[Full-disclosure] Turning SMB client side bug to server side
Here's a small technic to compromise via a SMB client side bug the PDC/DMB by abusing the Browser protocol, with no user interaction at all. Browser and NBNS abusing is well known since a long time, as theses protocols wasn't developed with security in mind, this blog post is a simple real case example. http://g-laurent.blogspot.com/2010/04/turning-smb-client-bug-to-server-side.html Regards, ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Best Wireless Sniffer for MAC OS X
VMWare of *nix and an external WLAN card. On 4/13/10 7:41 AM, "Justin Chang" wrote: > Hello group > > What are some of the best wireless sniffers on MAC OS X platform? I want to be > able to sniff the traffic and look for sensitive information. The company has > a small budget so both free and commercial are fine > > Thanks > > > ___ > Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. > Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html > Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/ ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] iDefense Security Advisory 04.15.10: Multiple Vendor AgentX++ Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
iDefense Security Advisory 04.15.10 http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/ Apr 15, 2010 I. BACKGROUND Agent Extensibility (AgentX) Protocol was designed to address interoperability issues with extensible SNMP agents. AgentX++ is a C++ implementation of the AgentX protocol. It is one of several C++ based SNMP libraries developed by Frank Fock. For more information refer to the URLs below. http://www.agentpp.com/ http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2741.txt II. DESCRIPTION Remote exploitation of a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability within AgentX++, as distributed with multiple vendors' products, allows attackers to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the AgentX master process. This vulnerability exists within the AgentX::receive_agentx function. By sending multiple blocks of data to the vulnerable function, an attacker could overwrite the data following the stack buffer, including the saved return address. III. ANALYSIS Exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the running AgentX master process. In order to exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must be able to connect to the AgentX master port, usually TCP port 705. No authentication is required. In the case of RealNetworks Helix Server v12, there is an option to install the AgentX master as an NT service. If installed in this way, the AgentX master will run with SYSTEM privileges. The privileges with which this process runs varies in other situations. Although the issue is present in the Linux version of Helix Server v12, it is not exploitable due to stack buffer padding added by the GNU compiler. Reliable code execution has been confirmed on Windows targets. IV. DETECTION iDefense confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in the following environments: RealNetworks Helix Server v12 on Linux RealNetworks Helix Server v12 on Windows 2003 SP2 AgentX++ source code v1.4.16 All products utilizing the AgentX++ library are suspected to be vulnerable. Helix Server and Helix Mobile server versions prior to 14.0.0 are vulnerable (11.x,12.x and 13.x series). V. WORKAROUND iDefense is currently unaware of any workarounds for this issue. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE RealNetworks Inc. has released a patch which addresses this issue. For more information, consult their advisory at the following URL. http://www.realnetworks.com/uploadedFiles/Support/helix-support/SecurityUpdate041410HS.pdf VII. CVE INFORMATION The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2010-1318 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems. VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 11/03/2008 Initial Vendor Notification 01/14/2009 Initial Vendor Reply 04/15/2010 Coordinated Public Disclosure IX. CREDIT This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by Manuel Santamarina Suarez. Get paid for vulnerability research http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php Free tools, research and upcoming events http://labs.idefense.com/ X. LEGAL NOTICES Copyright © 2010 iDefense, Inc. Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please e-mail customerserv...@idefense.com for permission. Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
[Full-disclosure] iDefense Security Advisory 04.15.10: Multiple Vendor AgentX++ Integer Overflow Vulnerability
