Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

2016-05-02 Thread Alex Hankey
Dear Bruno,

You have brought up a vitally important question.
Thank you so very much.
Best wishes

Alex

RE Bruno: How could the quantum correlations existence be definite if
nothing is objective?

ME: It does not really matter what the nature of the reality is, either
strongly objective (denied by quantum theory), or D'Espagnat's 'Veiled
Reality', the title of his book in which he discusses a
not-strongly-objective reality. Quantum correlations will have the same
level of existence as the wave function and everything built out of
mixtures of wave-functions, wave-packets, and / or quantum fields.

Quantum correlations exist as 'definitely' (or indefinitely) as everything
else.
(See the discussion(s) under Steve Bindeman's response(s) earlier today.)

ALSO: The problem with 'Interpreting Quantum Theory' is that if your basic
assumption about the nature of reality is not consistent with the
implications of quantum theory, then quantum theory will inevitably be
impossible to interpret, because its implications will deny your underlying
assumptions. (I REGARD THIS AS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE)

Quantum theory popularizer, Heinz Pagels (late husband of Elaine Pagels),
posed the question: "What is quantum theory trying to tell us about
existence / our universe?"
I fell that D'Espagnat's theorem says it all - or at least a great deal of
it.

My Proposed Resolution of the problem is to make sure that the macroscopic
reality you choose as the context for your interpretation of quantum theory
is not inconsistent with the theory. Then quantum theory turns out to be
relatively (sic!) easy to interpret.

But such realities are not popular as an underlying metaphysics in western
thought, though they do occur in South Asian schools of thought, and in
Whitehead's Process Philosophy.

That is why I promote a 'Vedic' interpretation of quantum theory which
starts with the idea of information and information generation as being
primary, and matter and energy as being secondary. The *processes* of
information generation (wave packet reduction), information transmission
(free states of wave functions), and information storage (bound states)
then become fundamental, along with the non-quantum states at critical
instabilities, where phenomenal experience becomes possible via <*O*
.

The primary source of information in the universe is then the symmetry
breaking process at the origin of the inflationary process in quantum
cosmology, a singularity in which I can locate information states of the
kind that I am proposing in this webinar as the foundation for
phenomenology / experience, since their <*O* structure can support
both the sense of self', in *O*, and integrated information supporting
gestalt cognition in <.

Interestingly and as I have already emphasized, this makes both the 'self'
a process, <*O*, and objects of perception, weakly objective entities
supported / manifested by sequences of information production processes.

I confess that I am a slightly unwilling Whiteheadian! (There is much to
learn!)

On 2 May 2016 at 09:55, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Hi Alex,
>
> On 02 May 2016, at 08:30, Alex Hankey wrote:
>
> RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to
> something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to
> something material.
>
> ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at least
> one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave function as a
> real entity in the (strongly) objective sense.
>
> I was under the impression that Bernard D'Espagnat's work for which he
> received the Templeton Prize had definitively shown that nothing is
> 'objectively real' in the strongly objective sense. The definite existence
> of quantum correlations destroys all that.
>
>
> Is that not self-defeating? How could the quantum correlations existence
> be definite if nothing is objective?
> With Digital Mechanism we need to accept that the existence of the
> universal machine and the computations is as real/true as the facts of
> elementary arithmetic, on which everyone agree(*). Then we can explain why
> machines develop a belief in a physical reality, and why that beliefs can
> last and can be sharable among many individuals, like with the quanta, and
> why some part of those beliefs are not sharable, yet undoubtable, like the
> qualia.
>
> (*) I like to define Arithmetical Realism by the action of not withdrawing
> your kids from school when they learn the table of addition and
> multiplication. It is mainly the belief that 2+2=5 is not correct.
>
>
> Once this is accepted, the enquirer is faced with the question of what to
> accept as fundamental. I have always considered 'information' in the sense
> of the process or flow that connects the observed to the observer as a
> satisfactory alternative. The process of information flow creates the
> observer-observed relationship and (the illusion of??) their separation.

Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

2016-05-02 Thread Alex Hankey
RE Bruno Marchal: Gödel's theorem implies that machines which are looking
at themselves (in a precise technical sense) develop a series of distinct
phenomenologies (arguably corresponding to justifiable, knowable,
observable, sensible).

ME: I find this a fascinating observation in that you are making a
phenomenological association with a self-referential kind of machine.

However, from the perspective of my proposal, surely your classes of
machine are not operating from a critical instability where the information
states themselves have the self-referential property embedded within them.
Or are they? Or some of them?

The question then arises whether such a machine could exhibit a capacity to
"reason about" a problem, which it had been posed, and so tackle the
problem as one of a member of.a class of similar problems?

