Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

2014-12-12 Thread Pedro C. Marijuan

Dear Loet, Steven, and colleagues,

During last ten years or so, with particular success in most recent 
years, Karl Friston has developed his free energy optimization 
principle, based on Shannon's information theory and optimal control 
theory as well as on the Bayesian brain hypothesis. I think this is the 
most advanced work towards a unified brain theory today. The 
minimization dynamics of the cerebral free energy construct (it is a 
sort of Helmoltz program revisited) becomes a generative process of 
perception, action, learning and adaptive behaviors in general. The 2010 
paper (Nature Reviews Neurosceince, doi: 10.138/nrn2787) where he 
precisely argues about a unified brain theory, is quite representative 
of his proposals. On a personal basis, during last two decades I was 
following and cooperating with Kenneth Paul Collins (we published a book 
in Spanish about the emergence of behavior from brain dynamics). Our 
scheme was based on the minimization of a collective variable supposedly 
a sort of entropy of excitation/inhibition ratios topologically 
distributed among neuronal surfaces of the cortex that was performed 
essentially by the medial parts of the brain. Although very rich in 
qualitative and behavioral aspects, the formal part was too weak 
(awfully weak). Until recent years I could not connect meaningfully 
Collin's approach with other works, and unfortunately he left scientific 
research long ago--but now the marriage with Friston's is remarkable. 
Putting them together may be a very fertile exploratory avenue.


best ---Pedro

Loet Leydesdorff wrote:


Dear Steven and colleagues,

 

I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read 
as an introduction?


 

It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial 
theories of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal 
apparatus: the design and the results do not yet have meaning without 
an interpretation in a substantial context. On the other side, a 
theory about, for example, neuro-information is a special theory. One 
can in this context use information theory as a statistical tool 
(among other tools). Sometimes, one can move beyond description. J


 

The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special 
theories, is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move 
between domains heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can 
perhaps be used metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice 
versa). The advantages have to be shown in empirical research: which 
questions can be addressed and which puzzles be solved?


 


Best,

Loet

 




Loet Leydesdorff

/Emeritus/ University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

l...@leydesdorff.net mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net; 
http://www.leydesdorff.net/
Honorary Professor, SPRU, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/University of 
Sussex;


Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/, 
Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, 
http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.htmlBeijing;


Visiting Professor, Birkbeck http://www.bbk.ac.uk/, University of 
London;


http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en 
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en


 

*From:* stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] *On 
Behalf Of *Steven Ericsson-Zenith

*Sent:* Tuesday, December 09, 2014 10:13 PM
*To:* l...@leydesdorff.net
*Cc:* Joseph Brenner; fis
*Subject:* Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

 

The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is 
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my 
model, can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision 
point and response covariance is impossible to consider. 

 

It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and 
hyper-functors in which I can express the explicit role of a base 
universal (per gravitation).


 

Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as 
information as process.


 

On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff 
l...@leydesdorff.net mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net wrote:


Dear colleagues,

 


Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus
because it allows for the dynamic extension. Theil
(1972)—Statistical decomposition analysis (North
Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information
measures. In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write:

 


mailbox:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/pcmarijuan.iacs/Datos%20de%20programa/Thunderbird/Profiles/2vg9i0k9.default/Mail/pop3.aragon-1.es/Inbox?number=1793468636header=quotebodypart=1.1.2filename=image001.png


 


in which

mailbox:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/pcmarijuan.iacs/Datos%20de%20programa/Thunderbird/Profiles/2vg9i0k9.default/Mail/pop3.aragon-1.es/Inbox?number=1793468636header

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

2014-12-12 Thread Ken Herold
Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11, 127-138 (February 2010) | doi
:10.1038/nrn2787
http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v11/n2/full/nrn2787.html

:)  Ken

On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 8:19 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan 
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es wrote:

