Re: [Freeipa-devel] Fwd: [openssl-users] removing Kerberos support from OpenSSL

2015-05-11 Thread Nathaniel McCallum
Yes and no.

The current Kerberos support is insecure and should not be used. The main
problem is that the session key is reused for all TLS connections. This
prevents perfect forward secrecy.

That being said, we have been toying around with the idea of making a new
standard for GSSAPI/TLS which uses a DH or a PAKE to ensure that both
sides contribute entropy to a random encryption key.

However, we have to get some of the other standards work off our plates
before we can tackle such a large task.

In short: existing Kerberos support should be removed from OpenSSL.

Nathaniel

On Tue, 2015-05-05 at 14:44 +0200, Petr Spacek wrote:
 Hello!
 
 Is this somehow interesting for us?
 
 Petr^2 Spacek
 
 
  Forwarded Message 
 Subject: [openssl-users] Kerberos
 Date: Tue, 05 May 2015 09:21:28 +0100
 From: Matt Caswell m...@openssl.org
 Reply-To: openssl-us...@openssl.org
 To: openssl-us...@openssl.org, openssl-...@openssl.org
 
 I am considering removing Kerberos support from OpenSSL 1.1.0. There 
 are
 a number of problems with the functionality as it stands, and it 
 seems
 to me to be a very rarely used feature. I'm interested in hearing any
 opinions on this (either for or against).
 
 Thanks in advance for your input,
 
 Matt
 ___
 openssl-users mailing list
 To unsubscribe: 
 https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
 

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Re: [Freeipa-devel] Fwd: [openssl-users] removing Kerberos support from OpenSSL

2015-05-11 Thread Nathaniel McCallum
Nico Williams has made an interesting proposal on this topic:
http://marc.info/?l=openssl-usersm=143136162429551w=2

It is probably worth discussing.

On Mon, 2015-05-11 at 10:09 -0400, Nathaniel McCallum wrote:
 Yes and no.
 
 The current Kerberos support is insecure and should not be used. The 
 main
 problem is that the session key is reused for all TLS connections. 
 This
 prevents perfect forward secrecy.
 
 That being said, we have been toying around with the idea of making 
 a new
 standard for GSSAPI/TLS which uses a DH or a PAKE to ensure that both
 sides contribute entropy to a random encryption key.
 
 However, we have to get some of the other standards work off our 
 plates
 before we can tackle such a large task.
 
 In short: existing Kerberos support should be removed from OpenSSL.
 
 Nathaniel
 
 On Tue, 2015-05-05 at 14:44 +0200, Petr Spacek wrote:
  Hello!
  
  Is this somehow interesting for us?
  
  Petr^2 Spacek
  
  
   Forwarded Message 
  Subject: [openssl-users] Kerberos
  Date: Tue, 05 May 2015 09:21:28 +0100
  From: Matt Caswell m...@openssl.org
  Reply-To: openssl-us...@openssl.org
  To: openssl-us...@openssl.org, openssl-...@openssl.org
  
  I am considering removing Kerberos support from OpenSSL 1.1.0. 
  There 
  are
  a number of problems with the functionality as it stands, and it 
  seems
  to me to be a very rarely used feature. I'm interested in hearing 
  any
  opinions on this (either for or against).
  
  Thanks in advance for your input,
  
  Matt
  ___
  openssl-users mailing list
  To unsubscribe: 
  https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users
  
 

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[Freeipa-devel] Fwd: [openssl-users] removing Kerberos support from OpenSSL

2015-05-05 Thread Petr Spacek
Hello!

Is this somehow interesting for us?

Petr^2 Spacek


 Forwarded Message 
Subject: [openssl-users] Kerberos
Date: Tue, 05 May 2015 09:21:28 +0100
From: Matt Caswell m...@openssl.org
Reply-To: openssl-us...@openssl.org
To: openssl-us...@openssl.org, openssl-...@openssl.org

I am considering removing Kerberos support from OpenSSL 1.1.0. There are
a number of problems with the functionality as it stands, and it seems
to me to be a very rarely used feature. I'm interested in hearing any
opinions on this (either for or against).

Thanks in advance for your input,

Matt
___
openssl-users mailing list
To unsubscribe: https://mta.openssl.org/mailman/listinfo/openssl-users

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