Caro Mark e cari tutti, la patologia finanziaria è determinata dall'ignoranza e dalla disonestà. L'una e l'altra vanno condannate, non tanto per ragioni morali, quanto per incapacità e corruzione. Si: corruzione o falsificazione della scienza economica qual è quella che ha portato alla formulazione di algoritmi falsi, pseudo teorici e non corrispondenti alla effettiva realtà dei mercati. Questo non ha niente a che vedere con la fiducia o la sfiducia nei confronti degli economisti. Tranne che non si abbia a che fare con correnti o tendenze economiche che scambiano l'apparenza con la realtà e la luce con le ombre. E viceversa. Nessuno nega che le scienze non sono tutte uguali. Tuttavia, servono tutte, se sono vere o fino a quando non vengono falsificate. Nella confusione (di parole e di concetti) che spesso si crea tra significazione, informazione e comunicazione bisogna non perdere di vista un fondamento: informazione sta a neg-entropia come dis-informazione sta ad entropia. Tutto ciò a prescindere dalla teoria dell'informazione alla fonte o matematica che definisce l'informazione di un messaggio con una formula che ricorda quella dell'entropia non avente alcun significato semantico, se non dopo avere introdotto un s-codice. In conclusione:i entropia è degradazione o deformazione (mortale), neg-entropia è informazione od ordine (vitale). Anche nella scienza dell'economia. Un abbraccio augurale. Francesco
2016-10-14 14:38 GMT+02:00 Pedro C. Marijuan <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>: > -------- Mensaje reenviado -------- > Asunto: Re: [Fis] Scientific communication (from Mark) > Fecha: Fri, 14 Oct 2016 13:04:06 +0100 > De: Mark Johnson <johnsonm...@gmail.com> <johnsonm...@gmail.com> > Para: fis <fis@listas.unizar.es> <fis@listas.unizar.es>, Pedro C. > Marijuan <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> <pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> > > Dear Karl, Loet and Bruno, > > On reflection, I had been thinking this discussion about scientific > communication had been a bit 'quiet'... now it is less quiet: there's > nothing like throwing 'god' into the equation to liven up discussions! > Why? > > More seriously (and sorry, this is a long post) there are three > fundamental distinctions and an example which I want to draw in the > light of your comments. They are: > 1. The distinction between IS and OUGHT in arguments about scientific > communication > 2. The distinction between an EXPLANATION and a DESCRIPTION > 3. Issues about ONTOLOGY and INFORMATION > 4. A musical example > > 1. IS - OUGHT > There are critical worries in Bruno's comments about making "theology, > the science, vulnerable, as reason is no more allowed in, and that > leaves the place for emotion and wishful thinking, which are quickly > exploited by manipulators, usually to steal our money, or control us > in some ways". Clearly, we ought not allow this to happen. In my > second video, I used the example of the swindler whose speech acts are > chosen in full knowledge of the constraints of the victim. Of course > there are unscrupulous religious people who do this; but there are > equally (and possibly more so) unscrupulous scientists (particularly, > I'm afraid, psychologists and economists (if they are to be considered > scientists - as they would like)). I like Bruno's theology of the > machine - it looks very similar to Ashby's concept of variety (the set > of propositions true about the machine = the set of possible states > the machine can exist in)... which brings us back to information, > Shannon, etc. > > I agree with Karl in his suggestion "to focus on the dichotomy > creating the foreground, lifting it off from the background. Patterns > connect the two: it is reasonable, in my view, to work on the subject > of patterns.". But it is easy to say that we "ought" to do this. I'd > prefer to see the pathologies that we see in education and publishing > are a direct consequence of our not doing this, and to describe the > ontological mechanisms. It is the business of arguing how our > scientific communication should be conducted in the light of what we > know about our science. > > Hume's famous passage in dealing with the dichotomy of "is" and > "ought" is worth reflecting on: > > "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have > always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the > ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or > makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am > surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of > propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not > connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is > imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this > ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis > necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same > time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether > inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, > which are entirely different from it." > > His complaint is about slippage from "is" to "ought" (he does not deny > the possibility of deriving an ought from an is - the logical > positivists misrepresented him). > > In my argument about scientific publishing I have tried to be careful > in avoiding 'oughts' and ground an argument for a richer embrace of > technological expression on the basis of describing how today's > science is. I'm arguing (not much differently from David Bohm whose > work on communication is new to me) that the nature of the science > entails the need for new practices of communication. > > There is a critical dimension (which I don't think is an Ought - it's > just a warning): if we continue to communicate in the way that we did > in the 17th century, then our communication won't work because it > works against the scientific ontology. I'm speculating that this > pathology feeds into financialisation processes which produce social > crisis. In Hume's argument, communication between scientists and an > ontology of regularity were tied together; now we have have to admit > multiple contingencies in our scientific practices, the communication > cannot be unchanged - can it? > > 2. EXPLANATION and DESCRIPTION > In the posts of Bruno