 Dear Loet, Steven, and colleagues,

 During last ten years or so, with particular success in most recent years,
 Karl Friston has developed his free energy optimization principle, based on
 Shannon's information theory and optimal control theory as well as on the
 Bayesian brain hypothesis. I think this is the most advanced work towards a
 unified brain theory today. The minimization dynamics of the cerebral free
 energy construct (it is a sort of Helmoltz program revisited) becomes a
 generative process of perception, action, learning and adaptive behaviors
 in general. The 2010 paper (Nature Reviews Neurosceince, doi:
 10.138/nrn2787) where he precisely argues about a unified brain theory, is
 quite representative of his proposals. On a personal basis, during last two
 decades I was following and cooperating with Kenneth Paul Collins (we
 published a book in Spanish about the emergence of behavior from brain
 dynamics). Our scheme was based on the minimization of a collective
 variable supposedly a sort of entropy of excitation/inhibition ratios
 topologically distributed among neuronal surfaces of the cortex that was
 performed essentially by the medial parts of the brain. Although very rich
 in qualitative and behavioral aspects, the formal part was too weak
 (awfully weak). Until recent years I could not connect meaningfully
 Collin's approach with other works, and unfortunately he left scientific
 research long ago--but now the marriage with Friston's is remarkable.
 Putting them together may be a very fertile exploratory avenue.

 best ---Pedro

 Loet Leydesdorff wrote:


 Dear Steven and colleagues,


 I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read as
 an introduction?


 It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial
 theories of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal
 apparatus: the design and the results do not yet have meaning without an
 interpretation in a substantial context. On the other side, a theory about,
 for example, neuro-information is a special theory. One can in this context
 use information theory as a statistical tool (among other tools).
 Sometimes, one can move beyond description. J


 The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special
 theories, is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move between
 domains heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can perhaps be
 used metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice versa). The
 advantages have to be shown in empirical research: which questions can be
 addressed and which puzzles be solved?


 Best,

 Loet


 

 Loet Leydesdorff

 /Emeritus/ University of Amsterdam
 Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

 l...@leydesdorff.net mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net;
 http://www.leydesdorff.net/
 Honorary Professor, SPRU, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/University of
 Sussex;

 Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/,
 Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/
 brief_en.htmlBeijing;

 Visiting Professor, Birkbeck http://www.bbk.ac.uk/, University of
 London;

 http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en 
 http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en


 *From:* stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] *On
 Behalf Of *Steven Ericsson-Zenith
 *Sent:* Tuesday, December 09, 2014 10:13 PM
 *To:* l...@leydesdorff.net
 *Cc:* Joseph Brenner; fis
 *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process


 The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is
 descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my
 model, can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point
 and response covariance is impossible to consider.

 It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors
 in which I can express the explicit role of a base universal (per
 gravitation).


 Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as information
 as process.


 On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net
 mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net wrote:

 Dear colleagues,


 Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus
 because it allows for the dynamic extension. Theil
 (1972)—Statistical decomposition analysis (North
 Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information
 measures. In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write:


 mailbox:///C|/Documents%20and%
 20Settings/pcmarijuan.iacs/Datos%20de%20programa/
 Thunderbird/Profiles/2vg9i0k9.default/Mail/pop3.aragon-1.es/
 Inbox?number=1793468636header=quotebodypart

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

2014-12-10 Thread Joseph Brenner
Dear All,

Several of you have asked recently for a description of Logic in Reality (LIR) 
that is more accessible that what I have written. Thank you for that. Let me 
respond by simply saying here that LIR is a logic of /change/, better of change 
and stability, non-change. The basic concept is that all complex processes or 
states-of-affairs have two major components in an antagonistic or 
contradictorial relation. If one component predominates, is more actual or 
actualized, the other is less dominant, is potential or potentialized. It is 
possible to refer to the states of these elements in terms of non-standard 
probabilities, thus going one step further than just description :-). 

To refer to Loet's examples, brain, culture and economy, LIR would say that 
antagonistic processes in the brain, not a model of the brain, are isomorphic 
to processes in culture and the economy in that the same movement from actual 
to potential, and potential to actual and to emergence of new entities takes 
place in all of them. The reason LIR is a logic and not physics or biology is 
that it permits inferences to be made about the direction of development of 
such processes. It is thus most interesting to read that there is also an 
heuristic movement between domains in Loet's approach.

The relation to information, from my perspective, is that 
information-as-process is now recognized as a complex of two elements, one 
obviously energetic, the substrate or carrier and its 'meaning', which is less 
obviously energy in some form. I suggest that the problem is how to understand 
'meaning'. One should perhaps also talk of 'meaning-as-process' - the 
experience of meaning in a human interpreter - which clearly involves physical 
processes.

I would be glad to answer further questions, especially if they refer 
specifically to the relation of LIR and information, on which I have two or 
three papers easily accessible on-line in Information. 

