Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Stanley N Salthe]

One of the most special properties of science -- indeed its core that
differentiates it from natural philosophy -- is the practice of testing
hypotheses.  Leaving aside the 'human' weaknesses involved here, there is,
however, the 'Duhem-Quine thesis' to be faced.  In order to test an
hypothesis, one must rig up some more or less elaborate set-up. This
involves various ancillary  assumptions, and even other hypotheses, that
enable the test, but that are not being tested themselves.  A failure to
corroborate an hypothesis does not automatically lead to rejection, because
some of these ancillary assumptions may have been inappropriate.  And so on.
 No single failure to corroborate can impugn an hypothesis, but the question
even is -- 'can anything at all be tested adequately?'.

This need not slow down a science.  For example take evolutionary biology
and its key hypothesis that natural selection is the mode by which
macroevolution (e.g., ape -> human) occurs.  Natural selection has been
tested adequately, and shown to operate to preserve the adaptedness of a
population, from one generation to the next.  But its application to
macroevolution has been testable (?) only in laboratory populations of
microorganisms.  Nevertheless natural selection remains the key ASSUMPTION
of all evolutionary thinking. Its role in macroevolution is NOT testable,
but is used to organize a major research program on the basis of its
plausibility.

STAN

On Thu, Jan 6, 2011 at 1:09 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Dear John and colleagues,
>
>
>
> The idea that the rationality of science is in the specifics of its nature
> as an institution goes back at least to C.S. Peirce, and does not lie in the
> activities or reasoning of specific scientists. The the sociological
> approach misses the target completely, and is rather mundane and relatively
> uninteresting (to use Jim Brown's words). Science is, indeed, just another
> institution, but it has rather special properties that are missed when we
> focus on the activities and rationales of individuals within the
> institution.
>
> I would maintain that both the institutions and the individuals reflect
> developments in the communication of science at the global level. Thus they
> participate insofar as the communication can be understood and brought
> forward (reproduced and changed). The codes of communication are specific;
> the institutions follow historically; for example, in moving from academies
> to universities during the 19th century. Of course, institutions can last
> longer than  individuals.
>
>
>
> I am not pleading against ethnography and other forms of sociology of
> science. However, the core subject is our subject: how is scientific
> information communicated? And how is this communication system (including
> scholarly discourses) evolving? The study of institutions provides us with
> windows of instantiations which can be interesting in themselves (for
> example, national differences).
>
>
>
> Best wishes for a happy New Year,
>
> Loet
>
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Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Loet Leydesdorff]

Dear John and colleagues, 

 

The idea that the rationality of science is in the specifics of its nature
as an institution goes back at least to C.S. Peirce, and does not lie in the
activities or reasoning of specific scientists. The the sociological
approach misses the target completely, and is rather mundane and relatively
uninteresting (to use Jim Brown's words). Science is, indeed, just another
institution, but it has rather special properties that are missed when we
focus on the activities and rationales of individuals within the
institution.

I would maintain that both the institutions and the individuals reflect
developments in the communication of science at the global level. Thus they
participate insofar as the communication can be understood and brought
forward (reproduced and changed). The codes of communication are specific;
the institutions follow historically; for example, in moving from academies
to universities during the 19th century. Of course, institutions can last
longer than  individuals.

 

I am not pleading against ethnography and other forms of sociology of
science. However, the core subject is our subject: how is scientific
information communicated? And how is this communication system (including
scholarly discourses) evolving? The study of institutions provides us with
windows of instantiations which can be interesting in themselves (for
example, national differences). 

 

Best wishes for a happy New Year, 

Loet

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Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[John Collier]

one can measure the extent to which innovation has become systemic
instead of assuming the existence of national (or regional) systems of
innovations on a priori grounds. Systemness of innovation patterns,
however, can be expected to remain in transition because of integrating
and differentiating forces. Integration among the functions of wealth
creation, knowledge production, and normative control takes place at the
interfaces in organizations, while exchanges on the market, scholarly
communication in knowledge production, and political discourse tend to
differentiate globally. The neo-institutional and the neo-evolutionary
versions of the Triple Helix model enable us to capture this tension
reflexively. Empirical studies inform us whether more than three helices
are needed for the explanation. The Triple Helix indicator can be
extended algorithmically, for example, with local-global as a fourth
dimension or, more generally, to an N-tuple of helices. 
 