and Karl, there is reference to science's search > for universal explanation. This is clearly a very deep issue, but it > fundamentally concerns our conception of causation. What is causation? > What is causal explanation? For Hume, causal explanations are > constructs produced in discourse (i.e. communication) between > scientists in the light of regular successions of events produced in > experiments. However, it is also worth considering that Hume was > deeply sceptical about the articulation of any rational foundation > which could underpin the production of regularities in nature. That > cast doubt on assumptions about inductive reasoning (and for anyone > who would champion Peirce's 'abduction', I think it suffers from the > same problem at a different level) > > Scientists certainly produce totalising explanations, cosmologies, > etc, and these can be very useful to organise discourse and scientific > activity, and also creating a sense of hubristic excitement which > moves things on. But whilst universalist claims will be made, all we > can safely say is that it is a "description of understanding". > Scientific communication occurs when different scientist's > "descriptions of understanding" coincide. I prefer to think of this as > a recognition between scientists that they operate within related or > shared constraints. We should inquire into the conditions when this > happens. > > To describe phenomena, and one's understanding of phenomena is to > reveal one's constraints. Describing doubt is a very important part of > this. Explanation is to attempt to remove doubt - not just of the > explainer, but of those they wish to convince. > > 3. ONTOLOGY and INFORMATION > Loet spotted a constraint in my understanding about redundancy and > made an intervention which has (this time - sorry for not getting it > until now!) really clarified things, and also opened up a connection > between ontology, information and redundancy. > > Essentially, to calculate the redundancy one must have the maximum > entropy, and the maximum entropy can only be gained from what Loet > calls the "specification of the system": that, in my understanding, is > an agreed ontology of what the system IS. > > I think this makes the relationship between Shannon information and > redundancy recursive. In order to agree the ontology of the system, > one must communicate; in order to communicate we must agree the > constraints; in order to apprehend constraints, we must identify the > redundancy... which can be identified through the maximum entropy, > which entails agreeing an ontology. And so on. This makes me think my > intuition about the importance of Lou Kauffmann's work isn't wide of > the mark. > > Information appears like a recursive version of Wittgenstein's > duck-rabbit, where there is a smaller duck-rabbit inside the larger > duck-rabbit. In Karl's terms, the dynamic of dichotomy between > foreground and background operates at all levels of recursion: > identify it at one level is an unavoidable constraint imposed on it. > > Of course, it is impractical to go to these recursive depths. > Shannon's equations constrain us to a simple empirically observable > domain. But I think it is important to recognise that the recursion is > there, and that we are effectively 'cutting into it' (or constraining > it) > > It may be that the point hangs on the identification of analogy, or > identity: of what is counted as "the same as" or "another one". > > 4. MUSICAL EXAMPLE > I'm preparing a video to explore this which uses a musical example. > I'll try and explain in text what I want the video to explain (you > will at least have two descriptions!): > > Music analysts identify those features in a score or some other record > of performance which are "the same" and "another" and produce their > analyses which show how different combinations of categories change > over time. But when we listen to a piece of music for the first time, > we know little of what is about to come, except that our expectations > are shaped as the music unfolds. What emerges over time is a > multiplicity of what might be called "descriptions" (although they > need not be verbalised, they can be expressed analytically to some > extent). These concern many different dimensions of what we hear, > including: > 1. the rhythmic patterns > 2. melodic patterns > 3. timbral patterns > 4. dynamics (loud and soft) > 5. phrasing > 6. pitch > 7. intervals... and so forth. > > Each description exists within constraints which are partly produced > by the other descriptions, and by other factors (like, for example, > one's familiarity with the style). As the music unfolds, new > descriptions (about form, climactic moments, harmonic progressions, > etc) emerge and whose constraints will interact with (and transform) > existing constraints - even (most powerfully in music) our emotional > constraints. > > I mention music because it is a form of communication which is > extremely powerful and which does not make any external reference. Yet > it tells us something about how we communicate, but there is an > analytical puzzle here. The specification of the system is beyond > reach, yet we sense the patterns, the repetition, the redundancy > without having a sophisticated way of calculating it. We also identify > that what we might consider to be "the same" at one moment in one > context, we might later count as being fundamentally "different" in > another (e.g. perhaps the same melody with a different harmony). > Moreover, I suggest that at these moments of seeing something to be > different that we once thought to be "the same" are moments of gaining > deeper insight into the meaning being conveyed. My deepened > understanding of the relationship between redundancy and the > "specification of the system" explained by Loet is an example. > > This, it seems to me, is the essence of what happens when we really > communicate. The process, I suggest, is an emergent interaction of > constraints. It requires multiple descriptions. As long as we attempt > to convey singular descriptions in academic papers alone, > communication in this sense is going to be very difficult - if not > impossible. > > Best wishes, > > Mark > > > > > On 13 October 2016 at 10:32, Karl Javorszky <karl.javors...