain theory today. The minimization dynamics of the cerebral
>> free
>> energy construct (it is a sort of Helmoltz program revisited) becomes a
>> generative process of perception, action, learning and adaptive
>> behaviors
>> in general. The 2010 paper (Nature Reviews Neurosceince, doi:
>> 10.138/nrn2787) where he precisely argues about a unified brain theory,
>> is
>> quite representative of his proposals. On a personal basis, during last
>> two
>> decades I was following and cooperating with Kenneth Paul Collins (we
>> published a book in Spanish about the emergence of behavior from brain
>> dynamics). Our scheme was based on the minimization of a collective
>> variable supposedly a sort of "entropy" of excitation/inhibition ratios
>> topologically distributed among neuronal surfaces of the cortex that was
>> performed essentially by the medial parts of the brain. Although very
>> rich
>> in qualitative and behavioral aspects, the formal part was too weak
>> (awfully weak). Until recent years I could not connect meaningfully
>> Collin's approach with other works, and unfortunately he left scientific
>> research long ago--but now the marriage with Friston's is remarkable.
>> Putting them together may be a very fertile exploratory avenue.
>>
>> best ---Pedro
>>
>> Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Dear Steven and colleagues,
>>>
>>>
>>> I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read
>>> as
>>> an introduction?
>>>
>>>
>>> It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial
>>> theories of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal
>>> apparatus: the design and the results do not yet have meaning without
>>> an
>>> interpretation in a substantial context. On the other side, a theory
>>> about,
>>> for example, neuro-information is a special theory. One can in this
>>> context
>>> use information theory as a statistical tool (among other tools).
>>> Sometimes, one can move beyond description. J
>>>
>>>
>>> The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special
>>> theories, is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move
>>> between
>>> domains heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can perhaps be
>>> used metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice versa). The
>>> advantages have to be shown in empirical research: which questions can
>>> be
>>> addressed and which puzzles be solved?
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Loet
>>>
>>>
>>> 
>>>
>>> Loet Leydesdorff
>>>
>>> /Emeritus/ University of Amsterdam
>>> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
>>>
>>> l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
>>> http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>>> Honorary Professor, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
>>> Sussex;
>&

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Ken Herold]

Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11, 127-138 (February 2010) | doi
:10.1038/nrn2787
http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v11/n2/full/nrn2787.html

:)  Ken

On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 8:19 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:
>
> Dear Loet, Steven, and colleagues,
>
> During last ten years or so, with particular success in most recent years,
> Karl Friston has developed his free energy optimization principle, based on
> Shannon's information theory and optimal control theory as well as on the
> Bayesian brain hypothesis. I think this is the most advanced work towards a
> unified brain theory today. The minimization dynamics of the cerebral free
> energy construct (it is a sort of Helmoltz program revisited) becomes a
> generative process of perception, action, learning and adaptive behaviors
> in general. The 2010 paper (Nature Reviews Neurosceince, doi:
> 10.138/nrn2787) where he precisely argues about a unified brain theory, is
> quite representative of his proposals. On a personal basis, during last two
> decades I was following and cooperating with Kenneth Paul Collins (we
> published a book in Spanish about the emergence of behavior from brain
> dynamics). Our scheme was based on the minimization of a collective
> variable supposedly a sort of "entropy" of excitation/inhibition ratios
> topologically distributed among neuronal surfaces of the cortex that was
> performed essentially by the medial parts of the brain. Although very rich
> in qualitative and behavioral aspects, the formal part was too weak
> (awfully weak). Until recent years I could not connect meaningfully
> Collin's approach with other works, and unfortunately he left scientific
> research long ago--but now the marriage with Friston's is remarkable.
> Putting them together may be a very fertile exploratory avenue.
>
> best ---Pedro
>
> Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>
>>
>> Dear Steven and colleagues,
>>
>>
>> I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read as
>> an introduction?
>>
>>
>> It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial
>> theories of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal
>> apparatus: the design and the results do not yet have meaning without an
>> interpretation in a substantial context. On the other side, a theory about,
>> for example, neuro-information is a special theory. One can in this context
>> use information theory as a statistical tool (among other tools).
>> Sometimes, one can move beyond description. J
>>
>>
>> The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special
>> theories, is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move between
>> domains heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can perhaps be
>> used metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice versa). The
>> advantages have to be shown in empirical research: which questions can be
>> addressed and which puzzles be solved?
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Loet
>>
>>
>> 
>>
>> Loet Leydesdorff
>>
>> /Emeritus/ University of Amsterdam
>> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
>>
>> l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>;
>> http://www.leydesdorff.net/
>> Honorary Professor, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
>> Sussex;
>>
>> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
>> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/
>> brief_en.html>Beijing;
>>
>> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of
>> London;
>>
>> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en <
>> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en>
>>
>>
>> *From:* stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] *On
>> Behalf Of *Steven Ericsson-Zenith
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 09, 2014 10:13 PM
>> *To:* l...@leydesdorff.net
>> *Cc:* Joseph Brenner; fis
>> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process
>>
>>
>> The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is
>> descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my
>> model, can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point
>> and response covariance is impossible to consider.
>>
>> It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors
>> in which I can express the explicit role of a base universal

