tamiko 17/06/20 08:31:52
Added:
00_all_0015-rtld-Completely-ignore-LD_LIBRARY_PATH-for-AT_SECURE.patch
00_all_0016-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_AUDIT-path-elements.patch
00_all_0017-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch
00_all_0018-Add-IS_IN-guard-to-multiarch-IFUNC-implementations.patch
00_all_0019-Ignore-and-remove-LD_HWCAP_MASK-for-AT_SECURE-progra.patch
Log:
glibc-2.25: update to patchset 5
Revision Changes Path
1.1
src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0015-rtld-Completely-ignore-LD_LIBRARY_PATH-for-AT_SECURE.patch
file :
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0015-rtld-Completely-ignore-LD_LIBRARY_PATH-for-AT_SECURE.patch?rev=1.1&view=markup
plain:
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0015-rtld-Completely-ignore-LD_LIBRARY_PATH-for-AT_SECURE.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/plain
Index: 00_all_0015-rtld-Completely-ignore-LD_LIBRARY_PATH-for-AT_SECURE.patch
===================================================================
>From 4d009d39ac9ede0369e268554a181b428f177a80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id:
<4d009d39ac9ede0369e268554a181b428f177a80.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
References: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 20:37:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] rtld: Completely ignore LD_LIBRARY_PATH for AT_SECURE=1
programs
To: libc-al...@sourceware.org
LD_LIBRARY_PATH can only be used to reorder system search paths, which
is not useful functionality.
---
elf/rtld.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
index 319ef06..824b6cf 100644
--- a/elf/rtld.c
+++ b/elf/rtld.c
@@ -2419,7 +2419,8 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
case 12:
/* The library search path. */
- if (memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
+ if (!__libc_enable_secure
+ && memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
{
library_path = &envline[13];
break;
--
2.9.4
1.1
src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0016-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_AUDIT-path-elements.patch
file :
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0016-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_AUDIT-path-elements.patch?rev=1.1&view=markup
plain:
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0016-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_AUDIT-path-elements.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/plain
Index: 00_all_0016-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_AUDIT-path-elements.patch
===================================================================
>From ba67ba3275d47e0080f0e5f09d9f5102c000c97e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id:
<ba67ba3275d47e0080f0e5f09d9f5102c000c97e.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
References: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 20:44:52 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] rtld: Reject overly long LD_AUDIT path elements
To: libc-al...@sourceware.org
Also only process the last LD_AUDIT entry.
---
elf/rtld.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
index cdddcf3..c9ddba1 100644
--- a/elf/rtld.c
+++ b/elf/rtld.c
@@ -100,13 +100,91 @@ strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local,
__pointer_chk_guard)
#endif
-/* List of auditing DSOs. */
+/* LD_AUDIT variable contents. Must be processed before the
+ audit_list below. */
+const char *audit_list_string;
+
+/* Cyclic list of auditing DSOs. audit_list->next is the first
+ element. */
static struct audit_list
{
const char *name;
struct audit_list *next;
} *audit_list;
+/* Iterator for audit_list_string followed by audit_list. */
+struct audit_list_iter
+{
+ /* Tail of audit_list_string still needing processing, or NULL. */
+ const char *audit_list_tail;
+
+ /* The list element returned in the previous iteration. NULL before
+ the first element. */
+ struct audit_list *previous;
+
+ /* Scratch buffer for returning a name which is part of
+ audit_list_string. */
+ char fname[PATH_MAX];
+};
+
+/* Initialize an audit list iterator. */
+static void
+audit_list_iter_init (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
+{
+ iter->audit_list_tail = audit_list_string;
+ iter->previous = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Iterate through both audit_list_string and audit_list. */
+static const char *
+audit_list_iter_next (struct audit_list_iter *iter)
+{
+ if (iter->audit_list_tail != NULL)
+ {
+ /* First iterate over audit_list_string. */
+ while (*iter->audit_list_tail != '\0')
+ {
+ /* Split audit list at colon. */
+ size_t len = strcspn (iter->audit_list_tail, ":");
+ if (len > 0 && len < PATH_MAX)
+ {
+ memcpy (iter->fname, iter->audit_list_tail, len);
+ iter->fname[len] = '\0';
+ }
+ else
+ /* Do not return this name to the caller. */
+ iter->fname[0] = '\0';
+
+ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
+ iter->audit_list_tail += len;
+ if (*iter->audit_list_tail == ':')
+ ++iter->audit_list_tail;
+
+ /* If the name is valid, return it. */
+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (iter->fname))
+ return iter->fname;
+ /* Otherwise, wrap around and try the next name. */
+ }
+ /* Fall through to the procesing of audit_list. */
+ }
+
+ if (iter->previous == NULL)
+ {
+ if (audit_list == NULL)
+ /* No pre-parsed audit list. */
+ return NULL;
