Re: Default password hash
The attached patch backports support for sha256 and sha512 hashes to
stable/7. It is not an exact MFH because the sha code in head uses
stpncpy(), which is not present in stable/7's libc.
DES
--
Dag-Erling Smørgrav - d...@des.no
Index: lib/libcrypt
===
--- lib/libcrypt (revision 236892)
+++ lib/libcrypt (working copy)
Property changes on: lib/libcrypt
___
Added: svn:mergeinfo
Merged /head/gnu/libcrypt:r183242
Merged /head/lib/libcrypt:r179308,183242,213738,213814,213903,216591,220497-220498,221142,221471,227006,234132
Index: lib/libcrypt/crypt.c
===
--- lib/libcrypt/crypt.c (revision 236892)
+++ lib/libcrypt/crypt.c (working copy)
@@ -63,6 +63,16 @@
$3$
},
{
+ sha256,
+ crypt_sha256,
+ $5$
+ },
+ {
+ sha512,
+ crypt_sha512,
+ $6$
+ },
+ {
NULL,
NULL,
NULL
Index: lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha512.c
===
--- lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha512.c (working copy)
+++ lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha512.c (working copy)
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
#define ROUNDS_MAX 9
static char *
-sha512_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen)
+crypt_sha512_r(const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen)
{
u_long srounds;
int n;
@@ -210,7 +210,9 @@
/* Now we can construct the result string. It consists of three
* parts. */
- cp = stpncpy(buffer, sha512_salt_prefix, MAX(0, buflen));
+ cp = buffer;
+ strncpy(buffer, sha512_salt_prefix, MAX(0, buflen));
+ cp += sizeof(sha512_salt_prefix) - 1;
buflen -= sizeof(sha512_salt_prefix) - 1;
if (rounds_custom) {
@@ -221,7 +223,8 @@
buflen -= n;
}
- cp = stpncpy(cp, salt, MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len));
+ strncpy(cp, salt, MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len));
+ cp += MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len);
buflen -= MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len);
if (buflen 0) {
@@ -280,12 +283,12 @@
/* This entry point is equivalent to crypt(3). */
char *
-sha512_crypt(const char *key, const char *salt)
+crypt_sha512(const char *key, const char *salt)
{
/* We don't want to have an arbitrary limit in the size of the
* password. We can compute an upper bound for the size of the
* result in advance and so we can prepare the buffer we pass to
- * `sha512_crypt_r'. */
+ * `crypt_sha512_r'. */
static char *buffer;
static int buflen;
int needed;
@@ -305,7 +308,7 @@
buflen = needed;
}
- return sha512_crypt_r(key, salt, buffer, buflen);
+ return crypt_sha512_r(key, salt, buffer, buflen);
}
#ifdef TEST
@@ -482,7 +485,7 @@
}
for (cnt = 0; cnt ntests2; ++cnt) {
- char *cp = sha512_crypt(tests2[cnt].input, tests2[cnt].salt);
+ char *cp = crypt_sha512(tests2[cnt].input, tests2[cnt].salt);
if (strcmp(cp, tests2[cnt].expected) != 0) {
printf(test %d: expected \%s\, got \%s\\n,
Index: lib/libcrypt/crypt.h
===
--- lib/libcrypt/crypt.h (revision 236892)
+++ lib/libcrypt/crypt.h (working copy)
@@ -36,5 +36,8 @@
char *crypt_md5(const char *pw, const char *salt);
char *crypt_nthash(const char *pw, const char *salt);
char *crypt_blowfish(const char *pw, const char *salt);
+char *crypt_sha256 (const char *pw, const char *salt);
+char *crypt_sha512 (const char *pw, const char *salt);
extern void _crypt_to64(char *s, u_long v, int n);
+extern void b64_from_24bit(uint8_t B2, uint8_t B1, uint8_t B0, int n, int *buflen, char **cp);
Index: lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha256.c
===
--- lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha256.c (working copy)
+++ lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha256.c (working copy)
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
#define ROUNDS_MAX 9
static char *
-sha256_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen)
+crypt_sha256_r(const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen)
{
u_long srounds;
int n;
@@ -210,7 +210,9 @@
/* Now we can construct the result string. It consists of three
* parts. */
- cp = stpncpy(buffer, sha256_salt_prefix, MAX(0, buflen));
+ cp = buffer;
+ strncpy(buffer, sha256_salt_prefix, MAX(0, buflen));
+ cp += sizeof(sha256_salt_prefix) - 1;
buflen -= sizeof(sha256_salt_prefix) - 1;
if (rounds_custom) {
@@ -221,7 +223,8 @@
buflen -= n;
}
- cp = stpncpy(cp, salt, MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len));
+ strncpy(cp, salt, MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len));
+ cp += MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len);
buflen -= MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len);
if (buflen 0) {
@@ -268,12 +271,12 @@
/* This entry point is equivalent to crypt(3). */
char *
-sha256_crypt(const char *key, const char *salt)
+crypt_sha256(const char *key, const char *salt)
{
/* We don't want to have an arbitrary limit in the size of the
* password. We can compute an
Re: Default password hash
The attached patch backports support for sha256 and sha512 hashes to
stable/7. It is not an exact MFH because the sha code in head uses
stpncpy(), which is not present in stable/7's libc.
