Or is there a cleaner way to add a additional seed as a one-off with
disturbing as little as possible (in the few seconds just after the
network is brought up).
If this needs to be done automatically, not really. If there's a
person available, you could use the please type a screen full of
Thanks to a badly-written mngt script - we've rencently noticed a freshly
generated ssh-key on a new AWS instances to be indentical to one seen a few
months prior.
Careful analysis of some other logs showed that we've had similar clashes on
another script just after startup generating a very
On Fri, 31 May 2013 12:01:02 +0200
Dirk-Willem van Gulik wrote:
Now we happen to have very easy access to blocks of 1024bits of
randomness from a remote server in already nicely PKI signed packages
(as it is needed later for something else).
Is it safe to simply *add* those with:
Op 31 mei 2013, om 14:02 heeft RW rwmailli...@googlemail.com het volgende
geschreven:
On Fri, 31 May 2013 12:01:02 +0200 Dirk-Willem van Gulik wrote:
# Seed Software random generator
#
cat rnd /dev/random
To be on the safe side you should sleep for about 0.5 seconds after
On Fri, 31 May 2013 14:26:39 +0200
Dirk-Willem van Gulik wrote:
Op 31 mei 2013, om 14:02 heeft RW rwmailli...@googlemail.com het
# Activate software random generator as an additional
source sysctl kern.random.sys.harvest.swi=1
IIRC this doesn't do anything
Thanks. So the man
.. snipped...
# Seed Software random generator
#
cat rnd /dev/random
# Activate software random generator as an additional source
sysctl kern.random.sys.harvest.swi=1
Or does this cause a loss/reset of all entropy gathered by the hardware sofar
On 2013-May-31 12:01:02 +0200, Dirk-Willem van Gulik di...@webweaving.org
wrote:
Thanks to a badly-written mngt script -
we've rencently noticed a freshly generated ssh-key on a new AWS
instances to be indentical to one seen a few months prior.
...
I am surmising that perhaps the (micro-T)
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