It is certainly true in mathematics that the human mind possesses such
abilities to an outstanding extent: not only the ability to comprehend a
problem, and secondly the ability to see the problem as a member of (in the
context of) a class of similar problems, but also the ability to *generalize
*a problem, and so *create* a class of similar problems as a context within
which more general reasoning processes can be applied to solve the problem
in question.

An example of such an approach is given by the Taniyama-Shimura
conjecture, "Each
Elliptical Function is equivalent to a particular Modular Form", one step
of the path followed by Andrew Wiles to prove Fermat's last theorem between
1986 and 1994.

Does this not also illustrate aspects of the discussion of Godel's theorem,
where Maxine has extensively quoted semantic objections to Godel's
statement on the grounds (as I understand her) that it could not be
construed as a direct product of phenomenological experience.

May I say that I would not regard my paraphrase of Maxine's reason as a
valid objection because I do not expect statements in mathematics to
conform to requirements for statements to be considered phenomenological.
The sentential calculus is constructed within the category of sets, and
Frege and Russell and Whitehead were operating within that framework, as
was Godel.

I personally do not regard the category of sets as a valid framework for
phenomenology.
My construction of a new information theory appropriate to describe
phenomenological experience specifically denies it. The sentential calculus
of Frege & co has no bite - it is superficial and not the enamel required
to start up the mind's intellectual digestion and absorption processes.


-- 
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics
and Phenomenological Philosophy

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Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

2016-05-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 02 May 2016, at 03:38, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone wrote:


To all concerned colleagues,

I appreciate the fact that discussions should be conversations about  
issues,
but this particular issue and in particular the critique cited in my  
posting
warrant extended exposition in order to show the reasoning upholding  
the critique.
I am thus quoting from specific articles, the first  
phenomenological, the second
analytic-logical--though they are obviously complementary as befits  
discussions

in phenomenology and the life sciences.

EXCERPT FROM:
SELF-REFERENCE AND GÖDEL'S THEOREM: A HUSSERLIAN ANALYSIS
Husserl Studies 19 (2003), pages 131-151.
Albert A. Johnstone

The aim of this article is to show that a Husserlian approach to the  
Liar paradoxes and to their closely related kin discloses the  
illusory nature of these difficulties. Phenomenological meaning  
analysis finds the ultimate source of mischief to be circular  
definition, implicit or explicit. Definitional circularity lies at  
the root both of the self-reference integral to the statements that  
generate Liar paradoxes, and of the particular instances of  
predicate criteria featured in the Grelling paradox as well as in  
the self-evaluating Gödel sentence crucial to Gödel's theorem.  
Since the statements thereby generated turn out on closer scrutiny  
to be vacuous and semantically nonsensical, their rejection from  
reasonable discourse is both warranted and imperative. Naturally  
enough, their exclusion dissolves the various problems created by  
their presence. . . .


VII: THE GOEDEL SENTENCE
Following a procedure invented by Gödel, one may assign numbers in  
some orderly way as names or class-numbers to each of the various  
classes of numbers (the prime numbers, the odd numbers, and so on).  
Some of these class-numbers will qualify for membership in the class  
they name; others will not. For instance, if the number 41 should  
happen to be the class-number that names the class of numbers that  
are divisible by 7, then since 41 does not have the property of  
being divisible by 7, the class-number 41 would not be a member of  
the class it names.
	Now, consider the class-number of the class of class-numbers that  
are members of the class they name. Does it have the defining  
property of the class it names? The question is unanswerable. Since  
the defining property of the class is that of being a class-number  
that is a member of the class it names, the necessary and sufficient  
condition for the class-number in question to be a member of the  
class it names turns out to be that it be a member of the class it  
names. In short, the number is a member if and only if it is a  
member. The criterion is circular--defined in terms of what was to  
be defined--and consequently not a criterion at all since it  
provides no way of determining whether or not the number is a member.
	The situation is obviously similar for the class-number of the  
complementary class of class-numbers--those that do not have the  
defining property of the class they name--since the criteria in the  
two cases are logically interdependent. The criterion of membership  
is likewise defined in circular fashion, and hence is vacuous. In  
addition, the criterion postulates an absurd analytic equivalence,  
that of the defining property with its negative. The question of  
whether the class-number is a member of the class it names is  
unanswerable, with the result that any proposed answer is neither  
true nor false. In addition, of course, any answer would generate  
paradox: the number has the requisite defining property if and only  
if it does not have it.
	As might be expected, the situation is not significantly different  
for the class-number of classes of which the definition involves  
semantic predicates. Consider, for instance, the class of class- 
numbers of which it is provable that they are members of the class  
they name. The question of whether the class-number of the class is  
a member of the class it numbers is undecidable. The possession by  
the class-number of the property requisite for membership is  
conditional upon the question of whether it provably possesses the  
property, with the result that the question can have no answer.  
Otherwise stated, the number has the defining property of the class  
it names if and only if it provably has that property. In these  
circumstances, the explanation of what it means for the class-number  
to have the property has to be circular in that it must define  
having the property in terms of having the property. The vacuity  
that results is hidden somewhat by the presence of the requirement  
of provability, but while provability might count as a necessary  
condition, in the present case it cannot be a sufficient one. In  
fact, its presence creates a semantically absurd situation: the  
analytic equivalence of having the property and provably having it.  
The statement of the 

