any i-nodes but no actual files. (Well, I've seen glitches on
ancient systems where /dev/null got turned into a regular file, leading
to amusing messages about "/dev/null: no space left on device"...)
--Steven M. Bellovin, h
ventually, but there's nothing in shape to release right now.
It's proof-of-concept C, a few awk scripts, and a bunch of hand-typed
awk and gnuplot.
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
___
freeb
te, I realized that my own cgd
"partition" (via vnd) was created from /dev/zero instead of /dev/urandom;
the result is that the entropy of the file itself reveals almost
exactly how much of the cgd partition is in use. I'll have to correct
that)
--Prof. Steve
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Thor Lancelot Simon writes:
>On Thu, Mar 03, 2005 at 10:15:55PM +0100, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote:
>>
>> And if CGD is _so_ officially approved as you say, then I can not
>> for the life of me understand how it can use the same key to generate
>> the IV and perform the
ong a cipher is. In that vein, I'll
note that 256-bit AES is approved for Top Secret traffic.
>
>Shortly after AES was gold-plated the earlier mentioned attack
>method where it is decomposed into a massive number of equations
>was presented.
>
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Thor Lancelot Simon writes:
>On Thu, Mar 03, 2005 at 05:31:34PM +0100, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote:
>> In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "ALeine" writes:
>>
>> >Not necessarily, if one were to implement the ideas I proposed
>> >I believe the performance could be kept at t
here is a very real threat not addressed here:
detecting unauthorized changes to an encrypted disk. For a very
elegant solution, see
http://www.isoc.org/isoc/conferences/ndss/05/proceedings/papers/storageint.pdf
--Prof. Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
__
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