+ /* Start of audit list. The first list element is at
+ audit_list->next (cyclic list). */
+ iter->previous = audit_list->next;
+ return iter->previous->name;
+ }
+ if (iter->previous == audit_list)
+ /* Cyclic list wrap-around. */
+ return NULL;
+ iter->previous = iter->previous->next;
+ return iter->previous->name;
+}
+
#ifndef HAVE_INLINED_SYSCALLS
/* Set nonzero during loading and initialization of executable and
libraries, cleared before the executable's entry point runs. This
@@ -1238,11 +1316,13 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
GL(dl_rtld_map).l_tls_modid = _dl_next_tls_modid ();
/* If we have auditing DSOs to load, do it now. */
- if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL))
+ bool need_security_init = true;
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (audit_list != NULL)
+ || __glibc_unlikely (audit_list_string != NULL))
{
- /* Iterate over all entries in the list. The order is important. */
struct audit_ifaces *last_audit = NULL;
- struct audit_list *al = audit_list->next;
+ struct audit_list_iter al_iter;
+ audit_list_iter_init (&al_iter);
/* Since we start using the auditing DSOs right away we need to
initialize the data structures now. */
@@ -1253,9 +1333,14 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend
to run this program.\n\
use different values (especially the pointer guard) and will
fail later on. */
security_init ();
+ need_security_init = false;
- do
+ while (true)
{
+ const char *name = audit_list_iter_next (&al_iter);
+ if (name == NULL)
+ break;
+
int tls_idx = GL(dl_tls_max_dtv_idx);
/* Now it is time to determine the layout of the static TLS
@@ -1264,7 +1349,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to
run this program.\n\
no DF_STATIC_TLS bit is set. The reason is that we know
glibc will use the static model. */
struct dlmopen_args dlmargs;
- dlmargs.fname = al->name;
+ dlmargs.fname = name;
dlmargs.map = NULL;
const char *objname;
@@ -1277,7 +1362,7 @@ of this helper program; chances are you did not intend to
run this program.\n\
not_loaded:
_dl_error_printf ("\
ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit interface: %s; ignored.\n",
- al->name, err_str);
+ name, err_str);
if (malloced)
free ((char *) err_str);
}
@@ -1381,10 +1466,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
goto not_loaded;
}
}
-
- al = al->next;
}
- while (al != audit_list->next);
/* If we have any auditing modules, announce that we already
have two objects loaded. */
@@ -1663,7 +1745,7 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
if (tcbp == NULL)
tcbp = init_tls ();
- if (__glibc_likely (audit_list == NULL))
+ if (__glibc_likely (need_security_init))
/* Initialize security features. But only if we have not done it
earlier. */
security_init ();
@@ -2294,9 +2376,7 @@ process_dl_audit (char *str)
char *p;
while ((p = (strsep) (&str, ":")) != NULL)
- if (p[0] != '\0'
- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (p))
{
/* This is using the local malloc, not the system malloc. The
memory can never be freed. */
@@ -2360,7 +2440,7 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
break;
}
if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
- process_dl_audit (&envline[6]);
+ audit_list_string = &envline[6];
break;
case 7:
1.1
src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0017-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch
file :
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0017-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch?rev=1.1&view=markup
plain:
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0017-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/plain
Index: 00_all_0017-rtld-Reject-overly-long-LD_PRELOAD-path-elements.patch
===================================================================
>From 65ff0b7a085b85271ec8fde99f542281b495e3bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
Message-Id:
<65ff0b7a085b85271ec8fde99f542281b495e3bc.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
References: <cover.1495998948.git.fwei...@redhat.com>
From: Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 28 May 2017 20:57:40 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] rtld: Reject overly long LD_PRELOAD path elements
To: libc-al...@sourceware.org
---
elf/rtld.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
index c9ddba1..7c049df 100644
--- a/elf/rtld.c
+++ b/elf/rtld.c
@@ -99,6 +99,22 @@ uintptr_t __pointer_chk_guard_local
strong_alias (__pointer_chk_guard_local, __pointer_chk_guard)
#endif
+/* Check that AT_SECURE=0, or that the passed name does not contain
+ directories and is not overly long. Reject empty names
+ unconditionally. */
+static bool
+dso_name_valid_for_suid (const char *p)
+{
+ if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
+ {
+ /* Ignore pathnames with directories for AT_SECURE=1
+ programs, and also skip overlong names. */
+ size_t len = strlen (p);
+ if (len >= NAME_MAX || memchr (p, '/', len) != NULL)
+ return false;
+ }
+ return *p != '\0';
+}
/* LD_AUDIT variable contents. Must be processed before the
audit_list below. */
@@ -794,6 +810,42 @@ static const char *preloadlist attribute_relro;
/* Nonzero if information about versions has to be printed. */
static int version_info attribute_relro;
+/* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
+ separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
+ executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope list.