iDefense Security Advisory 04.15.10 http://labs.idefense.com/intelligence/vulnerabilities/ Apr 15, 2010 I. BACKGROUND Agent Extensibility (AgentX) Protocol was designed to address interoperability issues with extensible SNMP agents. AgentX++ is a C++ implementation of the AgentX protocol. It is one of several C++ based SNMP libraries developed by Frank Fock. For more information refer to the URLs below. http://www.agentpp.com/ http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2741.txt II. DESCRIPTION Remote exploitation of an integer overflow vulnerability within AgentX++, as distributed with multiple vendors' products, allows attackers to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the AgentX master process. This vulnerability exists within the AgentX::receive_agentx function. If an attacker sends a request specifying the maximum 32-bit integer as the payload length, adding one will cause an integer overflow, resulting in the allocation of a "0" size buffer. Since an attacker can send as much, or as little, data as they wish, they can overflow the allocated heap buffer by an arbitrary amount. III. ANALYSIS Exploitation allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the running AgentX master process. In order to exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must be able to connect to the AgentX master port, usually TCP port 705. No authentication is required. The privileges with which this process runs varies in other situations. In order to listen on ports below 1024, root privileges are required. The master agent included with RealNetwork Helix Server v12 does not drop privileges after opening this port. Although the issue is present in the Windows version of Helix Server v12, it is not exploitable due the implementation of the "recv" function in Winsock. In Windows, the "recv" function buffers incoming data, and will return a "WSAENOBUFS" error when a request is made for more bytes than will fit in the buffer. No data is read in this case. IV. DETECTION iDefense confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in the following environments: RealNetworks Helix Server v12 on Linux RealNetworks Helix Server v12 on Windows 2003 SP2 AgentX++ source code v1.4.16 All products utilizing the AgentX++ library are suspected to be vulnerable. Helix Server and Helix Mobile server versions prior to 14.0.0 are vulnerable (11.x,12.x and 13.x series). V. WORKAROUND iDefense is currently unaware of any workarounds for this issue. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE RealNetworks Inc. has released a patch which addresses this issue. For more information, consult their advisory at the following URL. http://www.realnetworks.com/uploadedFiles/Support/helix-support/Securi tyUpdate041410HS.pdf VII. CVE INFORMATION The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CVE-2010-1319 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for security problems. VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 11/03/2008 Initial Vendor Notification 01/14/2009 Initial Vendor Reply 04/15/2010 Coordinated Public Disclosure IX. CREDIT This vulnerability was discovered by Joshua J. Drake of iDefense Labs. Get paid for vulnerability research http://labs.idefense.com/methodology/vulnerability/vcp.php Free tools, research and upcoming events http://labs.idefense.com/ X. LEGAL NOTICES Copyright © 2010 iDefense, Inc. Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express written consent of iDefense. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please e-mail customerserv...@idefense.com for permission. Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on, this information. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] Java Deployment Toolkit Performs Insufficient Validation of Parameters
On Fri, Apr 9, 2010 at 12:08 PM, Tavis Ormandy wrote: > --- > Mitigation > --- [...] > - Mozilla Firefox and other NPAPI based browser users can be protected using > File System ACLs to prevent access to npdeploytk.dll. Just for the record (since I had to go hunting to find out), Giorgio Maone says NoScript will protect Firefox users (so long as you haven't whitelisted the relevant website for other purposes) : http://forums.informaction.com/viewtopic.php?f=8&t=4207 As a lot of folks are concluding, it's better to just uninstall Java altogether (at least till Soracle sorts out the various appalling design decisions they seem to have made with this product), but some of us are stuck with workstations that need Java installed for one reason or another. Cheers Nick -- Leave the Olympics in Greece, where they belong. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
Re: [Full-disclosure] How to disable Java Deployment Toolkit
On Wed, Apr 14, 2010 at 11:15 AM, Kristof Zelechovski wrote: > Regarding the Java Deployment Toolkit vulnerability: > On Windows XP and later: open the Local Security Settings console and create > a prohibition rule for the path > %HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\JavaSoft\Java Web > Start\1.6.0_19\HOME%/JAVAWS.EXE Hmm ... presumably that would that need repeating for every later (and older) Java release until the functionality is believed safe ? Cheers Nick -- Leave the Olympics in Greece, where they belong. ___ Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. Charter: http://lists.grok.org.uk/full-disclosure-charter.html Hosted and sponsored by Secunia - http://secunia.com/
