Kris Kennaway [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On 3 Aug 2000, Dag-Erling Smorgrav wrote:
Since ps(1) no longer allows users to view other users' processes'
environment, I don't think it's a very big issue anymore.
This behavious is configurable - we shouldn't start relying on it at the
Poul-Henning Kamp [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
What happened to the FTP_PASSIVE_MODE environment variable ? As
far as I can tell it is no longer supported and as a result sysinstall
is broken. It uses Active FTP even if you select Passive FTP on
the menu :-(
Sysinstall does not use libfetch.
On Thu, Aug 03, 2000 at 01:26:01PM +0200, Dag-Erling Smorgrav wrote:
Peter Jeremy [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Whilst the environment is somewhat safer than the command line, I'd
still prefer not to have passwords embedded in environment variables.
Since ps(1) no longer allows users to view
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Poul-Henning Kamp writes:
: What happened to the FTP_PASSIVE_MODE environment variable ? As
: far as I can tell it is no longer supported and as a result sysinstall
: is broken. It uses Active FTP even if you select Passive FTP on
: the menu :-(
I've also noticed
Peter Jeremy [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Whilst the environment is somewhat safer than the command line, I'd
still prefer not to have passwords embedded in environment variables.
Since ps(1) no longer allows users to view other users' processes'
environment, I don't think it's a very big issue
On 3 Aug 2000, Dag-Erling Smorgrav wrote:
Peter Jeremy [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Whilst the environment is somewhat safer than the command line, I'd
still prefer not to have passwords embedded in environment variables.
Since ps(1) no longer allows users to view other users' processes'
I don't recall seeing this mentioned: In order to access the Internet,
I need to use proxy authorization. With the old fetch(1) I could use
an environment variable like "HTTP_PROXY_AUTH=basic:*:username" and
it would prompt for a password.
The new libfetch-based fetch(1) ignores the
