On Sat, Jan 6, 2018 at 8:58 AM, Walter Dnes wrote:
>
> I'm running openrc. On my 32-bit install, Intel Core2 duo, I get...
>
> zgrep BPF /proc/config.gz
> CONFIG_BPF=y
> # CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL is not set
> # CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_BPF is not set
> # CONFIG_TEST_BPF is not set
>
> On my 64-bi
On Sat, Jan 06, 2018 at 11:26:43AM +1100, Adam Carter wrote
> >
> > > So, HAVE_EBPF_JIT=y just means that BPF JIT _can_ be done on x86. There
> > > is a separate BPF_JIT setting to actually enable it.
> >
> > Well, that doesn't seem to be present here. Just the HAVE_ symbol.
>
>
> Careful, there
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 7:26 PM, Adam Carter wrote:
>> > So, HAVE_EBPF_JIT=y just means that BPF JIT _can_ be done on x86. There
>> > is a separate BPF_JIT setting to actually enable it.
>>
>> Well, that doesn't seem to be present here. Just the HAVE_ symbol.
>
>
> Careful, there's BPF and EBPF.
>
>
> > So, HAVE_EBPF_JIT=y just means that BPF JIT _can_ be done on x86. There
> > is a separate BPF_JIT setting to actually enable it.
>
> Well, that doesn't seem to be present here. Just the HAVE_ symbol.
Careful, there's BPF and EBPF.
$ zgrep BPF /proc/config.gz
CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF=y
CONFIG_BPF
On Friday, 5 January 2018 18:04:10 GMT Ian Zimmerman wrote:
> On 2018-01-05 11:10, Peter Humphrey wrote:
> > Symbol: HAVE_EBPF_JIT [=y]
> > │
> > │ Type : boolean
> > │ Defined at net/Kconfig:436
> > │ Selected by: X86 [=y] && X86_64 [=y]
> >
> > So it's on, like it or not. This is kernel 4.9
On 2018-01-05 11:10, Peter Humphrey wrote:
> Symbol: HAVE_EBPF_JIT [=y]
>
> │
> │ Type : boolean
> │ Defined at net/Kconfig:436
> │ Selected by: X86 [=y] && X86_64 [=y]
>
On Friday, 5 January 2018 01:18:23 GMT Rich Freeman wrote:
> I believe CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT isn't actually modifiable via make
> config - it is a dependency and I think it is there to indicate
> whether the feature is supported (maybe it is arch-specific, or there
> is some complex rule for it bei
>
> The settings relevant to Spectre are:
> CONFIG_BPF_JIT - this being set to y is enough to make Intel
> processors vulnerable to variant 1/2. This being set to y is
> necessary, but not sufficient, for making AMD vulnerable to variant 1.
> net.core.bpf_jit_enable - this being set to 1 along wit
On Thu, Jan 4, 2018 at 7:51 PM, Adam Carter wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 8:39 AM, Nikos Chantziaras wrote:
>>
>> On 04/01/18 18:18, Rich Freeman wrote:
>>>
>>> For variant 1 the only known vulnerability is BPF which probably
>>> next to nobody uses
>>
>>
>> I had to enable various BPF settings
On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 8:39 AM, Nikos Chantziaras wrote:
> On 04/01/18 18:18, Rich Freeman wrote:
>
>> For variant 1 the only known vulnerability is BPF which probably
>> next to nobody uses
>>
>
> I had to enable various BPF settings in the kernel because systemd
> wouldn't shut up about it. It
On 04/01/18 23:39, Nikos Chantziaras wrote:
On 04/01/18 18:18, Rich Freeman wrote:
For variant 1 the only known vulnerability is BPF which probably
next to nobody uses
I had to enable various BPF settings in the kernel because systemd
wouldn't shut up about it. It prints warning messages duri
On 04/01/18 18:18, Rich Freeman wrote:
For variant 1 the only known vulnerability is BPF which probably
next to nobody uses
I had to enable various BPF settings in the kernel because systemd
wouldn't shut up about it. It prints warning messages during boot that
the system doesn't support BPF.
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