@gmail.com> > <karl.javors...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Theology and Information > > > > > > > > Once again, Bruno has put his finger on the central point of interest: it is > > irrelevant, what we call the problem, the subject-matter remains the same > > over the generations. In times long gone, thinkers have called the same > > problems THEOLOGICAL questions, because it was usual to discriminate the > > known from the unknown by saying: what we know belongs to the realm of > > humans, what we don’t know is the domain of God. > > > > Irrespective of the name given to the target of research, it remains in a > > contrast to the knowledge accessible (presently) to us humans. It builds the > > BACKGROUND to that what we can understand, and therefore talk reasonably > > about. > > > > The background of perception, of understanding, of knowledge, of opinions, > > or even the background as such, as an epistemological construct, is a > > central theme in psychology. There, one treats it as a necessary correlate > > to the foreground and the trade has looked into the processes of > > dichotomisation which he human brain uses to perceive the foreground. The > > flip-flop technique – exchanging the background with the foreground – allows > > research into the mechanisms of recognition. > > > > The main point is to overcome the dichotomies which distinguish the > > foreground from the background. One such approach is to recognise that > > “contemporary” and “successive” are man-made (perception-induced) > > categories. This approach has allowed understanding, how the succession of > > the DNA’s elements relate to the contemporary properties of the temporally > > identical elements of the organism. This riddle has been solved. > > > > The task presently before us is to understand the meaning of the term > > PATTERNS. Once we understand patterns, we can explain how the recurring is > > related to the expected and the unexpected. Causality itself appears to be a > > corollary of patterns. > > > > Let me conclude by asserting that that we in the 21st century still labour > > on the same basic questions e.g. Giordano Bruno has raised, namely: what is > > the ultimate, unifying principle which drives the world. In today’s > > parlance, we do not discuss the same problems in terms of theology, (“what > > are the properties of God and how does He organise us and the world”) but in > > terms of quanta, energy and information (“what are the properties of > > information and how does it organise us and the world”), yet the approach is > > the same: we try to understand the properties of that what is the background > > to that what we can understand well. > > > > My suggestion is to focus on the dichotomy creating the foreground, lifting > > it off from the background. Patterns connect the two: it is reasonable, in > > my view, to work on the subject of patterns. Do patterns contain > > information? > > > > Karl > > > > > > 2016-10-11 19:58 GMT+02:00 Loet Leydesdorff <l...@leydesdorff.net> > > <l...@leydesdorff.net>: > >> > >> Dear Mark and colleagues, > >> > >> > >> > >> Loet, clearly the redundancy is apophatic, although one has to be cautious > >> in saying this: the domain of the apophatic is bigger than the domain of > >> Shannon redundancy. At some point in the future we may do better in > >> developing measurement techniques for 'surprise' in communication (I wonder > >> if Lou Kauffman's Recursive Distinguishing is a way forwards...). > >> > >> > >> > >> The extension of the redundancy is not primarily a matter of measurement > >> techniques, but of theorizing. The redundancy depends on the specification > >> of the system. The Shannon-type information is empirical, but only the > >> specification of the system enables us to specify the H(max) and therefore > >> the redundancy. > >> > >> > >> > >> As the system grows, it may develop new dimensions which are manifest as > >> bifurcations. (Reaction-diffusion dynamics; Rashevsky, Turing.) When one > >> goes from one dimension n to a two-dimensional system [n,m], the number of > >> options [H(max)] goes from log(n) to log(n * m), and thus the redundancy > >> increases rapidly. > >> > >> > >> > >> For example: as long as transport over the Alps is limited to passes like > >> the Brenner, the capacity can become exhausted. Digging tunnels or flying > >> over the Alps adds degrees of freedom to the transport system. The number > >> of > >> options (n * m * k * ….) can “explode” by cultural and technological > >> developments. The transitions come as surprises (e.g., the demise of the > >> Soviet-Union). Suddenly, the relevant systems definitions have to be > >> revised. > >> > >> > >> > >> The systems definitions have the status of hypotheses. Hypotheses can be > >> considered as theoretically informed expectations. The world of > >> expectations > >> proliferates with a dynamic different from the actualizations. The two > >> realms are coupled since the actualizations can be considered as > >> instantiations of the order of expectations; but only if the latter is > >> specified as different from the empirical order of realizations. > >> > >> > >> > >> Best, > >> > >> Loet > >> > >> > >> > >> ________________________________ > >> > >> Loet Leydesdorff > >> > >> Professor, University of Amsterdam > >> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR) > >> > >> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ > >> Associate Faculty, SPRU, University of Sussex; > >> > >> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, > >> Beijing; > >> > >> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck, University of London; > >> > >> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYAAAAJ&hl=en > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Fis mailing list > > Fis@listas.unizar.es > > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > > -- > Dr. Mark William Johnson > Institute of Learning and Teaching > Faculty of Health and Life Sciences > University of Liverpool > > Phone: 07786 064505 > Email: johnsonm...@gmail.com > Blog: http://dailyimprovisation.blogspot.com > . > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >
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