Re: Security: information leaks in /proc enable keystroke recovery

2009-08-16 Thread Robert Watson
On Sun, 16 Aug 2009, Oliver Pinter wrote: FreeBSD manages its process files more cautiously than Linux12 : it puts all register values into the file /proc/pid/regs that can only be read by the owner of a process, which blocks the information used by This is inaccurate, but largely in an

Re: Security: information leaks in /proc enable keystroke recovery

2009-08-16 Thread David Wagner
Thanks for the comments. Beyond this, and assuming the correct implementation of the above, we're into the grounds of classic trusted OS covert channel analysis, against which no COTS UNIX OSes I'm aware of are hardened. This isn't to dismiss these attacks as purely hypothetical -- we've

Re: Security: information leaks in /proc enable keystroke recovery

2009-08-16 Thread Robert N. M. Watson
On 16 Aug 2009, at 22:09, David Wagner wrote: Beyond this, and assuming the correct implementation of the above, we're into the grounds of classic trusted OS covert channel analysis, against which no COTS UNIX OSes I'm aware of are hardened. This isn't to dismiss these attacks as purely

Re: Security: information leaks in /proc enable keystroke recovery

2009-08-16 Thread David Wagner
I still think my definitions of covert channel vs side channel better reflect accepted usage these days, but whatever. I don't have any great desire to debate the definitions. That doesn't seem like a good use of everyone's time. I was trying to define some shorthand to more concisely make my