On Thu, 17 Apr 2008, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:
IV. Workaround
Disable support for IPv6 in the sshd(8) daemon by setting the option
AddressFamily inet in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
Disable support for X11 forwarding in the sshd(8) daemon by setting
the option X11Forwarding no
Ian Smith wrote:
On Thu, 17 Apr 2008, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:
IV. Workaround
Disable support for IPv6 in the sshd(8) daemon by setting the option
AddressFamily inet in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
Disable support for X11 forwarding in the sshd(8) daemon by setting
the
On Thu, 17 Apr 2008, Peter Pentchev wrote:
On Thu, Apr 17, 2008 at 04:07:56PM +1000, Ian Smith wrote:
On Thu, 17 Apr 2008, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:
IV. Workaround
Disable support for IPv6 in the sshd(8) daemon by setting the option
AddressFamily inet in
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: RIPEMD160
Ian Smith wrote:
On Thu, 17 Apr 2008, Peter Pentchev wrote:
On Thu, Apr 17, 2008 at 04:07:56PM +1000, Ian Smith wrote:
On Thu, 17 Apr 2008, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:
IV. Workaround
Disable support for
I'd like to thank the openssh-portable port maintainer/s for
preserving the -overwrite-base option. This eases our systems and
security update jobs measurably.
Unfortunately, openSSL has dropped the -overwrite-base option
(again), leaving us with two versions of openssl and some
confusion over
Matthew Seaman [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Hmmm... something that wasn't immediately clear to me reading the
advisory: the requirement for an attacker to listen(2) on tcp port
6010 means that they have to have a login on the box being attacked.
ie. it's a *local* information leak rather than a