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear Loet, Steven, and colleagues,

During last ten years or so, with particular success in most recent 
years, Karl Friston has developed his free energy optimization 
principle, based on Shannon's information theory and optimal control 
theory as well as on the Bayesian brain hypothesis. I think this is the 
most advanced work towards a unified brain theory today. The 
minimization dynamics of the cerebral free energy construct (it is a 
sort of Helmoltz program revisited) becomes a generative process of 
perception, action, learning and adaptive behaviors in general. The 2010 
paper (Nature Reviews Neurosceince, doi: 10.138/nrn2787) where he 
precisely argues about a unified brain theory, is quite representative 
of his proposals. On a personal basis, during last two decades I was 
following and cooperating with Kenneth Paul Collins (we published a book 
in Spanish about the emergence of behavior from brain dynamics). Our 
scheme was based on the minimization of a collective variable supposedly 
a sort of "entropy" of excitation/inhibition ratios topologically 
distributed among neuronal surfaces of the cortex that was performed 
essentially by the medial parts of the brain. Although very rich in 
qualitative and behavioral aspects, the formal part was too weak 
(awfully weak). Until recent years I could not connect meaningfully 
Collin's approach with other works, and unfortunately he left scientific 
research long ago--but now the marriage with Friston's is remarkable. 
Putting them together may be a very fertile exploratory avenue.


best ---Pedro

Loet Leydesdorff wrote:


Dear Steven and colleagues,

 

I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read 
as an introduction?


 

It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial 
theories of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal 
apparatus: the design and the results do not yet have meaning without 
an interpretation in a substantial context. On the other side, a 
theory about, for example, neuro-information is a special theory. One 
can in this context use information theory as a statistical tool 
(among other tools). Sometimes, one can move beyond description. J


 

The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special 
theories, is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move 
between domains heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can 
perhaps be used metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice 
versa). The advantages have to be shown in empirical research: which 
questions can be addressed and which puzzles be solved?


 


Best,

Loet

 




Loet Leydesdorff

/Emeritus/ University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>; 
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Honorary Professor, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of 
Sussex;


Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>, 
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, 
<http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;


Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of 
London;


http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en 
<http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en>


 

*From:* stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] *On 
Behalf Of *Steven Ericsson-Zenith

*Sent:* Tuesday, December 09, 2014 10:13 PM
*To:* l...@leydesdorff.net
*Cc:* Joseph Brenner; fis
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

 

The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is 
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my 
model, can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision 
point and response covariance is impossible to consider. 

 

It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and 
hyper-functors in which I can express the explicit role of a base 
universal (per gravitation).


 

Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as 
"information as process."


