Hi Erik, Thanks for backing me up on a number of things. Only one response below. > > In light of that, there's > > nothing particularly wrong with using CBC, if it is implemented well. > > At least, using it is not *more* wrong than using OFB, CFB, or CTR > > That is wrong. CBC mode allows
Hi, On Tue, Dec 27, 2016 at 09:01:49AM -0800, Tim wrote: > [...] > > > > But there still are people who use CBC... > > [...] > > All traditional modes that lack integrity protection are vulnerable to > chosen-ciphertext attacks in these kinds of scenarios. > [...] > All traditional modes need a
> > res = apr_crypto_passphrase(, , passphrase, > > strlen(passphrase), (unsigned char *) (), sizeof(apr_uuid_t), > > *cipher, APR_MODE_CBC, 1, 4096, f, r->pool); > > CBC. Again. > > The earliest mention of CFB which I know is dated 1989. > The earliest mention of CTR which I know is dated
On 2016-12-23 13:28:33 +0100, RedTeam Pentesting GmbH wrote: > res = apr_crypto_passphrase(, , passphrase, > strlen(passphrase), (unsigned char *) (), sizeof(apr_uuid_t), > *cipher, APR_MODE_CBC, 1, 4096, f, r->pool); CBC. Again. The earliest mention of CFB which I know is dated 1989. The
Advisory: Padding Oracle in Apache mod_session_crypto During a penetration test, RedTeam Pentesting discovered a Padding Oracle vulnerability in mod_session_crypto of the Apache web server. This vulnerability can be exploited to decrypt the session data and even encrypt attacker-specified data.