Hopefully, I did not use my second chance this week on this Monday
morning. J 
Best wishes, 
 
Loet
 


Loet Leydesdorff 
Professor, University of Amsterdam
Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), 
Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. 
Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
l...@leydesdorff.net ;

http://www.leydesdorff.net/ 
 
From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
[
mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] On Behalf Of Stanley N
Salthe
Sent: Sunday, December 12, 2010 10:37 PM
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible)
trialism
 
(As my first posting for this week) Loet -- replying
On Sun, Dec 12, 2010 at 2:20 AM, Loet Leydesdorff
<l...@leydesdorff.net>
wrote:
Dear Stan, Pedro, and colleagues,
I hesitated to react to Pedro’s post to which you in turn react. However,
it seems important to me to distinguish between science as a system of
rationalized expectations and a belief system such as a religion or a
worldview (or even a “philosophy of science” such as creationism). Of
course, one can also BELIEVE in science as a Worldview (a la the Vienna
Circle), but science remains different in its construction from a
religious system. The advent of modern science in the 17th
century is also called “the scientific revolution”. It was precisely a
clash with religion (e.g., Galileo).
 
Do you recall 'Laboratory Life' by Latour and Woolgar?  They
observed activities in a lab as ethnographers observe tribesmen. All
systematized behaviors have the flavor of ritual.  I recall myself
secretly 'praying' that my spectrophotometer readings would come out as I
wished, and being as careful as a priest working to gain 'purity' in
setting up each experiment.    


 

Within social constructivism, indeed, many scholars have tried –since
the 1970s­to explain science as a belief system or in the plural: “belief
systems”. This is also sometimes called the Durkheimian paradigm in the
sociology of science (Mary Douglas, David Bloor). It over-sociologizes
science, as sometimes scientific arguments can be overpoliticized.
Cognition, however, cannot be reduced to authorship or text. The
mechanisms which enable us to generate DISCURSIVE knowledge from messages
(knowledge claims) can be studied by considering science as a
communication system (or again in the plural: the sciences as differently
codified communication systems). The research question then becomes how
the communication of knowledge is different from the communication of
information. To which extent individual agents have access to this
communication may depend on their “intelligence” as a reflexive
capacity.

 
 I don't see how this general description differs
from one that would describe the activities of any discourse.  Could
you make a comparative 'chart' or something to show differences? 


 

The specific codifications which make it possible to proceed from
common-sense knowledge (or personal/tacit knowledge) to discursive
knowledge (which can also be counterintuitive) close the system off from
the external referent (“nature”) because the communication of reports
about the latter is always mediated by individual
perceptions/observations. The observations have to be communicated before
they can be appreciated and validated. The system(s) can thus further
develop abstracting from the specific agents or texts reporting and in
this sense anonymously. These cognitive constructs can be expected to
develop differently from social constructs.

 
 Surely 'the Church' proceeds in much the same
way.  What is distinctive here? 


 

Similarly, one can raise research questions about how religious
codification can be expected to operate differently from scientific
codification. Within these cognitive constructs – which one can analyze
only after hypothesizing them – one cannot expect distinctions to be
crystal-clear because the cognitive constructs remain discursively
constructed (that is, in terms of distributio

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Stanley N Salthe]

As my last posting for the week, replying to Pedro's interesting rejoinder
to an earlier one of mine -

On Fri, Dec 10, 2010 at 8:20 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

>  Dear Stan and colleagues,
>
> Taking it literally, isn't it a pure contradiction, an oxymoron, attempting
> a "scientific" "mythology"? The mythos is the way of knowing purely based on
> tradition and on the firmest doubtlessness, where the source of authority
> comes only from magnificent ancestors...
>