 

On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff 
mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net>> wrote:


Dear colleagues,

 


Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus
because it allows for the dynamic extension. Theil
(1972)—Statistical decomposition analysis (North
Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information
measures. In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write:

 


mailbox:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/pcmarijuan.iacs/Datos%20de%20programa/Thunderbird/Profiles/2vg9i0k9.default/Mail/pop3.aragon-1.es/Inbox?number=1793468636&header=quotebody&part=1.1.2&filename=image001.png


 


in which

mailbox:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/pcmarijuan.iacs/Datos%20de%20pr

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear All,

Several of you have asked recently for a description of Logic in Reality (LIR) 
that is more accessible that what I have written. Thank you for that. Let me 
respond by simply saying here that LIR is a logic of /change/, better of change 
and stability, non-change. The basic concept is that all complex processes or 
states-of-affairs have two major components in an antagonistic or 
contradictorial relation. If one component predominates, is more actual or 
actualized, the other is less dominant, is potential or potentialized. It is 
possible to refer to the states of these elements in terms of non-standard 
probabilities, thus going one step further than just description :-). 

To refer to Loet's examples, brain, culture and economy, LIR would say that 
antagonistic processes in the brain, not a model of the brain, are isomorphic 
to processes in culture and the economy in that the same movement from actual 
to potential, and potential to actual and to emergence of new entities takes 
place in all of them. The reason LIR is a logic and not physics or biology is 
that it permits inferences to be made about the direction of development of 
such processes. It is thus most interesting to read that there is also an 
heuristic movement between domains in Loet's approach.

The relation to information, from my perspective, is that 
information-as-process is now recognized as a complex of two elements, one 
obviously energetic, the substrate or carrier and its 'meaning', which is less 
obviously energy in some form. I suggest that the problem is how to understand 
'meaning'. One should perhaps also talk of 'meaning-as-process' - the 
experience of meaning in a human interpreter - which clearly involves physical 
processes.

I would be glad to answer further questions, especially if they refer 
specifically to the relation of LIR and information, on which I have two or 
three papers easily accessible on-line in Information. 

Best wishes,

Joseph

  
  - Original Message - 
  From: Loet Leydesdorff 
  To: 'Steven Ericsson-Zenith' ; 'fis' 
  Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2014 7:53 AM
  Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process


  Dear Steven and colleagues, 

   

  I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read as an 
introduction?

   

  It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial 
theories of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal apparatus: 
the design and the results do not yet have meaning without an interpretation in 
a substantial context. On the other side, a theory about, for example, 
neuro-information is a special theory. One can in this context use information 
theory as a statistical tool (among other tools). Sometimes, one can move 
beyond description. J

   

  The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special 
theories, is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move between 
domains heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can perhaps be used 
metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice versa). The advantages have 
to be shown in empirical research: which questions can be addressed and which 
puzzles be solved?

   

  Best,

  Loet

   


--

  Loet Leydesdorff 

  Emeritus University of Amsterdam
  Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

  l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
  Honorary Professor, SPRU, University of Sussex; 

  Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, Beijing;

  Visiting Professor, Birkbeck, University of London; 

  http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en

   

  From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
  Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2014 10:13 PM
  To: l...@leydesdorff.net
  Cc: Joseph Brenner; fis
  Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

   

  The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is 
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my model, 
can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point and 
response covariance is impossible to consider. 

   

  It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors in 
which I can express the explicit role of a base universal (per gravitation).

   

  Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as "information as 
process."

   

  On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff  
wrote:

Dear colleagues, 

 

Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it 
allows for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition 
analysis (North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information 
measures. In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write: 

 

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear Steven and colleagues, 

 

I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read as an 
introduction?

 

It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial theories 
of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal apparatus: the design 
and the results do not yet have meaning without an interpretation in a 
substantial context. On the other side, a theory about, for example, 
neuro-information is a special theory. One can in this context use information 
theory as a statistical tool (among other tools). Sometimes, one can move 
beyond description. :)

 

The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special theories, 
is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move between domains 
heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can perhaps be used 
metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice versa). The advantages have 
to be shown in empirical research: which questions can be addressed and which 
puzzles be solved?

 

Best,

Loet

 

  _  

Loet Leydesdorff 

Emeritus University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

 <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> l...@leydesdorff.net ;  
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/> http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
Honorary Professor,  <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/> SPRU, University of 
Sussex; 

Guest Professor  <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/> Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor,  <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html> ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor,  <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/> Birkbeck, University of London; 

 <http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en> 
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en

 

From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2014 10:13 PM
To: l...@leydesdorff.net
Cc: Joseph Brenner; fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

 

The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is 
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my model, 
can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point and 
response covariance is impossible to consider. 