Best wishes,

Joseph

  
  - Original Message - 
  From: Loet Leydesdorff 
  To: 'Steven Ericsson-Zenith' ; 'fis' 
  Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2014 7:53 AM
  Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process


  Dear Steven and colleagues, 

   

  I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read as an 
introduction?

   

  It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial 
theories of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal apparatus: 
the design and the results do not yet have meaning without an interpretation in 
a substantial context. On the other side, a theory about, for example, 
neuro-information is a special theory. One can in this context use information 
theory as a statistical tool (among other tools). Sometimes, one can move 
beyond description. J

   

  The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special 
theories, is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move between 
domains heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can perhaps be used 
metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice versa). The advantages have 
to be shown in empirical research: which questions can be addressed and which 
puzzles be solved?

   

  Best,

  Loet

   


--

  Loet Leydesdorff 

  Emeritus University of Amsterdam
  Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

  l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
  Honorary Professor, SPRU, University of Sussex; 

  Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC, Beijing;

  Visiting Professor, Birkbeck, University of London; 

  http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en

   

  From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
  Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2014 10:13 PM
  To: l...@leydesdorff.net
  Cc: Joseph Brenner; fis
  Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

   

  The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is 
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my model, 
can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point and 
response covariance is impossible to consider. 

   

  It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors in 
which I can express the explicit role of a base universal (per gravitation).

   

  Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as information as 
process.

   

  On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net 
wrote:

Dear colleagues, 

 

Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it 
allows for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition 
analysis (North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information 
measures. In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write: 

 

 

 

in which can be considered

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

2014-12-09 Thread Steven Ericsson-Zenith
The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my
model, can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point
and response covariance is impossible to consider.

It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors in
which I can express the explicit role of a base universal (per gravitation).

Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as information as
process.

On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net
wrote:

 Dear colleagues,



 Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it
 allows for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition
 analysis (North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic
 information measures. In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write:







 in which  can be considered as the a posteriori and  the a priori
 distribution. This dynamic information measure can be decomposed and
 aggregated. One can also develop measures for systemic developments and
 critical transitions. In other words, information as a process can also be
 measured in bits of information. Of course, one can extend the
 dimensionality (*i*) for the multivariate case (*ijk*…), and thus use
 information theory for network analysis (including time).



 Best,

 Loet



 References:

 ·Leydesdorff, L. (1991). The Static and Dynamic Analysis of
 Network Data Using Information Theory. *Social Networks, 13*(4), 301-345.

 ·Theil, H. (1972). *Statistical Decomposition Analysis*.
 Amsterdam/ London: North-Holland.




 --

 Loet Leydesdorff

 *Emeritus* University of Amsterdam
 Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
 Honorary Professor, SPRU, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/University of
 Sussex;

 Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/,
 Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
 http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.htmlBeijing;

 Visiting Professor, Birkbeck http://www.bbk.ac.uk/, University of
 London;

 http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en



 *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Steven
 Ericsson-Zenith
 *Sent:* Monday, December 08, 2014 10:22 PM
 *To:* Joseph Brenner
 *Cc:* fis
 *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process



 I am a little mystified by your assertion of information as process.
 What, exactly, is this and how does it differ fro information in general
 (Shannon). Is it related to Whitehead's process notions?



 In terms of neuroscience it is important to move away from connectionism
 and modern computational ideas I believe. It is not clear to me how
 information theory can be applied to the operation of the brain at the
 synaptic level because the actions and the decisions made are made across
 the structure and not at a single location.



 Recognition, for example, is not a point event but occurs rather when a
 particular shape is formed in the structure (of the CNS, for example) and
 is immediately covariant with the appropriate response (another shape)
 which may be characterized as a hyper-functor (which may or may not include
 neurons and astrocytes in the brain).



 Regards,

 Steven







 On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 4:39 AM, Joseph Brenner joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
 wrote:

 Dear Carolina,  Bob L., Bob U., Sören and Krassimir,

 First of all thanks to Carolina for having launched a most interesting
 thread, of which I have changed the title since the issues are broader than
 that of Neuroinformation alone, as Francesco has noted.