Here I use the term 'mythology' in an ethnographic sense, meaning 'stories
that are believed to be true'.  I use it deliberately in connection with my
understanding that scientific knowledge is a social construct every bit as
much as were the various knowledges gained by more 'primitive' cultures by
whatever means.  Of course, science itself, as a practice, does not claim
'truth' in the sense of unchanging status; even the Second Law of
thermodynamics might someday be falsified.  But persons brought up in a
scientific culture more or less instinctively assume that what is taught in
the classroom is true (unless other cultural forces working through the
family cast doubt on this), especially if this knowledge is useful in
technology. Putting a fine point on it, let me say that I personally do
BELIEVE that the Second Law is a truth about Nature.  But I also know that
it is merely a social construct.


> Well, I am going happily with Stan in the attempt of a renewed Natural
> Philosophy (and I think that future info outcomes may play a significant
> role there), but it does not necessarily mean to be engaged in a
> confrontation with other legitimate ways of seeing the world --and
> legitimately influencing in social practices, particularly by shared morals
> and ethos...  Given the antecedents of previous historical "revolutions" I
> am afraid that a funny world would not result from a unilateral scientifist
> vision (Orwell's 1984?).
>

This is a good point.  Here our experience in the US may be bearing upon me.
 Here we have religious groups actively engaged in contesting some
scientifically accepted truths -- e.g., the theory that biological evolution
has occurred.  In other countries this may no longer (or for the moment
anyway) be an issue, but the conflict clearly raises the possibility of the
contestability of belief, however grounded.  Allied religions in other
nations MIGHT take up the same position as some of those in the US, since
all (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) have the same root myths, and that
puts them all constitutively aligned against any new mythology, even if
based in science, and even if they use Jesuitical means to avoid literal
understandings of the ancient Middle Eastern myths.  We can see today that
mythology can motivate considerable activity in the adventures of the
current group of fundamentalists in Eurasia.

>
> Also, reflecting on Bob's advocation of "dualism", I would like to bring to
> attention again the informational scheme where "agency" is implied.  The
> philosophical outcome may be some form of "trialism", as one finds now the
> triplet: "world", "agents", "scientific observers". Casually I have found an
> interesting philosophical doctrine on trialism, as an alternative to
> Cartesian dualism, by John Cottingham (1985). The trialist interpretation
> keeps the two substances of mind and body, but introduces a third attribute,
> sensation, alongside thought and extension and belonging to the union of
> mind and body... There are many other nuances and complexities on the term,
> and probably some adjustments have to be made to properly fit the info
> scheme, but it looks OK.
>

I feel I should mention here the triadic philosophy of Charles Peirce, which
now is gaining considerable traction.  Here 'world-agents-scientific
observers' would appear as 'object-interpretant-sign'.  Working from this,
one reaches my position viv-a-vis scientific knowledge.  The cultural
'system of interpretance' creates both the sign (using information from the
object) and the interpretation.  Knowledge in this view, including
scientific knowledge, cannot be 'objective'.  The context for knowledge is
the knower.

STAN

>
>
> At a quick glance, and just looking at the discussions we have here, every
> party plays at his/her own with a "world" where information of different
> kinds impinge on active/perceptive "agents", endowed with transformative
> capabilities and with some form of intelligence (embodiment,
> self-production, etc may enter here, or not); and the scientific "observer"
> establishes the cutoffs and constraints through a narrative following a
> particular disciplinary pathway. I have also argued that in different angles
> of that story, at least in Nature (cells, nervous systems, people), one has
> to re-enter populational thinking, optimality guidance, and the doctrine of
> limitation. The hierarchy/heterarchy theme is also of importance in the
> populational aspect (as what we see 

Re: [Fis] reply to Javorsky. Plea for (responsible) trialism

[Pedro C. Marijuan]

Dear Stan and colleagues,

Taking it literally, isn't it a pure contradiction, an oxymoron, 
attempting a "scientific" "mythology"? The mythos is the way of knowing 
purely based on tradition and on the firmest doubtlessness, where the 
source of authority comes only from magnificent ancestors...  Well, I am 
going happily with Stan in the attempt of a renewed Natural Philosophy 
(and I think that future info outcomes may play a significant role 
there), but it does not necessarily mean to be engaged in a 
confrontation with other legitimate ways of seeing the world --and 
legitimately influencing in social practices, particularly by shared 
morals and ethos...  Given the antecedents of previous historical 
"revolutions" I am afraid that a funny world would not result from a 
unilateral scientifist vision (Orwell's 1984?).