+ (If the binary is running setuid all elements containing a '/' are
+ ignored since it is insecure.) Return the number of preloads
+ performed. */
+unsigned int
+handle_ld_preload (const char *preloadlist, struct link_map *main_map)
+{
+ unsigned int npreloads = 0;
+ const char *p = preloadlist;
+ char fname[PATH_MAX];
+
+ while (*p != '\0')
+ {
+ /* Split preload list at space/colon. */
+ size_t len = strcspn (p, " :");
+ if (len > 0 && len < PATH_MAX)
+ {
+ memcpy (fname, p, len);
+ fname[len] = '\0';
+ }
+ else
+ fname[0] = '\0';
+
+ /* Skip over the substring and the following delimiter. */
+ p += len;
+ if (*p == ' ' || *p == ':')
+ ++p;
+
+ if (dso_name_valid_for_suid (fname))
+ npreloads += do_preload (fname, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
+ }
+ return npreloads;
+}
+
static void
dl_main (const ElfW(Phdr) *phdr,
ElfW(Word) phnum,
@@ -1544,23 +1596,8 @@ ERROR: ld.so: object '%s' cannot be loaded as audit
interface: %s; ignored.\n",
if (__glibc_unlikely (preloadlist != NULL))
{
- /* The LD_PRELOAD environment variable gives list of libraries
- separated by white space or colons that are loaded before the
- executable's dependencies and prepended to the global scope
- list. If the binary is running setuid all elements
- containing a '/' are ignored since it is insecure. */
- char *list = strdupa (preloadlist);
- char *p;
-
HP_TIMING_NOW (start);
-
- /* Prevent optimizing strsep. Speed is not important here. */
- while ((p = (strsep) (&list, " :")) != NULL)
- if (p[0] != '\0'
- && (__builtin_expect (! __libc_enable_secure, 1)
- || strchr (p, '/') == NULL))
- npreloads += do_preload (p, main_map, "LD_PRELOAD");
-
+ npreloads += handle_ld_preload (preloadlist, main_map);
HP_TIMING_NOW (stop);
HP_TIMING_DIFF (diff, start, stop);
HP_TIMING_ACCUM_NT (load_time, diff);
1.1
src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0018-Add-IS_IN-guard-to-multiarch-IFUNC-implementations.patch
file :
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0018-Add-IS_IN-guard-to-multiarch-IFUNC-implementations.patch?rev=1.1&view=markup
plain:
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0018-Add-IS_IN-guard-to-multiarch-IFUNC-implementations.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/plain
Index: 00_all_0018-Add-IS_IN-guard-to-multiarch-IFUNC-implementations.patch
===================================================================
>From 862ee76acbf83a2d785809734b02c1929c4a0859 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthias Maier <tam...@43-1.org>
Date: Wed, 14 Jun 2017 03:22:11 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Add IS_IN guard to multiarch/IFUNC implementations
The two preceding rtld patches add the first reference to strcspn to
ld.so, which pulls in the multiarch/IFUNC implementations because the
files in question lack an IS_IN (libc) guard (which essentially disables
IFUNCs in ld.so).