 My first point is a response to Sören since I feel his book does not
 address Information-as-Process as 'physically' as I think necessary. His
 reference to the use of this term by Buckland (on p. 77 not 87), (which I
 had missed when first reading /Cybersemiotics/), however, is followed by a
 reference to information processing. (He later states that a new metatheory
 is required to replace the information processing paradigm, and he proposes
 Peircean semiotics, whereas I have proposed Logic in Reality.) I also note
 that Buckland places Information-as-Process in the 'Intangible' column of
 his matrix and one can question the ontological meaning of this.

 In the compendium /Philosophers of Process/. 1998. Browning and Myers
 (eds.). New York: Fordham University Press, Peirce is represented by four
 papers: The Architecture of Theories, The Doctrine of Necessity
 Examined, The Law of Mind  and Man's Glassy Essence. Unfortunately, in
 none of these is the word 'process' used, let alone described as a concept.
 'Process' is not an entry in the COMMENS Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce,
 edited by Bergman and Paavola, so the most one can say is that process was
 not a common concept in Peirce. If Information-as-Process is to be
 developed as a concept, I doubt that Peirce's

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

2014-12-09 Thread Loet Leydesdorff
Dear Steven and colleagues, 

 

I did not (yet) study your approach. Is there a paper that can be read as an 
introduction?

 

It seems to me that one can distinguish between formal and substantial theories 
of information. Shannon’s mathematical theory is a formal apparatus: the design 
and the results do not yet have meaning without an interpretation in a 
substantial context. On the other side, a theory about, for example, 
neuro-information is a special theory. One can in this context use information 
theory as a statistical tool (among other tools). Sometimes, one can move 
beyond description. :)

 

The advantage of information theory, from this perspective of special theories, 
is that the formal apparatus allows us sometimes to move between domains 
heuristically. For example, a model of the brain can perhaps be used 
metaphorically for culture or the economy (or vice versa). The advantages have 
to be shown in empirical research: which questions can be addressed and which 
puzzles be solved?

 

Best,

Loet

 

  _  

Loet Leydesdorff 

Emeritus University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

 mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net l...@leydesdorff.net ;  
http://www.leydesdorff.net/ http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
Honorary Professor,  http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/ SPRU, University of 
Sussex; 

Guest Professor  http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/ Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor,  http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor,  http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ Birkbeck, University of London; 

 http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en 
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en

 

From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Tuesday, December 09, 2014 10:13 PM
To: l...@leydesdorff.net
Cc: Joseph Brenner; fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

 

The problem with this approach (and approaches like it) is that it is 
descriptive and not explanatory. The distribution of the shape, in my model, 
can be described, perhaps, but the process or action decision point and 
response covariance is impossible to consider. 

 

It is for this reason that I use holomorphic functors and hyper-functors in 
which I can express the explicit role of a base universal (per gravitation).

 

Nor is it clear to me that this is what Joe referred to as information as 
process.

 

On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:20 PM, Loet Leydesdorff l...@leydesdorff.net 
mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net  wrote:

Dear colleagues, 

 

Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it allows 
for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition analysis 
(North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information measures. 
In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write: 

 

 

 

in which can be considered as the a posteriori and the a priori distribution. 
This dynamic information measure can be decomposed and aggregated. One can also 
develop measures for systemic developments and critical transitions. In other 
words, information as a process can also be measured in bits of information. Of 
course, one can extend the dimensionality (i) for the multivariate case (ijk…), 
and thus use information theory for network analysis (including time).

 

Best,

Loet

 

References:

*Leydesdorff, L. (1991). The Static and Dynamic Analysis of Network 
Data Using Information Theory. Social Networks, 13(4), 301-345. 

*Theil, H. (1972). Statistical Decomposition Analysis. Amsterdam/ 
London: North-Holland.

 

 


  _  


Loet Leydesdorff 

Emeritus University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

 mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net l...@leydesdorff.net ;  
http://www.leydesdorff.net/ http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
Honorary Professor,  http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/ SPRU, University of 
Sussex; 

Guest Professor  http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/ Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor,  http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor,  http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ Birkbeck, University of London; 

 http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en 
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en

 

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es 
mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es ] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Monday, December 08, 2014 10:22 PM
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

 

I am a little mystified by your assertion of information as process. What, 
exactly, is this and how does it differ fro information in general (Shannon). 
Is it related to Whitehead's process notions?

