Re: [Freeipa-users] Hardening freeipa on the internet

2014-05-09 Thread Richard Clark
On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 10:11:15AM +0200, Martin Kosek wrote:
 
 Does anybody know about other precautions that should be made besides standard
 hardening (SELinux, firewall, log audits)?
 

I've been running IPA on AWS for a while, replicating within regions as
well as inter-region and also a regular datacentre. 
Not using IPA DNS services, but instead using Route53 (managed by
puppet).

All in all have been pretty impressed with the stability of it.


As well as disabling anonymous binds, you should also disallow
plain-text connections.

This is done in /etc/dirsrv/slapd-PROD-TELNIC-NET/dse.ldif
Find nsslapd-minssf, and change this from '0' to '56'

With this enabled, all clients will need to communicate via STARTTLS or
LDAPS.

The only caveat to this is in 3.0, this affects only the regular slapd
instance, and not the CA slapd which replicates over plain-text only.
This is apparently fixed in 3.2.


Cheers,
-- 
Richard Clark
rich...@fohnet.co.uk


signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
___
Freeipa-users mailing list
Freeipa-users@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-users

Re: [Freeipa-users] Hardening freeipa on the internet

2014-04-30 Thread Martin Kosek
On 04/28/2014 05:16 PM, Simo Sorce wrote:
 On Mon, 2014-04-28 at 16:11 +0100, Andrew Holway wrote:
 I realized that you probably want to disable anonymous access to LDAP. It
 will prevent random strangers to enumerate all users in your database...

 This sounds like a bug no? anonymous access to LDAP?
 
 Historically many Linux and Unix OSs did not authenticate to LDAP to
 download POSIX info, so we allow by default to access a lot of the tree
 anonymously.
 We are in the process of changing how the permissions work in 4.0, and
 will contextually close down a lot more of the tree letting the admin
 more easily configure access.
 
 So, no it is not technically a bug, but it is something you want to look
 out for as an admin.
 
 Simo.
 

Let me just advertise the core feature of upcoming FreeIPA 4.0 which contains
re-design of ACIs and permissions in FreeIPA:

http://www.freeipa.org/page/V4/Permissions_V2

With this feature, it will be very easy to control visibility of different
parts of FreeIPA DIT - i.e. for example allow POSIX user attributes for
anonymous bot allow other attributes to authenticated only, same with groups,
HBAC rules, ...

Martin

___
Freeipa-users mailing list
Freeipa-users@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-users


Re: [Freeipa-users] Hardening freeipa on the internet

2014-04-28 Thread Petr Spacek

On 25.4.2014 11:00, Petr Spacek wrote:

On 25.4.2014 10:11, Martin Kosek wrote:

On 04/25/2014 09:50 AM, Andrew Holway wrote:

Hello,

I am having a think about running freeipa on the open seas for more
distributed organisations and would like to understand where the
weaknesses might be. I would almost certainly only make the ui
unavailable however I am unsure about the other services.

Would this be a workable?

Thanks,

Andrew


That's actually a very good question. I am currently working on a public
FreeIPA demo on Red Hat OpenStack platform which I will make available in
upcoming weeks and have few pointers for you:

1) If you have DNS configured, make sure that your FreeIPA DNS does not pose as
open DNS resolver to avoid DNS amplification attacks.

Following extension to named.conf options should be a good start:

 allow-transfer {none;};

This configuration applies only to zones defined in named.conf and not to
FreeIPA zones defined in LDAP.

Make sure that allow-transfer is configured for FreeIPA zones:
$ ipa dnszone-mod --allow-transfer=none; example.


 allow-recursion {none;};
 recursion no;
 version [Secured];
 rate-limit {
 responses-per-second 15;

You may need to modify this value to fit your needs.

Further reading about DNS amplification attacks:
http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA13-088A

Further reading about Response Rate Limiting:
http://bkraft.fr/blog/bind_RRL_feature/

https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01000/0/A-Quick-Introduction-to-Response-Rate-Limiting.html


https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-00994/0


 };

2) Prevention for NTP amplification attack

More info here:
https://support.steadfast.net/Knowledgebase/Article/View/106/0/preventing-ntp-amplification-attacks



Further reading about NTP amplification attacks:
http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-013A


Does anybody know about other precautions that should be made besides standard
hardening (SELinux, firewall, log audits)?


I wonder if Kerberos over UDP could have the same problem... Maybe only if you
have some principals with disabled pre-authentication. I don't know. Kerberos
is not listed on
http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A ...


I realized that you probably want to disable anonymous access to LDAP. It will 
prevent random strangers to enumerate all users in your database...


--
Petr^2 Spacek

___
Freeipa-users mailing list
Freeipa-users@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-users


Re: [Freeipa-users] Hardening freeipa on the internet

2014-04-28 Thread Andrew Holway
 I realized that you probably want to disable anonymous access to LDAP. It
 will prevent random strangers to enumerate all users in your database...

This sounds like a bug no? anonymous access to LDAP?



 --
 Petr^2 Spacek

 ___
 Freeipa-users mailing list
 Freeipa-users@redhat.com
 https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-users

___
Freeipa-users mailing list
Freeipa-users@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-users


Re: [Freeipa-users] Hardening freeipa on the internet

2014-04-28 Thread Simo Sorce
On Mon, 2014-04-28 at 16:11 +0100, Andrew Holway wrote:
  I realized that you probably want to disable anonymous access to LDAP. It
  will prevent random strangers to enumerate all users in your database...
 
 This sounds like a bug no? anonymous access to LDAP?

Historically many Linux and Unix OSs did not authenticate to LDAP to
download POSIX info, so we allow by default to access a lot of the tree
anonymously.
We are in the process of changing how the permissions work in 4.0, and
will contextually close down a lot more of the tree letting the admin
more easily configure access.

So, no it is not technically a bug, but it is something you want to look
out for as an admin.

Simo.

-- 
Simo Sorce * Red Hat, Inc * New York

___
Freeipa-users mailing list
Freeipa-users@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-users


Re: [Freeipa-users] Hardening freeipa on the internet

2014-04-25 Thread Martin Kosek
On 04/25/2014 09:50 AM, Andrew Holway wrote:
 Hello,
 
 I am having a think about running freeipa on the open seas for more
 distributed organisations and would like to understand where the
 weaknesses might be. I would almost certainly only make the ui
 unavailable however I am unsure about the other services.
 
 Would this be a workable?
 
 Thanks,
 
 Andrew

That's actually a very good question. I am currently working on a public
FreeIPA demo on Red Hat OpenStack platform which I will make available in
upcoming weeks and have few pointers for you:

1) If you have DNS configured, make sure that your FreeIPA DNS does not pose as
open DNS resolver to avoid DNS amplification attacks.

Following extension to named.conf options should be a good start:

allow-transfer {none;};
allow-recursion {none;};
recursion no;
version [Secured];
rate-limit {
responses-per-second 15;
};

2) Prevention for NTP amplification attack

More info here:
https://support.steadfast.net/Knowledgebase/Article/View/106/0/preventing-ntp-amplification-attacks

Does anybody know about other precautions that should be made besides standard
hardening (SELinux, firewall, log audits)?

Thanks,
Martin

___
Freeipa-users mailing list
Freeipa-users@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/freeipa-users