Patch by Florian Weimer <fwei...@redhat.com>
---
sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c | 6 ++++--
sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
index 6d61e19..ec230fb 100644
--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
+++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/strcspn-c.c
@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
-#define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
+#if IS_IN (libc)
+# define __strcspn_sse2 __strcspn_ia32
+# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcspn-c.c>
+#endif
diff --git a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
index 7760b96..6742a35 100644
--- a/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
+++ b/sysdeps/i386/i686/multiarch/varshift.c
@@ -1 +1,3 @@
-#include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
+#if IS_IN (libc)
+# include <sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/varshift.c>
+#endif
--
2.13.0
1.1
src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0019-Ignore-and-remove-LD_HWCAP_MASK-for-AT_SECURE-progra.patch
file :
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0019-Ignore-and-remove-LD_HWCAP_MASK-for-AT_SECURE-progra.patch?rev=1.1&view=markup
plain:
http://sources.gentoo.org/viewvc.cgi/gentoo/src/patchsets/glibc/2.25/00_all_0019-Ignore-and-remove-LD_HWCAP_MASK-for-AT_SECURE-progra.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/plain
Index: 00_all_0019-Ignore-and-remove-LD_HWCAP_MASK-for-AT_SECURE-progra.patch
===================================================================
>From 1c1243b6fc33c029488add276e56570a07803bfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddh...@sourceware.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 20:52:04 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] Ignore and remove LD_HWCAP_MASK for AT_SECURE programs (bug
#21209)
The LD_HWCAP_MASK environment variable may alter the selection of
function variants for some architectures. For AT_SECURE process it
means that if an outdated routine has a bug that would otherwise not
affect newer platforms by default, LD_HWCAP_MASK will allow that bug
to be exploited.
To be on the safe side, ignore and disable LD_HWCAP_MASK for setuid
binaries.
[BZ #21209]
* elf/rtld.c (process_envvars): Ignore LD_HWCAP_MASK for
AT_SECURE processes.
* sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h: Add LD_HWCAP_MASK.
* elf/tst-env-setuid.c (test_parent): Test LD_HWCAP_MASK.
(test_child): Likewise.
* elf/Makefile (tst-env-setuid-ENV): Add LD_HWCAP_MASK.
---
ChangeLog | 10 ++++++++++
elf/Makefile | 3 ++-
elf/rtld.c | 3 ++-
elf/tst-env-setuid.c | 12 ++++++++++++
sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h | 1 +
5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/elf/Makefile b/elf/Makefile
index 61abeb59ee..cc4aeb25b6 100644
--- a/elf/Makefile
+++ b/elf/Makefile
@@ -1398,6 +1398,7 @@ $(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose:
$(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose-dso.so
$(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose.out: $(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose-dso.so \
$(objpfx)tst-nodelete-dlclose-plugin.so
-tst-env-setuid-ENV = MALLOC_CHECK_=2 MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_=4096
+tst-env-setuid-ENV = MALLOC_CHECK_=2 MALLOC_MMAP_THRESHOLD_=4096 \
+ LD_HWCAP_MASK=0xffffffff
tst-env-setuid-tunables-ENV = \
GLIBC_TUNABLES=glibc.malloc.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096
diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
index a036ece956..5986eaf4a1 100644
--- a/elf/rtld.c
+++ b/elf/rtld.c
@@ -2404,7 +2404,8 @@ process_envvars (enum mode *modep)
case 10:
/* Mask for the important hardware capabilities. */
- if (memcmp (envline, "HWCAP_MASK", 10) == 0)
+ if (!__libc_enable_secure
+ && memcmp (envline, "HWCAP_MASK", 10) == 0)
GLRO(dl_hwcap_mask) = __strtoul_internal (&envline[11], NULL,
0, 0);
break;
diff --git a/elf/tst-env-setuid.c b/elf/tst-env-setuid.c
index 6ec3fa5874..eec408eb5d 100644
--- a/elf/tst-env-setuid.c
+++ b/elf/tst-env-setuid.c
@@ -213,6 +213,12 @@ test_child (void)
return 1;
}
+ if (getenv ("LD_HWCAP_MASK") != NULL)
+ {
+ printf ("LD_HWCAP_MASK still set\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
#endif
@@ -233,6 +239,12 @@ test_parent (void)
return 1;
}
+ if (getenv ("LD_HWCAP_MASK") == NULL)
+ {
+ printf ("LD_HWCAP_MASK lost\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
#endif
diff --git a/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h b/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
index a74083786e..5ea8a4a259 100644
--- a/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
+++ b/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
"LD_DEBUG\0" \
"LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT\0" \
"LD_DYNAMIC_WEAK\0" \
+ "LD_HWCAP_MASK\0" \
"LD_LIBRARY_PATH\0" \
"LD_ORIGIN_PATH\0" \
"LD_PRELOAD\0" \
--
2.13.0
