Re: [Fis] Everett & quantum wave collapse

2018-05-21 Thread Bruno Marchal
Dear Arthuro,


> On 17 May 2018, at 16:30, tozziart...@libero.it wrote:
> 
> Dear Bruno, 
> 
> as far as you wrote and I understood, your Mechanistic framework requires the 
> tenet that quantum wave collapse does not exist.
> 
> In order to prove that, you invoke the authority of Everett.
> 
> 

I refer to Everett, but the truth is that I have never been able to make sense 
of the collapse of the wave packet, which simply contradict the wave equation 
and thus introduce a dualism, which is never well defined. It is obviously an 
axiom added to make disappear the other worlds, to fit the appearance. Everett 
just realise it was not needed, and it solved very elegantly the so called 
measurement problem. It makes physics back to realism, determinism, locality, 
and this in a way consistent with Computationalism (aka Mechanism).

But note that I did prove already (well before I knew QM and Everett) that 
Mechanism alone implies a “many-worlds” or “many histories” interpretation of 
arithmetic (or of any Turing universal system).





> 
> 
> I want to provide a simple, very rough explanation (excuse me!), for the 
> FISers unaware of the Everett's account:
> 
> 
> You are in front of two streets, one turns left and the other turns rigth.
> 
> You have to choose where to turn.
> 
> If you turn left, you could not anymore turn right.
> 
> This is, very roughly speaking, what quantum wave collapse means: if you make 
> a choice, it is irreversible in our Universe.
> 
> In order to avoid such irreversibility, Everett, who did not like quantum 
> wave collapse, provided the following account:
> every time you have to choose whether you have to turn left or right, the 
> entire Universe splits in two different Universes: in one Universe you turn 
> left, while another you turns right in another Universe.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

This is oversimplifying and is actually importantly wrong, if you don’t mind.

Let us assume that the brain is not a quantum computer (as an hot object, this 
is believed by most scientists). If you choose where to turn, with mechanism + 
Everett, you will not split the reality in two. 

To split the reality in that situation, you need to prepare a particle in a 
quantum superposition state, say 

1/sqrt(2) [ up + down]

With up and down being some quantum attribute (like a stern Gerlach spin 
measurement device, in some fixed direction of space), and you have to  
correlate your decision to go left or right according to the measurement of the 
spin (say), like to decide that if you find the spin up you go left, and if you 
find spin down.

So, that is really not a choice. Subjectively, it will seem like a decision by 
throwing a coin. Only in that case will the world split in two (to simplify, as 
both with comp and in some reading of Everett, the physical reality does not 
split, it is consciousness which differentiate in two histories, and that 
splitting propagate to the entire universe at a speed slower than light, just 
by interactions).

This follows from two fundamental features of QM:

 1) the linearity of the tensor product ( A (up + down) = (A up + A down), with 
A being for example the measuring instrument, then the observer, etc. The 
superposition is “contagious” on the environment.

2) the linearity of the state evolution, which explains that in each branch the 
evolution of the physical acts like if they has not have been any split.




> 
> Now, dear FISer, tell me if the Everett's approach is tenable or it is not, 
> and, if your answer is that it is tenable, tell me how it could be even 
> theoretically demonstrated.  
> 
> 


It is demonstrated in the sense that it follows from the literal reading of 
quantum mechanics

If A is the observer, and “A-up” means A having seen “up” (and A-down = A 
seeing “down”). And if A look at the particle spin, we have:

(A down + A up) ==> (A-down down + A-up up).

The observer consciousness has split into seeing up, and seeing down. But with 
mechanism and the linearity of evolution, the observer does not feel the split, 
like in the mechanist first person indeterminacy in a classical 
self-duplication.

This will evolves, in our case into two histories:

(A-down  turning left  down. + A-up turning right up), etc.

So we get the explanation of the subjective (first person) indeterminacy 
without third person indeterminacy in nature. The quantum indeterminacy is 
explained by the (older) first person indeterminacy provided by 
Computationalism. 

Evidences that Nature obeys the Wave equation is abundant. As it explains the 
appearance of a collapse, without introducing a physical collapse, this theory 
is conceptually simpler, and it is those who believe that there is a collapse 
who have to provide the evidences. But there are none, and this makes QM 
applicable to cosmology, quantum computing, etc.

And then, we get again a realist, deterministic and local theory, which is 
consistent with special relativity.