DES
--
Dag-Erling Smørgrav - d...@des.no
Index: lib/libcrypt
===
--- lib/libcrypt (revision 236892)
+++ lib/libcrypt (working copy)
Property changes on: lib/libcrypt
___
Added: svn:mergeinfo
Merged /head/gnu/libcrypt:r183242
Merged /head/lib/libcrypt:r179308,183242,213738,213814,213903,216591,220497-220498,221142,221471,227006,234132
Index: lib/libcrypt/crypt.c
===
--- lib/libcrypt/crypt.c (revision 236892)
+++ lib/libcrypt/crypt.c (working copy)
@@ -63,6 +63,16 @@
$3$
},
{
+ sha256,
+ crypt_sha256,
+ $5$
+ },
+ {
+ sha512,
+ crypt_sha512,
+ $6$
+ },
+ {
NULL,
NULL,
NULL
Index: lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha512.c
===
--- lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha512.c (working copy)
+++ lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha512.c (working copy)
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
#define ROUNDS_MAX 9
static char *
-sha512_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen)
+crypt_sha512_r(const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen)
{
u_long srounds;
int n;
@@ -210,7 +210,9 @@
/* Now we can construct the result string. It consists of three
* parts. */
- cp = stpncpy(buffer, sha512_salt_prefix, MAX(0, buflen));
+ cp = buffer;
+ strncpy(buffer, sha512_salt_prefix, MAX(0, buflen));
+ cp += sizeof(sha512_salt_prefix) - 1;
buflen -= sizeof(sha512_salt_prefix) - 1;
if (rounds_custom) {
@@ -221,7 +223,8 @@
buflen -= n;
}
- cp = stpncpy(cp, salt, MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len));
+ strncpy(cp, salt, MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len));
+ cp += MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len);
buflen -= MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len);
if (buflen 0) {
@@ -280,12 +283,12 @@
/* This entry point is equivalent to crypt(3). */
char *
-sha512_crypt(const char *key, const char *salt)
+crypt_sha512(const char *key, const char *salt)
{
/* We don't want to have an arbitrary limit in the size of the
* password. We can compute an upper bound for the size of the
* result in advance and so we can prepare the buffer we pass to
- * `sha512_crypt_r'. */
+ * `crypt_sha512_r'. */
static char *buffer;
static int buflen;
int needed;
@@ -305,7 +308,7 @@
buflen = needed;
}
- return sha512_crypt_r(key, salt, buffer, buflen);
+ return crypt_sha512_r(key, salt, buffer, buflen);
}
#ifdef TEST
@@ -482,7 +485,7 @@
}
for (cnt = 0; cnt ntests2; ++cnt) {
- char *cp = sha512_crypt(tests2[cnt].input, tests2[cnt].salt);
+ char *cp = crypt_sha512(tests2[cnt].input, tests2[cnt].salt);
if (strcmp(cp, tests2[cnt].expected) != 0) {
printf(test %d: expected \%s\, got \%s\\n,
Index: lib/libcrypt/crypt.h
===
--- lib/libcrypt/crypt.h (revision 236892)
+++ lib/libcrypt/crypt.h (working copy)
@@ -36,5 +36,8 @@
char *crypt_md5(const char *pw, const char *salt);
char *crypt_nthash(const char *pw, const char *salt);
char *crypt_blowfish(const char *pw, const char *salt);
+char *crypt_sha256 (const char *pw, const char *salt);
+char *crypt_sha512 (const char *pw, const char *salt);
extern void _crypt_to64(char *s, u_long v, int n);
+extern void b64_from_24bit(uint8_t B2, uint8_t B1, uint8_t B0, int n, int *buflen, char **cp);
Index: lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha256.c
===
--- lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha256.c (working copy)
+++ lib/libcrypt/crypt-sha256.c (working copy)
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
#define ROUNDS_MAX 9
static char *
-sha256_crypt_r(const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen)
+crypt_sha256_r(const char *key, const char *salt, char *buffer, int buflen)
{
u_long srounds;
int n;
@@ -210,7 +210,9 @@
/* Now we can construct the result string. It consists of three
* parts. */
- cp = stpncpy(buffer, sha256_salt_prefix, MAX(0, buflen));
+ cp = buffer;
+ strncpy(buffer, sha256_salt_prefix, MAX(0, buflen));
+ cp += sizeof(sha256_salt_prefix) - 1;
buflen -= sizeof(sha256_salt_prefix) - 1;
if (rounds_custom) {
@@ -221,7 +223,8 @@
buflen -= n;
}
- cp = stpncpy(cp, salt, MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len));
+ strncpy(cp, salt, MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len));
+ cp += MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len);
buflen -= MIN((size_t)MAX(0, buflen), salt_len);
if (buflen 0) {
@@ -268,12 +271,12 @@
/* This entry point is equivalent to crypt(3). */
char *
-sha256_crypt(const char *key, const char *salt)
+crypt_sha256(const char *key, const char *salt)
{
/* We don't want to have an arbitrary limit in the size of the
* password. We can compute an
FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-12:03.bind
