Gitweb:
http://git.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962
Commit: bbaca6c2e7ef0f663bc31be4dad7cf530f6c4962
Parent: b599fdfdb4bb4941e9076308efcf3bb89e577db5
Author: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
AuthorDate: Wed Feb 14 00:34:16 2007 -0800
Committer: Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
CommitDate: Wed Feb 14 08:10:00 2007 -0800
[PATCH] selinux: enhance selinux to always ignore private inodes
Hmmm...turns out to not be quite enough, as the /proc/sys inodes aren't
truly
private to the fs, so we can run into them in a variety of security hooks
beyond just the inode hooks, such as security_file_permission (when reading
and writing them via the vfs helpers), security_sb_mount (when mounting
other
filesystems on directories in proc like binfmt_misc), and deeper within the
security module itself (as in flush_unauthorized_files upon inheritance
across
execve). So I think we have to add an IS_PRIVATE() guard within SELinux, as
below. Note however that the use of the private flag here could be
confusing,
as these inodes are _not_ private to the fs, are exposed to userspace, and
security modules must implement the sysctl hook to get any access control
over
them.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +++
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b8ede1c..b1ac22d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1077,6 +1077,9 @@ static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
+ if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
+ return 0;
+
tsec = tsk->security;
isec = inode->i_security;
-
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