The collapse postulate, on the 

Re: [Fis] Everett & quantum wave collapse

2018-05-17 Thread Lars-Göran Johansson
I completely agree, Arturo! And Everett’s many world’s interpretation have been 
criticised, I would say, killed, since long, for example by Healy and Stein, 
both in NOUS XVIII, 1984. The problem is conceptual; what does Everett mean by 
a world? Referring to your simple example below, one might reasonably ask; 
which individual is the reference of ’me’ in the two scenarios? It cannot be 
the same, of course. So Everett suggests that I have innumerable replicas in 
innumerable worlds. Well if you are allowed to postulate whatever you like, you 
can explain anything, and refute any unpleasant scientific observation. Quantum 
mechanics certainly does not force us to do that.

Lars-Göran

17 maj 2018 kl. 16:30 skrev tozziart...@libero.it:


Dear Bruno,

as far as you wrote and I understood, your Mechanistic framework requires the 
tenet that quantum wave collapse does not exist.

In order to prove that, you invoke the authority of Everett.


I want to provide a simple, very rough explanation (excuse me!), for the FISers 
unaware of the Everett's account:

You are in front of two streets, one turns left and the other turns rigth.

You have to choose where to turn.

If you turn left, you could not anymore turn right.

This is, very roughly speaking, what quantum wave collapse means: if you make a 
choice, it is irreversible in our Universe.



In order to avoid such irreversibility, Everett, who did not like quantum wave 
collapse, provided the following account:

every time you have to choose whether you have to turn left or right, the 
entire Universe splits in two different Universes: in one Universe you turn 
left, while another you turns right in another Universe.



Now, dear FISer, tell me if the Everett's approach is tenable or it is not, 
and, if your answer is that it is tenable, tell me how it could be even 
theoretically demonstrated.


Il 17 maggio 2018 alle 11.25 Bruno Marchal 
> ha scritto:

Dear Arturo,


On 14 May 2018, at 12:25, tozziart...@libero.it 
wrote:


Daer Bruno,

first of all, sorry for the previous private communication, but for a mistake, 
I did not add the FIS list in the CC.


Concerning your Faith, i.e., arithmetic,

I agree it is faith, but it is less faith than any scientists. Especially that 
we need only a tiny part of the arithmetical truth.

Did you have heard about someone taking back his/her children from primary 
school when they are taught the laws of addition and multiplication, by 
claiming they have not that faith?




this appraoch... simply does not work for the description of physical and 
biological issues.

The approach just study the necessary logical consequence of assuming our 
bodies to be digitalisable.  I predicted all the quantum weirdness from this 45 
years ago. But then it took me 30 years to get precise mathematical 
predictions, which until now fits with the fact, when physicalism needs a 
brain-mind identity thesis which has been shown inconsistent.
I am not sure why you say that Mechanism cannot work for physical and 
biological issues. You might confuse the computable (like automata), and the 
semi-computable (like the universal Turing machine).





It is just in our mind.  See:

http://vixra.org/abs/1804.0132


What do you mean by “real world”?
I agree Euclid geometry is in our head. The whole physical reality is indeed 
shown to be “in the head” of *any* universal machine or universal number, etc.




I'm not confusing digital physics with Mechanism, and I read, of course, the 
work of Everett (the original mathematical one), and it is exactly like 
Mechanism: an untestable, fashinating analogy.  He wants, without any 
possibility of proof, to extend the realm of quantum dynamics to the whole 
macroscopic world.


For a logician; Everett is the Herbrand model of the Schroedinger equation, 
that is QM without the unintelligible “collapse” of the wave. Put simply: the 
“many-world” is just literal quantum mechanics without collapse.
Everett did not propose a new speculative theory: he just showed that we don’t 
need the collapse axiom, as QM + mechanism recovers it phenomenologically. Then 
my work shows this can work only if we recover also the wave itself from 
arithmetic (or Turing equivalent).

It is the collapse which is bad and unclear, and not needed, untestable, 
assumption.



When you state that:

"the reality becomes the universal mind (the mind of the universal Turing 
machine) and the physical is the border of the universal mind viewed from 
inside that universal mind".

you are saying something that, reductionistic or not (I do not understand your 
emphasis on this rather trascurable concepts of matter, reduction, and so on), 
needs to be clearly proofed, before becoming the gold standard.


What I did has been peer reviewed and verified by many people. Have you read my 
papers?
Did you find a problem, or are you just