Re: [Fis] FIS Discussion (No Vol #)

2016-05-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Alex,

On 02 May 2016, at 08:30, Alex Hankey wrote:

RE Bruno Marchal: It is easier to explain the illusion of matter to  
something conscious than to explain the illusion of consciousness to  
something material.


ME: At the Consciousness Conference I found it extraordinary that at  
least one plenary presentation was centered round treating the wave  
function as a real entity in the (strongly) objective sense.


I was under the impression that Bernard D'Espagnat's work for which  
he received the Templeton Prize had definitively shown that nothing  
is 'objectively real' in the strongly objective sense. The definite  
existence of quantum correlations destroys all that.


Is that not self-defeating? How could the quantum correlations  
existence be definite if nothing is objective?
With Digital Mechanism we need to accept that the existence of the  
universal machine and the computations is as real/true as the facts of  
elementary arithmetic, on which everyone agree(*). Then we can explain  
why machines develop a belief in a physical reality, and why that  
beliefs can last and can be sharable among many individuals, like with  
the quanta, and why some part of those beliefs are not sharable, yet  
undoubtable, like the qualia.


(*) I like to define Arithmetical Realism by the action of not  
withdrawing your kids from school when they learn the table of  
addition and multiplication. It is mainly the belief that 2+2=5 is not  
correct.




Once this is accepted, the enquirer is faced with the question of  
what to accept as fundamental. I have always considered  
'information' in the sense of the process or flow that connects the  
observed to the observer as a satisfactory alternative. The process  
of information flow creates the observer-observed relationship and  
(the illusion of??) their separation.


I can be OK with this. In arithmetic, it is more like a consciousness  
flow, and actually a differentiating consciousness flow, from which  
the laws of physics evolve.






Sequences of information production made possible by lack of  
equilibrium, both mechanical and thermodynamic, create pictures of  
particle tracks at the microscopic level, and pictures of objects at  
the macroscopic level.


This already seem to presuppose a physical reality. As I am interested  
in understanding what that could be and where it comes from, I prefer  
to not assume it. I gave an argument why such an assumption is not  
quite compatible with the digital mechanist assumption (not in  
physics, but in cognitive science).





Everything is made consistent by the existence of quantum  
correlations in mathematical ways use by Everett in the book on the  
Many Worlds interpretation by Bryce De Witt (note that I use the  
mathematics, but do not concur with the interpretation).


Everett did not talk about a new interpretation. He just gave a new  
Quantum Mechanics formulation, which is basically the old one  
(Copenhagen) but without the assumption of a wave collapse. I tend to  
agree with David Deutsch on this: the "many-world" is just literal  
quantum mechanics, where we apply the wave or matrix equation to the  
observed and the observer as well.






In my approach, the universe continuously makes choices, and selects  
among its own futures. I had a lengthy conversation with Henry Stapp  
two days ago at the conference after his talk, and checked that he  
still approves of this approach.



The only problem with Everett theory, is that he used digital  
mechanism, and what I did show, is that this should force him to  
extend the embedding of the physicist in the wave to the embedding of  
the mathematician in arithmetic (a dormant notion, alas). The ultimate  
equation of physics might be only arithmetic (or anything Turing  
equivalent). All the rest becomes internal phenomenologies, at least  
assuming digital mechanism.
This makes also digital mechanism testable, by comparing the physical  
phenomenology with the actual observation. Up to now, it fits:  the  
quantum weirdness of the universal wave (the multiverse) seem to match  
well  the digital mechanist arithmetical weirdness of arithmetic  
(intuitively and formally).
The only trouble is that such a top down approach leads to complex  
unsolved problem in mathematics, which is normal, given the depth and  
complexity of the subject. I am not a defender of digital mechanism, I  
use it only because the philosophical and theological questions  
becomes mathematical problem. I search the key only under the lamp of  
mathematics.


Best,

Bruno




P.S. Thanks to all for making this such a rich and interesting  
discussion.


--
Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789


2015 JPBMB