 

It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors in 
which I can express the explicit role of a base universal (per gravitation).

 

Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as "information as 
process."

 

On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> > wrote:

Dear colleagues, 

 

Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it allows 
for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition analysis 
(North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information measures. 
In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write: 

 

 

 

in which can be considered as the a posteriori and the a priori distribution. 
This dynamic information measure can be decomposed and aggregated. One can also 
develop measures for systemic developments and critical transitions. In other 
words, information as a process can also be measured in bits of information. Of 
course, one can extend the dimensionality (i) for the multivariate case (ijk…), 
and thus use information theory for network analysis (including time).

 

Best,

Loet

 

References:

*Leydesdorff, L. (1991). The Static and Dynamic Analysis of Network 
Data Using Information Theory. Social Networks, 13(4), 301-345. 

*Theil, H. (1972). Statistical Decomposition Analysis. Amsterdam/ 
London: North-Holland.

 

 


  _  


Loet Leydesdorff 

Emeritus University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

 <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> l...@leydesdorff.net ;  
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/> http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
Honorary Professor,  <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/> SPRU, University of 
Sussex; 

Guest Professor  <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/> Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor,  <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html> ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor,  <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/> Birkbeck, University of London; 

 <http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en> 
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en

 

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es 
<mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> ] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Monday, December 08, 2014 10:22 PM
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

 

I am a little mystified by your assertion of "information as process." What, 
exactly, is this and how does it differ fro information in general (Shannon). 
Is it related to Whitehead's process notions?

 

In terms of neuroscience it is important to move away from connectionism and

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my
model, can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point
and response covariance is impossible to consider.

It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors in
which I can express the explicit role of a base universal (per gravitation).

Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as "information as
process."

On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it
> allows for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition
> analysis (North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic
> information measures. In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> in which  can be considered as the a posteriori and  the a priori
> distribution. This dynamic information measure can be decomposed and
> aggregated. One can also develop measures for systemic developments and
> critical transitions. In other words, information as a process can also be
> measured in bits of information. Of course, one can extend the
> dimensionality (*i*) for the multivariate case (*ijk*…), and thus use
> information theory for network analysis (including time).
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
>
> References:
>
> ·Leydesdorff, L. (1991). The Static and Dynamic Analysis of
> Network Data Using Information Theory. *Social Networks, 13*(4), 301-345.
>
> ·Theil, H. (1972). *Statistical Decomposition Analysis*.
> Amsterdam/ London: North-Holland.
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> *Emeritus* University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)
>
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> Honorary Professor, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
> Sussex;
>
> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;
>
> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of
> London;
>
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en
>
>
>
> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Steven
> Ericsson-Zenith
> *Sent:* Monday, December 08, 2014 10:22 PM
> *To:* Joseph Brenner
> *Cc:* fis
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process
>
>
>
> I am a little mystified by your assertion of "information as process."
> What, exactly, is this and how does it differ fro information in general
> (Shannon). Is it related to Whitehead's process notions?
>
>
>
> In terms of neuroscience it is important to move away from connectionism
> and modern computational ideas I believe. It is not clear to me how
> information theory can be applied to the operation of the brain at the
> synaptic level because the actions and the decisions made are made across
> the structure and not at a single location.
>
>
>
> Recognition, for example, is not a point event but occurs rather when a
> particular shape is formed in the structure (of the CNS, for example) and
> is immediately covariant with the "appropriate" response (another shape)
> which may be characterized as a hyper-functor (which may or may not include
> neurons and astrocytes in the brain).
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Steven
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 4:39 AM, Joseph Brenner 
> wrote:
>
> Dear Carolina,  Bob L., Bob U., Sören and Krassimir,
>
> First of all thanks to Carolina for having launched a most interesting
> thread, of which I have changed the title since the issues are broader than
> that of Neuroinformation alone, as Francesco has noted.
>
> My first point is a response to Sören since I feel his book does not
> address Information-as-Process as 'physically' as I think necessary. His
> reference to the use of this term by Buckland (on p. 77 not 87), (which I
> had missed when first reading /Cybersemiotics/), however, is followed by a
> reference to information processing. (He later states that a new metatheory
> is required to replace the information processing paradigm, and he proposes
> Peircean semiotics, whereas I have proposed Logic in Reality.) I also note
> that Buckland places Information-as-Process in the 'Intangible' column of
> his matrix and one can question the ontological meaning of this.
>
> In the compendium /Philosophers of Process/. 1998. Browning and Myers
> 

