Re: [gentoo-dev] PSA: switching default tmpfiles virtual provider

2020-11-26 Thread Michael Orlitzky
On 11/26/20 5:37 PM, Peter Stuge wrote: > Georgy Yakovlev wrote: >> I'll be switching default tmpfiles provider to sys-apps/systemd-tmpfiles >> by the end of the week by updating virtual/tmpfiles ebuild. > > Michael Orlitzky wrote: >> Corollary: the tmpfiles.d specification can only be

Re: [gentoo-dev] PSA: switching default tmpfiles virtual provider

2020-11-26 Thread Thomas Deutschmann
On 2020-11-26 21:36, Michael Orlitzky wrote: Most of these security issues were fixed in systemd-tmpfiles years ago, and you can easily find upstream tmpfiles.d entries that contain e.g. "Z" entries. In that case, the upstream file is not in error, and root doesn't have to be actively tricked

Re: [gentoo-dev] PSA: switching default tmpfiles virtual provider

2020-11-26 Thread Sam James
> On 26 Nov 2020, at 22:37, Peter Stuge wrote: > Michael Orlitzky wrote: >> Corollary: the tmpfiles.d specification can only be implemented (safely) >> on Linux after all. > > So should virtual/tmpfiles differentiate based on system? > It won’t be keyworded where it’s not available so Portage

Re: [gentoo-dev] PSA: switching default tmpfiles virtual provider

2020-11-26 Thread David Seifert
On Thu, 2020-11-26 at 17:45 -0500, Michael Orlitzky wrote: > On 11/26/20 5:37 PM, Peter Stuge wrote: > > Georgy Yakovlev wrote: > > > I'll be switching default tmpfiles provider to sys-apps/systemd- > > > tmpfiles > > > by the end of the week by updating virtual/tmpfiles ebuild. > > > > Michael

Re: [gentoo-dev] PSA: switching default tmpfiles virtual provider

2020-11-26 Thread Michael Orlitzky
On 11/26/20 5:57 PM, Thomas Deutschmann wrote: > > I disagree here: Packages installing tmpfiles configs requiring > recursive chown on each boot are doing something wrong from  my P.O.V. No argument there, but me thinking they're wrong doesn't stop people from doing it. > Note that hardlinks

Re: [gentoo-dev] Packages up for grabs: x11-misc/zim

2020-11-26 Thread Bernard Cafarelli
Le Thu, 26 Nov 2020 00:27:53 +0100 Jonas Stein a écrit: > Dear all > > the following packages are up for grabs while dissolving > the desktop-misc project: > > x11-misc/zim > https://packages.gentoo.org/packages/x11-misc/zim > > It is a very powerful deskop wiki which is written in python. It

Re: [gentoo-dev] Packages up for grabs: x11-misc/zim

2020-11-26 Thread Azamat Hackimov
Hi. Also created https://github.com/gentoo/gentoo/pull/18411 for taking maintainership. чт, 26 нояб. 2020 г. в 12:01, Bernard Cafarelli : > > Le Thu, 26 Nov 2020 00:27:53 +0100 > Jonas Stein a écrit: > > > Dear all > > > > the following packages are up for grabs while dissolving > > the

Re: [gentoo-dev] PSA: switching default tmpfiles virtual provider

2020-11-26 Thread Peter Stuge
Georgy Yakovlev wrote: > I'll be switching default tmpfiles provider to sys-apps/systemd-tmpfiles > by the end of the week by updating virtual/tmpfiles ebuild. Michael Orlitzky wrote: > Corollary: the tmpfiles.d specification can only be implemented (safely) > on Linux after all. So should

Re: [gentoo-dev] PSA: switching default tmpfiles virtual provider

2020-11-26 Thread Thomas Deutschmann
Hi, I don't have any objections regarding the change of the default tmpfiles provider but I would like to classify the vulnerability: On 2020-11-25 22:57, Georgy Yakovlev wrote: In case you don't know, opentmpfiles has an open CVE CVE-2017-18925: root privilege escalation by symlink attack

[gentoo-dev] Dissolving project desktop-misc

2020-11-26 Thread Jonas Stein
Dear all, sorting packages in a group of "misc" packages was not useful. We have to dissolve the project desktop-misc There are some tickets which should be closed first before we reassign the packages to maintainer-needed. It would be good to review if there are packages which have to be

Re: [gentoo-dev] PSA: switching default tmpfiles virtual provider

2020-11-26 Thread Michael Orlitzky
On 11/26/20 10:07 AM, Thomas Deutschmann wrote: > > Only root is allowed to write to these directories. In other words: To > exploit this, a malicious local user (or a remote attacker who already > gained user access) would have to trick root into creating specially > crafted tmpfiles config