Re: [PATCH v2 19/19] signed push: fortify against replay attacks

2014-09-02 Thread Junio C Hamano
Stefan Beller writes: > On 22.08.2014 22:30, Junio C Hamano wrote: >> @@ -1226,12 +1232,28 @@ static int delete_only(struct command *commands) >> return 1; >> } >> >> +static char *prepare_push_cert_nonce(const char *sitename, const char *dir) >> +{ >> +struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT

Re: [PATCH v2 19/19] signed push: fortify against replay attacks

2014-08-30 Thread Stefan Beller
On 22.08.2014 22:30, Junio C Hamano wrote: > @@ -1226,12 +1232,28 @@ static int delete_only(struct command *commands) > return 1; > } > > +static char *prepare_push_cert_nonce(const char *sitename, const char *dir) > +{ > + struct strbuf buf = STRBUF_INIT; > + unsigned char sha1[20

Re: [PATCH v2 19/19] signed push: fortify against replay attacks

2014-08-23 Thread Eric Sunshine
On Fri, Aug 22, 2014 at 4:30 PM, Junio C Hamano wrote: > In order to prevent a valid push certificate for pushing into an > repository from getting replayed to push to an unrelated one, send a > nonce string from the receive-pack process and have the signer > include it in the push certificate. T

[PATCH v2 19/19] signed push: fortify against replay attacks

2014-08-22 Thread Junio C Hamano
In order to prevent a valid push certificate for pushing into an repository from getting replayed to push to an unrelated one, send a nonce string from the receive-pack process and have the signer include it in the push certificate. The original nonce is exported as GIT_PUSH_CERT_NONCE for the hoo