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear colleagues, 

 

Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it allows 
for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition analysis 
(North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information measures. 
In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write: 

 

 

 

in which  can be considered as the a posteriori and  the a priori distribution. 
This dynamic information measure can be decomposed and aggregated. One can also 
develop measures for systemic developments and critical transitions. In other 
words, information as a process can also be measured in bits of information. Of 
course, one can extend the dimensionality (i) for the multivariate case (ijk…), 
and thus use information theory for network analysis (including time).

 

Best,

Loet

 

References:

*Leydesdorff, L. (1991). The Static and Dynamic Analysis of Network 
Data Using Information Theory. Social Networks, 13(4), 301-345. 

*Theil, H. (1972). Statistical Decomposition Analysis. Amsterdam/ 
London: North-Holland.

 

 

  _  

Loet Leydesdorff 

Emeritus University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

 <mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net> l...@leydesdorff.net ;  
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/> http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
Honorary Professor,  <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/> SPRU, University of 
Sussex; 

Guest Professor  <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/> Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor,  <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html> ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor,  <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/> Birkbeck, University of London; 

 <http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en> 
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en

 

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Steven 
Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Monday, December 08, 2014 10:22 PM
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

 

I am a little mystified by your assertion of "information as process." What, 
exactly, is this and how does it differ fro information in general (Shannon). 
Is it related to Whitehead's process notions?

 

In terms of neuroscience it is important to move away from connectionism and 
modern computational ideas I believe. It is not clear to me how information 
theory can be applied to the operation of the brain at the synaptic level 
because the actions and the decisions made are made across the structure and 
not at a single location. 

 

Recognition, for example, is not a point event but occurs rather when a 
particular shape is formed in the structure (of the CNS, for example) and is 
immediately covariant with the "appropriate" response (another shape) which may 
be characterized as a hyper-functor (which may or may not include neurons and 
astrocytes in the brain).

 

Regards,

Steven

 

  

 

On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 4:39 AM, Joseph Brenner mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> > wrote:

Dear Carolina,  Bob L., Bob U., Sören and Krassimir,

First of all thanks to Carolina for having launched a most interesting thread, 
of which I have changed the title since the issues are broader than that of 
Neuroinformation alone, as Francesco has noted.

My first point is a response to Sören since I feel his book does not address 
Information-as-Process as 'physically' as I think necessary. His reference to 
the use of this term by Buckland (on p. 77 not 87), (which I had missed when 
first reading /Cybersemiotics/), however, is followed by a reference to 
information processing. (He later states that a new metatheory is required to 
replace the information processing paradigm, and he proposes Peircean 
semiotics, whereas I have proposed Logic in Reality.) I also note that Buckland 
places Information-as-Process in the 'Intangible' column of his matrix and one 
can question the ontological meaning of this.

In the compendium /Philosophers of Process/. 1998. Browning and Myers (eds.). 
New York: Fordham University Press, Peirce is represented by four papers: "The 
Architecture of Theories", "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined", "The Law of 
Mind"  and "Man's Glassy Essence". Unfortunately, in none of these is the word 
'process' used, let alone described as a concept. 'Process' is not an entry in 
the COMMENS Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce, edited by Bergman and Paavola, 
so the most one can say is that process was not a common concept in Peirce. If 
Information-as-Process is to be developed as a concept, I doubt that Peirce's 
semiotics will help.

