Re: TCP vulnerability

2004-04-24 Thread Andre Oppermann
Alan Evans wrote: > > I agree, but what's most important is to maintain > backward compatibility. If one breaks it, it's a DoS > is some sense. I also saw some postings on NetBSD > which does ratelimiting of ACKs (in response to SYNs), > and ACKs RST. IMHO, the latter is bogus - why ACK a > RST? A

Re: TCP vulnerability

2004-04-24 Thread Alan Evans
I agree, but what's most important is to maintain backward compatibility. If one breaks it, it's a DoS is some sense. I also saw some postings on NetBSD which does ratelimiting of ACKs (in response to SYNs), and ACKs RST. IMHO, the latter is bogus - why ACK a RST? And, the former may impose an arti

Re: TCP vulnerability

2004-04-24 Thread Andre Oppermann
Chuck Swiger wrote: > > Alan Evans wrote: > > I'm sure FreeBSD is vulnerable. > > > > http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA04-111A.html > > > > There's a draft that (sort of) addresses this. Should > > we adopt it? > > This issue is being discussed on freebsd-security now, and Mike Silbersack

Re: TCP vulnerability

2004-04-24 Thread Chuck Swiger
Alan Evans wrote: I'm sure FreeBSD is vulnerable. http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA04-111A.html There's a draft that (sort of) addresses this. Should we adopt it? This issue is being discussed on freebsd-security now, and Mike Silbersack <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> has some patches available for