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 = FreeBSD-SA-12:03.bind Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Incorrect handling of zero-length RDATA fields in named(8) Category: contrib Module: bind Announced: 2012-06-12 Credits:Dan Luther, Jeffrey A. Spain Affects:All supported versions of FreeBSD Corrected: 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.4-STABLE) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_7_4, 7.4-RELEASE-p9) 2012-06-04 22:21:55 UTC (RELENG_8, 8.3-STABLE) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8_3, 8.3-RELEASE-p3) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8_2, 8.2-RELEASE-p9) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8_1, 8.1-RELEASE-p11) 2012-06-04 22:14:33 UTC (RELENG_9, 9.0-STABLE) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_9_0, 9.0-RELEASE-p3) CVE Name: CVE-2012-1667 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/. I. Background BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols. The named(8) daemon is an Internet Domain Name Server. II. Problem Description The named(8) server does not properly handle DNS resource records where the RDATA field is zero length, which may cause various issues for the servers handling them. III. Impact Resolving servers may crash or disclose some portion of memory to the client. Authoritative servers may crash on restart after transferring a zone containing records with zero-length RDATA fields. These would result in a denial of service, or leak of sensitive information. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems not running the BIND name server are not affected. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE, 8-STABLE, or 9-STABLE, or to the RELENG_7_4, RELENG_8_3, RELENG_8_2, RELENG_8_1, or RELENG_9_0 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.4, 8.3, 8.2, 8.1 and 9.0 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 7.4-RELEASE, 8.3-RELEASE, 8.2-RELEASE, and 8.1-RELEASE] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:03/bind.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:03/bind.patch.asc [FreeBSD 9.0-RELEASE] # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:03/bind-90.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:03/bind-90.patch.asc b) Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch /path/to/patch # cd /usr/src/lib/bind/ # make obj make depend make make install # cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/named # make obj make depend make make install 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running 7.4-RELEASE, 8.3-RELEASE, 8.2-RELEASE, 8.1-RELEASE, or 9.0-RELEASE on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install 4) Install and run BIND from the Ports Collection after the correction date. The following versions and newer versions of BIND installed from the Ports Collection are not affected by this vulnerability: bind96-9.6.3.1.ESV.R7.1 bind97-9.7.6.1 bind98-9.8.3.1 bind99-9.9.1.1 VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - - RELENG_7 src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c 1.1.1.5.2.4 src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c 1.1.1.2.2.5 RELENG_7_4 src/UPDATING1.507.2.36.2.11 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.18.2.14 src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c 1.1.1.5.2.1.2.1 src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c 1.1.1.2.2.3.2.1 RELENG_8 src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c 1.2.2.4 src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c 1.2.2.5 RELENG_8_3 src/UPDATING 1.632.2.26.2.5 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.15.2.7 src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdata.c 1.2.2.2.2.1 src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/rdataslab.c 1.2.2.3.2.1 RELENG_8_2 src/UPDATING
FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-12:04.sysret
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 = FreeBSD-SA-12:04.sysret Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Privilege escalation when returning from kernel Category: core Module: sys_amd64 Announced: 2012-06-12 Credits:Rafal Wojtczuk, John Baldwin Affects:All supported versions of FreeBSD Corrected: 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.4-STABLE) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_7_4, 7.4-RELEASE-p9) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8, 8.3-STABLE) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8_3, 8.3-RELEASE-p3) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8_2, 8.2-RELEASE-p9) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8_1, 8.1-RELEASE-p11) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_9, 9.0-STABLE) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_9_0, 9.0-RELEASE-p3) CVE Name: CVE-2012-0217 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/. I. Background The FreeBSD operating system implements a rings model of security, where privileged operations are done in the kernel, and most applications request access to these operations by making a system call, which puts the CPU into the required privilege level and passes control to the kernel. II. Problem Description FreeBSD/amd64 runs on CPUs from different vendors. Due to varying behaviour of CPUs in 64 bit mode a sanity check of the kernel may be insufficient when returning from a system call. III. Impact Successful exploitation of the problem can lead to local kernel privilege escalation, kernel data corruption and/or crash. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be able to run code with user privileges on the target system. IV. Workaround No workaround is available. However FreeBSD/amd64 running on AMD CPUs is not vulnerable to this particular problem. Systems with 64 bit capable CPUs, but running the 32 bit FreeBSD/i386 kernel are not vulnerable, nor are systems running on different processor architectures. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE, 8-STABLE, or 9-STABLE, or to the RELENG_7_4, RELENG_8_3, RELENG_8_2, RELENG_8_1, or RELENG_9_0 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.4, 8.3, 8.2, 8.1 and 9.0 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:04/sysret.