In the notes of both Bob. L and Bob U., however, one finds workable properties 
than can be assigned to Information-as-Process, the verb-noun dialectic and the 
concept of real trophic exchange. Krassimir's concept of information being 
dynamic (a process) or stat

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

[Steven Ericsson-Zenith]

I am a little mystified by your assertion of "information as process."
What, exactly, is this and how does it differ fro information in general
(Shannon). Is it related to Whitehead's process notions?

In terms of neuroscience it is important to move away from connectionism
and modern computational ideas I believe. It is not clear to me how
information theory can be applied to the operation of the brain at the
synaptic level because the actions and the decisions made are made across
the structure and not at a single location.

Recognition, for example, is not a point event but occurs rather when a
particular shape is formed in the structure (of the CNS, for example) and
is immediately covariant with the "appropriate" response (another shape)
which may be characterized as a hyper-functor (which may or may not include
neurons and astrocytes in the brain).

Regards,
Steven



On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 4:39 AM, Joseph Brenner 
wrote:

> Dear Carolina,  Bob L., Bob U., Sören and Krassimir,
>
> First of all thanks to Carolina for having launched a most interesting
> thread, of which I have changed the title since the issues are broader than
> that of Neuroinformation alone, as Francesco has noted.
>
> My first point is a response to Sören since I feel his book does not
> address Information-as-Process as 'physically' as I think necessary. His
> reference to the use of this term by Buckland (on p. 77 not 87), (which I
> had missed when first reading /Cybersemiotics/), however, is followed by a
> reference to information processing. (He later states that a new metatheory
> is required to replace the information processing paradigm, and he proposes
> Peircean semiotics, whereas I have proposed Logic in Reality.) I also note
> that Buckland places Information-as-Process in the 'Intangible' column of
> his matrix and one can question the ontological meaning of this.
>
> In the compendium /Philosophers of Process/. 1998. Browning and Myers
> (eds.). New York: Fordham University Press, Peirce is represented by four
> papers: "The Architecture of Theories", "The Doctrine of Necessity
> Examined", "The Law of Mind"  and "Man's Glassy Essence". Unfortunately, in
> none of these is the word 'process' used, let alone described as a concept.
> 'Process' is not an entry in the COMMENS Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce,
> edited by Bergman and Paavola, so the most one can say is that process was
> not a common concept in Peirce. If Information-as-Process is to be
> developed as a concept, I doubt that Peirce's semiotics will help.
>
> In the notes of both Bob. L and Bob U., however, one finds workable
> properties than can be assigned to Information-as-Process, the verb-noun
> dialectic and the concept of real trophic exchange. Krassimir's concept of
> information being dynamic (a process) or static depending on what it
> reflects does not give as complete a notion as I would like that
> information is /in-itself/ a process, even it reflects (refers to) static
> or abstract objects. Nevertheless, Krassimir clearly sees the dualism of
> information as composed of dynamic and static entities, whose interaction,
> as in the case of the first two approaches, can be discussed in the
> framework of Logic in Reality. The problem is his use of the term
> 'reflection' whose nature is not clear as I have remarked to him before.
>
> I look forward to further discussion.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message - From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz" 
> To: "Carolina Isiegas" 
> Cc: 
> Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 6:30 PM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Neuroinformation?
>
>
> Dear Dr. Isiegas:
>
> I envision neuroinformation as the mutual information of the neuronal
> network where synaptic connections are weighted by the frequencies of
> discharge between all pairs of neurons. This is directly analogous to a
> network of trophic exchanges among an ecosystem, as illustrated in
> .
>
> Please note that this measure is different from the conventional
> sender-channel-receiver format of communications theory. It resembles more
> the "structural information" inhering in the neuronal network. John
> Collier (also a FISer) calls such information "enformation" to draw
> attention to its different nature.
>
> With best wishes for success,
>
> Bob Ulanowicz
>
>  Dear list,
>>
>> I have been reading during the last year all these interesting
>> exchanges. Some of them terrific discussions! Given my scientific
>> backgound
>> (Molecular Neuroscience), I would like to hear your point of view on the
>> topic of neuroinformation, how information "exists" within the Central
>> Nervous Systems. My task was experimental; I was interested in
>> investigating the molecular mechanisms underlying learning and memory,
>> specifically, the role of the cAMP-PKA-CREB signaling pathway in such
>> brain
>> functions (In Ted Abel´s Lab at the University of Pennsylvania, where I
>> spent 7 years). I ge

[Fis] Information-as-Process

[Joseph Brenner]

Dear Carolina,  Bob L., Bob U., Sören and Krassimir,

First of all thanks to Carolina for having launched a most interesting 
thread, of which I have changed the title since the issues are broader than 
that of Neuroinformation alone, as Francesco has noted.