Also, reflecting on Bob's advocation of "dualism", I would like to bring 
to attention again the informational scheme where "agency" is implied.  
The philosophical outcome may be some form of "trialism", as one finds 
now the triplet: "world", "agents", "scientific observers". Casually I 
have found an interesting philosophical doctrine on trialism, as an 
alternative to Cartesian dualism, by John Cottingham (1985). The 
trialist interpretation keeps the two substances of mind and body, but 
introduces a third attribute, sensation, alongside thought and extension 
and belonging to the union of mind and body... There are many other 
nuances and complexities on the term, and probably some adjustments have 
to be made to properly fit the info scheme, but it looks OK.


At a quick glance, and just looking at the discussions we have here, 
every party plays at his/her own with a "world" where information of 
different kinds impinge on active/perceptive "agents", endowed with 
transformative capabilities and with some form of intelligence 
(embodiment, self-production, etc may enter here, or not); and the 
scientific "observer" establishes the cutoffs and constraints through a 
narrative following a particular disciplinary pathway. I have also 
argued that in different angles of that story, at least in Nature 
(cells, nervous systems, people), one has to re-enter populational 
thinking, optimality guidance, and the doctrine of limitation. The 
hierarchy/heterarchy theme is also of importance in the populational 
aspect (as what we see often is "nested agencies"), etc.


My contention is that the general relationship between information & 
intelligence (and their respective disciplines) needs a new form of 
discourse. Whether the depicted scaffolding may be of interest or not, 
is highly debatable!


best wishes

Pedro


Stanley N Salthe escribió:
in my first for the week, Replying to Joseph: 

Dealing as I do with hierarchies and thermodynamics, I have come to 
the postmodern conclusion that our explicit scientific knowledge is a 
logical construct -- unlike our intuitive 'knowledge' (viz. qualia) of 
the world we are IMMERSED IN.  In these scientifically-based efforts 
we create a logical simulacrum (which I call 'Nature') of The World. 
 Its basis is logic and esthetic, but today it also passes through a 
pragmatic filter imposed by those who pay for the science.  This 
latter bias works mostly in choice of study objects.  Stepping back 
from active engagement in the process of gaining primary knowledge in 
these ways, I feel that I am these days engaging in a renewed Natural 
Philosophy -- an attempt to construct a scientifically based 
'mythology' for moderns, meant as an alternative to religious myths. 
 These latter importantly have also engaged, via rituals, the qualia 
we are immersed in.  Inasmuch as Natural Philosophy has no such 
practices associated with it, the primary function of the emerging 
Nature is to challenge the religiously based myths associated with the 
rituals in an attempt to unseat the associated political 
establishments (Rome, the Caliphate, the Republican Party, etc.) that 
enforce them. 

On Thu, Dec 9, 2010 at 7:54 AM, Joseph Brenner > wrote:


Dear All,

In agreeing with Bob, I would like to point out that his critique
is not
"theoretical philosophy". He is calling attention to something
essential
missing in the pictures and models of Stan and Karl, namely, 1)
the "life
and blood" of the world; 2) that that "life and blood" follows
different
rules than the entities in the models; 3) those rules are based on
real
dualities of equal ontological purport: order and disorder,
continuity and
discontinuity, entropy and negentropy; etc.; and 4) these
dualities play
out in real interactions in biology, cognition and society, for
example
in information and non-information.

It is perfectly possible to see "grids" of numbers and levels or
hierarchies
in Nature as abstract structures - this is indeed Karl's word, as
is his use
of "independence" -