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:04/sysret.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. # cd /usr/src # patch /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html and reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running 7.4-RELEASE, 8.3-RELEASE, 8.2-RELEASE, 8.1-RELEASE, or 9.0-RELEASE on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - - RELENG_7 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.319.2.14 RELENG_7_4 src/UPDATING1.507.2.36.2.11 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.18.2.14 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.319.2.12.2.2 RELENG_8 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.332.2.24 RELENG_8_3 src/UPDATING 1.632.2.26.2.5 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.15.2.7 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.332.2.21.2.2 RELENG_8_2 src/UPDATING1.632.2.19.2.11 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.12.2.14 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.332.2.14.2.2 RELENG_8_1 src/UPDATING1.632.2.14.2.14 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.10.2.15 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.332.2.10.2.2 RELENG_9 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c1.357.2.9 RELENG_9_0 src/UPDATING 1.702.2.4.2.5
ANNOUNCE: [FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-12:04.sysret
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 = FreeBSD-SA-12:04.sysret Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Privilege escalation when returning from kernel Category: core Module: sys_amd64 Announced: 2012-06-12 Credits:Rafal Wojtczuk, John Baldwin Affects:All supported versions of FreeBSD Corrected: 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.4-STABLE) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_7_4, 7.4-RELEASE-p9) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8, 8.3-STABLE) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8_3, 8.3-RELEASE-p3) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8_2, 8.2-RELEASE-p9) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_8_1, 8.1-RELEASE-p11) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_9, 9.0-STABLE) 2012-06-12 12:10:10 UTC (RELENG_9_0, 9.0-RELEASE-p3) CVE Name: CVE-2012-0217 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/. I. Background The FreeBSD operating system implements a rings model of security, where privileged operations are done in the kernel, and most applications request access to these operations by making a system call, which puts the CPU into the required privilege level and passes control to the kernel. II. Problem Description FreeBSD/amd64 runs on CPUs from different vendors. Due to varying behaviour of CPUs in 64 bit mode a sanity check of the kernel may be insufficient when returning from a system call. III. Impact Successful exploitation of the problem can lead to local kernel privilege escalation, kernel data corruption and/or crash. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must be able to run code with user privileges on the target system. IV. Workaround No workaround is available. However FreeBSD/amd64 running on AMD CPUs is not vulnerable to this particular problem. Systems with 64 bit capable CPUs, but running the 32 bit FreeBSD/i386 kernel are not vulnerable, nor are systems running on different processor architectures. V. Solution Perform one of the following: 1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7-STABLE, 8-STABLE, or 9-STABLE, or to the RELENG_7_4, RELENG_8_3, RELENG_8_2, RELENG_8_1, or RELENG_9_0 security branch dated after the correction date. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.4, 8.3, 8.2, 8.1 and 9.0 systems. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:04/sysret.patch # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-12:04/sysret.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. # cd /usr/src # patch /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in URL:http://www.FreeBSD.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html and reboot the system. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running 7.4-RELEASE, 8.3-RELEASE, 8.2-RELEASE, 8.1-RELEASE, or 9.0-RELEASE on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in FreeBSD. CVS: Branch Revision Path - - RELENG_7 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.319.2.14 RELENG_7_4 src/UPDATING1.507.2.36.2.11 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.18.2.14 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.319.2.12.2.2 RELENG_8 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.332.2.24 RELENG_8_3 src/UPDATING 1.632.2.26.2.5 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.15.2.7 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.332.2.21.2.2 RELENG_8_2 src/UPDATING1.632.2.19.2.11 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.12.2.14 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.332.2.14.2.2 RELENG_8_1 src/UPDATING1.632.2.14.2.14 src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.83.2.10.2.15 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c 1.332.2.10.2.2 RELENG_9 src/sys/amd64/amd64/trap.c1.357.2.9 RELENG_9_0 src/UPDATING 1.702.2.4.2.5
