Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Bogdan Ćulibrk
Actually, pretty much anyone who uses client certificates in an enterprise environment is likely to have a problem with this, which is why the IETF TLS working group is working on publishing a protocol fix. It looks like that RFC should be published, at Proposed Standard, in a few weeks, and

Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Dag-Erling Smørgrav
Bogdan Ćulibrk b...@default.rs writes: This advisory kinda made big problem here in local (things stopped working). I had to do rollback this update because of session renegotiation breakage. That's the whole point, the patch disables session renegotiation because it's fundamentally broken.

Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Bogdan Ćulibrk
Dag-Erling Smørgrav wrote: Bogdan Ćulibrk b...@default.rs writes: This advisory kinda made big problem here in local (things stopped working). I had to do rollback this update because of session renegotiation breakage. That's the whole point, the patch disables session renegotiation because

Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Dag-Erling Smørgrav
Bogdan Ćulibrk b...@default.rs writes: basically whole communication between two application relied on using exactly this funcionality in openssl. In that case, the only choice you have is to revert to the previous version... DES -- Dag-Erling Smørgrav - d...@des.no

Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Dag-Erling Smørgrav
Dan Lukes d...@obluda.cz writes: Even after the patch has been installed, my browser is still able to connect to SSL aware HTTP servers. My MUA is still sending/receiving emails over SMTP/SSL and IMAP/SSL ... Do you use client-side certificates? I'm not saying you have no problem, i'm saying

RE: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Barry Raveendran Greene
Actually, pretty much anyone who uses client certificates in an enterprise environment is likely to have a problem with this, which is why the IETF TLS working group is working on publishing a protocol fix. It looks like that RFC should be published, at Proposed Standard, in a few

Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Dag-Erling Smørgrav
Dag-Erling Smørgrav d...@des.no writes: The correct anser is: answer, even DES -- Dag-Erling Smørgrav - d...@des.no ___ freebsd-security@freebsd.org mailing list http://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/freebsd-security To unsubscribe, send any mail

Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Chris Palmer
Dag-Erling Sm??rgrav writes: Do you use client-side certificates? This is probably the original poster's problem. FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl made clear that the patch fixes the protocol bug by removing the broken feature (session renegotiation), but stated incorrectly that

Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Maxim Dounin
Hello! On Thu, Dec 10, 2009 at 10:37:18AM -0800, Chris Palmer wrote: Dag-Erling Sm??rgrav writes: Do you use client-side certificates? This is probably the original poster's problem. FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl made clear that the patch fixes the protocol bug by

Re: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-09:15.ssl

2009-12-10 Thread Chris Palmer
Maxim Dounin writes: It's not true. Patch (as well as OpenSSL 0.9.8l) breaks only apps that do not request client certs in initial handshake, but instead do it via renegotiation. It's not really commonly used feature. The ideal case is not the typical case: