On Tue, Feb 04, 2003 at 11:51:14AM -0800, Justin Lundy wrote:
> Has similar work been done in FreeBSD been done? This would be a nice
> feature in 5.0-CURRENT. We had SecureBSD, and the IBM port of propolice,
> but both projects appear to be defunct at present.
What happened to Propolice? The 4.x
Thus spake Garance A Drosihn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> I agree that random offsets will not buy much in the way of
> security, but it might make some kinds of initialization errors
> more obvious. I'm thinking of the kind of errors where a routine
> forgets to initialize a key variable, but everythin
Justin Lundy wrote:
> "Add a possibility to add a random offset to the stack on exec. This makes
> it slightly harder to write generic buffer overflows. This doesn't really
> give any real security, but it raises the bar for script-kiddies and it's
> really cheap.
It's also security through obscur
On Tue, Feb 04, 2003 at 11:51:14AM -0800, Justin Lundy wrote:
> Has similar work been done in FreeBSD been done? This would be a nice
> feature in 5.0-CURRENT. We had SecureBSD, and the IBM port of propolice,
> but both projects appear to be defunct at present. If we can integrate
> MAC into the ke
Justin Lundy wrote:
"Add a possibility to add a random offset to the stack on exec. This makes
it slightly harder to write generic buffer overflows. This doesn't really
give any real security, but it raises the bar for script-kiddies and it's
really cheap.
This idea can also be used within app
Has similar work been done in FreeBSD been done? This would be a nice
feature in 5.0-CURRENT. We had SecureBSD, and the IBM port of propolice,
but both projects appear to be defunct at present. If we can integrate
MAC into the kernel, why not port over OpenBSD's rebasing implementation
from /src/s
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