My first point is a response to Sören since I feel his book does not address 
Information-as-Process as 'physically' as I think necessary. His reference 
to the use of this term by Buckland (on p. 77 not 87), (which I had missed 
when first reading /Cybersemiotics/), however, is followed by a reference to 
information processing. (He later states that a new metatheory is required 
to replace the information processing paradigm, and he proposes Peircean 
semiotics, whereas I have proposed Logic in Reality.) I also note that 
Buckland places Information-as-Process in the 'Intangible' column of his 
matrix and one can question the ontological meaning of this.


In the compendium /Philosophers of Process/. 1998. Browning and Myers 
(eds.). New York: Fordham University Press, Peirce is represented by four 
papers: "The Architecture of Theories", "The Doctrine of Necessity 
Examined", "The Law of Mind"  and "Man's Glassy Essence". Unfortunately, in 
none of these is the word 'process' used, let alone described as a concept. 
'Process' is not an entry in the COMMENS Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce, 
edited by Bergman and Paavola, so the most one can say is that process was 
not a common concept in Peirce. If Information-as-Process is to be developed 
as a concept, I doubt that Peirce's semiotics will help.


In the notes of both Bob. L and Bob U., however, one finds workable 
properties than can be assigned to Information-as-Process, the verb-noun 
dialectic and the concept of real trophic exchange. Krassimir's concept of 
information being dynamic (a process) or static depending on what it 
reflects does not give as complete a notion as I would like that information 
is /in-itself/ a process, even it reflects (refers to) static or abstract 
objects. Nevertheless, Krassimir clearly sees the dualism of information as 
composed of dynamic and static entities, whose interaction, as in the case 
of the first two approaches, can be discussed in the framework of Logic in 
Reality. The problem is his use of the term 'reflection' whose nature is not 
clear as I have remarked to him before.


I look forward to further discussion.

Best wishes,

Joseph




- Original Message - 
From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz" 

To: "Carolina Isiegas" 
Cc: 
Sent: Wednesday, December 03, 2014 6:30 PM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Neuroinformation?


Dear Dr. Isiegas:

I envision neuroinformation as the mutual information of the neuronal
network where synaptic connections are weighted by the frequencies of
discharge between all pairs of neurons. This is directly analogous to a
network of trophic exchanges among an ecosystem, as illustrated in
.

Please note that this measure is different from the conventional
sender-channel-receiver format of communications theory. It resembles more
the "structural information" inhering in the neuronal network. John
Collier (also a FISer) calls such information "enformation" to draw
attention to its different nature.

With best wishes for success,

Bob Ulanowicz


Dear list,

I have been reading during the last year all these interesting
exchanges. Some of them terrific discussions! Given my scientific
backgound
(Molecular Neuroscience), I would like to hear your point of view on the
topic of neuroinformation, how information "exists" within the Central
Nervous Systems. My task was experimental; I was interested in
investigating the molecular mechanisms underlying learning and memory,
specifically, the role of the cAMP-PKA-CREB signaling pathway in such
brain
functions (In Ted Abel´s Lab at the University of Pennsylvania, where I
spent 7 years). I generated several genetically modified mice in which I
could regulate the expression of this pathway in specific brain regions
and
in which I studied the effects of upregulation or downregulation at the
synaptic and behavioral levels. However, I am conscious that the
"information flow" within the mouse Nervous System is far more complex
that
in the "simple" pathway that I was studying...so, my concrete question for
you "Fishers" or "Fisers", how should we contemplate the micro and macro
structures of information within the neural realm? what is
Neuroinformation?

Best wishes,


--
Carolina Isiegas
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