 

In terms of neuroscience it is important to move away from connectionism and 
modern computational ideas I believe. It is not clear to me how information 
theory can be applied to the operation of the brain at the synaptic level 
because

Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

2014-12-08 Thread Loet Leydesdorff
Dear colleagues, 

 

Shannon’s information theory can be considered as a calculus because it allows 
for the dynamic extension. Theil (1972)—Statistical decomposition analysis 
(North Holland)—distinguished between static and dynamic information measures. 
In addition to Shannon’s statical H, one can write: 

 

 

 

in which  can be considered as the a posteriori and  the a priori distribution. 
This dynamic information measure can be decomposed and aggregated. One can also 
develop measures for systemic developments and critical transitions. In other 
words, information as a process can also be measured in bits of information. Of 
course, one can extend the dimensionality (i) for the multivariate case (ijk…), 
and thus use information theory for network analysis (including time).

 

Best,

Loet

 

References:

*Leydesdorff, L. (1991). The Static and Dynamic Analysis of Network 
Data Using Information Theory. Social Networks, 13(4), 301-345. 

*Theil, H. (1972). Statistical Decomposition Analysis. Amsterdam/ 
London: North-Holland.

 

 

  _  

Loet Leydesdorff 

Emeritus University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR)

 mailto:l...@leydesdorff.net l...@leydesdorff.net ;  
http://www.leydesdorff.net/ http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
Honorary Professor,  http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/ SPRU, University of 
Sussex; 

Guest Professor  http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/ Zhejiang Univ., Hangzhou; 
Visiting Professor,  http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html ISTIC, Beijing;

Visiting Professor,  http://www.bbk.ac.uk/ Birkbeck, University of London; 

 http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en 
http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJhl=en

 

From: Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Steven 
Ericsson-Zenith
Sent: Monday, December 08, 2014 10:22 PM
To: Joseph Brenner
Cc: fis
Subject: Re: [Fis] Information-as-Process

 

I am a little mystified by your assertion of information as process. What, 
exactly, is this and how does it differ fro information in general (Shannon). 
Is it related to Whitehead's process notions?

 

In terms of neuroscience it is important to move away from connectionism and 
modern computational ideas I believe. It is not clear to me how information 
theory can be applied to the operation of the brain at the synaptic level 
because the actions and the decisions made are made across the structure and 
not at a single location. 

 

Recognition, for example, is not a point event but occurs rather when a 
particular shape is formed in the structure (of the CNS, for example) and is 
immediately covariant with the appropriate response (another shape) which may 
be characterized as a hyper-functor (which may or may not include neurons and 
astrocytes in the brain).

 

Regards,

Steven

 

  

 

On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 4:39 AM, Joseph Brenner joe.bren...@bluewin.ch 
mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch  wrote:

Dear Carolina,  Bob L., Bob U., Sören and Krassimir,

First of all thanks to Carolina for having launched a most interesting thread, 
of which I have changed the title since the issues are broader than that of 
Neuroinformation alone, as Francesco has noted.

My first point is a response to Sören since I feel his book does not address 
Information-as-Process as 'physically' as I think necessary. His reference to 
the use of this term by Buckland (on p. 77 not 87), (which I had missed when 
first reading /Cybersemiotics/), however, is followed by a reference to 
information processing. (He later states that a new metatheory is required to 
replace the information processing paradigm, and he proposes Peircean 
semiotics, whereas I have proposed Logic in Reality.) I also note that Buckland 
places Information-as-Process in the 'Intangible' column of his matrix and one 
can question the ontological meaning of this.

In the compendium /Philosophers of Process/. 1998. Browning and Myers (eds.). 
New York: Fordham University Press, Peirce is represented by four papers: The 
Architecture of Theories, The Doctrine of Necessity Examined, The Law of 
Mind  and Man's Glassy Essence. Unfortunately, in none of these is the word 
'process' used, let alone described as a concept. 'Process' is not an entry in 
the COMMENS Digital Companion to C. S. Peirce, edited by Bergman and Paavola, 
so the most one can say is that process was not a common concept in Peirce. If 
Information-as-Process is to be developed as a concept, I doubt that Peirce's 
semiotics will help.

In the notes of both Bob. L and Bob U., however, one finds workable properties 
than can be assigned to Information-as-Process, the verb-noun dialectic and the 
concept of real trophic exchange. Krassimir's concept of information being 
dynamic (a process) or static depending on what it reflects does not give as 
complete a notion as I would like that information is /in-itself/ a process, 
even it reflects (refers to) static or abstract objects